Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Several plaintiffs, including an individual, an investment fund, and a limited partnership, engaged in trading derivatives tied to the Sterling London Interbank Offered Rate (Sterling LIBOR). They alleged that a group of major banks conspired to manipulate Sterling LIBOR for their own trading advantage. The plaintiffs claimed that the banks coordinated false submissions to the rate-setting process, sometimes inflating and sometimes deflating the benchmark, which in turn affected the value of Sterling LIBOR-based derivatives. The plaintiffs asserted that this manipulation was orchestrated through internal and external communications among banks and with the help of inter-dealer brokers.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the case and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Sherman Act and the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). The district court found that two plaintiffs lacked antitrust standing because they were not “efficient enforcers” and had not transacted directly with the defendants, resulting in only indirect and remote damages. The court also determined that the third plaintiff, a limited partnership, lacked the capacity to sue and had not properly assigned its claims to a substitute entity. Additionally, the court found that one plaintiff failed to adequately plead specific intent for the CEA claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, but on a narrower ground. The Second Circuit held that none of the plaintiffs plausibly alleged actual injury under either the Sherman Act or the CEA. The court explained that because the alleged manipulation was multidirectional—sometimes raising and sometimes lowering Sterling LIBOR—the plaintiffs did not show that they suffered net harm as a result of the defendants’ conduct. Without specific allegations of transactions where they were harmed by the manipulation, the plaintiffs’ claims could not proceed. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed, and the cross-appeal was dismissed as moot. View "Sonterra Cap. Master Fund, Ltd. v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

A group of neighbors opposed the development of a public sports park on a 65-acre parcel in Maui. The State Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) sought and received a special use permit from the County of Maui Planning Commission to build the park. Several future members of the neighbors’ group, Maui Lani Neighbors, Inc. (MLN), received notice of the permit hearing, attended, and some testified, but none formally intervened in the proceedings. After the permit was granted, one future MLN member filed an administrative appeal but later dismissed it. MLN was then incorporated and filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, challenging the permit on zoning, environmental, constitutional, and procedural grounds.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit dismissed most of MLN’s claims, holding that they should have been brought as an administrative appeal of the Planning Commission’s decision under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 91-14, and that MLN failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, but with different reasoning on some points. The ICA held that the administrative process provided an exclusive remedy for most claims, but allowed that some environmental claims under HRS chapter 343 (the Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Act, or HEPA) could proceed in circuit court if they did not seek to invalidate the permit.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i affirmed the ICA’s judgment in most respects, but clarified that MLN’s claims under HRS chapter 343 were not subject to the exhaustion doctrine and could be brought directly in circuit court. The court held that, except for HEPA claims, MLN was required to challenge the permit through an administrative appeal, and that the declaratory judgment statute (HRS § 632-1) did not provide an alternative route. The court remanded the case to the circuit court to consider the HEPA-based claims. View "Maui Lani Neighbors v. State" on Justia Law

