Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A property owner applied for a conditional use permit to build a commercial hog facility on its land in rural Cherry County, Nebraska. The facility was intended to provide manure for fertilizing the owner's crops. Neighboring landowners objected to the issuance of the permit, arguing that the owner, not being the operator of the facility, could not establish compliance with zoning regulations regarding odor mitigation and water contamination.The Cherry County Board of Commissioners issued the permit, and the neighboring landowners appealed to the district court, seeking a trial de novo. The district court held a trial and determined that the owner's application complied with the relevant zoning regulations, affirming the issuance of the permit. The neighboring landowners then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court, while the Board cross-appealed, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the neighboring landowners' appeal.The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the district court had jurisdiction over the appeal, as the relevant statutes did not limit the right to appeal to applicants only. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in finding that the property owner demonstrated compliance with the zoning regulations. The court held that the property owner, not the operator, was responsible for showing compliance with the regulations and that the odor and water contamination mitigation plans submitted by the owner were sufficient. The court affirmed the district court's decision to uphold the issuance of the conditional use permit. View "Amorak v. Cherry Cty. Bd. of Comrs." on Justia Law

William Maxwell, a federal prisoner, filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus, seeking transfer to a halfway house or home confinement under the First Step Act of 2018. He argued that the district court erred in determining that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas dismissed Maxwell's petition, concluding that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies. Maxwell appealed this decision, contending that the district court's determination was incorrect.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that Maxwell's request for transfer to a halfway house or home confinement did not entitle him to accelerated release. According to the court's precedent in Melot v. Bergami, such relief should be sought through a civil rights suit rather than a habeas petition. Consequently, the court did not address whether Maxwell had exhausted his administrative remedies, as the proper vehicle for his claim was a civil rights suit, not a habeas petition. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Maxwell's petition. View "Maxwell v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Allan Gumarang entered into a lease agreement with Braemer on Raymond, LLC (Lessor) to operate an ice cream parlor. The lease included provisions requiring the Lessor to maintain the property and for Gumarang to obtain liability insurance and indemnify the Lessor against claims arising from his use of the property. In October 2017, a fire destroyed the property, and Gumarang alleged that the Lessor and its management (Management) failed to ensure the property had adequate fire prevention systems.Gumarang filed a lawsuit against the Lessor and Management for breach of contract, negligence, and other claims. In response, the Lessor and Management demanded that Gumarang defend and indemnify them under the lease terms. When Gumarang refused, they filed a cross-complaint for indemnity and breach of contract. Gumarang filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint, arguing it arose from his protected activity of filing the lawsuit.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Gumarang’s anti-SLAPP motion in part, striking the cross-claims for comparative indemnity and equitable indemnity but denied it for the contractual indemnity and breach of contract claims. The court found that the latter claims did not arise from protected activity and that the indemnity provision in the lease was enforceable. The court also denied Gumarang’s request for attorney fees, finding he did not achieve a practical benefit from the partial success of his anti-SLAPP motion.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the lower court’s decisions. The appellate court agreed that the cross-claims for contractual indemnity and breach of contract did not arise from Gumarang’s protected activity of filing the lawsuit but from his alleged breach of the lease’s indemnity provision. The court also upheld the denial of attorney fees, concluding that Gumarang did not obtain a significant practical benefit from the partial success of his anti-SLAPP motion. View "Gumarang v. Braemer on Raymond, LLC" on Justia Law

Ronald Rubin filed a lawsuit naming Kimberly Grippa as part of a criminal enterprise. His lawyer sent allegedly defamatory letters to state officials, asking them to investigate the alleged criminal enterprise and included copies of the complaint. Grippa sued Rubin for defamation, claiming the letters harmed her reputation and professional standing. Rubin moved for summary judgment, arguing the letters were protected by Florida’s absolute and qualified litigation privileges and that he could not be held vicariously liable for his lawyer’s actions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida denied Rubin’s motion for summary judgment on all grounds. The court found that the letters were not protected by the absolute litigation privilege because they were sent outside the litigation process and included additional statements beyond those in the complaint. The court also determined that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the statements were made with express malice, precluding the qualified litigation privilege. Lastly, the court rejected Rubin’s vicarious liability argument, suggesting that Rubin directed his lawyer’s actions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the denial of Florida’s absolute litigation privilege is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine but lacked jurisdiction to consider the denial of the qualified litigation privilege or the vicarious liability issue. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the absolute litigation privilege, concluding that the letters were sent outside the judicial process and included additional defamatory statements. The court dismissed the appeal regarding the qualified litigation privilege and vicarious liability for lack of jurisdiction. View "Grippa v. Rubin" on Justia Law

