Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Diana Delgado owed money on a department store credit card, and Midland Credit Management, Inc. purchased the debt and sued her in Minnesota state court. Delgado did not respond to the summons, leading to a default judgment in favor of Midland. Instead of seeking reconsideration or appealing the default judgment, Delgado filed a federal lawsuit against Midland, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, including that Midland tried to collect the debt without owning it.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Delgado's case, concluding that the issue of debt ownership had already been resolved in the state-court action and gave the default judgment issue-preclusive effect. Delgado appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that a Minnesota state-court default judgment can have issue-preclusive effect in a subsequent federal lawsuit. The court relied on the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Herreid v. Deaver, which established that a default judgment is conclusive on the facts essential to its existence, even if the defendant did not participate in the proceedings. The court found that Midland's ownership of the debt was essential to the default judgment and that Delgado had a full and fair opportunity to contest the issue in state court.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the default judgment was a final determination on the merits and that applying collateral estoppel did not work an injustice in this case. View "Delgado v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc." on Justia Law

Jahn Patric Kirlin and Sara Louise Kirlin filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Christian William Jones, Dr. Barclay A. Monaster, and Physicians Clinic Inc. d/b/a Methodist Physicians Clinic – Council Bluffs. Jahn Kirlin experienced severe neck pain and headaches, and despite seeking medical help, an MRI was delayed. Dr. Monaster, who had returned from treatment for alcohol abuse, refused to order an MRI, and Kirlin later suffered a stroke after a chiropractic adjustment. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants altered medical records and that Dr. Monaster was intoxicated during treatment.The Pottawattamie County District Court initially dismissed the case due to a defective certificate of merit. The plaintiffs refiled with a new certificate, but the court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed this decision, allowing the plaintiffs to proceed.Upon remand, the district court did not set new deadlines, leading to confusion about the applicable expert certification deadline. The defendants moved for summary judgment again, arguing the plaintiffs missed the deadline. The district court agreed, finding no good cause to extend the deadline, and granted summary judgment to the defendants.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court abused its discretion by not finding good cause for the plaintiffs' delayed expert certification. The court noted the confusion about deadlines, lack of prejudice to the defendants, the plaintiffs' diligence, and the defendants' actions. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kirlin v. Monaster" on Justia Law

Nancy Walker executed a will in 2011, leaving personal property to her stepchildren and sister, Beatrice Land, and specific real property to Beatrice. In 2020, Nancy executed a new will and a deed, leaving the same property to her stepgranddaughter, Magen Grimes, and Magen's husband, Joseph Culpepper. Nancy died three weeks later. Beatrice contested the validity of the 2020 will and deed, claiming Nancy lacked testamentary capacity and was under undue influence.The Russell Circuit Court held a jury trial, which found the 2020 will and deed invalid. The court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict and denied post-judgment motions from the proponents of the 2020 will and deed. Beatrice's request for costs incurred in challenging the will was also denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court's judgment invalidating the 2020 will, finding sufficient evidence that Nancy lacked testamentary capacity. However, it reversed the judgment invalidating the 2020 deed, citing jurisdictional limitations. The court also reversed the denial of Beatrice's request for costs and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the amount of costs and attorney fees, and who should pay them. View "Boykin v. Land" on Justia Law

