Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Pamela Pollock sued her supervisor, Michael Kelso, in 2018 for sexual harassment and racial discrimination, alleging that Kelso asked her for sexual intercourse in 2016 and, after she rejected him, promoted less qualified individuals of other races to positions she sought. The trial court initially ruled that Pollock’s suit was time-barred, a decision which was affirmed by the appellate court. However, in 2021, the California Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the statute of limitations begins when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the adverse promotion decision, that the defense bears the burden on this issue, and that costs or fees on appeal cannot be awarded to a prevailing defendant without determining the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.Following the Supreme Court’s directions, the appellate court remanded the case and ordered costs for Pollock. Pollock then moved for attorney fees in the trial court, which awarded her $493,577.10. Kelso appealed this award. Before the trial date, Kelso and Pollock settled the bulk of their case, with Pollock moving to dismiss her underlying case with prejudice except for the attorney fee award, which Kelso was appealing. The trial court retained jurisdiction regarding the fee award.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court denied Pollock’s motion to dismiss Kelso’s appeal, affirming that Kelso was appealing from a final collateral order. On the merits, the court affirmed the fee award, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining Pollock as the prevailing party and in the amount awarded. The court found that the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and that the fee award, including the use of a 1.8 multiplier, was reasonable. View "Pollock v. Kelso" on Justia Law

A woman sued her father, alleging childhood sexual abuse, and supported her claims with expert testimony on the accuracy of "recovered" memories. The abuse allegedly began when she was three years old and stopped in 1992. By 1995, she no longer recalled the abuse but began to develop confusing memories eighteen years later. These memories eventually led to her filing a lawsuit against her father for human trafficking, sexual abuse, assault, emotional distress, false imprisonment, and incest under federal and state law. She claimed her lawsuit was timely because she had repressed the memories of the abuse.In the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, the court allowed Dr. James Hopper to testify as an expert on repressed and recovered memories, despite objections from the defendant, Ronald A. Cohen. The court aimed to balance the testimony of Dr. Hopper with that of Dr. Deryn Strange, who testified that there is no scientific support for the theory that trauma victims can repress and later recover memories with clarity. The jury returned a mixed verdict, finding for the plaintiff on five state law counts and awarding her $1.5 million in damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and found that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to properly analyze Dr. Hopper's qualifications and the reliability and fit of his testimony. The appellate court concluded that Dr. Hopper's testimony lacked the necessary scientific support and relevance to the case. The court determined that the admission of this testimony was prejudicial and affected the jury's verdict. Consequently, the Third Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Cohen v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Linda Thompson filed a putative class action against the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (the "Exchange") in Illinois state court, alleging that the Exchange printed her credit card’s expiration date on purchase receipts, violating the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA). The Exchange removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which allows federal agencies to remove cases to federal court. Thompson moved to remand the case to state court, arguing lack of Article III standing, while the Exchange moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois denied Thompson’s motion to remand and granted the Exchange’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the Exchange, as a federal entity, could remove the case without asserting a colorable federal defense and had an absolute right to litigate in federal court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that the Exchange did not need to present a federal defense to remove the case. However, it found that the district court erred in dismissing the suit. The Seventh Circuit held that under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), when a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, it must remand the case to state court. The court noted that Thompson’s lack of Article III standing did not preclude state court jurisdiction, as state courts are not bound by Article III constraints. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to remand it to state court. View "Thompson v Army and Air Force Exchange Service" on Justia Law

Jeane Whitfield filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Dennis Schimpf and Sweetgrass Plastic Surgery, LLC, alleging negligence in performing breast augmentation-mastopexy surgery and in post-operative care. Whitfield experienced complications post-surgery, including severe pain and wound issues, leading her to seek further medical attention and additional surgeries. She claimed Schimpf's negligence caused her injuries and inadequate post-operative care exacerbated her condition.The jury in the Circuit Court of Charleston County found in favor of Schimpf and Sweetgrass, determining that Whitfield did not prove the defendants deviated from the standard of care. Whitfield appealed, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Whitfield then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court, challenging two evidentiary rulings: the exclusion of evidence to show bias of Sweetgrass' office manager, Vicky Tolbert, and the admission of testimony from Schimpf's expert witnesses based on their Rule 35 examinations of Whitfield.The South Carolina Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the admission of the expert testimony but erred in affirming the exclusion of evidence of Tolbert's bias. The Supreme Court held that evidence of Tolbert's sexual relationship with Schimpf, her salary, and the free cosmetic procedures she received was relevant to show potential bias and should have been admitted. The Court determined that excluding this evidence was prejudicial to Whitfield's case, as it impacted the jury's ability to assess Tolbert's credibility. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Whitfield v. Schimpf" on Justia Law