Quintin Grillone resigned from his position as a police officer in 2014 while under investigation for providing false information to a prosecutor regarding a traffic citation against his mother. The Peace Officer Standards and Training Division (POST) did not learn of the incident until 2019 when Grillone disclosed it in his application to join a new police department. Following an investigation, POST initiated disciplinary proceedings, and an administrative law judge found that Grillone's conduct constituted obstruction of justice. The POST Council then retroactively suspended Grillone’s certification for three years.Grillone sought judicial review by the Utah Court of Appeals, arguing that the disciplinary proceedings were time-barred by the four-year catch-all statute of limitations for civil actions under Utah Code § 78B-2-307(4). He contended that the statute governing POST disciplinary proceedings referred to them as “civil actions,” thus subjecting them to the civil statute of limitations. The court of appeals, however, held that civil statutes of limitation do not apply to administrative disciplinary proceedings absent specific legislative authority and found that the POST statute did not incorporate the civil statute of limitations.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court agreed that civil statutes of limitation are generally inapplicable to administrative disciplinary proceedings unless the legislature indicates otherwise. The Court concluded that the POST statute’s reference to “civil actions” was intended to distinguish POST proceedings from criminal actions, not to incorporate the civil statutes of limitation. Therefore, the disciplinary proceedings against Grillone were not time-barred, and the POST Council’s three-year suspension of his certification was upheld. View "Grillone v. Peace Officer Standards" on Justia Law

Jacques Rivera, after being released from over 20 years in prison for a wrongful murder conviction, sued the City of Chicago and several police officers under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for civil rights violations. A jury awarded him over $17 million, and his attorneys sought more than $6 million in fees and costs. The case was settled for $18.75 million, including at least $3.75 million for attorneys' fees and costs. Chicago, which had an insurance policy with Starstone Insurance SE covering liabilities between $15 and $20 million, sought indemnity for the $3.75 million. Starstone refused, claiming their policy only covered damages, not attorneys' fees and costs, and filed for a declaratory judgment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled in favor of Chicago, determining that the insurance policy covered the entire $18.75 million settlement as an "ultimate net loss" that Chicago was legally obligated to pay. Starstone appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court first addressed whether Starstone, a Societas Europaea (SE) based in Liechtenstein, qualified as a "corporation" under 28 U.S.C. §1332 for diversity jurisdiction purposes and concluded that it did. On the merits, the court found that the insurance policy's language covered the entire settlement amount, including attorneys' fees and costs, as part of the "ultimate net loss" Chicago was legally obligated to pay. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the policy's terms included indemnity for attorneys' fees and costs awarded under statutory provisions. View "Starstone Insurance SE v City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The City of Bakersfield operates multiple weirs on the Kern River to divert water for its use and for several water agencies, including the North Kern Water Storage District (NKWSD) and the Buena Vista Water Storage District. Environmental groups, including Bring Back the Kern (BBTK) and Water Audit California (WAC), sought and obtained a preliminary injunction from the Superior Court of Kern County. The injunction prohibited Bakersfield from operating the weirs in a manner that reduced Kern River flows below the volume sufficient to keep fish downstream in good condition. The trial court refused to consider the potential harm to the City or the water agencies in determining the applicability of the injunction.The water agencies filed motions for reconsideration, arguing that the injunction and the subsequent order setting a flow rate were issued without proper consideration of their interests. The trial court stayed the flow rate order and modified the injunction, but the water agencies appealed the injunction and the order setting a flow rate.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, held that under the self-executing provisions of article X, section 2 of the state Constitution, courts must always consider the reasonableness of water use when adjudicating such cases. The court found that the trial court's failure to consider the reasonableness of the water use it was ordering in the injunction was a constitutional error. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the injunction and the order setting a flow rate and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court also addressed issues related to the bond requirement and the due process rights of the water agencies, concluding that the trial court erred in setting a nominal bond and in issuing an implementation order that affected the water agencies without their agreement. View "Bring Back the Kern v. City of Bakersfield" on Justia Law

