Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A client sued its lawyer for legal malpractice after losing a case. The client had previously been sued for fraud and lost, resulting in a significant judgment against it. The client then assigned its malpractice claim against its lawyer to the opposing party in the fraud case, hoping to share in any recovery. However, the court had previously held that such assignments are generally not allowed because they can lead to a reversal of positions that is demeaning to the justice system.In the lower courts, the trial court found the lawyer negligent but not grossly negligent, and the jury awarded damages to the client. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that the client could pursue its own malpractice claim but reversed the directed verdict on gross negligence, remanding the case for a new trial. In the second trial, the jury again found the lawyer negligent and grossly negligent, awarding significant damages. The court of appeals reversed the judgment due to an improper jury instruction and remanded for a third trial.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the client could pursue its own malpractice claim despite the arrangement with the opposing party. The court found that while there was evidence of the lawyer's negligence, the evidence that the lawyer's negligence was the sole cause of the fraud judgment was conclusory. The court also held that there was no evidence of gross negligence. Therefore, the court affirmed the remand for a new trial on negligence but reversed the judgment on gross negligence, rendering a take-nothing judgment on that claim. View "HENRY S. MILLER COMMERCIAL COMPANY v. NEWSOM, TERRY & NEWSOM, LLP" on Justia Law

Clint Edwards, a pretrial detainee in a Westchester County Department of Corrections (WCDOC) jail, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Edwards claimed that Correction Officer Christopher Arocho failed to protect him and incited other inmates to attack him. He also alleged that several WCDOC officials subjected him to unsanitary and unhealthy conditions in administrative segregation and that his placement in administrative segregation without notice or a hearing violated his procedural due process rights.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Edwards’s conditions of confinement and procedural due process claims for failure to state a claim. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Arocho on the failure to protect claim, determining that Edwards had not exhausted his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Edwards had adequately stated claims for conditions of confinement and procedural due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also found that Edwards raised a factual dispute regarding whether he exhausted his administrative remedies, which precluded summary judgment on the failure to protect claim. The court vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Edwards v. Arocho" on Justia Law

LegalForce RAPC Worldwide, P.C. ("LegalForce USA"), a California S corporation operating legal services websites, sued LegalForce, Inc. ("LegalForce Japan"), a Japanese corporation providing legal software services, for trademark infringement. LegalForce USA alleged that LegalForce Japan's U.S. expansion plans, website ownership, and advertising and selling of equity infringed its trademark. The district court dismissed the website claims for lack of jurisdiction and the expansion plan claims as unripe. The claims concerning equity were dismissed for failure to state a claim.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed all claims except those related to the advertising and selling of equity. The court held that it had jurisdiction over these claims but dismissed them for failure to state a claim, reasoning that advertising and selling equity is not connected to the sale of goods or services and thus cannot constitute trademark infringement. The court also found that LegalForce USA failed to justify an extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that using a trademark in connection with the sale of equity does not constitute using the mark in connection with "goods or services" under the Lanham Act. The court also affirmed that LegalForce Japan's services in Japan could not satisfy the "in connection with" goods or services requirement under the Lanham Act, as the relevant conduct occurred outside U.S. territory. The court concluded that the Lanham Act does not apply extraterritorially in this context. View "LEGALFORCE RAPC WORLDWIDE, PC V. LEGALFORCE, INC." on Justia Law

POM of Kansas, LLC, owns and distributes Dragon's Ascent, an arcade game where players shoot dragons for prizes redeemable for cash. Concerned about the game's legality under Kansas law, POM sought approval from state agencies, which declined to provide a formal opinion. POM proceeded with the game's launch and filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Kansas Expanded Lottery Act does not apply to Dragon's Ascent, that the game complies with Kansas' criminal gambling statutes, and that those statutes are unconstitutionally vague.The Shawnee District Court dismissed the claims against the Kansas Racing and Gaming Commission and the Douglas County District Attorney, ruling that no real controversy existed as neither had investigated the game nor threatened prosecution. The court retained the Kansas Attorney General in the case due to the constitutional challenges raised. The district court later dismissed POM's claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and ruled against the constitutional challenges on the merits.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on the issue of standing. The court held that POM lacked standing to seek a declaratory judgment about the Kansas Expanded Lottery Act because no defendant suggested the Act applied to Dragon's Ascent. The court also found that POM lacked standing to seek a declaration that Dragon's Ascent is lawful under Kansas criminal gambling statutes, as there was no credible threat of prosecution or seizure of the devices. Finally, the court concluded that POM lacked standing to raise a constitutional vagueness challenge to the gambling statutes, as there was no credible threat of prosecution.The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of POM's claims regarding the Expanded Lottery Act and the legality of Dragon's Ascent, vacated the ruling on the constitutional vagueness challenge, and remanded the matter for dismissal. View "POM of Kansas v. Kobach" on Justia Law

