Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this case, a condominium unit was sold at a foreclosure sale in 2014 to Tyroshi Investments after the original owner defaulted on both her mortgage and condominium assessments. The condominium association conducted the sale, and Tyroshi subsequently rented out the unit. In 2015, the mortgage and deed of trust were transferred to U.S. Bank, which then initiated its own judicial foreclosure and purchased the unit at a second sale in 2016. Both Tyroshi and U.S. Bank recorded their deeds at different times, and for a period, Tyroshi’s tenants continued to occupy the unit while U.S. Bank paid taxes and assessments. In 2020, Tyroshi was denied access to the unit, leading to litigation over rightful ownership.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a bench trial and determined that U.S. Bank’s claims to quiet title and invalidate the 2014 foreclosure sale were timely, applying a fifteen-year statute of limitations for actions “for the recovery of lands” under D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(1). The court declared the 2014 sale invalid and found U.S. Bank to be the legal owner. Tyroshi appealed, arguing that the claims were untimely.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the fifteen-year limitations period applies only to possessory actions, such as ejectment or adverse possession, not to claims like wrongful foreclosure or breach of contract, which are subject to shorter limitations periods. The court found that U.S. Bank’s claims were time-barred, except for a portion of its unjust enrichment claim related to payments made within three years of the suit. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of the unjust enrichment claim. View "Tyroshi Investments, LLC v. U.S. Bank, NA, Successor Trustee to LaSalle Bank NA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit against eleven defendants, alleging a scheme involving breach of employment agreements, misappropriation of funds, embezzlement, and fraud. The suit was originally filed in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, Mississippi. Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, citing diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs sought to remand the case to state court, relying on a provision in three defendants’ contracts that specified venue in Harrison County, Mississippi, and included language about consent to personal jurisdiction and venue solely within those forums, along with a waiver of objections to those forums.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi interpreted the contractual provision as a waiver of the defendants’ right to remove the case to federal court. The district court reasoned that the provision gave the first-filing party the sole right to choose the court, and that by waiving objections to venue and personal jurisdiction, the defendants had also waived their removal rights. Consequently, the district court remanded the case to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the contractual waiver de novo, applying Mississippi law. The Fifth Circuit held that the contract provision did not constitute a clear and unequivocal waiver of the defendants’ right to remove the case to federal court. The court found that the language regarding venue and jurisdiction could reasonably refer to geographic location and did not explicitly or implicitly waive removal rights, especially since the contract contemplated litigation in both state and federal courts in Harrison County. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s remand order. View "Gulf Coast Pharmaceuticals Plus, L.L.C. v. RFT Consulting" on Justia Law

The founder and former CEO of a national pizza company brought suit against a public relations firm that had previously provided services to the company. The dispute arose after the plaintiff alleged that the firm leaked confidential and damaging information about him to the press, in violation of a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) that included an arbitration clause. The NDA was executed after the company requested the firm sign it, anticipating close work with the plaintiff during a period of reputational crisis. The relationship between the parties deteriorated following a conference call in which the plaintiff made controversial remarks, which were later reported in the media, leading to his resignation from the company’s board.The case was initially filed in state court and then removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. Over several years, the litigation involved multiple amended complaints, extensive discovery, and dispositive motions. The defendant did not move to compel arbitration until after the district court denied summary judgment on the NDA claim. The district court held a bench trial and found that the NDA was enforceable and contained a binding arbitration provision. However, the court concluded that the defendant had defaulted on its right to arbitrate by actively litigating the case for years before seeking arbitration, and thus denied the motion to compel arbitration.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s contract formation ruling but had jurisdiction to review the default determination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the defendant defaulted on its arbitration rights by seeking a merits resolution in court before moving to compel arbitration. The court dismissed the appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction, otherwise affirmed the district court’s judgment, and denied the plaintiff’s request for sanctions. View "Schnatter v. 247 Group, LLC" on Justia Law

