Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Ms. Rajmonda Mile attended her daughter’s wedding at Kirkbrae Country Club on September 9, 2018, where she allegedly slipped and fell. She filed a lawsuit against Kirkbrae in Providence County Superior Court and requested any photographs or videotapes of the incident. Kirkbrae acknowledged possessing a surveillance video of the incident but claimed it was protected under attorney work product privilege, referencing the case Cabral v. Arruda.The Superior Court denied Ms. Mile’s motion to compel the production of the video, agreeing with Kirkbrae’s assertion that the video was protected under the work product doctrine. Ms. Mile then sought review from the Rhode Island Supreme Court, arguing that the video was actual evidence of the incident and not created in anticipation of litigation.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the video was not protected under the work product privilege because it was recorded by Kirkbrae’s surveillance system at the time of the incident and not at the request of an attorney. The court emphasized that the burden of proving the applicability of the work product privilege lies with the party seeking to withhold the evidence. Since Kirkbrae failed to meet this burden, the trial justice’s denial of the motion to compel was deemed an error.The Rhode Island Supreme Court quashed the Superior Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, instructing the lower court to compel the production of the video. View "Mile v. Kirkbrae Country Club" on Justia Law

Judith Clinton filed a complaint in the Superior Court for Washington County against Chad Babcock, Lisa Nelson, Regina Foster Bartlett, and Caryn Sullivan, alleging defamation and other misconduct that caused her reputational damage, emotional distress, and monetary losses. Clinton later amended her complaint to include Maria DiMaggio and Toastmasters International, adding a breach of contract claim against the latter. The Superior Court allowed Clinton to file a second amended complaint but denied her third and fourth motions to amend.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to enforce a dismissal stipulation and vacated a scheduling order. Clinton, who had been representing herself after unsuccessful attempts to secure new counsel, signed a Stipulated Agreement of Dismissal with all defendants, which was filed on December 13, 2022. Subsequently, the defendants filed a Stipulation of Dismissal on December 27, 2022, without notifying Clinton, who then alleged fraudulent conduct. The trial justice initially vacated the Stipulated Agreement of Dismissal and scheduled a trial date but later reconsidered this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice properly reinstated the Stipulated Agreement of Dismissal, noting that the agreement was binding and could not be set aside without the consent of all parties, absent extraordinary circumstances such as fraud or mutual mistake. The court found no evidence of duress or other factors that would justify vacating the agreement. The Supreme Court also upheld the trial justice's decision to treat the defendants' motions as motions to reconsider, given the lack of proper notice to the defendants at the initial hearing. View "Clinton v. Babcock" on Justia Law

WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. sought to build a natural gas pipeline through McKenzie County, North Dakota. After obtaining a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, WBI attempted to acquire the necessary easements through voluntary sales. When one family refused to sell, WBI filed a federal condemnation action under the Natural Gas Act. After three years of negotiations, the parties agreed on the amount of just compensation for the easement, but the issue of attorney fees remained unresolved.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota ruled that WBI was responsible for the family's attorney fees based on North Dakota law, which allows for such fees in condemnation proceedings. The district court relied on the precedent set by Petersburg School District of Nelson County v. Peterson.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the availability of attorney fees depends on whether state or federal law governs the compensation due. The court concluded that federal law applies because WBI was exercising the federal eminent-domain power delegated under the Natural Gas Act. The court noted that the Fifth Amendment's requirement for just compensation does not include attorney fees unless explicitly provided by statute. The Natural Gas Act does not mention attorney fees, and thus, the default rule under the Fifth Amendment applies. Consequently, the court vacated the district court's award of attorney fees, holding that WBI is not obligated to pay the family's attorney fees. View "WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. v. 189.9 rods in Twsp. 149" on Justia Law

