Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Larissa Marland, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Norman Marland, filed a medical malpractice claim against the University of Connecticut Health Center and related entities. The decedent had been treated at the hospital and was later admitted to the intensive care unit, where he fell and subsequently died. The plaintiff alleged that the hospital staff breached the standard of care owed to the decedent.The plaintiff filed a notice of claim with the claims commissioner, including a physician’s opinion letter. The claims commissioner failed to resolve the claim within the statutory two-year period and an additional one-year extension granted by the General Assembly. Despite this, the commissioner eventually authorized the plaintiff to sue the state. The plaintiff then filed the present action in the Superior Court.The state moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claims commissioner’s waiver of sovereign immunity was invalid because it was issued after the expiration of the one-year extension. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the commissioner did not have the authority to grant the waiver beyond the extension period.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s action. The court held that, once the claims commissioner authorizes suit and waives sovereign immunity, the state cannot challenge that decision in the Superior Court. The court emphasized that such challenges should be raised before the claims commissioner. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to deny the state’s motion to dismiss. View "Marland v. University of Connecticut Health Center" on Justia Law

Deborah Bradshaw and Chrystal Antao sued American Airlines and Mesa Airlines, alleging injuries and damages from the airlines' negligent handling of an in-flight emergency. During a June 2020 flight, the aircraft experienced a malfunction that led to a loss of cabin pressure, requiring an emergency descent. The plaintiffs claimed the pilot failed to properly inform passengers of the threat and descended too rapidly, while American Airlines failed to provide medical personnel upon landing.The case was initially filed in the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, and later removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma on diversity grounds. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the airlines, concluding that federal law preempted Oklahoma's common-carrier standard of care in aviation safety. The court allowed the plaintiffs to pursue a state negligence claim using the federal "reckless-or-careless manner" standard but found no evidence that the airlines violated this standard.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the Federal Aviation Act and related regulations preempt state law in the field of aviation safety. The court agreed that the federal "careless or reckless manner" standard of care applies, preempting Oklahoma's common-carrier standard. The court found no genuine issue of material fact regarding a violation of federal regulations by the airlines and upheld the summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Bradshaw v. American Airlines" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when he lost control of his motorcycle on Lark Street in Albany, allegedly due to a road defect the City knew about but failed to repair. The case centers on whether reports submitted through the City's online system, SeeClickFix (SCF), constituted "written notice" of the defect and if those reports were "actually given" to the designated official.The Supreme Court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment, holding that SCF reports might constitute prior written notice but that factual issues precluded summary judgment. These issues included whether the complaints were based on verbal or written communications, whether the defects described were related to the accident, and whether the City's actions created or exacerbated the defect. The court also rejected the City's claim of governmental immunity.The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, agreeing that SCF complaints could be considered written notice and rejecting the City's immunity argument. The Appellate Division granted the City leave to appeal and certified the question of whether it erred in affirming the denial of the City's motion.The New York Court of Appeals held that SCF reports could constitute written notice and that the City's implementation of SCF meant the reports were "actually given" to the Commissioner of General Services. The court also found that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on whether the City's negligence created a dangerous condition and rejected the City's claim of governmental immunity, as the repair of the road was a proprietary function. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's order and answered the certified question in the negative. View "Calabrese v City of Albany" on Justia Law

Amra Schmitz, a 52-year-old former public relations representative, applied for Social Security disability benefits in February 2020, claiming disability since January 2018. After a telephonic hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) applied the five-step disability analysis and concluded that despite Schmitz's limitations and inability to perform her past job, there were still jobs she could perform. The ALJ found that Schmitz had severe impairments but did not meet the criteria for disability. The ALJ determined that Schmitz could perform light work with certain restrictions and identified six types of unskilled jobs she could do.The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ's decision, and Schmitz filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. Schmitz argued that the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence, particularly criticizing the vocational expert's (VE) testimony regarding the number of available jobs. The district court found that Schmitz had forfeited this objection by not raising it during the hearing or in post-hearing briefs and upheld the ALJ's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo, applying the same deferential standard. The court noted that Schmitz did not object to the VE's testimony during the hearing, thus forfeiting her objection. The court found that the VE's testimony was coherent, plausible, and based on her expertise. The court also determined that the ALJ had no duty to further investigate the VE's job-number estimates in the absence of an objection. The court concluded that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Schmitz v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Sarah Lindsley filed a discrimination lawsuit against her employer, Omni Hotels Management Corporation, alleging sex-based pay discrimination under the Equal Pay Act (EPA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Lindsley claimed that her initial salary was set too low due to her sex, causing her to earn less than her male colleagues despite subsequent raises. She also alleged that she faced harassment and that her complaints about pay discrepancies were ignored.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially granted summary judgment in favor of Omni on all claims. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for trial on the pay-discrimination claims under Title VII and the EPA. At trial, the jury found Omni not liable under the EPA but awarded Lindsley over $25 million in Title VII damages despite finding no liability under Title VII. The district court deemed the jury's answers inconsistent, amended the verdict form, and ordered further deliberation. The jury then found for Lindsley on her Title VII claim, again awarding over $25 million in damages, which the district court reduced under the statutory cap.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court did not err in handling the first verdict form but did err in handling the second verdict form. The appellate court found that the jury's answers in the second verdict form were inconsistent, as they found that any pay disparity resulted from a factor other than sex (an affirmative defense to both the EPA and Title VII claims) but still awarded Title VII damages. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Lindsley v. Omni Hotels" on Justia Law

