Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Christine Berger and Brian Repnow were in a decade-long relationship but never married. During their relationship, they accumulated various properties and businesses. In August 2021, Berger filed a lawsuit seeking partition, conversion, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment, requesting an equitable division of their accumulated real and personal property or monetary damages. Repnow claimed sole ownership of the properties and requested denial of Berger's claims.The District Court of Mercer, South Central Judicial District, held a two-day bench trial in October 2023. The court granted Berger's partition claim for the Expansion Drive property, awarding her sole ownership, and determined that the other properties and vehicles were solely owned by Repnow. The court also granted Berger's unjust enrichment claim, awarding her $64,000 for her contributions to Repnow's properties, and denied the claims of conversion and promissory estoppel. The court awarded the Dream Girls Boutique business to Repnow and Powerhouse Nutrition to Berger.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's finding that the parties intended to share ownership of the Expansion Drive property and the award of Powerhouse Nutrition to Berger. However, it reversed the decision to award 100% of the Expansion Drive property to Berger, stating that the district court should have considered the parties' respective ownership interests and made an equitable division. The court also found that the district court failed to complete the unjust enrichment analysis and adequately explain the $64,000 award.The North Dakota Supreme Court remanded the case for the district court to determine the parties' respective ownership interests in the Expansion Drive property and make an award consistent with those interests. The court also instructed the district court to complete the unjust enrichment analysis and provide a clear explanation for the $64,000 award if necessary. View "Berger v. Repnow" on Justia Law

Samantha Davis filed a petition for a disorderly conduct restraining order against Richard Romanyshyn in April 2024. The district court granted a temporary restraining order and outlined the hearing procedure, which limited the hearing to 15 minutes unless a full evidentiary hearing was requested. The procedure required the requesting party to file a notice of witnesses and a summary of their anticipated testimony three days before the hearing. If no request was made, evidence had to be presented by affidavit, and affiants had to be available for cross-examination if notified 24 hours before the hearing.Davis did not request a full evidentiary hearing but filed a notice to cross-examine Romanyshyn. Romanyshyn argued he requested a full evidentiary hearing and filed a notice to cross-examine through his answer, but the district court found he did not follow the proper procedure. The hearing was limited to arguments from Davis’s counsel and Romanyshyn, along with Davis’s petition and Romanyshyn’s affidavit. The district court granted Davis a two-year restraining order, later amended to include the parties’ two minor children, conflicting with an existing parental responsibility order.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and concluded that the district court deprived Romanyshyn of a full evidentiary hearing as required by N.D.C.C. § 12.1–31.2–01(1). The court found that the district court relied solely on inadmissible hearsay in Davis’s petition and Romanyshyn’s affidavit, without allowing cross-examination or presenting admissible evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the restraining order and remanded the case for a full evidentiary hearing. The court also noted that any restraining order issued on remand must not conflict with the existing parental responsibility order. View "Davis v. Romanyshyn" on Justia Law

Thomas Steiger and Hope VanDelden have two minor children, G.L.M.S. and T.L.S. Thomas filed a Petition for Establishment of a Permanent Parenting Plan in October 2016, which was granted in May 2017 after Hope did not respond or attend the hearing. The plan allowed the children to reside primarily with Thomas and have contact with Hope on alternating weekends, holidays, and up to 14 days of vacation each year. Hope filed a motion to amend the parenting plan in October 2017, claiming Thomas had reduced her parenting time. Thomas’s mother and stepfather also petitioned to intervene, asserting their grandparenting time had been decreased.In October 2023, Hope filed a motion to proceed with mediation to address the parenting plan. After unsuccessful mediation, she filed another motion to amend the plan in January 2024, claiming Thomas did not allow the children to spend additional time with her. Thomas opposed the motion, asserting there was no change in circumstances to warrant an amendment. The District Court set an in-chambers interview with the oldest child, G.L.M.S., but did not hold an evidentiary hearing before granting Hope’s motion to amend the parenting plan in July 2024.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the District Court erred by not holding a hearing on the motion to amend the parenting plan, as required by Montana law unless the motion is denied for lack of adequate cause. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s order and remanded the case for a hearing to determine if the statutory criteria for amending the parenting plan were met and to amend the plan in the best interests of the children. View "In Re G.L.M.S. and T.L.S." on Justia Law

