Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Emmett Hotard acquired two lots in Hancock County in 2006 and used one as security for a loan from The Peoples Bank. After defaulting on the loan and failing to pay property taxes, Lot 17 was sold at a tax sale to Ken Foreman in 2012. The bank later assigned its interest to Emmett's brother, Eric Hotard, who initiated foreclosure proceedings. Eric's company, DHP1, LLC, purchased the lots at a foreclosure sale in 2014. The chancery clerk sent a notice of the tax sale to Emmett, which was returned undelivered. Notices were also sent to lienholders, including Eric.The Hancock County Chancery Court found that the chancery clerk failed to satisfy statutory notice requirements for the tax sale and declared the sale void. The court granted summary judgment in favor of DHP1, LLC, and voided the tax deed to Ken Foreman and the subsequent quitclaim deed to Baron Foreman, who had acquired Lot 17 from Ken.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the chancery court's decision. The court held that Emmett, as the record owner 180 days before the redemption period expired, was entitled to notice. The chancery clerk failed to provide proper notice by certified mail or personal service and did not conduct a diligent search for Emmett's address, which was easily discoverable in the land records. The court emphasized that any deviation from the statutory notice requirements renders a tax sale void. Consequently, the tax sale was declared void, and summary judgment in favor of DHP1, LLC, was affirmed. View "Foreman v. DHP1, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2019, New Hampshire filed two lawsuits in state court against 3M Company and other chemical companies, alleging that they produced defective PFAS products, negligently marketed them, and concealed their toxicity, leading to widespread contamination of the state's natural resources. One lawsuit sought damages for PFAS from aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF), while the other sought damages for non-AFFF PFAS contamination. The latter, referred to as the "Non-AFFF Suit," is the subject of this appeal.The Non-AFFF Suit proceeded in state court, and over the next three years, the court dismissed some of New Hampshire's claims. In August 2021, New Hampshire filed a second amended complaint. In December 2021, New Hampshire disclosed over 200 sites allegedly contaminated with non-AFFF PFAS. In April 2022, 3M removed the case to federal court, arguing that the contamination involved MilSpec AFFF PFAS, which it produced for the U.S. military, thus invoking the federal officer removal statute. New Hampshire moved to remand the case, and the district court agreed, citing that 3M's removal was untimely and did not meet the federal officer removal statute requirements.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that it had appellate jurisdiction. The court assumed, without deciding, that the alleged commingling of MilSpec AFFF PFAS and non-AFFF PFAS satisfied the nexus requirement for federal officer removal. However, it found that 3M's removal was untimely. The court determined that New Hampshire's filings in 2019 and 2020 provided sufficient information for 3M to ascertain removability, starting the 30-day removal clock well before 3M filed for removal in April 2022. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to state court. View "New Hampshire v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between several plaintiffs, who are independent distributors for Nu Skin Enterprises Inc., and the defendants, which include Nu Skin and its affiliates. The plaintiffs allege that Nu Skin operates an unlawful pyramid scheme, making it difficult for distributors to profit from product sales alone, and instead requiring them to recruit new distributors to earn money. The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in Spokane County Superior Court, asserting claims under various state and federal laws.In the lower courts, Nu Skin filed a motion to dismiss the case for improper venue based on a forum-selection clause in the parties' contract, which designated Utah as the exclusive forum for dispute resolution. The Spokane County Superior Court denied Nu Skin's motion, ruling that the case did not fall within the contractual definition of a "Dispute" and that Spokane County was a proper venue. Nu Skin sought reconsideration, which was also denied, and then moved for discretionary review.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case and addressed whether CR 12(b)(3) is the correct procedural mechanism to enforce a contractual forum-selection clause designating a non-Washington forum. The court held that CR 12(b)(3) is not the appropriate procedure for such enforcement. The court reasoned that the plain language of CR 12(b)(3) authorizes dismissal only when venue is "improper" according to Washington's venue statutes and court rules, which do not account for contractual forum-selection clauses. Therefore, a forum-selection clause cannot render a statutorily authorized venue "improper" under CR 12(b)(3). The court affirmed the denial of Nu Skin's motion to dismiss and remanded the case to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Raab v. Nu Skin Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

