Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Pharma Conference Education, Inc. entered into an agreement with the University of Tennessee Health Science Center to produce pharmaceutical continuing education programs "as is feasible." The Health Science Center terminated the agreement before any programs were held. Pharma sued to enforce the agreement, but the State argued that the agreement lacked consideration and was not a valid contract. The key issue was whether the promise to produce programs "as is feasible" constituted consideration or was an illusory promise.The Tennessee Claims Commission granted summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that the agreement lacked consideration because Pharma's promise was illusory. The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that Pharma's promise gave it complete discretion and was therefore illusory. Both courts relied on the deposition testimony of Pharma's president, John W. Smith, to support their conclusions.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that Pharma's promise to produce as many programs "as is feasible" constitutes adequate consideration. The Court explained that the term "feasible" has an objective meaning and does not give Pharma unfettered discretion. The Court also noted that the statutory presumption of consideration under Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-50-103 applies, and the State failed to rebut this presumption. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the Claims Commission for further proceedings, including consideration of the State's argument regarding mutual assent. View "Pharma Conference Education, Inc. v. State" on Justia Law

In Michigan, citizens can amend the state constitution through ballot initiatives without legislative approval. Two state senators and nine state representatives challenged the use of such initiatives to regulate federal elections, arguing it violated the U.S. Constitution's Elections Clause. They sought to prevent Michigan officials from enforcing these amendments.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed the case, ruling that the legislators lacked standing to sue under Civil Rule 12(b)(1). The court found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a concrete injury necessary for standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the legislators did not have standing because they did not represent the entire legislature or a controlling bloc within it. The court distinguished this case from precedents where entire legislatures or controlling blocs had standing to sue. The court emphasized that individual legislators generally lack standing to assert institutional injuries of the legislature. The court also noted that the legislators had not shown that their votes were nullified by the amendments, as required for standing under relevant Supreme Court precedents.The Sixth Circuit concluded that the legislators' claims did not meet the requirements for standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, as they did not suffer a concrete and particularized injury. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case. View "Lindsey v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

Angela Reading, a mother and former school board member, alleged that federal and local government officials violated her First Amendment rights by censoring and retaliating against her after she posted comments on Facebook. The controversy began when Reading criticized a poster at her child's elementary school that featured various sexual identities. Her post drew significant attention and backlash from military personnel at a nearby base, leading to a series of communications and actions by local and federal officials, including heightened security at a school board meeting and referrals to counter-terrorism authorities.Reading sought a preliminary injunction to prevent further interference with her free speech rights. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied her motion, concluding that she failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether Reading had standing to seek a preliminary injunction. The court found that the bulk of the alleged unlawful conduct occurred during a brief period and had significantly subsided by the time Reading filed her lawsuit. The court determined that Reading did not show a substantial risk of future harm or a likelihood of future injury traceable to the defendants. Consequently, the court held that Reading lacked standing to seek a preliminary injunction and affirmed the District Court's order denying her motion. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Reading v. North Hanover Township" on Justia Law

Howard University’s Board of Trustees amended the institution’s bylaws to remove trustee positions that had been filled by alumni, students, and faculty for several decades. A group of alumni sued the University and the Board in D.C. Superior Court, seeking a declaration that the Board’s amendment was ultra vires because it violated the governing bylaws. Howard removed the case to federal court, arguing that the governance dispute hinged on the University’s federal charter. The alumni moved to remand the case back to state court.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the alumni’s motion to remand, holding that the suit implicated a significant federal issue under Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing. The District Court then granted Howard’s motion to dismiss the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that the District Court erred in exercising jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals determined that the case did not arise under federal law nor present a significant, disputed federal issue under Grable. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Jenkins v. Howard University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff John Doe filed a class action lawsuit against Integris Health, Inc., alleging that Integris collected confidential health information from its website visitors and unlawfully shared it with third parties like Google and Facebook. Doe's complaint, filed in Oklahoma state court, asserted state law claims including negligence, invasion of privacy, and breach of fiduciary duty. Integris removed the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, claiming it was acting under the direction of a federal officer by helping the federal government achieve its objective of ensuring patient access to electronic health records (EHR).The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma remanded the case to state court, concluding that Integris had not demonstrated it was "acting under" the direction of a federal officer. The court found that Integris was merely complying with federal regulations, which is insufficient to establish federal officer jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Tenth Circuit held that Integris was not "acting under" a federal officer because it was only complying with federal regulations and not fulfilling a basic government task. The court emphasized that compliance with federal law, even if highly detailed and supervised, does not equate to acting under a federal officer. The court also noted that Integris's use of tracking technology on its website was not required by the federal government and was not part of any federal directive. Therefore, the court concluded that removal under the federal officer removal statute was improper. View "Doe v. Integris Health" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a civil suit against the defendant, alleging defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) after the defendant reported to the police that the plaintiff had sexually and physically assaulted her. This report led to the plaintiff being criminally charged, arrested, and held without bail for almost two years before being acquitted. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's report was false and made with malicious intent to harm him.The Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the defendant's statements to the police were absolutely privileged as communications preliminary to a judicial proceeding. The court also granted the defendant's special motion to strike under Vermont's anti-SLAPP statute, 12 V.S.A. § 1041, and awarded attorney’s fees to the defendant. The court reasoned that the defendant's statements were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute as an exercise of her right to petition the government.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of judgment on the pleadings, agreeing that the defendant's statements to the police were absolutely privileged. The Court held that public policy supports extending absolute privilege to such statements to encourage free and full disclosure to law enforcement without fear of civil liability. The Court also affirmed the trial court's application of the anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that the defendant's statements were made in connection with a public issue and were an exercise of her constitutional rights. However, the Supreme Court remanded the case for the trial court to consider the plaintiff's constitutional challenges to the anti-SLAPP statute, which the trial court had not adequately addressed. View "Talandar v. Manchester-Murphy" on Justia Law

