Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Ashley Hushen and Alexandra Weary, along with their mothers, reported allegations of sexual harassment by a classmate, Benjamin Gonzales, to their high school administrators. The school conducted a Title IX investigation, resulting in Benjamin's three-day suspension and subsequent juvenile charges for unlawful sexual contact. Benjamin was acquitted of all charges, and the school reopened the investigation, ultimately concluding that Benjamin had not violated school policies. The students involved felt traumatized by the process, and by the time the proceedings concluded, they had graduated.Benjamin later sued Ashley, Alexandra, and their mothers for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on statements made during the Title IX investigations. The defendants filed a special motion to dismiss under Colorado's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that their statements were absolutely privileged as they were made during a quasi-judicial proceeding. Both the trial court and the Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that the Title IX proceedings were not quasi-judicial due to procedural shortcomings, allowing Benjamin's lawsuit to proceed.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and clarified that the determination of whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial is separate from whether it offers sufficient due process. The court held that a proceeding is quasi-judicial if it involves determining the interests, rights, or duties of specific individuals and applying current law or policy to past or present facts. The court concluded that the Title IX investigation met these criteria and was therefore quasi-judicial. Consequently, the statements made during the investigation were protected by absolute privilege, and the lawsuit against Ashley, Alexandra, and their mothers could not proceed. The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hushen v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

E.R., the appellant, filed a complaint against the Beaufort County School District, alleging that the district failed to respond appropriately to her reports of sexual abuse and harassment while she was a student. E.R. claimed she was sexually assaulted by three male students and subsequently bullied and harassed by other students. Despite reporting these incidents to school officials, she alleged that no appropriate action was taken.The case was initially filed in South Carolina state court, asserting claims under Title IX and state law for negligence and gross negligence. The school district removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss it, arguing that the claims were untimely under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA), which has a two-year statute of limitations. The district court agreed, applying the SCTCA's statute of limitations to both the Title IX and state law claims, and dismissed the case as it was filed more than two years after E.R. turned 18.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the appropriate statute of limitations for Title IX claims is the state's general personal injury statute of limitations, not the SCTCA's two-year period. The court reasoned that Title IX claims should borrow the statute of limitations from the most analogous state law cause of action, which in this case is the general personal injury statute. Since South Carolina's general personal injury statute of limitations is three years, E.R.'s claims were timely.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of E.R.'s complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "E.R. v. Beaufort County School District" on Justia Law

The State of New Jersey sued the Dow Chemical Company in state court for the design, manufacture, marketing, and sale of 1,4-dioxane, a substance alleged to be highly toxic and a likely human carcinogen. Dow used 1,4-dioxane to inhibit 1,1,1-trichloroethane (TCA) to create a cleaning agent for metal. New Jersey claims that Dow’s products containing 1,4-dioxane caused substantial environmental harm. The case centers on whether the lawsuit should be heard in state or federal court.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey remanded the case to state court. The District Court found that Dow was not acting under the United States Government when it produced and sold 1,4-dioxane inhibited TCA. Dow had argued that it acted under the federal government’s direction, citing the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). However, the District Court concluded that Dow’s relationship with the government did not meet the criteria for federal-officer removal, as Dow had independently produced and sold the product before any relevant federal regulations were implemented.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Third Circuit held that Dow did not satisfy the “acting under” requirement of the federal-officer removal statute. The court explained that Dow’s production and sale of 1,4-dioxane inhibited TCA were not directed, guided, or controlled by the federal government. Dow’s actions were independent and predated the government’s product specifications. Therefore, the case was properly remanded to state court, as Dow could not litigate under the federal-officer removal statute. View "Attorney General New Jersey v. Dow Chemical Company" on Justia Law