In August 2022, Rebecca Henderson and her minor son were involved in an automobile collision in Alabama. Henderson, a Kentucky resident, had an insurance policy from Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Kentucky Farm Bureau) that provided uninsured-motorist (UM) benefits. In July 2024, Henderson filed a complaint in the Baldwin Circuit Court, asserting a negligence/wantonness claim against the other driver, Trey Allan Knapp, and a claim for damages by contract against Kentucky Farm Bureau, alleging entitlement to UM benefits as Knapp had no liability insurance.Kentucky Farm Bureau moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that the Baldwin Circuit Court lacked personal jurisdiction over it, as it only does business in Kentucky and has no contacts with Alabama. The motion was supported by an affidavit from a Kentucky Farm Bureau employee. Henderson opposed the motion, arguing that the insurance policy provided nationwide coverage, thus establishing sufficient contacts with Alabama. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss without explanation, leading Kentucky Farm Bureau to petition the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and concluded that Kentucky Farm Bureau did not have sufficient contacts with Alabama to establish personal jurisdiction. The court noted that the insurance policy was issued and delivered in Kentucky, and Kentucky Farm Bureau does not conduct business in Alabama. The court distinguished between providing liability coverage nationwide and being subject to contract claims in any state. Consequently, the court granted the petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Baldwin Circuit Court to dismiss Henderson's claim against Kentucky Farm Bureau for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "In re: Henderson v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Earnest Charles Jones was severely injured by a bull on August 27, 2018, and was transported by helicopter to the University of South Alabama Hospital. During the transport, flight nurse Bryan Heath Wester allegedly removed a nasal-gastro tube from Jones's throat, causing further injuries. Nearly two years later, Ovetta Jones, on behalf of Earnest, filed a lawsuit against Wester and Air Evac EMS, Inc., alleging negligence and wantonness related to the care provided during the transport.The Dallas Circuit Court initially reviewed the case, where the Joneses filed their complaint on August 24, 2020. The complaint focused on the removal of the nasal-gastro tube by Wester. Nearly four years later, the Joneses amended their complaint to include new allegations that Wester had stolen and replaced ketamine with saline solution the day before the transport, and that other flight nurses failed to detect this and properly treat Earnest's pain. Air Evac moved for summary judgment, arguing that the amended complaint was time-barred and did not relate back to the initial complaint. The trial court denied the motion.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the amended complaint did not arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the initial complaint. The amended complaint introduced entirely new facts and allegations, including actions by different individuals on a different day. Consequently, the amended complaint could not relate back to the initial complaint and was time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations and repose. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted Air Evac's petition for a writ of mandamus, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the summary judgment and to enter an order granting the motion. View "Ex parte Air Evac EMS, Inc." on Justia Law

Kilvert, a Rhode Island company, acquired a commercial property and claimed that SBC Tower, a Delaware company, breached their lease agreement by failing to pay fifty percent of the payments received from subleases. Kilvert filed a Commercial Property Eviction Complaint in Rhode Island district court, seeking eviction and damages. SBC Tower removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island based on diversity jurisdiction. Kilvert moved to remand, arguing that Rhode Island law grants exclusive jurisdiction over landlord-tenant disputes to state district courts.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island agreed with Kilvert and granted the motion to remand, holding that Rhode Island law mandates that the state district court is the proper court for this action, making removal improper. SBC Tower appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that the Rhode Island statute in question, R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-8-3(a)(2), allocates jurisdiction among state courts and does not divest federal courts of jurisdiction in cases where diversity jurisdiction is present. The court held that the statute does not preclude removal to federal court and that the federal court has the authority to hear the case. Consequently, the First Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "289 Kilvert, LLC v. SBC Tower Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

Daniel Escamilla, a certified fugitive recovery agent, searched the home of Lan Ting Wu and Andy Yu Feng Yang in 2012, looking for Yang’s brother, who was wanted on felony drug trafficking charges. Yang, Wu, and their minor son sued Escamilla for assault, battery, trespass, false imprisonment, and emotional distress. Their lawyer, John Vannucci, represented them. Escamilla defended the search as supported by probable cause and cross-complained against Yang for abuse of process. In 2019, a jury found in favor of Escamilla on all claims and awarded him $20,000 in damages. On August 30, 2021, Escamilla filed a malicious prosecution action against Yang, Wu, and Vannucci.The Alameda County Superior Court granted Vannucci’s motion to strike Escamilla’s complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), agreeing that the one-year statute of limitations for claims against attorneys under section 340.6 applied, making the suit time-barred. The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine the appropriate statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution action against an attorney. The court held that section 340.6, which provides a one-year limitations period for certain suits against attorneys, does not apply to claims brought by parties who were never their clients or the intended beneficiaries of their clients. Instead, the two-year statute of limitations under section 335.1 applies to malicious prosecution claims brought by formerly adverse parties. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Appeal to consider any unaddressed arguments in the anti-SLAPP motion. View "Escamilla v. Vannucci" on Justia Law

