Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves D.H.E., the biological father of V.S., a minor. The Cook County circuit court found V.S. neglected due to an injurious environment and dependent due to his mother's disability. Consequently, V.S. was adjudged a ward of the court, and guardianship was granted to the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). D.H.E. appealed, arguing that the neglect finding violated his due process rights, was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that the court failed to provide a factual basis for its disposition.The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's adjudication and disposition orders. It found that D.H.E.'s challenges related to the neglect finding were moot because he did not also challenge the dependency finding. The appellate court also upheld the disposition order, which granted guardianship and custody to DCFS based on the finding that D.H.E. was unable to care for V.S.The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court's judgment. The court held that D.H.E.'s appeal was moot because he failed to challenge the dependency finding, which alone was sufficient to support the wardship and disposition orders. The court also found that the collateral consequences exception to mootness did not apply, as no significant collateral consequences specifically tied to the neglect finding were identified. Therefore, the court did not address the remaining issues on appeal. View "In re V.S." on Justia Law

Steuben Foods, Inc. (Steuben) filed a complaint in 2010 in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, alleging that Shibuya Hoppmann Corp. infringed claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,209,591, 6,536,188, and 6,702,985. Shibuya Kogyo Co., Ltd. was added as a defendant in 2012, and a similar complaint was filed against HP Hood LLC. The cases were consolidated and later transferred to the District of Delaware in 2019. The district court issued a claim construction order in 2020 and denied cross-motions for summary judgment in 2021. A five-day jury trial resulted in a verdict that the asserted patents were valid and infringed, awarding Steuben $38,322,283.78 in damages.The district court granted Shibuya’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of noninfringement for all asserted patents, found the invalidity arguments waived, and conditionally granted a new trial. Steuben appealed the JMOL and the conditional grant of a new trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the JMOL of noninfringement for the ’591 and ’188 patents, finding substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict of infringement. The court affirmed the JMOL of noninfringement for the ’985 patent, holding that the continuous addition of sterilant could not be equivalent to the claim’s requirement of intermittent addition. The court also reversed the conditional grant of a new trial on noninfringement and vacated the conditional grant of a new trial on invalidity and damages, remanding for further proceedings.The main holdings were: reversing the JMOL of noninfringement for the ’591 and ’188 patents, affirming the JMOL of noninfringement for the ’985 patent, reversing the conditional grant of a new trial on noninfringement, and vacating the conditional grant of a new trial on invalidity and damages. View "STEUBEN FOODS, INC. v. SHIBUYA HOPPMANN CORPORATION " on Justia Law

Clover Boykin filed a lawsuit against Greenwood Leflore Hospital (GLH) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that GLH intentionally withheld her medical records, preventing her from filing a medical malpractice suit. Boykin claimed that GLH's actions violated her constitutional right of access to the courts. GLH responded with a motion to dismiss, arguing that Boykin's claims failed as a matter of law, the employee was immune from suit, GLH was never served, and the suit was time-barred.The Leflore County Circuit Court denied GLH's motion to dismiss and granted Boykin additional time to serve GLH. GLH then sought an interlocutory appeal, which the Supreme Court of Mississippi granted. Boykin did not file a brief in response to the appeal.The Supreme Court of Mississippi accepted Boykin's failure to file a brief as a confession of error and found that Boykin's claims failed as a matter of law. The court held that HIPAA does not provide a private right of action and that Boykin could not use § 1983 to enforce a federal statute that does not give her an individual right. The court reversed the trial judge's denial of the motion to dismiss and rendered judgment in favor of GLH. View "Greenwood Leflore Hospital v. Boykin" on Justia Law