The case involves Plaintiff Craig Gabaldon, who was stopped by New Mexico State Police Officer Kevin Smith for multiple traffic violations, including improper merging, speeding, and failing to use a turn signal. During the stop, Officer Smith detected signs of intoxication and arrested Gabaldon after a struggle, during which a loaded gun was found on Gabaldon. Officer Kurtis Ward assisted in the arrest. Gabaldon filed a civil action alleging constitutional violations and state-law claims, asserting that the stop was motivated by his affiliation with the Bandidos Motorcycle Club.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted Defendants' motion for sanctions for spoliation of evidence, as Gabaldon had returned his Bandidos gear to the club, which likely destroyed it. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Gabaldon's Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims, citing qualified immunity and finding reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and probable cause for the arrest. Gabaldon's affidavit, which contradicted his deposition testimony, was struck down as a sham affidavit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the spoliation motion or in striking Gabaldon's affidavit. The appellate court agreed that the affidavit was an attempt to create a sham fact issue, as it contradicted Gabaldon's earlier deposition testimony without new evidence. The court also upheld the summary judgment, finding that Officer Smith had reasonable suspicion to stop Gabaldon based on observed traffic violations. The appellate court concluded that the district court's rulings were correct and affirmed the judgment. View "Gabaldon v. New Mexico State Police" on Justia Law

The case involves a workplace accident where the decedent sustained severe head injuries, resulting in a persistent vegetative state and eventual death. The decedent's workers' compensation claim was allowed for several conditions, and he sought scheduled-loss compensation for the loss of use of his bilateral upper and lower extremities. The Industrial Commission of Ohio initially denied this claim, concluding that the loss of use was due to brain injury, not direct injury to the extremities.The decedent filed a mandamus action challenging the denial, but it was dismissed after his death. Subsequently, his surviving spouse, Byk, filed a motion with the commission for scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) and 4123.60. The commission denied this motion, stating that the decedent's entitlement to the loss-of-use award had already been determined and denied.Byk then filed a mandamus action in the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which granted a limited writ directing the commission to vacate its order and issue a new order adjudicating the merits of Byk’s claim. The commission and Republic Steel appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the Tenth District's judgment. The court held that Byk was not entitled to scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.60 because the decedent was not "lawfully entitled to have applied" a second time for the same scheduled-loss compensation that had already been denied. The court emphasized that the statutory language did not authorize an injured worker to reapply for the same compensation after a final denial. Consequently, Byk's request for a writ of mandamus was denied. View "State ex rel. Byk v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law

In September 2023, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a report that a child, A.O., had visible bruises on his face. A.O. told officers that his mother, F.O., had hit him. DCFS investigated and found multiple injuries on A.O. Mother claimed the injuries were from a ball hitting A.O. at a park. A.O. was removed from Mother's custody and placed in foster care. DCFS filed a petition alleging physical abuse by Mother. Mother denied the allegations but later pleaded "no contest" to an amended petition that alleged inappropriate discipline.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County detained A.O. from Mother and ordered that visits occur in a therapeutic setting. DCFS faced challenges in arranging these visits due to difficulties in finding a suitable therapist. Despite these efforts, Mother had no contact with A.O. from the time of detention until the six-month review hearing. At this hearing, the court found that DCFS had provided reasonable services and continued reunification services for Mother. Mother appealed, arguing that DCFS had not provided reasonable services.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Mother could appeal the reasonable services finding because an erroneous finding could impair her ability to request an extension of reunification services and potentially lead to the termination of her parental rights. The court found that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that DCFS had provided reasonable services, despite the lack of visits, due to the efforts made to arrange therapeutic visits and the challenges faced. The court affirmed the juvenile court's order. View "In re A.O." on Justia Law

Christopher Cole, an employee of The Kansas City Southern Railway Company (KCSR), sustained severe injuries while working, leading to the amputation of both legs. Cole filed a negligence claim under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), asserting general negligence and negligence per se due to KCSR's violation of an Illinois close clearance regulation. The jury found KCSR liable and awarded Cole $12 million in damages, which the circuit court entered as judgment. The court later amended the judgment to include post-judgment interest.The Circuit Court of St. Louis County presided over the initial trial. The jury found Cole 21 percent at fault and KCSR 79 percent at fault. KCSR filed motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), both of which were overruled. Cole subsequently filed a motion to amend the judgment to include post-judgment interest, which the circuit court granted.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case. The court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in many respects but vacated the $12 million damages award and the post-judgment interest. The court held that the circuit court erred in submitting jury instructions that deprived KCSR of its contributory negligence defense under FELA. The court also found that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment to include post-judgment interest after the original judgment became final. The Supreme Court of Missouri remanded the case to the circuit court to reduce the damages award to $9.48 million, reflecting Cole’s contributory negligence, and to enter judgment without post-judgment interest. View "Cole v. The Kansas City Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