The Randy W. Stevens Living Trust owns land in Saratoga, Wyoming, bordered by an alleyway owned by the Town of Saratoga. Randy Stevens, the trustee, and Quality Landscape & Nursery, Inc., which uses the land, have had various disputes with the Town over the years. In 2019, a judgment was issued in favor of the Town, which the Stevens parties did not appeal. In 2023, the Stevens Trust and Quality Landscape filed a motion for an order to show cause and for a writ of mandamus, which the district court dismissed, citing res judicata and the parties' contractual limitations period. The court also found mandamus was not available under the circumstances.The district court of Carbon County had previously ruled on several issues between the parties, including the reconstruction of the alleyway, installation of utilities, and access to the property. The court found that the Town had acted in good faith and that the Stevens parties had failed to prove damages. The Stevens parties did not appeal these rulings. In 2023, they sought to revisit these issues, but the district court dismissed their motion, finding that the claims were barred by res judicata and the contractual limitations period.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the claims raised by the Stevens parties were barred by res judicata, as they had been or could have been litigated in prior proceedings. The court also agreed that mandamus was not an appropriate remedy, as the duties in question were not ministerial. Finally, the court found that judicial estoppel did not apply, as the Town had not taken inconsistent positions. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Stevens parties' motion. View "Stevens v. The Governing Body of the Town of Saratoga, Wyoming" on Justia Law

Charlene Monfore petitioned for guardianship and conservatorship over her mother, Gerda Flyte, who suffers from dementia. Gerda’s son, Roger Flyte, objected and requested to be appointed instead. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found it was not in Gerda’s best interests to appoint either Charlene or Roger and instead appointed Black Hills Advocate, LLC (BHA), a for-profit corporation. Charlene appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by not appointing her and lacked statutory authority to appoint a for-profit organization.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Fall River County, South Dakota, initially appointed Charlene as temporary guardian and conservator. Roger objected, raising concerns about Gerda’s care under Charlene, including medical neglect and financial mismanagement. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the court found both Charlene and Roger unsuitable due to various concerns, including Charlene’s failure to provide necessary medical care and financial mismanagement, and Roger’s financial irresponsibility and anger issues. The court appointed BHA as guardian and conservator.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint Charlene, given the evidence of her inadequate care and financial mismanagement. However, the Supreme Court found that SDCL 29A-5-110 does not authorize the appointment of for-profit entities as guardians or conservators, except for qualified banks or trust companies as conservators. Therefore, the appointment of BHA was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The court also awarded Roger one-half of his requested appellate attorney fees. View "Guardianship And Conservatorship Of Flyte" on Justia Law

Pat Doe and Jarrod Burnham each filed complaints for protection from abuse against each other in December 2021. Doe's complaint was transferred to Portland for a consolidated hearing, where the court found that Burnham had abused Doe and granted her a two-year protection order effective until January 14, 2024. On January 4, 2024, Doe attempted to file a motion to extend the protection order in Bangor but was informed it needed to be filed in Portland. She mailed the motion on January 13, 2024, but it never arrived due to insufficient postage. Doe learned the order had not been extended on January 17, 2024, and filed a new protection from abuse action in Bangor.The District Court in Portland denied Doe's motion to extend the protection order, concluding it could not extend an expired order. Doe's motion for reconsideration was also denied, with the court finding that her failure to file on time was not excusable neglect and that the statute did not permit extending an expired order. Doe then filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing excusable neglect, which was also denied. The court stated that excusable neglect under M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) did not apply to statutory deadlines.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decisions, holding that 19-A M.R.S. § 4111(1) unambiguously prohibits extending an expired protection order. The court also held that a motion for relief from judgment cannot be used to circumvent statutory authority, and thus the trial court did not err in denying Doe's motion for relief from judgment. View "Doe v. Burnham" on Justia Law

This case involves the termination of parental rights and an adoption proceeding. Jane Doe 1 ("Mother") and John Doe ("Father") had a child out of wedlock. Approximately eight months after the child's birth, Mother and her fiancé filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights and allow the fiancé to adopt the child. Mother did not serve the petition on Father, and he did not participate in the proceedings. The magistrate court terminated Father's parental rights and granted the adoption. Father later filed two motions to set aside the judgment, arguing that his due process rights were violated due to lack of notice. This appeal concerns Father's second motion.The magistrate court denied Father's second motion, finding it barred by res judicata. The district court disagreed, reversed the magistrate court's order, and remanded the matter for the magistrate court to consider the motion on its merits. Mother appealed, arguing that Father's motion was barred by procedural doctrines, including res judicata and waiver.The Supreme Court of Idaho held that Father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion alleged a fundamental error that deprived him of his right to procedural due process, which in turn violated his fundamental constitutional right to raise his child. The Court concluded that the fundamental error doctrine applies to create an exception to the doctrines of res judicata and waiver. The Court affirmed the district court's decision and remanded the matter to the magistrate court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion was timely and, if so, whether the termination and adoption judgment is void. The Court also awarded partial attorney fees to Father for defending against certain arguments raised by Mother on appeal. View "Doe v. Doe" on Justia Law