Lisa and Peter Woodward incurred a debt of $2,214.44 for their child's dental care, which was placed with Credit Service International Corporation (CSIC) for collection. CSIC filed a claim in conciliation court, but the Woodwards did not receive notice as the summons was sent to their previous address. CSIC obtained a default judgment and attempted to garnish the Woodwards' wages. The Woodwards hired attorney Kevin Giebel, who filed a lawsuit claiming violations of Minnesota garnishment laws and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). CSIC and Muske removed the case to federal court and offered a judgment of $2,002.00 plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, which the Woodwards accepted.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted the Woodwards' motion for attorney’s fees in part, awarding $12,075.00 out of the $29,139.00 sought. The court used the lodestar method to determine the reasonable fee, concluding that $350 per hour was appropriate and that only 34.5 of the 72.4 hours claimed were reasonable. The Woodwards requested permission to file a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied, stating that the request did not meet the standard for reconsideration and merely reargued previously considered matters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found no merit in the Woodwards' arguments regarding the denial of their initial motion for attorney’s fees, the reduction of the hourly rate, and the number of hours deemed reasonable. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings and that the fee award was appropriate given the circumstances of the case. View "Woodward v. Credit Service Intl. Corp." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Michael Etchegoinberry, Erik Clausen, Barlow Family Farms, L.P., and Christopher Todd Allen, own land in the Westlands Water District, part of the San Luis Unit in California. They alleged that the United States failed to provide necessary drainage for their irrigated lands, leading to a rise in the water table and accumulation of saline groundwater, which they claimed resulted in a taking of their property without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.The United States Court of Federal Claims initially denied the government's motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, agreeing with the plaintiffs that their claim was timely under the stabilization doctrine. This doctrine postpones the accrual of a takings claim until the damage has stabilized and the extent of the damage is reasonably foreseeable. The case was then stayed for nearly seven years for settlement attempts. In 2023, the Court of Federal Claims revisited the issue and dismissed the case sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the stabilization doctrine did not apply and the claim was time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the dismissal. The court held that the stabilization doctrine did not apply because the plaintiffs' claim was based on the regular and known lack of drainage over many years, not an irregular or intermittent physical process. Even if the doctrine applied, the court found that the plaintiffs' claim accrued before the critical date of September 2, 2005, as they were aware of the permanent nature of the damage to their land well before that date. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' claim was time-barred and affirmed the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "ETCHEGOINBERRY v. US " on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Perry Spriggs was struck by a U.S. Postal Service vehicle while riding his bicycle on Calliope Street in New Orleans on March 23, 2022. On March 23, 2023, Spriggs faxed his medical records and a signed Standard Form 95 (SF-95) to the Postal Service, addressed to Tara D. Lennix, a Louisiana District Tort Claims/Collections Specialist, at the correct fax number. Spriggs received a fax confirmation stating successful transmission. On March 22, 2024, Spriggs filed a lawsuit against the United States for personal injury and property damage from the accident.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed Spriggs’s claims with prejudice, granting the United States' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court found no affirmative evidence of receipt of the SF-95 by the Postal Service, relying on declarations from Postal Service employees stating they did not receive the fax. The court also dismissed the claims under Rule 12(b)(6) due to the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations for presentment to the agency.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in disregarding the fax confirmation sheet as probative evidence of presentment under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The Fifth Circuit held that a fax confirmation sheet indicating successful transmission to the correct recipient is probative evidence that the FTCA’s presentment requirement has been satisfied. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Spriggs v. United States" on Justia Law

K.T. filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her ex-partner, E.S., with whom she shares three daughters. K.T. alleged that E.S. had subjected her to physical and sexual abuse over several years, including incidents where the children were present. She also claimed that E.S. had abducted the children from Texas to California without her consent. K.T. sought to include the children as protected parties in the DVRO, citing their exposure to E.S.'s abusive behavior.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted K.T. a temporary restraining order (TRO) against E.S. but did not include the children as protected parties, citing a lack of imminent risk of harm to them. During the hearing on K.T.'s DVRO request, the court reviewed her declaration and testimony, which detailed the abuse and the children's exposure to it. The court granted the DVRO protecting K.T. but did not include the children, stating there was no credible evidence of physical or sexual abuse of the children.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court had used the wrong legal standard by requiring evidence of direct abuse of the children. The appellate court held that the correct standard was "good cause" based on the totality of the circumstances, which includes the children's exposure to domestic violence. The appellate court found that K.T. had provided sufficient evidence of good cause to include the children as protected parties in the DVRO.The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision in part, directing it to modify the DVRO to include the children as protected parties. The court otherwise affirmed the trial court's order and awarded costs to K.T. View "K.T. v. E.S." on Justia Law