Andrew J. Winterbottom, a veteran, was awarded a 30% disability rating for his service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which was later increased to 50%. He appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals seeking a higher rating. During a Board hearing in June 2021, the judge questioned Winterbottom about specific violent episodes, which he later claimed demonstrated judicial bias. In May 2022, the Board denied a higher rating, concluding that his violent behavior was not unprovoked.Winterbottom appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision and exhibited bias. The Veterans Court partially agreed, remanding the case because the Board did not adequately explain why it gave less weight to a private counselor's opinion. However, the court found no bias warranting reassignment, stating the judge's questions aimed to determine if the violent conduct was provoked.Winterbottom then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal, stating it lacked jurisdiction to review non-final orders from the Veterans Court. The court noted that exceptions to the finality requirement, as outlined in Williams v. Principi, did not apply to Winterbottom's case. The court also declined to create a new exception for judicial bias claims, suggesting that such claims should be raised through a mandamus petition or after a final judgment. Thus, the appeal was dismissed. View "WINTERBOTTOM v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

Steven M. Camburn, a former sales specialist for Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) and equivalent state and municipal laws. Camburn alleged that Novartis violated the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) by offering remuneration to physicians to induce them to prescribe its drug Gilenya, which treats multiple sclerosis. He claimed that Novartis used its peer-to-peer speaker program and other forms of illicit remuneration to influence physicians' prescribing practices.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Camburn's Third Amended Complaint (TAC) with prejudice, concluding that he had not pleaded his allegations with the particularity required under Rule 9(b) to support a strong inference of an AKS-based FCA violation. The court found that Camburn's allegations did not adequately demonstrate the existence of a kickback scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that a plaintiff states an AKS violation if they allege with particularity that at least one purpose of the purported scheme was to induce fraudulent conduct. The court found that Camburn had adequately pleaded certain categories of factual allegations that gave rise to a strong inference of an AKS violation. Specifically, Camburn sufficiently alleged that Novartis held sham speaker events with no legitimate attendees, excessively compensated physician speakers for canceled events, and selected and retained speakers to incentivize prescription-writing.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal in part but vacated the judgment and remanded the case in part. The court instructed the district court to evaluate whether Camburn had stated all the elements of an FCA claim with respect to the adequately pleaded AKS violations and to assess the adequacy of Camburn's claims under state and municipal law. View "Camburn v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a complaint in the Land Court regarding a property in Duxbury, claiming ownership following a foreclosure sale. The defendants, who had executed a mortgage in favor of the plaintiff's predecessor, refused to vacate the property. The Land Court judge ruled in favor of the plaintiff, declaring them the lawful owner. The defendants appealed this decision.Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a summary process complaint in the Housing Court to gain possession of the property and requested use and occupancy payments from the defendants during the litigation. The Housing Court judge granted this request but stayed the proceedings pending the appeal of the Land Court judgment. The defendants sought interlocutory relief from a single justice of the Appeals Court, who vacated the Housing Court's order, stating that the Housing Court judge had not determined ownership.The plaintiff renewed their motion in the Housing Court, which was again granted, with the judge explicitly relying on the Land Court's judgment under the doctrine of res judicata. The defendants again sought relief from the single justice, who vacated the order, arguing that the Housing Court judge's reliance on the appealed Land Court judgment was improper. The plaintiff was granted leave to appeal to a full panel of the Appeals Court, and the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case on its own motion.The Supreme Judicial Court held that a judge hearing a summary process action for possession may rely on a final judgment of the Land Court regarding ownership, even if an appeal is pending. The court confirmed that the Land Court's judgment had preclusive effect, allowing the Housing Court judge to order interim use and occupancy payments. The order of the single justice was reversed, and the defendants' petition for relief was denied. View "TJR Services LLC v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law

