Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Jessica Johnson filed a negligence action against Evan Unruh one day before the three-year statute of limitations expired. Johnson attempted to serve Unruh 121 days after filing the complaint and simultaneously filed a motion for an enlargement of time to serve him, which the trial court granted. Unruh filed two motions to dismiss for insufficient service of process, both of which were denied by the trial court. Unruh then petitioned for an interlocutory appeal, which was granted.The Hinds County Circuit Court initially denied Unruh's motions to dismiss, finding that Johnson's motion for an enlargement of time was timely and that her subsequent service attempts were valid. The trial court concluded that Johnson's service on August 13, 2021, was within the extended time frame granted by the court.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and agreed with Unruh that the trial court erred in granting Johnson's motion for an enlargement of time. The court found that Johnson failed to show good cause for her delay in serving Unruh within the 120-day period required by Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h). The court noted that Johnson did not attempt to serve Unruh until after the 120-day deadline had expired and did not provide specific details or evidence of attempts to serve him within the initial period.The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the statute of limitations for Johnson's negligence claim had expired, as she failed to properly serve Unruh within the required time frame. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's decision and rendered a judgment dismissing Johnson's negligence claim with prejudice. View "Unruh v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The incumbent candidate, Vern Gavin, lost the election to challenger Wanda Evers. Gavin filed a petition for judicial review in the Hinds County Circuit Court, claiming Evers was an unqualified elector due to her residency outside the district and citing several voting irregularities. The circuit court granted summary judgment on the election irregularities and dismissed the residency claim under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Gavin's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to his appeal.The Hinds County Circuit Court initially reviewed the case. Gavin challenged Evers's residency, noting her voting address was transferred outside the district and back within it, and she claimed a homestead exemption at a Jackson address. The Hinds County Executive Committee certified Evers as a candidate despite Gavin's challenge. Evers defeated Gavin in the runoff election. Gavin filed a contest of the election and a petition for judicial review, requesting a special election due to alleged irregularities and disputing Evers's residency qualification. The circuit court granted summary judgment on the election irregularities and dismissed the residency claim, finding Evers met the two-year residency requirement.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. The court affirmed the circuit court's rulings, finding no error. The court held that Gavin received proper notice of the summary judgment motion and that the circuit court did not err in considering both the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment. The court also upheld the exclusion of certain affidavits as hearsay and irrelevant. The court found that Gavin failed to present evidence of election irregularities affecting the outcome and that Evers met the residency requirement. The court also affirmed the denial of Gavin's motion for reconsideration, finding the new evidence presented was cumulative and for impeachment purposes only. View "Gavin v. Evers" on Justia Law

Denise Evans was diagnosed with a ureteral injury shortly after undergoing a hysterectomy on August 14, 2019. She filed a negligence lawsuit in state court against the surgeon and associated medical entities. The surgeon was employed by a federally-funded health center, and the Attorney General certified that he was acting within the scope of his employment, allowing the United States to substitute itself as the defendant under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). The government removed the case to federal court and requested dismissal due to Evans's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court dismissed the claims against the government without prejudice and remanded the claims against the non-governmental defendants to state court.Evans then exhausted her administrative remedies by filing a claim with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which was received on September 23, 2021. After HHS failed to render a final disposition within six months, Evans filed a lawsuit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting medical negligence. The government moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the claim was barred by the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations. Evans contended that the Westfall Act’s savings provision and the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply. The district court disagreed and dismissed the suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Westfall Act’s savings provision does not apply when the United States substitutes itself as a party under § 233(c) of the PHSA. The court also found that equitable tolling was inapplicable, as Evans did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances preventing her from timely filing her claim. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Evans's lawsuit. View "Evans v United States" on Justia Law