Carl Grant, a Vietnam War veteran suffering from dementia and PTSD, left his home in Conyers, Georgia, on February 2, 2020, and ended up in Birmingham, Alabama. Officer Vincent Larry of the Birmingham Police Department found Grant disoriented and detained him for a misdemeanor. Grant was taken to a hospital, where he was treated for minor injuries. While being escorted to the restroom, Larry allegedly assaulted Grant, causing severe spinal injuries that led to Grant's death on July 24, 2020. William Jenkins, representing Grant's estate, filed a lawsuit against Larry, the City of Birmingham, and various city officials.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted a summary judgment in favor of the City defendants, dismissing Jenkins's claims with prejudice on February 22, 2023. Jenkins filed a postjudgment motion on March 21, 2023, which was denied by operation of law on June 20, 2023. Jenkins also filed a "motion for clarification" on April 28, 2023, which the court purported to grant on June 21, 2023, reinstating claims against Larry and Scott Thurmond. However, this order was a nullity as the court had lost jurisdiction after the postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law.Jenkins filed a notice of appeal on November 3, 2023, which was dismissed as arising from a non-final order. He then filed another appeal on January 24, 2024, which was transferred to the Supreme Court of Alabama. The Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the appeal, instructing the circuit court to vacate its June 21, 2023, order and all subsequent orders, as they were nullities. The February 22, 2023, judgment was deemed final, and Jenkins's failure to appeal it timely resulted in the dismissal of his current appeal. View "Jenkins v. City of Birmingham" on Justia Law

The case involves the father of J.M. (Father) appealing an order from the Circuit Court denying his motion to dismiss a neglect petition due to defective service of process. The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed the petition after J.M.'s mother passed away, leaving J.M. without a caretaker. Father, who was living in Florida and had not seen J.M. for over a year, was served with the petition by a process server. He argued that service was defective because it was not performed by a law enforcement officer as required by RSA 169-C:8, I.The Circuit Court denied Father's motion to dismiss, and the adjudicatory hearing proceeded, resulting in a finding of neglect and an order for J.M.'s out-of-home placement. Father did not immediately appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss and participated in the hearing, leading to the waiver of his service of process challenge under Mosier v. Kinley.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and agreed with DCYF that Father waived his challenge by not appealing immediately. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the trial court's neglect finding, noting that Father had not seen J.M. for 18 months and had not provided any support for two years despite being financially able.The court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the neglect finding was supported by evidence and that the trial court did not err in continuing J.M.'s out-of-home placement instead of placing J.M. in Father's custody under DCYF supervision. The Supreme Court clarified that appeals from a denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are discretionary and must be filed within 30 days. View "In re J.M." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs filed a premises liability suit against Waffle House, Inc. and WH Capital LLC in October 2019. In April 2021, the defendants filed a motion for sanctions due to the plaintiffs' alleged failure to comply with a discovery order. In July 2021, the plaintiffs dismissed their lawsuit without prejudice. In September 2021, the defendants filed a motion for attorneys' fees, arguing that the plaintiffs dismissed their lawsuit to escape sanctions. The plaintiffs then filed a renewal action. In July 2022, the trial court awarded the defendants $101,082 in attorneys' fees in the dismissed case.The plaintiffs sought to appeal the attorneys' fees award by filing an application for discretionary appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the application, concluding that because the plaintiffs had filed a renewal action, the case remained pending below, making the fee award a non-final order. Therefore, the plaintiffs were required to obtain a certificate of immediate review. The Court of Appeals relied on the case Eidson v. Croutch in its analysis.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the renewal action was a new case, not a continuance of the dismissed case. Therefore, the dismissed case was no longer pending below. The court held that under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), the order awarding attorneys' fees was a final judgment, and no certificate of immediate review was required. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the discretionary application and remanded the case for consideration of that application. View "COOK-ROSE v. WAFFLE HOUSE INC." on Justia Law

Laura Lazar sued real estate brokers Lynette Bishop, Shen Shulz, Sotheby’s International Realty, Inc., and Shen Realty, Inc. for breach of fiduciary duty related to the sale of her father's Malibu house. Lazar's father, Daniel Gottlieb, had assigned his causes of action to her. The complaint alleged that the brokers failed to disclose a dual agency and did not work to obtain the highest possible sale price, resulting in a sale price significantly lower than the house's value.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that Lazar lacked standing to sue because the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty was not assignable under Civil Code section 954. The court likened the relationship between a real estate broker and client to that of an attorney and client, which involves a highly personal and confidential relationship, making such claims nonassignable. Lazar appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that a cause of action for breach of a real estate broker’s fiduciary duties, which seeks only damages related to property rights and pecuniary interests, is assignable. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the remaining grounds argued in the defendants' motion. The appellate court found that the transactional nature of the broker-client relationship, unlike the attorney-client relationship, does not involve highly personalized rights of recovery, and thus, the claim is assignable. View "Lazar v. Bishop" on Justia Law