Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

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Harold Sheppard, Jr., who operates a plane salvage and trucking business, began leasing part of the South Big Horn County Airport in 2011 for a metal scrapping and recycling venture. In 2019, Big Horn County sued him for unpaid rent, resulting in a money judgment and an order to remove his property, which he did not comply with. In 2021, the County filed a $543,600 storage lien against his property. Sheppard then sued the Board of County Commissioners to stop the sale of his property, challenge the lien, and seek damages. The parties engaged in settlement negotiations in September 2022, leading to the vacating of a scheduled trial.The County Commissioners moved to dismiss Sheppard’s claims for failure to prosecute in January 2024, citing a lack of action since the September 2022 status conference. The district court granted the motion, dismissing the case with prejudice. Sheppard did not appeal this dismissal but filed a motion to reconsider under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) in March 2024, arguing that the dismissal was premature and that the court should enforce the settlement agreement before dismissing the case.The district court denied Sheppard’s motion, finding he failed to meet the burden for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Sheppard appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by not recognizing the unusual circumstances and the existence of a settlement agreement. The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court noted that Sheppard failed to protect his legal interests by ensuring the settlement agreement and lease were executed and that his delay in filing the motion to reconsider was unreasonable. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Sheppard v. Board of County Commissioners, In and for Big Horn County, Wyoming" on Justia Law

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In 2020, Article 13 LLC filed a quiet title action against LaSalle National Bank Association (now U.S. Bank) to discharge a mortgage as time-barred, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired since a foreclosure action was commenced in 2007. U.S. Bank contended that the statute of limitations had not expired because the 2007 foreclosure action was invalid to accelerate the mortgage debt. The district court found a disputed issue of material fact regarding the validity of the 2007 foreclosure action and denied both parties' motions for summary judgment.Following the district court's ruling, New York enacted the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA), which bars the defense of the invalidity of prior accelerations of mortgages in quiet title actions. Article 13 LLC moved for reconsideration, and the district court applied FAPA retroactively, granting summary judgment in favor of Article 13 LLC. U.S. Bank appealed, arguing that FAPA should not be applied retroactively and that such retroactivity would be unconstitutional under both the New York and U.S. Constitutions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the questions of FAPA's retroactivity and its constitutionality under the New York Constitution were novel and essential to the resolution of the appeal. Consequently, the Second Circuit certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals: whether Section 7 of FAPA applies to foreclosure actions commenced before the statute's enactment, and whether FAPA's retroactive application violates substantive and procedural due process under the New York Constitution. The Second Circuit deferred its resolution of the appeal pending the New York Court of Appeals' response. View "Article 13 LLC v. Lasalle Nat'l Bank Ass'n" on Justia Law

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Brooke N. Somers, a resident of Cecil County, Maryland, attended a Board of Education meeting on February 9, 2022, without wearing a mask, contrary to Maryland state emergency regulations. Officer Anthony Devine and John Roush informed her she could not enter without a mask. Somers claimed a medical exemption but was directed to sit in the lobby and watch the meeting via livestream. After causing a disturbance in the lobby and refusing to lower her volume or leave when ordered, Somers was arrested by Officer Devine. She resisted arrest, leading to a minor scuffle. Somers was charged with several offenses, convicted on two counts, but later acquitted on appeal.Somers filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against multiple defendants, including Officer Devine. The district court dismissed claims against all defendants except Devine, granting him summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity for all federal-law claims, including retaliatory arrest, unlawful arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that an objectively reasonable officer could have found probable cause for Somers' arrest, thus entitling Officer Devine to qualified immunity on the retaliatory arrest, unlawful arrest, and malicious prosecution claims. The court also found that the force used by Officer Devine was minimal and reasonable given Somers' resistance, granting him qualified immunity on the excessive-force claims. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Somers v. Devine" on Justia Law