Banorte, a group of five associated entities of the Mexican bank Grupo Financiero Banorte, sued Cartograf S.A. de C.V. (Cartograf Mexico) in the Fourth Civil Court of Mexico City in 2021. Banorte alleged that Cartograf Mexico and its sole administrator, José Páramo Riestra, defaulted on loans and concealed assets. Banorte filed an ex parte application in the Eastern District of Virginia to conduct discovery on Cartograf Mexico’s American subsidiary, Cartograf USA, Inc., under 28 U.S.C. § 1782. The district court granted the application, allowing Banorte to serve Cartograf USA with a subpoena. Cartograf USA moved to quash the subpoena, but the district court denied the motion.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted Banorte’s application for discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, finding that the statutory requirements and discretionary factors set out in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. weighed in Banorte’s favor. The court allowed Banorte to serve subpoenas on Cartograf USA, seeking documents and deposition testimony related to Cartograf USA’s relationship with Cartograf Mexico and Páramo. Cartograf USA argued that the discovery was not for use in a foreign proceeding and that Banorte’s requests were made in bad faith, but the district court rejected these arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit held that Banorte satisfied the statutory requirements of § 1782, including the “for use” requirement, as the requested discovery had a reasonable possibility of being useful in the Mexican civil proceedings. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in analyzing the Intel factors, including the receptivity of the foreign tribunal and whether the request was an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court’s careful consideration of the factors and its decision to grant the application and deny the motion to quash were appropriate. View "Banco Mercantil Del Norte, S.A v. Cartograf USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Monsanto Company, Pharmacia, LLC, and Solutia, Inc. (collectively, "Monsanto") filed a lawsuit in St. Louis County Circuit Court in Missouri against Magnetek, Inc., General Electric Co. ("GE"), Paramount Global, KYOCERA AVX Components Corporation, Cornell Dubilier Electronics, Inc., and The Gillette Company LLC (collectively, "Defendants"). Monsanto alleged that it continues to incur substantial costs to defend against PCB lawsuits that should be borne by Defendants and sought to enforce written agreements obligating Defendants to defend, indemnify, and hold Monsanto harmless in all currently pending and future PCB lawsuits.GE removed the action to federal court, asserting jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted Monsanto’s motion to remand, finding that GE's removal was untimely. GE appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the parties had waived Missouri Supreme Court Rule 54.13(c)’s personal service provision and expressly agreed that January 31, 2023, was the effective date for service of process. The court determined that the 30-day removal period began on the agreed effective date of service, not when GE signed the acknowledgment and waiver of service of process or when Monsanto filed the document. Consequently, GE's notice of removal was filed within the 30-day period, making the removal timely.The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s order of remand and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court declined to address whether GE satisfies the government contractor requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), as this issue was not addressed by the district court. View "Monsanto Company v. General Electric Co." on Justia Law

An inmate at Green Bay Correctional Institution, who is a practicing Muslim, filed a lawsuit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (WDOC). He challenged WDOC's policy prohibiting inmates from leading religious programs when no outside religious leader or volunteer is available, claiming it resulted in unnecessary cancellations of religious programs. He also alleged that the cancellation of these programs breached a prior settlement agreement with WDOC.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment in favor of WDOC on the RLUIPA claim, finding that the policy was the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling interest of maintaining prison safety and security. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the inmate on the state law breach-of-contract claim as to liability but relinquished supplemental jurisdiction over the request for injunctive relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of WDOC on the RLUIPA claim, agreeing that the policy was the least restrictive means to ensure prison safety and security. However, the appellate court vacated the district court's partial judgment on the state law breach-of-contract claim. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction over the remedy portion of the claim while retaining jurisdiction over liability. The case was remanded to the district court to determine whether to retain or relinquish jurisdiction over the entire state law claim. View "West v Hoy" on Justia Law