Mark Blackwell criticized the city manager of Wayne, Michigan, leading the manager to complain to the police. Two officers convinced a prosecutor to charge Blackwell with stalking, but a judge acquitted him. Blackwell then sued the manager and officers, alleging they violated his First Amendment rights by inducing the prosecution in retaliation for his political speech. The district court found that Blackwell's complaint had enough facts to rebut the city officials' qualified-immunity defense at the pleading stage.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied the city officials' motion to dismiss, leading them to appeal. The district court refused to consider exhibits attached to the motion to dismiss and held that the complaint stated a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim. The court also found that qualified immunity would not protect the officials if Blackwell could prove his allegations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court's decision to exclude the outside-the-complaint exhibits and found that Blackwell's complaint plausibly alleged a lack of probable cause for the stalking charge. The court held that the complaint sufficiently pleaded a First Amendment violation and that the law clearly established this violation. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss, allowing Blackwell's claims to proceed. View "Blackwell v. Nocerini" on Justia Law

Autumn Bertels was severely injured in a car accident involving her grandmother, Elizabeth Bertels, and another driver, Denver Barr, who both died in the crash. Autumn later filed a lawsuit against Elizabeth's estate, and they reached an agreement where the estate assigned its claims against Elizabeth's insurer, Farm Bureau Property & Casualty Insurance Company, to Autumn. The agreement stipulated that Autumn would not seek to collect from the estate's assets and would cover the estate's litigation expenses. A judge awarded Autumn a $15.75 million judgment against the estate, and she subsequently sued Farm Bureau for breach of contract and bad faith.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed Autumn's suit against Farm Bureau, ruling that she lacked standing because the assignment from the estate was invalid. The court determined that Autumn provided no consideration for the assignment, as her promises were already required by the Kansas nonclaim statute, which bars claims against a deceased person's estate after a certain period and requires the claimant to pay the estate's litigation expenses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the nonclaim statute barred Autumn's claim against the estate's assets and required her to pay the estate's expenses, rendering her promises in the agreement illusory and without consideration. Consequently, the assignment was invalid, and Autumn lacked standing to sue Farm Bureau. The court also rejected Autumn's arguments regarding tolling of the nonclaim statute due to her minority and other constitutional claims, finding them unpersuasive or procedurally barred. View "Bertels v. Farm Bureau Property & Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The petitioners, Fidel Angel Lopez Quinteros, Evelyn de Los Angeles Polanco Ortiz, and their minor child A.A.L.P., are natives and citizens of El Salvador. They were issued Notices to Appear by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2021, charging them with being present in the United States without admission or parole. The petitioners conceded their removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). A.A.L.P. was listed as a derivative beneficiary on Lopez's application. The petition for review challenges only the denial of their asylum applications.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Lopez and Polanco's testimonies credible but denied their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The IJ concluded that the gang's threats were motivated by financial gain rather than the petitioners' membership in particular social groups. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision on asylum and withholding of removal and deemed the CAT claims waived as they were not meaningfully challenged.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied the petitioners' claim that the BIA erred by not remanding to correct the hearing transcript, as this issue was not exhausted before the BIA. The court also found no merit in the petitioners' contention that the agency failed to engage in a proper mixed-motive analysis. However, the court held that the BIA's finding of no nexus between Polanco's persecution and her familial relationship to Lopez was not supported by substantial evidence. The court concluded that Polanco's family status was a central reason for the gang's threats against her. Consequently, the court denied the petition in part, granted it in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Lopez-Quinteros v. Garland" on Justia Law

Chrisma Felin Mondzali Bopaka, a citizen of the Republic of the Congo, entered the United States without valid entry documents on August 23, 2018. He sought asylum, withholding of removal (WOR), and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming persecution based on his political opinion and family membership. Bopaka alleged that his family was targeted due to his father's opposition to the government, and he feared harm if returned to the Congo.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Bopaka not credible due to numerous inconsistencies and omissions in his testimony, declaration, and documentary evidence. The IJ denied his applications for asylum, WOR, and CAT protection, concluding that Bopaka failed to meet his burden of proof. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, finding no error in the adverse credibility determination and insufficient corroborating evidence. The BIA also denied Bopaka's motions to remand and reopen, citing a lack of new, material evidence that could change the outcome.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found substantial evidence supporting the IJ's and BIA's adverse credibility determination, noting significant inconsistencies and omissions in Bopaka's accounts. The court also agreed with the BIA's assessment that the new evidence presented in the motions to remand and reopen was insufficient to alter the previous findings. Consequently, the petitions for review were denied. View "Mondzali Bopaka v. Garland" on Justia Law

Harold Winston, an African-American male with over 30 years of service, sued his employer, the County of Los Angeles, alleging race-based discrimination, retaliation, and failure to maintain a discrimination-free environment under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and whistleblower retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5. While the case was pending, section 1102.5 was amended to allow courts to award reasonable attorney fees to prevailing whistleblower plaintiffs. After the jury found in Winston’s favor on his retaliation claim under section 1102.5, he filed a motion for attorney fees based on the new provision.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Winston’s motion for attorney fees, ruling that the fee provision did not apply retroactively to his case, which was filed in 2019 before the amendment took effect. The court found no legislative intent supporting retroactive application and noted that Winston did not prevail on his FEHA claims, which could have provided a basis for attorney fees.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that a new statute authorizing an award of attorney fees applies to actions pending on the statute’s effective date. The court cited case precedent establishing that newly enacted attorney fee provisions are procedural and apply to pending litigation. The court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case with directions for the trial court to determine the appropriateness and reasonableness of Winston’s fee request. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Winston v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law