John Doe 2, a student athlete at North Carolina State University, alleged that he was sexually abused by Robert Murphy, the university’s Director of Sports Medicine, under the guise of medical treatment. Doe claimed that the university was deliberately indifferent to prior complaints of Murphy’s sexual misconduct. The district court dismissed Doe’s complaint, finding that he failed to plead facts supporting an inference that the university had actual notice of Murphy’s sexual harassment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court concluded that a report of “sexual grooming” could not provide actual notice to the university of sexual harassment. The district court assumed without deciding that the report was made to an official with the requisite authority for Title IX purposes but found that the report did not describe an incident of sexual harassment and thus could not support a plausible inference of actual notice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that a report of “sexual grooming” can objectively be construed as alleging sexual harassment, thus providing actual notice to the university. The court found that the district court erred in its conclusion and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the report was made to an appropriate official with the authority to address complaints of sexual harassment and to institute corrective measures on behalf of the university. View "John Doe 2 v. North Carolina State University" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of hospice service providers in Oklahoma, sued Defendant Axxess Technology Solutions, Inc. for breach of contract, alleging that Axxess failed to properly process claims, resulting in non-payment for services. Axxess was served but mistakenly believed it had not been due to an employee error. Consequently, Axxess did not respond to the complaint, leading the district court to enter a default judgment against it. Axxess moved to set aside the default judgment, arguing the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to a contractual mediation requirement. The district court denied this motion, and Axxess did not appeal.Over six months later, Axxess filed a second motion to set aside the default judgment, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (4), and (6). The district court denied this motion on claim preclusion grounds, and Axxess timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision but not on claim preclusion grounds. Instead, it held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the second motion because the arguments raised could have been presented in the first motion. The court noted that Axxess's delay in raising these arguments was sufficient reason to deny relief under Rule 60(b). The court also granted Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to properly allege diversity jurisdiction, concluding that there was complete diversity between the parties. View "Choice Hospice v. Axxess Technology Solutions" on Justia Law

Wayne Brown, a Tulsa police officer, was terminated after a private citizen, Marq Lewis, brought several of Brown's old Facebook posts to the attention of the City of Tulsa and the Tulsa Police Department. The posts included images and messages that were deemed offensive and in violation of the department's social media policy. Brown filed a lawsuit claiming his termination violated his First Amendment rights and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He also brought a wrongful discharge claim under Oklahoma law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma dismissed Brown's federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claim. The court concluded that the City's interest in maintaining public confidence in the police force outweighed Brown's free speech rights and that Chief Jordan was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also dismissed Brown's Equal Protection claim, determining it was a "class-of-one" theory foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the dismissal of Brown's First Amendment claim, finding that the district court erred in conducting the Pickering balancing test at the motion to dismiss stage and in granting qualified immunity to Chief Jordan. The court affirmed the dismissal of Brown's Equal Protection claim, agreeing that it was a non-cognizable "class-of-one" claim in the public employment context. The court also reversed the district court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Brown's state law claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Brown v. City of Tulsa" on Justia Law

In 1960, the Cuban government seized Banco Nuñez and Banco Pujol, two privately held Cuban banks, and absorbed their assets into Banco Nacional de Cuba (BNC). Decades later, in 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act, which allows U.S. nationals to sue any person trafficking in property confiscated by the Cuban regime. The plaintiffs, successors-in-interest to the assets of Banco Nuñez and Banco Pujol, brought a Helms-Burton action against Société Générale and BNP Paribas, alleging that the banks trafficked in their confiscated property by providing financial services to BNC.The plaintiffs initially filed their suits in the Southern District of Florida and the Southern District of New York. The district courts dismissed the complaints, holding that most of the allegations were time-barred under 22 U.S.C. § 6084, which they construed as a statute of repose. The courts also found that the remaining allegations failed to plausibly allege trafficking as defined by the Helms-Burton Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring their claims. However, it affirmed the district courts' rulings that 22 U.S.C. § 6084 is a statute of repose, not subject to equitable tolling, and that the presidential suspensions of the right to bring an action under the Act did not toll the time bar. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations of conduct after 2010 were insufficient to state a plausible claim of trafficking under the Helms-Burton Act. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district courts, dismissing the plaintiffs' actions. View "Moreira v. Société Générale,S.A." on Justia Law

Silverthorne Seismic, L.L.C. licensed seismic data to Casillas Petroleum Resource Partners II, L.L.C. and sent the data to Sterling Seismic Services, Ltd. for processing. Silverthorne alleged that Sterling sent unlicensed data to Casillas, which Casillas then showed to potential investors. Silverthorne sued Sterling for trade-secret misappropriation under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, seeking a reasonable royalty as a remedy.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas set the standard for calculating a reasonable royalty, adopting a definition from a previous case, University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp. The district court certified this order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), concluding that the reasonable-royalty standard was a controlling question of law with substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal would materially advance the litigation. The district court stayed the proceedings pending the appeal, and an administrative panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted leave to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that granting leave to appeal was an error. The court found that the district court's order did not involve a controlling question of law and that the appeal would not materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. The court emphasized that the parties had not yet gone to trial, and Silverthorne had not proven liability, making the damages issue premature. The court vacated the order granting leave to appeal, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Silverthorne v. Sterling Seismic" on Justia Law

Beata Zarzecki, a Polish national, entered the United States on a six-month tourist visa in 1989 and remained in the country illegally. In 1998, she married a U.S. citizen, and they have a daughter who is also a U.S. citizen. In 2013, removal proceedings were initiated against her, and she applied for adjustment of status based on her marriage. Her application was complicated by a 2005 conviction for felony aggravated driving under the influence, resulting in a fatal accident. She was sentenced to nine years in prison and served over eight years. Additional incidents included a 2003 arrest for aggravated assault and a 2004 charge for driving without insurance.The immigration judge denied her application for adjustment of status, citing the severity of her criminal record and insufficient evidence of addressing her mental health issues. The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) reviewed the case de novo and upheld the immigration judge's decision, emphasizing the egregious nature of her offense and finding that her mitigating factors did not outweigh the adverse factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Zarzecki's petition, focusing on whether the Board committed legal or constitutional errors. Zarzecki argued that the Board failed to properly consider her mental health evidence and did not apply the correct standard of review. The court found that the Board did consider her mental health evidence and applied the appropriate standard of review. The court concluded that the Board did not commit any legal or constitutional errors and dismissed Zarzecki's petition for lack of jurisdiction, as discretionary decisions regarding adjustment of status are not subject to judicial review. View "Zarzecki v. Garland" on Justia Law