Oscar and Audrey Madrigal purchased a car from Hyundai Motor America in 2011 for $24,172.73. The car allegedly did not function as warranted, and repeated repair attempts failed. The Madrigals requested Hyundai to repurchase the car under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, but Hyundai refused, leading the Madrigals to sue for violations of the Act. Hyundai made two settlement offers under California Code of Civil Procedure section 998, which the Madrigals did not accept. On the first day of trial, after the court tentatively ruled against the Madrigals on pretrial motions, the parties settled for $39,000, with the Madrigals retaining the right to seek costs and attorney fees by motion.The Placer County Superior Court ruled that section 998 did not apply because the case settled before trial, and awarded the Madrigals $84,742.50 in attorney fees and $17,681.05 in other costs. Hyundai appealed, arguing that the Madrigals should not recover any postoffer costs because they settled for less than the second 998 offer. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that section 998’s cost-shifting provisions applied and remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of California affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision. The Court held that section 998’s cost-shifting provisions apply even when a case settles before trial but after a section 998 offer is rejected or deemed withdrawn. The Court reasoned that the statute’s language and purpose—to encourage the settlement of lawsuits before trial—support this interpretation. The Court clarified that parties are free to agree on their own allocation of costs and fees as part of a settlement agreement, but absent such an agreement, section 998’s default cost-shifting rules apply. View "Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America" on Justia Law

McKenzie County, North Dakota, sued the United States and the Department of the Interior, claiming ownership of mineral royalties under certain lands. The County argued that previous litigation had settled the matter in its favor. The United States contended that the prior litigation involved different lands and that the County’s claim was untimely. The district court ruled in favor of the County, and the United States appealed.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota had previously granted judgment for the County, concluding that the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments and a 1991 Judgment quieted title to the disputed minerals in favor of the County. The district court held that the County’s claim was not barred by the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations and that the All Writs Act and Rule 70 empowered it to enforce its prior judgments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that the All Writs Act could not be used to circumvent the Quiet Title Act’s requirements. The court determined that the 1991 Judgment did not include the tracts listed in the 2019 Complaint and that the County’s claim under the Quiet Title Act was untimely. The court concluded that the County knew or should have known of the United States’ adverse claim to the mineral royalties by December 2003, thus triggering the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year statute of limitations. The Eighth Circuit instructed the district court to enter judgment in favor of the United States. View "McKenzie County, ND v. United States" on Justia Law

Mr. Dourdounas, a high school math teacher, was assigned to the Absent Teacher Reserve (ATR) in 2012. The ATR is a pool of teachers whose positions were eliminated but who were not terminated. In 2017, the DOE and UFT created a voluntary severance package for ATR teachers. Mr. Dourdounas, believing he was still in the ATR pool, applied for the severance package but was denied because the DOE claimed he had been permanently hired at Bronx International High School.Mr. Dourdounas followed the grievance process outlined in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the DOE and UFT. After exhausting the grievance process, including an internal appeal within the UFT, he commenced an article 78 proceeding against the City, alleging breach of contract for denying him the retirement incentive. The DOE moved to dismiss the petition on several grounds, including timeliness and failure to state a cause of action.The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as time-barred, and the Appellate Division affirmed, stating that the statute of limitations began when Mr. Dourdounas was informed of the denial in July 2017. The Appellate Division held that pursuing the grievance process did not toll the statute of limitations.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal but on different grounds. The court held that under the precedent set in Ambach, an employee cannot seek judicial review of a claim arising under a CBA without alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation by the union. Since Mr. Dourdounas did not allege such a breach, his claim was dismissed. The court also clarified that claims arising solely from a CBA must be brought as a breach of contract action, not through an article 78 proceeding. View "Matter of Dourdounas v City of New York" on Justia Law