Interfaith Sanctuary Housing Services, Inc. (IFS) applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate a large-scale low-barrier shelter home in Northwest Boise. The Planning and Zoning Commission (PZC) initially denied the application, citing concerns about compatibility with the neighborhood, undue burden on public facilities, adverse effects on nearby properties, and insufficient information on mitigating adverse impacts. IFS appealed to the Boise City Council, which reversed the PZC’s decision and granted the CUP, imposing 30 conditions of approval. The Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. (VPNA) sought reconsideration, which was denied, and then petitioned the district court for judicial review.The district court upheld the City Council’s decision, finding no error in the Council’s actions. VPNA appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the City Council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, based on unlawful procedure, and that the Council’s reasoned statement was inadequate under the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA).The Idaho Supreme Court found that the City Council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and based on unlawful procedure because the PZC’s determination that the CUP could not be conditioned into compliance with the CUP criteria was not an error. The Court also found that the City Council’s reasoned statement was conclusory and failed to adequately resolve pertinent factual disputes, thus violating LLUPA and depriving VPNA of due process. The Court concluded that VPNA demonstrated a prejudice to its substantial rights.The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to invalidate the City Council’s approval of the CUP. VPNA was awarded costs but not attorney fees on appeal. View "Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. City of Boise" on Justia Law

Clayton D. Richards underwent a medical procedure at Vanderbilt University Medical Center (VUMC) in August 2013, resulting in bilateral lower extremity paralysis. He initially filed a negligence lawsuit against VUMC in December 2014, which he later voluntarily dismissed. Richards refiled his complaint in January 2021, relying on Tennessee's saving statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-105, which allows a plaintiff to refile a lawsuit within one year of a voluntary nonsuit. However, the trial court dismissed his complaint, ruling that Richards did not comply with the saving statute's terms.The Circuit Court for Davidson County dismissed Richards' refiled complaint, holding that it was not filed within the one-year period required by the saving statute. Richards argued that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) provided him with a 120-day extension to the one-year saving statute, making his lawsuit timely. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal, agreeing that the 120-day extension did not apply to the saving statute.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) does not extend the one-year refiling period provided by the saving statute. The court emphasized that the 120-day extension applies only to statutes of limitations and repose, not to the saving statute. Consequently, Richards' refiled complaint was untimely, and the trial court's dismissal of the case was upheld. View "Richards v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center" on Justia Law

David Morway sought review of an unpublished order by the court of appeals that dismissed his appeal as untimely. The appeal was against a May 24, 2023, circuit court order denying his motion to modify or terminate spousal maintenance. The court of appeals concluded that the order was final for purposes of appeal under WIS. STAT. § 808.03(1) and dismissed the appeal because David filed his notice of appeal outside the 90-day timeframe.In the Ozaukee County Circuit Court, David and Karen Morway were divorced in 2019, with David ordered to pay spousal maintenance. David filed a motion to modify the maintenance in May 2022 due to a change in his employment circumstances. The family court commissioner reduced David’s maintenance obligation, but Karen appealed. The circuit court held a trial and denied David’s motion to modify or terminate maintenance in an oral decision on April 19, 2023, which was later memorialized in the May 24 order. Karen’s post-trial motion for attorney fees based on overtrial was also denied at that time.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the May 24 order was final because it disposed of the entire matter in litigation, specifically David’s motion to modify or terminate maintenance. The court held that the order was unambiguous in its finality, despite lacking an explicit finality statement. The court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, concluding that David’s notice of appeal was not timely filed within the 90-day period, and thus, the court of appeals properly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Morway v. Morway" on Justia Law

Appellants CKHS, Inc. and The Foundation for Delaware County sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Appellees Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc. and Prospect Crozer, LLC from converting Delaware County Memorial Hospital from an emergency and acute care facility to a behavioral health hospital. The asset purchase agreement (APA) between the parties included clauses requiring Prospect to maintain key service lines, including emergency medicine, for five years and to consult with a local advisory board before making significant changes after that period. Additionally, the APA stipulated that any breach would cause irreparable damage.The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas granted the preliminary injunction, finding that Appellants demonstrated the necessary prerequisites, including irreparable harm. The court relied on the APA's irreparable harm clause and expert testimony from Melissa Lyon, who testified that removing healthcare access points from a community almost always negatively impacts health outcomes, particularly for socioeconomically disadvantaged and elderly populations.The Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court's order, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by finding irreparable harm based on speculative and hypothetical evidence. The Commonwealth Court held that the APA's irreparable harm clause alone was insufficient and required concrete evidence of harm, which it found lacking in Lyon's testimony.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and determined that the Commonwealth Court misapplied the appellate standard of review, which requires a highly deferential approach to the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the trial court had apparently reasonable grounds to issue the preliminary injunction based on Lyon's testimony and the APA's irreparable harm clause. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings to address the remaining factors for preliminary injunctive relief. View "CKHS, Inc. v. Prospect Med Hldgs, Inc." on Justia Law