Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Landowners Anne and Mark Guillemette appealed an Environmental Division order denying their motion to dismiss neighbor Michael Casey’s appeal and remanding the matter to the Monkton Development Review Board (DRB) for consideration on the merits. Casey had challenged the zoning administrator’s decision that the Guillemettes’ wood-processing facility was exempt from enforcement due to the fifteen-year limitations period. Casey filed his appeal late, relying on incorrect instructions from the zoning administrator.The Environmental Division concluded that 10 V.S.A. § 8504(b)(2)(C) allowed Casey’s appeal to proceed despite the untimely filing, as disallowing the appeal would result in manifest injustice. The court remanded the matter to the DRB for consideration on the merits.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Environmental Division’s decision. The Supreme Court held that 10 V.S.A. § 8504(b)(2)(C) does not apply to appeals from the decisions of municipal administrative officers, such as zoning administrators. Instead, it applies only to appeals from municipal regulatory proceedings to the Environmental Division. Therefore, the finality provision at 24 V.S.A. § 4472 barred Casey’s untimely appeal, and the Environmental Division lacked jurisdiction to permit the appeal to proceed. View "In re Guillemette ZA Determination Appeal" on Justia Law

Pamela McKenzie was shopping at a Walgreens in Houston in 2019 when she was detained on suspicion of shoplifting. A Walgreens employee called the police, suspecting McKenzie was the same person who had stolen from the store earlier that day. After reviewing surveillance footage, the police determined McKenzie was not the thief and released her. McKenzie claimed that other Walgreens employees had agreed she was not the thief, but the employee called the police anyway. She sued Walgreens for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, gross negligence, respondeat superior liability for employee negligence, and negligent hiring, training, and supervision (NHTS).The trial court denied Walgreens' motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), which allows for early dismissal of legal actions based on the exercise of free speech. A divided Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the trial court erred by not dismissing McKenzie’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, gross negligence, and vicarious liability for employee negligence. However, it held that the NHTS claim was not subject to dismissal under the TCPA because it was not entirely based on the employee’s exercise of free speech rights.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the TCPA does apply to McKenzie’s NHTS claim. The court concluded that McKenzie failed to meet her evidentiary burden to avoid dismissal, as she did not provide clear and specific evidence for each essential element of her NHTS claim. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, specifically for the dismissal of McKenzie’s NHTS claim. The remainder of the Court of Appeals' judgment was left undisturbed. View "WALGREENS v. MCKENZIE" on Justia Law

Casey Cotton was involved in a car collision with Caleb and Adriane Crabtree, resulting in severe injuries to Caleb. The Crabtrees filed a lawsuit against Cotton and his insurer, Allstate, alleging that Allstate refused early settlement offers and failed to inform Cotton of these offers. While the claims against Allstate were dismissed, the claims against Cotton proceeded in the Lamar County Circuit Court. During the personal injury suit, Cotton declared bankruptcy, and his bankruptcy estate included a potential bad faith claim against Allstate. The Crabtrees, as unsecured creditors, petitioned the bankruptcy court to allow the personal injury suit to proceed to trial.The bankruptcy court directed that the suit against Cotton be liquidated by jury trial to pursue claims against Allstate for any resulting excess judgment. The Crabtrees sought an assignment of Cotton’s bad faith claim as a settlement of their unsecured claims in Cotton’s bankruptcy estate. Unable to afford the $10,000 up-front cost, they engaged Court Properties, LLC, to assist with financing. Court Properties paid the trustee $10,000 to acquire the bad faith claim, then assigned it to the Crabtrees in exchange for $10,000 plus interest, contingent on successful recovery from Allstate. Cotton was discharged from bankruptcy, and a jury verdict awarded the Crabtrees $4,605,000 in the personal injury suit.The Crabtrees filed an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, which dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the assignments champertous and void under Mississippi Code Section 97-9-11. The Crabtrees appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which certified a question to the Supreme Court of Mississippi.The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that Mississippi Code Section 97-9-11 prohibits a creditor in bankruptcy from engaging a disinterested third party to purchase a cause of action from a debtor. The court clarified that solicitation of a disinterested third party to prosecute a case in which it has no legitimate interest violates the statute. View "Crabtree v. Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Ryan Holman sued the County of Butte, alleging it breached mandatory duties under Government Code section 815.6 related to the evaluation, investigation, and cross-reporting of a child abuse referral against him. Holman claimed the County failed to conduct an in-person investigation or cross-report the abuse allegations, leading to years of abuse and subsequent psychological issues. The County argued its employee exercised discretion in deciding to "evaluate out" the referral without further investigation, thus invoking discretionary immunity.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the County's employee was exercising discretion protected by immunity when deciding to close the referral without an in-person investigation or cross-reporting. The court found no mandatory duty was breached, and the County was not liable under Government Code section 815.6.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the County had a mandatory duty under section 11166, subdivision (j), to cross-report the child abuse referral to law enforcement and other agencies. The court determined that the duty to cross-report is triggered by the receipt of a mandated child abuse report and does not involve discretionary judgment. The appellate court found a triable issue of fact regarding whether the County breached this mandatory duty by failing to cross-report the referral, thus reversing the summary judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Holman v. County of Butte" on Justia Law