A collective bargaining agreement between the Teamsters Union and Quality Custom Distribution guaranteed that the top 80% of senior employees would receive at least 40 paid hours per week. During the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, many Starbucks stores in or near Chicago closed or reduced their hours, resulting in senior employees averaging only 30 hours a week. The Union demanded that the employer make up the difference, but the employer refused, citing an exception for Acts of God.The dispute was taken to an arbitrator, who ruled in favor of the Union. The arbitrator determined that while epidemics might be considered Acts of God, the reduction in work was primarily due to the Governor of Illinois' orders, which were not Acts of God. The employer then filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to nullify the arbitrator's decision. The district court judge declined to nullify the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that as long as the arbitrator interprets the contract, the award must stand. The arbitrator had interpreted the contract's "Act of God" clause, concluding it did not cover the Governor's orders. The court emphasized that judicial review of arbitration awards is limited to ensuring the arbitrator interpreted the contract, not whether the interpretation was correct. The court also noted that the employer's conduct in the litigation process imposed unnecessary costs and ordered the employer to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. View "Quality Custom Distribution Services LLC v International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 710" on Justia Law

A.J. began experiencing auditory hallucinations around 2010, leading to multiple hospitalizations and incarcerations. Diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2023, he was found mentally incompetent to stand trial on various charges. The criminal court vacated the incompetency order and directed the Public Guardian to investigate an LPS conservatorship. The Public Guardian filed a petition, citing A.J.'s grave disability due to mental health and substance abuse disorders. A.J.'s psychiatrist and social worker testified about his lack of insight into his illness, unwillingness to take medication, and history of aggressive behavior.The trial court appointed a temporary conservator in 2024. During a jury trial, the social worker and psychiatrist testified about A.J.'s inability to maintain housing due to his mental illness and aggressive behavior. The jury found A.J. gravely disabled. The trial court then appointed the Public Guardian as his conservator, granting the power to place him in a psychiatric or other state-licensed facility.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. A.J. argued that the Public Guardian's closing argument improperly suggested he was unable to provide shelter due to past involuntary detentions and that the trial court improperly delegated the duty to designate the least restrictive placement. The court disagreed with A.J.'s first argument, finding no authority to support his claim and noting that the Public Guardian's argument was based on multiple factors. However, the court agreed that the trial court failed to designate the least restrictive placement, as required by law. The court remanded the case for the trial court to designate the least restrictive placement but otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "In re Conservatorship of the Person of A.J." on Justia Law

A constable, Deborah Martinez-Garibay, was fatally shot while attempting to serve a writ of restitution to a tenant who had threatened a resident with a gun. The tenant also killed Angela Fox, who was accompanying Garibay, and another individual before taking his own life. Angela's surviving spouse, William Fox, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Garibay's spouse, Pima County, and the Arizona Constable Ethics, Standards and Training Board, alleging negligence and gross negligence on Garibay's part.The Superior Court of Pima County denied Garibay's spouse's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which argued that Garibay was entitled to judicial immunity and owed no duty to Angela. The Court of Appeals accepted special action jurisdiction and reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that Garibay was judicially immune from liability as her actions did not constitute "misconduct" under A.R.S. § 11-449.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to determine whether the common law doctrine of judicial immunity shields constables from liability under A.R.S. § 11-449. The court held that § 11-449 limits, rather than abrogates, judicial immunity. It concluded that a constable who engages in "misconduct" in the service or execution of a writ is subject to liability. The court defined "misconduct" as an intentional violation of an applicable rule, standard, or norm, rather than mere negligence or gross negligence.The court found that Fox's complaint did not allege that Garibay engaged in "misconduct" as defined by the statute, but rather that she was negligent or grossly negligent. Therefore, the court concluded that Garibay was entitled to judicial immunity and reversed the lower court's decision, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "GARIBAY v FOX" on Justia Law