Jekyll Island State Park Authority, a Georgia entity, operates the Summer Waves Water Park and owns the federally registered trademark for SUMMER WAVES. In 2021, Jekyll Island discovered that Polygroup Macau Limited, an intellectual property holding company registered in the British Virgin Islands, had registered nearly identical SUMMER WAVES marks. Polygroup Macau’s general counsel had also asked to buy Jekyll Island’s domain name, summerwaves.com. Jekyll Island sued Polygroup Macau for trademark infringement and to cancel Polygroup Macau’s marks. Polygroup Macau moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing it did not sell products in the United States using its trademarks.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia granted Polygroup Macau’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Polygroup Macau did not have sufficient contacts with the United States to support personal jurisdiction. The court noted that Polygroup Macau did not sell products in the United States using its trademarks and only permitted other entities to do so, making the connection between Polygroup Macau’s activities and Jekyll Island’s claims too attenuated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court’s conclusion. The Eleventh Circuit found that Polygroup Macau had purposefully availed itself of the benefits of United States law by registering and maintaining trademarks with the USPTO, allowing its sister companies to use those trademarks to sell products in the United States, and marketing specifically to U.S. consumers. The court held that the connection between Jekyll Island’s claims and Polygroup Macau’s activities in the United States was close enough to support specific jurisdiction. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for consideration on the merits. View "Jekyll Island-State Park Authority v. Polygroup Macau Limited" on Justia Law

In 2008, a class action was filed against officials from the City of Tenaha and Shelby County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs claimed that the officials had an illegal practice of targeting and seizing property from racial or ethnic minorities. A settlement agreement, including a consent decree, was reached, requiring the defendants to follow specific procedures to prevent future illegal stops. The decree also included a court-appointed monitor to ensure compliance. The consent decree was initially entered in 2013, amended in 2019, and expired in July 2020. Plaintiffs' motion to extend the decree was denied, and the County Defendants settled, leaving only the City Defendants in the case.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas handled the case, where class counsel filed four motions for attorney fees. The first three motions were granted, totaling $324,773.90. The fourth motion requested $88,553.33 for fees from April to December 2020. Initially denied as untimely, the decision was vacated and remanded by the appellate court. On reconsideration, the district court awarded $16,020, reducing the hourly rates and the hours deemed reasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court failed to provide class-wide notice of the attorney-fee motion as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h). This failure deprived class members of the opportunity to object to the fee motion. The appellate court held that the district court abused its discretion by not enforcing the notice requirement and vacated the fee award, remanding the case for further proceedings to ensure compliance with Rule 23(h). View "Morrow v. Jones" on Justia Law

Mark Petersen sued Deputy Stefanie Pedersen under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging false arrest for drunk driving and an unlawful blood draw. On December 27, 2018, Deputy Pedersen responded to a car crash in rural Wisconsin. She found Petersen, who was intoxicated, attempting to change a tire on a car registered to him. Witnesses confirmed he was the only person near the car. Petersen had a history of uncooperative behavior with law enforcement and prior OWI charges. Based on the scene, his behavior, and his intoxication, Pedersen arrested him for OWI and obtained a search warrant for a blood draw, which confirmed his high BAC.In the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, Petersen was charged with OWI – 4th Offense. He moved to suppress the BAC evidence, arguing lack of probable cause for his arrest. The state court granted his motion, leading to the dismissal of the charges. Petersen then filed a § 1983 lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which was reduced to claims against Deputy Pedersen for false arrest and unreasonable search. The district court granted summary judgment for Pedersen, finding probable cause for the arrest and a valid search warrant for the blood draw, and also granted her qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that probable cause supported Petersen’s arrest based on the totality of the circumstances, including his intoxication, the scene of the crash, and witness statements. The court also found the blood draw was lawful as it was conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant. Additionally, the court held that Deputy Pedersen was entitled to qualified immunity for both the arrest and the blood draw. View "Petersen v Pedersen" on Justia Law