A citizen of Mexico, who had been a lawful permanent resident in the United States since 1982, was convicted twice for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon—first in 2011 for shooting his ex-wife and again in 2018 for assaulting a roommate with a knife. These felony convictions led the Department of Homeland Security to initiate removal proceedings against him under Section 237(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which concerns firearm offenses. An immigration judge ordered his removal after he completed his sentences, finding him ineligible for relief due to his convictions.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the removal order in 2020. The individual’s first petition for review to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was dismissed as untimely. In 2022, he filed his first motion to reopen or reconsider with the BIA, arguing that a Supreme Court decision, Borden v. United States, changed the legal landscape regarding his removability. The BIA denied this motion, finding Borden inapplicable because his removal was based on a firearm offense, not an aggravated felony, and that the motion was untimely. In 2024, he filed a second motion to reopen, again citing Borden and seeking equitable tolling of both the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen. The BIA denied this second motion, holding that the statutory limit of one motion to reopen applied and that equitable tolling did not extend to the numerical bar.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial. The court held that the statutory “number bar” in the INA, which generally allows only one motion to reopen, is not subject to equitable tolling. The court dismissed the petition in part and denied it in part, concluding that the BIA did not err in refusing to reopen the removal proceedings. View "Garcia Morin v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Several borrowers executed mortgage agreements with a lender, granting the lender a lien on their respective properties in Hawai‘i. Between 2008 and 2009, the borrowers defaulted on their mortgage loans, and the lender foreclosed on the properties through nonjudicial foreclosure sales. The lender was the winning bidder at each sale and subsequently conveyed the properties to third parties. In 2019, the borrowers filed suit, alleging wrongful foreclosure, unfair or deceptive acts and practices (UDAP), and sought quiet title and ejectment against the current titleholders. They requested both monetary damages and the return of title and possession of the properties.The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of the lender and the titleholders. The court found that the borrowers could not establish compensatory damages because their outstanding mortgage debts at the time of foreclosure exceeded any damages they claimed, even when accounting for loss of use and other asserted losses. The court also determined that the borrowers’ quiet title and ejectment claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the titleholders were bona fide purchasers. The borrowers appealed, and the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i accepted transfer of the case.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i affirmed the circuit court’s summary judgment. The court held that, under its precedents, borrowers must establish compensatory damages after accounting for their mortgage debts to survive summary judgment on wrongful foreclosure and UDAP claims. Here, the borrowers’ debts exceeded their claimed damages. The court further held that claims for return of title and possession are subject to a six-year statute of limitations for wrongful foreclosure actions, which barred the borrowers’ claims. Additionally, the court concluded that the titleholders were bona fide purchasers, as the foreclosure affidavits did not provide constructive notice of any defects. View "McCullough v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including a medical practice, individual physicians, a medical society, and two patients, brought various claims against a health insurer, alleging that the insurer interfered with doctor-patient relationships, denied or delayed coverage for medical services, and caused significant harm to patients. The claims included tortious interference with contractual rights, unfair competition, RICO violations, and emotional distress, with specific factual allegations that the insurer’s actions led to worsened medical outcomes for the patients involved.The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit reviewed the insurer’s motion to compel arbitration based on arbitration clauses in provider agreements and member handbooks. Instead of determining whether the claims were subject to arbitration, the circuit court focused on the alleged unconscionability of the contracts as a whole, finding them to be contracts of adhesion and unconscionable, and denied the motion to compel arbitration. The court also denied summary judgment as to one patient’s claims and did not stay the medical society’s claims pending arbitration.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that the circuit court erred by not following the required analytical framework for arbitrability. The Supreme Court vacated the lower court’s order in part, holding that claims arising under the Participating Physician Agreement must be referred to arbitration because the agreement delegated the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Claims under the Medicare and QUEST Agreements were also subject to arbitration, as the arbitration clauses were not shown to be substantively unconscionable. However, the Court held that the claims of one patient and the physician as a patient were not subject to mandatory arbitration, and another patient’s claims were not subject to a grievance and appeals clause. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Frederick A. Nitta, M.D., Inc. v. Hawaii Medical Service Association." on Justia Law

A Georgia corporation operates several hospitals and clinics in west Georgia and, through an affiliated entity, also operates a small hospital and clinics in east Alabama. An Alabama resident sought treatment at the Alabama hospital and was subsequently transferred by ambulance to the corporation’s Georgia facility for a heart-catheterization procedure. The procedure was performed by a Georgia-based physician employed by the corporation, who is not licensed in Alabama and has never practiced there. The patient alleges that the physician’s negligence during the procedure in Georgia caused him to suffer renal failure and require further medical intervention. The patient sued both the corporation and the physician in the Randolph Circuit Court in Alabama, asserting claims under both Alabama and Georgia medical liability statutes and alleging the corporation’s vicarious liability for the physician’s actions.The physician and the corporation moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Alabama court lacked personal jurisdiction over them and that venue was improper. The circuit court dismissed the claims against the physician for lack of personal jurisdiction but denied the corporation’s motion to dismiss. The corporation then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss the claims against it.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the corporation was not subject to general jurisdiction in Alabama, as it was neither incorporated nor had its principal place of business there. However, the Court found that specific personal jurisdiction existed because the patient’s treatment began at the Alabama facility operated by the corporation, and the subsequent care in Georgia was sufficiently related to the corporation’s activities in Alabama. The Court also concluded that the corporation had not demonstrated a clear legal right to dismissal based on improper venue, as it had not adequately addressed whether Alabama’s venue statute applied to claims brought under another state’s law. The petition for a writ of mandamus was denied. View "Ex parte Tanner Medical Center, Inc." on Justia Law