Yelp, a company that publishes consumer reviews, introduced a notification on its business pages for crisis pregnancy centers (CPCs) in 2022, stating that these centers typically offer limited medical services. After objections from several state Attorneys General, including Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, Yelp replaced the notice with one stating that CPCs do not offer abortions or abortion referrals. Despite this change, Paxton initiated an investigation and sent Yelp a notice of intent to file suit, alleging that the original notice violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices – Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). Yelp then filed a lawsuit in federal court, claiming First Amendment retaliation, and sought to enjoin Paxton from further action. The next day, Paxton filed a state court action against Yelp.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Yelp’s federal case based on the Younger abstention doctrine, which prevents federal courts from interfering with ongoing state judicial proceedings. The district court found that the requirements for Younger abstention were met and that the bad faith exception did not apply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Younger’s bad faith exception did not apply because Yelp had not sufficiently established that the Texas civil enforcement action was brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid judgment or was facially meritless. The court also found that Yelp failed to show that Paxton’s enforcement action was motivated by a desire to harass or retaliate against Yelp for its support of abortion rights. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Yelp’s request for discovery and an evidentiary hearing. View "YELP INC. V. PAXTON" on Justia Law

James Ethridge, a Texas resident, purchased a Samsung 18650 lithium-ion battery from a Wyoming-based seller on Amazon in October 2018. The battery exploded in his pocket in November 2019, causing severe burns and other injuries. Ethridge filed a personal injury lawsuit in Texas state court in 2021 against Samsung SDI Company, Firehouse Vapors LLC, and two Amazon entities. He later added Macromall LLC as a defendant. After dismissing Firehouse Vapors, the remaining defendants removed the case to federal court. Ethridge then dismissed Macromall, leaving Samsung and the Amazon entities as defendants.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the Amazon defendants and dismissed Samsung for lack of personal jurisdiction. Ethridge appealed the dismissal of Samsung to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, voluntarily dismissing his appeal against Amazon.The Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo and reversed the dismissal. The court held that Samsung had purposefully availed itself of the Texas market by shipping 18650 batteries to companies like Black & Decker, HP, and Dell in Texas. The court found that Ethridge's claims were related to Samsung's contacts with Texas, as the same type of battery that injured Ethridge was sold in Texas. The court concluded that exercising personal jurisdiction over Samsung in Texas was fair and reasonable, given the state's interest in providing a forum for its injured residents and Samsung's ability to litigate in Texas. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ethridge v. Samsung SDI" on Justia Law

Speech First, Incorporated, challenged Texas State University's harassment policy, arguing it violated the First Amendment. The policy prohibited "unwelcome verbal" or "written conduct" without defining these terms, potentially stifling speech on sensitive topics like abortion, immigration, and gender identity. Speech First claimed the policy targeted politically disfavored speech, causing students to self-censor.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas acknowledged the policy's First Amendment issues but refused to issue a preliminary injunction. Instead, it pressured the University to amend the policy. The University reluctantly complied, and the district court dismissed Speech First's motion as moot, believing the policy change resolved the issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It disagreed with the lower court's ruling that the policy change rendered the request for a preliminary injunction moot. The appellate court noted that voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case unless it is absolutely clear the behavior will not recur. The court found that Texas State's policy change, made under judicial pressure, did not meet this stringent standard. The University continued to defend the original policy, and there was no controlling statement ensuring the policy would not revert.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further consideration of the motion for preliminary injunctive relief. View "Speech First v. McCall" on Justia Law