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Ms. Rajmonda Mile attended her daughter’s wedding at Kirkbrae Country Club on September 9, 2018, where she allegedly slipped and fell. She filed a lawsuit against Kirkbrae in Providence County Superior Court and requested any photographs or videotapes of the incident. Kirkbrae acknowledged possessing a surveillance video of the incident but claimed it was protected under attorney work product privilege, referencing the case Cabral v. Arruda.The Superior Court denied Ms. Mile’s motion to compel the production of the video, agreeing with Kirkbrae’s assertion that the video was protected under the work product doctrine. Ms. Mile then sought review from the Rhode Island Supreme Court, arguing that the video was actual evidence of the incident and not created in anticipation of litigation.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the video was not protected under the work product privilege because it was recorded by Kirkbrae’s surveillance system at the time of the incident and not at the request of an attorney. The court emphasized that the burden of proving the applicability of the work product privilege lies with the party seeking to withhold the evidence. Since Kirkbrae failed to meet this burden, the trial justice’s denial of the motion to compel was deemed an error.The Rhode Island Supreme Court quashed the Superior Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, instructing the lower court to compel the production of the video. View "Mile v. Kirkbrae Country Club" on Justia Law

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Judith Clinton filed a complaint in the Superior Court for Washington County against Chad Babcock, Lisa Nelson, Regina Foster Bartlett, and Caryn Sullivan, alleging defamation and other misconduct that caused her reputational damage, emotional distress, and monetary losses. Clinton later amended her complaint to include Maria DiMaggio and Toastmasters International, adding a breach of contract claim against the latter. The Superior Court allowed Clinton to file a second amended complaint but denied her third and fourth motions to amend.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to enforce a dismissal stipulation and vacated a scheduling order. Clinton, who had been representing herself after unsuccessful attempts to secure new counsel, signed a Stipulated Agreement of Dismissal with all defendants, which was filed on December 13, 2022. Subsequently, the defendants filed a Stipulation of Dismissal on December 27, 2022, without notifying Clinton, who then alleged fraudulent conduct. The trial justice initially vacated the Stipulated Agreement of Dismissal and scheduled a trial date but later reconsidered this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice properly reinstated the Stipulated Agreement of Dismissal, noting that the agreement was binding and could not be set aside without the consent of all parties, absent extraordinary circumstances such as fraud or mutual mistake. The court found no evidence of duress or other factors that would justify vacating the agreement. The Supreme Court also upheld the trial justice's decision to treat the defendants' motions as motions to reconsider, given the lack of proper notice to the defendants at the initial hearing. View "Clinton v. Babcock" on Justia Law

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WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. sought to build a natural gas pipeline through McKenzie County, North Dakota. After obtaining a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, WBI attempted to acquire the necessary easements through voluntary sales. When one family refused to sell, WBI filed a federal condemnation action under the Natural Gas Act. After three years of negotiations, the parties agreed on the amount of just compensation for the easement, but the issue of attorney fees remained unresolved.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota ruled that WBI was responsible for the family's attorney fees based on North Dakota law, which allows for such fees in condemnation proceedings. The district court relied on the precedent set by Petersburg School District of Nelson County v. Peterson.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the availability of attorney fees depends on whether state or federal law governs the compensation due. The court concluded that federal law applies because WBI was exercising the federal eminent-domain power delegated under the Natural Gas Act. The court noted that the Fifth Amendment's requirement for just compensation does not include attorney fees unless explicitly provided by statute. The Natural Gas Act does not mention attorney fees, and thus, the default rule under the Fifth Amendment applies. Consequently, the court vacated the district court's award of attorney fees, holding that WBI is not obligated to pay the family's attorney fees. View "WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. v. 189.9 rods in Twsp. 149" on Justia Law