After the death of Arthur L. Bacon, Richard D. Gaynor, acting as the personal representative of Bacon’s estate, filed a lawsuit against Tom L. Larkin and Jerome B. Williams. The complaint alleged that a durable power of attorney in favor of Larkin was recorded shortly after Bacon’s death, though it was purportedly executed in 2019. It further claimed that, just hours before Bacon died, Larkin executed a deed transferring all of Bacon’s real property to Williams. The estate sought to void the conveyance and requested damages.Williams and Larkin each filed motions to dismiss. The Talladega Circuit Court granted Larkin’s motion to dismiss on March 3, 2025, but did not resolve the claims against Williams. On the same day, the court ordered the plaintiff to amend the complaint within 30 days to include necessary heirs or real parties in interest. Gaynor requested more time to respond, which both defendants opposed. On April 11, 2025, Gaynor filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama, challenging the dismissal of Larkin. Subsequently, the circuit court entered an order stating that the dismissal of Larkin was a final order for purposes of appeal, referencing Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed whether it had jurisdiction over the appeal. The Court held that, because the circuit court’s order did not dispose of all claims against all parties and lacked a proper Rule 54(b) certification at the time the notice of appeal was filed, there was no final judgment. The Court declined to remand for possible certification and dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order. View "Gaynor v. Larkin" on Justia Law

The dispute involved multiple parties and claims arising from business dealings between a printing company and several associated entities and individuals. The plaintiff brought four claims, including breach of contract and fraud, against four defendants. The defendants responded with various counterclaims, including breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and others. Over the course of the litigation, some claims were resolved through motions, while others remained pending.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed the fraud claim and one defendant early in the proceedings. Later, the court granted summary judgment on certain breach of contract claims but did not issue a final judgment or certify its order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The parties then attempted to dismiss the remaining claims between some of them using a joint motion under Rule 41(a)(2), believing that the summary judgment order had fully resolved the other claims. The court granted this motion and subsequently dismissed the settled claims between two parties with prejudice. The plaintiff then filed a notice of appeal, seeking review of the summary judgment and denial of reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and determined that it lacked jurisdiction. The court held that, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 41(a) allows for voluntary dismissal only of an entire action, not individual claims, and that partial summary judgment orders are not final or appealable unless certified under Rule 54(b). Because the district court had not entered a Rule 54(b) certification and unresolved claims remained, the attempted partial dismissal was ineffective, and the action was not fully resolved. As a result, there was no final decision to appeal, and the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "CMYK Enterprises, Inc. v. Advanced Print Technologies, LLC" on Justia Law

A 78-year-old inmate in a Texas men’s prison, who identifies as a transgender woman, sought sex-reassignment surgery after being diagnosed with gender dysphoria in 2013. The inmate received hormone therapy and was chemically castrated, but was ultimately denied surgery by prison medical staff. The inmate alleged that state officials discriminated by providing reconstructive vaginoplasty to female inmates while denying similar surgery to transgender inmates, claiming a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas initially denied motions to dismiss based on sovereign immunity, finding that the inmate was similarly situated to cisgender female inmates and that the claims met the requirements of the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity. On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s orders, holding that the inmate had not adequately pled that any defendant was sufficiently connected to enforcement of the challenged policy. On remand, after further proceedings and discovery, the district court granted judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the defendants were either improper under Ex parte Young or that the requested relief was not permitted, and dismissed the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the inmate lacked standing. The court found that the alleged injury was not fairly traceable to the defendants, as there was no evidence that any treating physician had determined the inmate was a suitable candidate for surgery or would refer the inmate for the procedure. Without such evidence, the injury could not be redressed by a favorable judicial decision against the defendants. View "Haverkamp v. Linthicum" on Justia Law

A hotel in the Town of Newburgh, New York, agreed to provide long-term housing to asylum seekers as part of a program initiated by New York City. In response, the Town alleged that the hotel’s actions violated local zoning and occupancy ordinances, which limited hotel stays to transient guests for no more than 30 days. The Town inspected the hotel, found modifications suggesting long-term use, and filed suit in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Orange County, seeking to enjoin the hotel from housing asylum seekers for extended periods. The state court issued a temporary restraining order, but allowed the asylum seekers already present to remain pending further orders.The hotel removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, arguing that the Town’s enforcement was racially motivated and violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, thus justifying removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). The district court found that removal was improper because the hotel had not sufficiently pleaded grounds for removal under § 1443(1), and remanded the case to state court.While the hotel’s appeal of the remand order was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the underlying state court action was discontinued with prejudice after the asylum seekers left and the City ended its program. The Second Circuit determined that, because the state court case was permanently terminated, there was no longer a live controversy regarding removal. The court held the appeal was moot and, following standard practice when mootness occurs through no fault of the appellant, vacated the district court’s remand order and dismissed the appeal. View "Town of Newburgh v. Newburgh EOM LLC" on Justia Law