The City of New Orleans filed a lawsuit against several pipeline operators and Entergy New Orleans LLC, alleging that their oil and gas production and transportation activities caused damage to the City's coastal zone. The City claimed that Entergy allowed its pipeline canals to widen and erode, threatening the City's storm buffer. The lawsuit was filed under Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978 (SLCRMA).The defendants removed the case to federal court, arguing that Entergy, the only in-state defendant, was improperly joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction. Entergy consented to the removal and argued that it was exempt from SLCRMA’s permit requirements because its activities commenced before the statute's effective date. The City moved to remand the case to state court, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied the motion, dismissed Entergy as a party, and stayed the case pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that Entergy was improperly joined because its activities were exempt under SLCRMA’s Historical-Use Exception, which applies to uses legally commenced before the statute's effective date. The court found no reasonable basis for the City to recover against Entergy, thus disregarding Entergy's citizenship and establishing complete diversity among the parties. The court also rejected the City's argument that it was merely a nominal party representing Louisiana, concluding that the City filed the suit on its own behalf and stood to benefit from a favorable ruling. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court's denial of the City's motion to remand. View "New Orleans City v. Aspect Energy" on Justia Law

Andre Le Doux was driving on Interstate 81 in Virginia when he encountered a sudden traffic standstill due to a torrential downpour. As he braked, a vehicle behind him pushed his van into another vehicle, leaving his van exposed in the left lane. Ervin Worthy, driving a Western Express tractor trailer, saw the heavy rain and braked, but could not stop in time and collided with Le Doux’s van, causing severe injuries to Le Doux.Le Doux sued Worthy for negligence and willful and wanton negligence, and Western Express for vicarious liability and negligent hiring. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia excluded expert testimony from Le Doux’s meteorologist and accident reconstructionist due to gaps in radar data and inaccurate GPS timestamps. The court also excluded testimony from Le Doux’s trucking expert, finding it unnecessary for the jury to understand the standard of care for a tractor trailer driver in rainy conditions. Additionally, the court dismissed Le Doux’s negligent hiring claim against Western Express, reasoning that since Worthy was acting within the scope of his employment, the claim was redundant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s exclusion of the expert testimonies, agreeing that the gaps in data and potential jury confusion justified the decision. The court also upheld the exclusion of the trucking expert’s testimony, finding that the jury could understand the necessary standard of care without it. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of the negligent hiring claim, holding that since the jury found Worthy not negligent, Western Express could not be liable for negligent hiring. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings. View "Le Doux v. Western Express, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2001, Frances Mack-Marion refinanced her property, taking out a new mortgage. In 2020, U.S. Bank National Association, the successor-in-interest to the mortgage, initiated foreclosure proceedings against her. Mack-Marion counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that U.S. Bank was barred from foreclosure because the mortgage closed without attorney supervision, referencing the Matrix Financial Services Corporation v. Frazer decision. The Master-in-Equity dismissed her claim, ruling it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the mortgage was recorded before the effective date of Matrix.The Master-in-Equity interpreted Hambrick v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation to mean only the South Carolina Supreme Court could determine unauthorized practice of law claims. Additionally, the Master found Mack-Marion's claim insufficient as the mortgage predated Matrix. Mack-Marion appealed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted her motion to certify the appeal.The South Carolina Supreme Court overruled Hambrick to the extent it held that circuit courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over unauthorized practice of law claims. The Court clarified that circuit courts do have jurisdiction over such claims and reaffirmed that Matrix applies prospectively. The Court held that the Master had subject matter jurisdiction but correctly dismissed Mack-Marion's claim under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, because her mortgage was recorded before the effective date of Matrix. The Court affirmed the Master's dismissal as modified, maintaining that U.S. Bank could pursue foreclosure. View "U.S. Bank National Association v. Mack" on Justia Law

K.S., a minor, through his guardian James Seeger, sued Richland School District Two, alleging gross negligence in supervising K.S.'s first-grade teacher and seeking liability under respondeat superior for injuries K.S. suffered due to the teacher's actions. The teacher, under personal stress, humiliated K.S. and other students, and physically grabbed K.S., causing him pain. K.S. experienced significant emotional distress and was diagnosed with persistent depressive disorder and anxiety.The trial court granted the District a directed verdict, ruling that the District could not be liable for negligence as K.S. suffered no physical injury. The court also excluded Seeger's expert testimony and ruled that the Safe School Climate Act did not repeal the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. The court of appeals affirmed the directed verdict, agreeing that no physical injury occurred and did not address the expert testimony exclusion or the Safe Schools Act ruling.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the directed verdict, finding that the teacher's forceful grabbing of K.S. constituted sufficient physical harm to support a negligence claim. The court also reversed the exclusion of Seeger's expert, Dr. McEvoy, ruling that his testimony was not needlessly cumulative and would have provided crucial insight into the District's policies and their implementation. The court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the Safe Schools Act did not repeal the Tort Claims Act, maintaining that the Act does not create a private right of action or alter tort liability.The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, allowing Seeger's negligence claims to proceed and permitting the District to renew objections to Dr. McEvoy's testimony on remand. View "K.S. v. Richland School District Two" on Justia Law