A law firm serving on the Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee in multidistrict litigation related to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks was found to have deliberately leaked a confidential deposition transcript to a reporter, violating two court-issued protective orders. The firm, Kreindler & Kreindler LLP, had previously received a warning for a similar breach. After the leak, the firm conducted an internal investigation but failed to question the individual responsible. When the breach was investigated by the court, the firm initially denied responsibility and submitted deficient declarations before ultimately admitting the leak.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, after a two-day evidentiary hearing before a Magistrate Judge, found that the firm had willfully violated the protective orders and misled the court. The court imposed sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b), including removal of the firm from the Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee, an order to pay attorney’s fees, and a bar on receiving certain funds. The District Judge affirmed these sanctions. The firm’s petition for a writ of mandamus to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was denied, after which the firm filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the sanctions order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a Rule 37(b) sanctions order against attorneys for discovery violations is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The court reasoned that such orders are effectively reviewable after final judgment and do not resolve important issues separate from the merits of the underlying litigation. Accordingly, the Second Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "In re: Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001" on Justia Law

A woman was injured when a heat lamp manufactured by a company made contact with her foot during an acupuncture session performed by a physician. She initially sued the physician and his employer for medical malpractice. The physician then filed a third-party complaint against the manufacturer, alleging product liability. The injured woman subsequently filed a direct product liability claim against the manufacturer. The manufacturer raised special defenses, asserting that both the woman and the physician bore comparative responsibility for her injuries and that, if found liable, it would be entitled to contribution from the physician. Before trial concluded, the physician withdrew his third-party complaint. The jury found the manufacturer 80 percent responsible and the physician 20 percent responsible for the woman’s damages.After judgment was rendered, the Connecticut Appellate Court reversed the judgment as to the medical malpractice claim against the physician for lack of personal jurisdiction but affirmed the product liability judgment, including the jury’s allocation of comparative responsibility. The Connecticut Supreme Court denied the manufacturer’s petition for certification to appeal, and the woman withdrew her appeals after receiving payment in satisfaction of the judgment.The manufacturer and its insurer then filed a contribution action against the physician, seeking to recover 20 percent of the amount paid to the injured woman. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer and its insurer. On appeal, the physician argued that he was not a party subject to the comparative responsibility provisions of the Connecticut Product Liability Act and that the contribution action was untimely.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that all defendants in an action involving a product liability claim, regardless of whether they are product sellers, are subject to comparative responsibility under the statute. The Court also held that a contribution action is timely if brought within one year after all appellate proceedings in the underlying action are final. The judgment in favor of the manufacturer and its insurer was affirmed. View "Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang" on Justia Law

Three individuals, including the appellant, formed a limited liability company (LLC) to design and sell firearms products, later adding two more members to a second LLC. The first LLC did not have a formal operating agreement, while the second adopted one in early 2019, setting a low company valuation. The appellant’s behavior became erratic and disruptive, leading to accusations against a key business partner and other members, which damaged business relationships and led to the loss of significant contracts. The remaining members of both LLCs unanimously voted to dissociate the appellant, citing his conduct as making it unlawful to continue business with him. The appellant disputed the validity of the operating agreement in the second LLC and challenged the valuation of his interests in both companies, also alleging wrongful dissociation, defamation, and conversion of property.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The court found the appellant was properly dissociated from the first LLC under Montana’s Limited Liability Company Act due to the unanimous vote and the unlawfulness of continuing business with him. It also held that the second LLC’s operating agreement was valid and permitted dissociation by unanimous vote. The court valued the appellant’s interests according to the operating agreement for the second LLC and based on company assets for the first LLC. The court denied the appellant’s motion to extend expert disclosure deadlines and partially denied his motion to compel discovery. It also granted summary judgment to the defendants on the conversion claim, finding no evidence of unauthorized control over the appellant’s property.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court’s rulings on dissociation and valuation regarding the second LLC, as well as the summary judgment on the conversion claim. However, it reversed the valuation of the appellant’s interest in the first LLC, holding that the district court erred by failing to consider the company’s “going concern” value as required by statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "Herbert v. Shield Arms" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over the ownership of real property located at 829 Yale Street in Houston, Texas. In 2019, Nicholas Fugedi, acting as trustee for the Carb Pura Vida Trust, initiated a quiet title action against several defendants. The central issue became whether the trust, and specifically Fugedi’s appointment as trustee, was used as a device to create diversity jurisdiction in federal court, given that Fugedi was a citizen of Michigan while the underlying parties were Texas residents.Initially, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas ruled against Fugedi, finding the deed void under Texas law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed that decision but noted that the district court could consider new evidence on remand regarding whether the trust was a sham created to manufacture diversity jurisdiction. On remand, the district court found that Fugedi had been appointed as a sham trustee solely to create diversity jurisdiction, and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1359.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo, and its factual findings for clear error. The Fifth Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 1359 applies to trusts and that a trust can be used as a device to improperly manufacture diversity jurisdiction. The court found no clear error in the district court’s factual findings that Fugedi was appointed as a sham trustee for the purpose of creating federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Fugedi v. Initram" on Justia Law