Marina Debity brought claims against the Monroe County Board of Education for sex discrimination and retaliation under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA). Debity alleged that the Board offered her a lower salary than it had paid a male predecessor, Matthew Ancel, for the same job and retaliated by withdrawing her job offer when she requested equal pay.A jury found that the Board offered Debity less money for legitimate reasons unrelated to her sex and did not retaliate against her. Despite these findings, the jury awarded Debity over $195,000 in damages, likely due to poor instructions on the verdict form. The magistrate judge noticed the inconsistency but dismissed the jury without allowing objections. The magistrate judge later denied Debity's motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, classifying the verdicts as special verdicts and reconciling the inconsistency by entering judgment based on the jury's answers to the interrogatories.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the magistrate judge presented the jury with a general verdict on the retaliation claims and a general verdict with interrogatories on the discrimination claims. The jury's answers to the interrogatories on the discrimination claims were consistent with each other but inconsistent with the general verdict. The court affirmed the magistrate judge's decision to enter judgment based on the interrogatories.Regarding the Board's affirmative defense to the discrimination claims, the court held that budget constraints and market forces of supply and demand each provided an independent basis to uphold the jury's verdict. Both reasons were legitimate business explanations for offering Debity a lower salary than Ancel. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the Board on all claims. View "Debity v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Karl Tobien, a door-to-door salesman, was attacked by a dog while working in Ohio. He filed two federal lawsuits: one against the homeowners in the Southern District of Ohio, which was dismissed by agreement, and another against Nationwide General Insurance Company in the Eastern District of Kentucky. Tobien claimed Nationwide violated Kentucky’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, acted in bad faith, and sought punitive damages after the company denied his insurance claim.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed Tobien’s lawsuit for improper venue, concluding that most relevant events occurred in Ohio. Tobien appealed, arguing that the Eastern District of Kentucky was a proper venue and that the district court should have transferred the case to the Southern District of Ohio instead of dismissing it.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and upheld the district court’s decision. The court determined that Tobien failed to show that a substantial part of the events giving rise to his claims occurred in the Eastern District of Kentucky. The court also found that transferring the case to the Southern District of Ohio would not be in the interest of justice, as Ohio law would apply and Tobien’s claims would fail under Ohio law. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Tobien’s lawsuit. View "Tobien v. Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A personal representative of a deceased resident's estate filed a complaint against a hospital district and its associated rehabilitation center, alleging negligence and vicarious liability for injuries suffered by the resident due to physical abuse by a temporary certified nursing assistant (CNA). The hospital district denied liability, claiming the CNA was an independent contractor. After a six-day trial, the jury found the CNA was an agent of the hospital district, and her negligence was a proximate cause of the resident's damages. The jury apportioned fault between the CNA and the hospital district, awarding $660,000 in damages to the estate.The district court reduced the damages by the percentage of fault attributed to the CNA, leading to an appeal by the personal representative, who argued the reduction was contrary to Wyoming law and inconsistent with the jury's verdict. The hospital district cross-appealed, asserting the district court should not have allowed the jury to consider whether the CNA was an agent and should have granted its motion for judgment as a matter of law.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and found the district court did not err in denying the hospital district's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court held there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in favor of the personal representative on both direct and vicarious liability claims. The court also found the jury instructions adequately informed the jury of the applicable law and did not cause confusion.However, the Supreme Court determined the district court erred in reducing the damages. The jury found the CNA's conduct was negligent and that she was an agent of the hospital district, making the hospital district vicariously liable for her actions. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter a judgment for the full $660,000 in favor of the estate. View "Campbell County Hospital District v. Elsner" on Justia Law