Dr. Judith Robinson, a former employee of HealthNet, a federally qualified health center in Indiana, brought a qui tam action against HealthNet, alleging fraudulent billing practices, including improper Medicaid billing for ultrasound readings. She claimed that HealthNet billed Medicaid for face-to-face encounters that did not occur. Dr. Robinson initially filed a suit in 2013 (Robinson I), which was settled in 2017, excluding the wrap-around claims. These claims were dismissed without prejudice, allowing for future litigation.In 2019, Dr. Robinson filed a new suit (Robinson II) to address the wrap-around claims. The United States declined to intervene, but Indiana did. Indiana moved to dismiss all claims except for the wrap-around claims from October 18, 2013, to February 28, 2015, as the rest were time-barred. The district court dismissed Count III of Dr. Robinson's complaint, which sought to enforce an alleged oral settlement agreement, due to lack of standing, as Dr. Robinson failed to provide competent proof of the agreement's existence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Count III, agreeing that Dr. Robinson lacked standing because she did not demonstrate any breach of the alleged oral agreement by HealthNet. The court also upheld the district court's approval of the settlement between Indiana and HealthNet, finding it fair, adequate, and reasonable. The court noted that the reduction in the relator’s share was due to Dr. Robinson's own actions, including the failure to obtain a tolling agreement, which led to many claims being time-barred. The court also agreed with the application of the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) in calculating the settlement amount. View "Robinson v. Healthnet, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2017, Samantha Braun was rear-ended by Radena Wollman in a car accident. Wollman admitted fault, and the case proceeded to a jury trial to determine damages. Braun claimed various injuries, including a traumatic brain injury, and sought significant damages. During the trial, the circuit court admitted several of Braun's medical records over her objections, citing the business records hearsay exception. The jury awarded Braun $125,000, which was significantly less than she requested. Braun appealed, arguing that the admission of her medical records was an abuse of discretion and prejudiced her right to a fair trial.The Circuit Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit admitted the medical records, finding sufficient foundation and applying the business records hearsay exception. Braun objected, arguing lack of foundation and hearsay. The court overruled most of her objections and admitted the records. The jury awarded Braun $125,000 in damages, which she appealed, claiming the court's admission of the records was erroneous and prejudicial.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and found that the circuit court erred in admitting the medical records under the business records exception without proper foundation. However, the court determined that Braun's statements in the records were admissible as non-hearsay, and some statements were admissible under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception. Despite the errors, the court concluded that Braun did not demonstrate substantial prejudice affecting the jury's verdict. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, upholding the $125,000 damages award. View "Braun v. Wollman" on Justia Law

CKY, Inc. entered into a fixed-price construction contract with the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) in October 2012. CKY encountered unexpected conditions, including heavy rainfall and undisclosed culverts, which led to additional expenses. CKY sought compensation for these expenses, but the Corps denied the requests. CKY then filed a claim under the Contract Disputes Act, seeking $1,146,226 for the additional costs incurred. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (Board) ruled in favor of CKY regarding the undisclosed culverts but denied compensation for other claims.The Board awarded CKY $185,000 plus interest for the expenses related to the undisclosed culverts. CKY then applied for attorney’s fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The Board granted the application, concluding that the government’s position regarding the undisclosed culverts was not substantially justified. The Board limited its substantial-justification inquiry to the government’s litigation position on the specific claim where CKY prevailed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Board erred by categorically narrowing its substantial-justification inquiry to the government’s litigation position and to the specific claim on which CKY prevailed. The court emphasized that the substantial-justification inquiry should consider both the agency’s pre-litigation conduct and its litigation position, and should treat the case as an inclusive whole rather than focusing on individual claims. The court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration without the categorical limitations previously applied. View "In Re SECRETARY OF THE ARMY " on Justia Law