A group consisting of a local chapter of a national organization and two individuals challenged certain rules governing public comment at Wilson County Board of Education meetings in Tennessee. The Board’s policies required speakers to disclose their names and addresses, limited comments to certain topics, and included a restriction on “abusive” comments as read by the Chair at meetings. The plaintiffs alleged that these rules deterred them from fully expressing their views, particularly regarding controversial school policies, and that they feared enforcement of the address-disclosure and abusive-comments rules. One plaintiff was stopped from speaking at a meeting for refusing to provide her address.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, seeking to enjoin enforcement of three rules: the public-interest provision, the address-disclosure requirement, and the abusive-comments restriction. After the suit was filed, the Board removed the address-disclosure and abusive-comments rules from its policies and meeting materials. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding they had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits regarding the public-interest provision, nor a likelihood of imminent and irreparable harm from the other two rules, since they had been rescinded.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the public-interest provision because they had not shown a credible threat of its enforcement. As to the address-disclosure and abusive-comments rules, the court found that, because the Board had rescinded these rules and committed not to reinstate them during the litigation, the plaintiffs could not show a likelihood of imminent and irreparable harm necessary for preliminary injunctive relief. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Moms For Liberty - Wilson County, Tenn. v. Wilson Cnty. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

A patent owner brought two infringement lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against a semiconductor company, alleging that certain integrated circuit products infringed three patents related to electronic circuitry and power-saving features. The accused products included specific chips that allegedly implemented a particular feature. After the lawsuits were filed, the defendant challenged the cases on grounds including improper service, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. During the litigation, the plaintiff produced a licensing agreement with a third party, and subsequently entered into another agreement covering the accused products. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed both cases without prejudice.Following the dismissals, the defendant moved for attorneys’ fees, costs, and sanctions, arguing that the lawsuits were baseless. The district court denied the defendant’s motions for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, costs under Rule 54(d)(1), and sanctions under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, but converted the voluntary dismissals to dismissals with prejudice as a sanction. The court also denied the defendant’s discovery requests related to confidentiality and access to certain materials.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in denying fees under § 285 and costs under Rule 54(d)(1), because the defendant became a prevailing party when the dismissals were converted to dismissals with prejudice. The Federal Circuit vacated those portions of the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of Rule 11 sanctions and fees under § 1927, finding no abuse of discretion. It also affirmed the denial of the remaining discovery request, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the protective order. The judgment was thus vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. View "FUTURE LINK SYSTEMS, LLC v. REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION " on Justia Law

A plaintiff alleged that, between 1965 and 1969, while he was a young child attending an elementary school in a California school district, he was repeatedly sexually assaulted by the school’s principal. The complaint stated that school staff and faculty were aware or suspected the abuse, and that similar abuse occurred to other students. The plaintiff claimed ongoing psychological and emotional harm as a result. He brought four negligence-based causes of action against the school district, asserting that he was not required to present a government tort claim before filing suit due to statutory changes exempting such claims.The Superior Court of Merced County sustained the school district’s demurrer without leave to amend, dismissing the complaint. The court found that the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement was fatal to his case, and concluded that legislative changes extending the statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault did not alter the deadline for filing a claim against a public entity.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed whether Assembly Bill No. 218’s retroactive waiver of the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement for claims under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 violated the California Constitution’s gift clause. The appellate court held that the retroactive waiver did not create a new liability or cause of action, but merely removed a procedural barrier to suit. The court further found that the legislative purpose of aiding victims of childhood sexual assault served a valid public purpose and did not constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds. The judgment of dismissal was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe R.L. v. Merced City School District" on Justia Law