Stephen Cook, a trustee of two charitable trusts, sued Preston Marshall, both personally and in his capacity as a trustee of a related trust, alleging that Preston's failures caused the charitable trusts to incur debt and tax penalties. The district court denied Preston's motion to dismiss and later granted Cook partial summary judgment. Preston appealed, arguing that the suit should be dismissed because Cook's unnamed co-trustees lacked diversity of citizenship.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana initially ruled in Cook's favor, ordering Preston to authorize payments from the Peroxisome Trust to the Marshall Heritage Foundation and holding that Preston breached his fiduciary duties. Cook later moved to enforce this judgment, claiming Preston continued to refuse to authorize payments and failed to file tax returns. The district court held Preston in contempt but did not remove him as co-trustee. Cook then filed a new suit against Preston, seeking damages and Preston's removal as co-trustee. The district court denied Preston's motion to dismiss, which argued that the claims were barred by res judicata and that necessary parties were not joined.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that complete diversity of citizenship existed because the trusts themselves were not parties, and only the citizenship of Cook and Preston mattered. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding without joining Elaine and Pierce as parties. Additionally, the court determined that res judicata did not bar Cook's claims because the new claims arose from Preston's post-judgment conduct. Finally, the court rejected Preston's arguments regarding comparative fault and failure to mitigate damages, affirming the district court's judgment. View "Cook v. Marshall" on Justia Law

Automotive Finance Corporation (AFC) extended a loan to Monmars Automotive Group LLC, which was guaranteed by Meng Liu, her then-husband Ning Ao, and Liu’s friend Xiaoqiao Yang. After Monmars defaulted, AFC sued to recover the debt. Liu, representing herself, filed unsworn letters claiming she did not sign the loan agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment for AFC. Ao later admitted in an unsworn letter to forging Liu’s and Yang’s signatures, but Liu did not file a motion to correct error or appeal properly.The Marion Superior Court set aside the judgment based on fraud under Trial Rule 60(B)(3) after Liu, now represented by counsel, presented Ao’s testimony about the forgery. AFC appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals issued conflicting opinions in related cases. In Liu’s case, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision, but in Yang’s case, it reversed.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(3). The court found that Liu could have raised the fraud issue in a timely motion to correct error or on appeal. Additionally, there was no evidence that the alleged fraud prejudiced Liu’s ability to present her case. The court emphasized the importance of finality in judgments and the need for litigants, including those representing themselves, to comply with procedural requirements.The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for reinstatement of summary judgment in favor of AFC. View "Automotive Finance Corporation v. Liu" on Justia Law

A.K. appealed a disorderly conduct restraining order issued against her. Jennifer Gooss, on behalf of her minor daughter, filed the petition alleging A.K., also a minor, engaged in disorderly conduct. A temporary restraining order was issued, and a hearing was held. After a 30-minute hearing, the district court issued a disorderly conduct restraining order against A.K.The District Court of Mercer County, South Central Judicial District, conducted the hearing. A.K. argued on appeal that she was denied due process because the court's time limit on the hearing deprived her of a reasonable opportunity to rebut the evidence and testify on her own behalf. She also contended that the district court's findings were not supported by the evidence.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court noted that a district court's decision to grant a restraining order or conduct a hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The court found that A.K. did not object to the 30-minute time limit at the outset of the hearing and did not request additional time. The court determined that the district court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by setting the time limitations and that A.K. had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the petitioner.The Supreme Court also reviewed the district court's findings and concluded that sufficient evidence supported the finding that A.K.'s conduct affected the minor petitioner's safety, security, or privacy. The court held that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous and that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the restraining order. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the disorderly conduct restraining order. View "Gooss v. A.K." on Justia Law