Jon and Shawna Hill, along with their children, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Stuart Clive and his employer, Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A. (EMI), alleging that Clive misdiagnosed Jon Hill with vertigo when he was actually suffering from a stroke. This misdiagnosis led to severe physical and cognitive impairments for Jon Hill. The Hills claimed negligence, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, and respondeat superior liability. The district court dismissed the children's claims, ruling that Idaho does not recognize a claim for loss of parental consortium. The jury found in favor of EMI and Clive, and the district court denied the Hills' motion for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct.The Hills appealed the district court's dismissal of their children's claims, two evidentiary rulings, and the denial of their motion for a new trial. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the children's claims, agreeing that Idaho law does not recognize a claim for loss of parental consortium for non-fatal injuries. The court noted that creating such a cause of action involves significant policy considerations best left to the legislature.The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision to allow expert testimony on "hindsight bias" by EMI's expert, Dr. Opeolu M. Adeoye, finding it irrelevant and prejudicial. The court held that this error affected the Hills' substantial rights, as the testimony improperly endorsed EMI's theme of hindsight bias, potentially influencing the jury's decision. Consequently, the judgment in favor of EMI and Clive was vacated, and the case was remanded for a new trial. The court did not address the Hills' other issues on appeal due to the remand. EMI's request for attorney fees on appeal was denied, as they were not the prevailing party. View "Hill v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A." on Justia Law

Kevin Vericker published an internet blog questioning the credentials, character, and competency of Norman Christopher Powell, who was appointed as the attorney for North Bay Village. Powell filed a defamation lawsuit against Vericker, claiming the blog posts were defamatory per se. Vericker responded with a motion for summary judgment and an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that Powell, as a public official, needed to prove actual malice, which he could not. The trial court denied Vericker's motion.Vericker then sought a writ of certiorari from the Third District Court of Appeal to review the denial of his anti-SLAPP motion. The Third District held that certiorari was not appropriate for reviewing such orders, aligning with the Fourth District's position that public policy favors interlocutory review through rule amendments rather than expanding certiorari jurisdiction. The Third District certified conflict with the Second District's decisions in Gundel, Baird, and Davis, which had allowed certiorari review for anti-SLAPP motions.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and held that denials of anti-SLAPP motions do not constitute irreparable harm sufficient to support certiorari relief. The court emphasized that the Anti-SLAPP statute does not provide immunity from suit but rather aims for the expeditious resolution of meritless, speech-targeted lawsuits. To align with legislative intent, the court amended Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3) to allow interlocutory review of nonfinal orders denying anti-SLAPP motions. The court approved the Third District's decision and disapproved the Second District's conflicting decisions. View "Vericker v. Powell" on Justia Law

Susan Kinder, a white woman, was employed by the Marion County Prosecutor’s Office (MCPO) and alleged racial discrimination when she was reassigned to a new role. She claimed violations of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. Kinder had conflicts with a black colleague, Lydia Richardson, who accused her of making racially insensitive remarks. An investigation found the animosity was mutual. The prosecutor decided to reassign both employees, but Kinder viewed her new role as a demotion.The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a right-to-sue letter on April 28, 2022, but Kinder’s counsel could not access it until July 6, 2022. Kinder filed her complaint on October 4, 2022, alleging Title VII and Equal Protection Clause violations. The MCPO moved for summary judgment, arguing the Title VII claim was untimely and that the office was not a suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment to the MCPO, finding the Title VII claim was filed outside the 90-day window and that the MCPO was an arm of the state, immune from § 1983 claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the 90-day period for filing the Title VII claim began when Kinder’s counsel was notified on June 15, 2022, that the right-to-sue letter was available, making the October 4 filing untimely. The court also held that the MCPO is an arm of the state and not a suable “person” under § 1983, as the office is financially interdependent with the state and enjoys state indemnification for employment-related actions. View "Kinder v Marion County Prosecutor's Office" on Justia Law