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Lisa and Peter Woodward incurred a debt of $2,214.44 for their child's dental care, which was placed with Credit Service International Corporation (CSIC) for collection. CSIC filed a claim in conciliation court, but the Woodwards did not receive notice as the summons was sent to their previous address. CSIC obtained a default judgment and attempted to garnish the Woodwards' wages. The Woodwards hired attorney Kevin Giebel, who filed a lawsuit claiming violations of Minnesota garnishment laws and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). CSIC and Muske removed the case to federal court and offered a judgment of $2,002.00 plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, which the Woodwards accepted.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted the Woodwards' motion for attorney’s fees in part, awarding $12,075.00 out of the $29,139.00 sought. The court used the lodestar method to determine the reasonable fee, concluding that $350 per hour was appropriate and that only 34.5 of the 72.4 hours claimed were reasonable. The Woodwards requested permission to file a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied, stating that the request did not meet the standard for reconsideration and merely reargued previously considered matters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found no merit in the Woodwards' arguments regarding the denial of their initial motion for attorney’s fees, the reduction of the hourly rate, and the number of hours deemed reasonable. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings and that the fee award was appropriate given the circumstances of the case. View "Woodward v. Credit Service Intl. Corp." on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs, Michael Etchegoinberry, Erik Clausen, Barlow Family Farms, L.P., and Christopher Todd Allen, own land in the Westlands Water District, part of the San Luis Unit in California. They alleged that the United States failed to provide necessary drainage for their irrigated lands, leading to a rise in the water table and accumulation of saline groundwater, which they claimed resulted in a taking of their property without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.The United States Court of Federal Claims initially denied the government's motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, agreeing with the plaintiffs that their claim was timely under the stabilization doctrine. This doctrine postpones the accrual of a takings claim until the damage has stabilized and the extent of the damage is reasonably foreseeable. The case was then stayed for nearly seven years for settlement attempts. In 2023, the Court of Federal Claims revisited the issue and dismissed the case sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the stabilization doctrine did not apply and the claim was time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the dismissal. The court held that the stabilization doctrine did not apply because the plaintiffs' claim was based on the regular and known lack of drainage over many years, not an irregular or intermittent physical process. Even if the doctrine applied, the court found that the plaintiffs' claim accrued before the critical date of September 2, 2005, as they were aware of the permanent nature of the damage to their land well before that date. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' claim was time-barred and affirmed the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "ETCHEGOINBERRY v. US " on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-Appellant Perry Spriggs was struck by a U.S. Postal Service vehicle while riding his bicycle on Calliope Street in New Orleans on March 23, 2022. On March 23, 2023, Spriggs faxed his medical records and a signed Standard Form 95 (SF-95) to the Postal Service, addressed to Tara D. Lennix, a Louisiana District Tort Claims/Collections Specialist, at the correct fax number. Spriggs received a fax confirmation stating successful transmission. On March 22, 2024, Spriggs filed a lawsuit against the United States for personal injury and property damage from the accident.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed Spriggs’s claims with prejudice, granting the United States' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court found no affirmative evidence of receipt of the SF-95 by the Postal Service, relying on declarations from Postal Service employees stating they did not receive the fax. The court also dismissed the claims under Rule 12(b)(6) due to the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations for presentment to the agency.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in disregarding the fax confirmation sheet as probative evidence of presentment under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The Fifth Circuit held that a fax confirmation sheet indicating successful transmission to the correct recipient is probative evidence that the FTCA’s presentment requirement has been satisfied. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Spriggs v. United States" on Justia Law

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K.T. filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her ex-partner, E.S., with whom she shares three daughters. K.T. alleged that E.S. had subjected her to physical and sexual abuse over several years, including incidents where the children were present. She also claimed that E.S. had abducted the children from Texas to California without her consent. K.T. sought to include the children as protected parties in the DVRO, citing their exposure to E.S.'s abusive behavior.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted K.T. a temporary restraining order (TRO) against E.S. but did not include the children as protected parties, citing a lack of imminent risk of harm to them. During the hearing on K.T.'s DVRO request, the court reviewed her declaration and testimony, which detailed the abuse and the children's exposure to it. The court granted the DVRO protecting K.T. but did not include the children, stating there was no credible evidence of physical or sexual abuse of the children.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court had used the wrong legal standard by requiring evidence of direct abuse of the children. The appellate court held that the correct standard was "good cause" based on the totality of the circumstances, which includes the children's exposure to domestic violence. The appellate court found that K.T. had provided sufficient evidence of good cause to include the children as protected parties in the DVRO.The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision in part, directing it to modify the DVRO to include the children as protected parties. The court otherwise affirmed the trial court's order and awarded costs to K.T. View "K.T. v. E.S." on Justia Law