Valerie Thomas received a notice claiming she owed $187, which she disputed. Resurgent Capital Services notified TransUnion about the debt before opening Thomas's letter and reported the dispute 29 days later. Thomas sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, seeking statutory damages for the delay. A jury awarded her $250. The clerk delayed entering the judgment, which was eventually entered on June 11, 2024. Resurgent filed a notice of appeal four days earlier, narrowly avoiding missing the appeal deadline.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois concluded that Resurgent should have notified TransUnion earlier. Resurgent appealed, arguing that Thomas lacked standing because the delay did not injure her. District Judge Bucklo initially ruled that Thomas was injured as a matter of law, referencing Ewing v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, which treated the absence of a dispute notice as defamation. However, the court noted that injury must be proven and not assumed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It found that Thomas did not provide evidence of injury before or during the trial. She did not attempt to show that her credit score or insurance costs were affected by the delay. Judge Bucklo had precluded Thomas from introducing evidence of actual injury, and Thomas did not challenge this ruling or seek a new trial. The appellate court held that Thomas lacked standing to sue due to the absence of evidence showing injury. Consequently, the judgment of the district court was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of a justiciable controversy. View "Thomas v LVNV Funding, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Mary C. Sutphin, filed a complaint alleging statutory violations of the Uniform Trust Code and breaches of fiduciary duties against several defendants, including A. David Abrams and others. The complaint was amended twice, with the second amended complaint containing sixteen counts related to the management of Lewis Chevrolet and interference with the plaintiff’s inheritance. During discovery, the plaintiff received over ten thousand documents, which led to the filing of the second amended complaint. The defendants sought detailed information about the factual basis of the plaintiff’s allegations through interrogatories, but the plaintiff’s responses were deemed insufficient, leading to a motion to compel and subsequent orders for the plaintiff to supplement her responses.The Circuit Court of Raleigh County referred the discovery disputes to a discovery commissioner, who recommended that the plaintiff supplement her responses with specific references to the complaint and discovery materials. The plaintiff complied, but the defendants were still unsatisfied and sought to depose the plaintiff’s counsel, arguing that the plaintiff had relied on her counsel for the factual basis of her claims. The discovery commissioner denied the motion to compel the deposition of the plaintiff’s counsel, applying the Shelton test, which requires showing that no other means exist to obtain the information, the information is relevant and non-privileged, and the information is crucial to the case. The circuit court partially rejected the discovery commissioner’s decision and ordered the deposition of the plaintiff’s counsel.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court committed a clear error of law by not properly applying the Shelton test. The court held that the information sought could be obtained from other sources and that the deposition would invade the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. Consequently, the court granted the writ of prohibition, preventing the deposition of the plaintiff’s counsel. View "State ex rel. Sutphin v. Poling" on Justia Law

Danny Webb and Danny Webb Construction Company, Inc. (Webb petitioners) appealed a Fayette County Circuit Court order that set aside a jury verdict in their favor and awarded North Hills Group, Inc. (North Hills) a new trial. North Hills had claimed that Webb petitioners contaminated their property by injecting fracking waste into a well on North Hills' land. Webb petitioners argued that the circuit court erred because sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict and because the parties' lease agreement precluded North Hills' claim for unjust enrichment.The Circuit Court of Fayette County had previously found that Webb petitioners breached their lease agreement with North Hills by injecting unauthorized substances into the well. The court set aside the jury's verdict, finding it contrary to the clear weight of the evidence and granting North Hills a new trial. Webb petitioners appealed, arguing that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence and that the lease agreement barred the unjust enrichment claim.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court abused its discretion. The court held that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, including testimony that the substances found on North Hills' property did not exceed health-based standards. The court also held that the lease agreement precluded North Hills' unjust enrichment claim because it governed Webb Construction's injection activities. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the jury's verdict in favor of Webb petitioners and to enter judgment in accordance with the verdict. View "Danny Webb Construction Company, Inc. v. North Hills Group, Inc." on Justia Law