James and Amber May hired RES Construction to build their home in Sioux Falls. RES subcontracted First Rate Excavate, Inc. to install the septic system and construct the foundation. The Mays alleged that the foundation was installed several feet below grade level, causing significant drainage and septic issues that damaged their home, yard, and neighboring properties. They sued First Rate for negligence. The circuit court dismissed the claim based on the economic loss doctrine, and the Mays appealed.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Lincoln County, South Dakota, dismissed the Mays' negligence claim, citing the economic loss doctrine, which limits remedies for purely economic losses to those specified in a contract. The court reasoned that the Mays lacked privity of contract with First Rate and that their claims were barred by the six-year statute of limitations.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the economic loss doctrine should not be expanded beyond claims arising from transactions involving the sale of defective goods under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The court noted that the doctrine is designed to prevent parties from circumventing contract remedies by seeking tort remedies for economic losses. Since the Mays' claim was based on negligence and not on a UCC transaction, the economic loss doctrine did not apply. Additionally, the court found that the lack of privity between the Mays and First Rate further precluded the application of the economic loss doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "May v. First Rate Excavate" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned property adjacent to an unpaved road where the Town of Lodi determined that low-hanging branches and dead or dying trees posed a hazard. In 2010, the Town hired a tree service company to cut or remove fifty-five trees on plaintiffs' land, believing the trees were within the right of way. Plaintiffs disagreed and sought treble damages under RPAPL 861 (1). The parties agreed to binding arbitration, and the arbitrator awarded plaintiffs damages, including treble the "stumpage value" of the trees.The Supreme Court confirmed the arbitrator's award, and a divided Appellate Division affirmed. The Appellate Division majority held that treble damages under RPAPL 861 were not punitive but intended to capture elusive compensatory damages. The dissenting justices argued that the treble damages were punitive and could not be awarded against the Town. The Town appealed to the Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that treble damages under RPAPL 861 are punitive in nature. The Court reasoned that the statute's "good faith" provision, which reduces damages from treble to single if the defendant acted in good faith, indicates a punitive intent. The Court also noted that the legislative history and structure of the statute support the conclusion that treble damages are meant to punish and deter wrongful conduct. Consequently, the Court reversed the Appellate Division's order insofar as appealed from, with costs, and granted the petition to vacate the award in part. View "Matter of Rosbaugh v Town of Lodi" on Justia Law

Catherine Kuo was killed while volunteering at a food distribution event organized by the Dublin Unified School District (DUSD). Her family and estate sued DUSD for negligence and premises liability, alleging failure to implement and communicate safety protocols. DUSD moved for summary judgment, arguing that Labor Code section 3364.5, which deems school volunteers as employees entitled to workers' compensation benefits, barred the plaintiffs' claims.The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, granted DUSD’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that section 3364.5 applied, providing that workers' compensation was the sole remedy for any injury, including death, sustained by volunteers while performing their duties. The court found that the statute's plain language and legislative history supported this interpretation, and thus, it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the term "any injury" in section 3364.5 unambiguously includes fatal injuries. The court also determined that DUSD’s resolution, which declared volunteers entitled to workers' compensation benefits, satisfied the statutory requirement, even though it did not explicitly use the word "deemed." The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the statute did not apply because DUSD did not treat its volunteers as employees in practice, noting that the statute did not require such conduct.The appellate court concluded that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of DUSD, affirming that workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs' claims. View "Kuo v. Dublin Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

A tenured professor at the University of Illinois Chicago School of Law, Jason Kilborn, included an expurgated racial slur in a law school exam question. This led to an investigation by university officials, who found that Kilborn had created a racially hostile environment and violated the university's nondiscrimination policy. Consequently, Kilborn was suspended from teaching until he completed a diversity training program and was denied a two percent raise. Kilborn sued several university officials, alleging violations of his constitutional rights to free speech and due process.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Kilborn's federal claims with prejudice, finding that his speech was not constitutionally protected. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice. Kilborn appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the dismissal of Kilborn's First Amendment retaliation claim, concluding that his speech was constitutionally protected under the Supreme Court's decisions in Connick v. Myers and Pickering v. Board of Education. The court found that Kilborn's speech addressed matters of public concern and that the university's actions could be seen as pretextual. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Kilborn's remaining federal claims, including his compelled speech and procedural due process claims. The court also vacated the dismissal of Kilborn's state law claims for further consideration by the district court. View "Kilborn v. Amiridis" on Justia Law