Dyamond Davis, an employee at the Shapiro Development Center, informed her supervisor on May 12, 2017, that she needed to leave work due to pregnancy-related morning sickness. Her supervisor allowed her to leave, reminding her to complete the necessary paperwork. Davis was later granted FMLA leave retroactive to May, but DHS determined that part of her May 12 absence was unauthorized because it believed FMLA did not cover morning sickness and that Davis violated policies requiring the substitution of accrued paid leave for FMLA leave. Consequently, DHS terminated her employment. Davis appealed her termination unsuccessfully to the Illinois Civil Service Commission and then filed a lawsuit alleging FMLA interference. Another employee, Antionette Burns, joined the lawsuit with a similar claim.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois dismissed Burns’s claim for lack of Article III standing and granted summary judgment in favor of DHS on Davis’s claim. The court found that Burns failed to establish a concrete injury-in-fact and that DHS was entitled to rely on the medical certification provided by Davis’s doctor, which did not indicate a need for intermittent leave for morning sickness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of Burns’s claim without prejudice, agreeing that she failed to establish a concrete injury-in-fact. However, the court found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding Davis’s FMLA claim. The court noted that morning sickness qualifies as a serious health condition under FMLA and that DHS was aware of Davis’s need for intermittent leave due to morning sickness. The court also found that DHS may have improperly applied its paid leave substitution policy, which could have led to Davis’s termination. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for DHS on Davis’s claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Davis v Illinois Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

In the late 1980s, Ronald Koziol purchased property in Central Falls, Rhode Island, zoned for heavy industrial use. In 1992, the zoning changed to residential, making the existing automotive repair business a legal nonconforming use. In 2022, Koziol Firearms, Inc. was formed to operate a firearms business on the property. The City’s zoning official denied the request, stating the property was in a residential zone, requiring a use variance. The Zoning Board of Review denied the variance application, and the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, also seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1992 zoning amendment was invalid.The Superior Court denied the plaintiff’s motion to present additional evidence and dismissed the zoning appeal, finding the property had a viable use as an automotive repair business. The court dismissed the declaratory judgment count without prejudice, stating it lacked sufficient evidence to rule on the validity of the 1992 zoning amendment.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. The plaintiff argued the trial justice overlooked material evidence and that the zoning classification was in dispute. The City contended the case was moot, the plaintiff lacked standing, and the claim was barred by laches. The Supreme Court found the trial justice did not conduct necessary fact-finding for the declaratory judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court for a new hearing to determine if the plaintiff should be granted declaratory relief. View "Koziol Firearms, Inc. v. Marchand" on Justia Law

M.H.W. has been involuntarily committed to the Montana Mental Health Nursing Care Center (NCC) since June 16, 2020, due to paranoid schizophrenia and an inability to manage his diabetes. The Tenth Judicial District Court extended his commitment several times, with the most recent extension being on January 6, 2022. On December 14, 2022, a petition was filed to extend his commitment for another year. Notice was served, indicating that if a hearing was requested less than 10 days before the termination of the previous commitment, the commitment would be extended until the hearing. However, the court did not issue an order extending the commitment beyond January 6, 2023.On February 8, 2023, M.H.W.'s counsel requested a contested hearing, which was scheduled for April 6, 2023, and later rescheduled to June 1, 2023. The District Court ordered that M.H.W. remain committed until the hearing. At the hearing, the court found that M.H.W. continued to exhibit symptoms of schizophrenia and could not manage his basic needs, including his diabetes. The court ordered his recommitment to NCC for up to one year.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the expiration of M.H.W.'s commitment did not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction, as the commitment was extended by operation of law when no hearing was requested before January 6, 2023. The court also held that the District Court's failure to enter an order extending the commitment did not constitute plain error, as M.H.W. received due process through the contested hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's order of recommitment. View "In re M.H.W." on Justia Law