Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Landowner Daniel Banyai appealed an Environmental Division decision upholding a notice of violation, granting a permanent injunction, and assessing $46,600 in fines, relating to alleged zoning violations and the construction of a firearms training facility in the Town of Pawlet. Banyai argued he had a valid permit, certain exhibits were improperly admitted at the merits hearing, and the fines were excessive. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. View "Town of Pawlet v. Banyai" on Justia Law

In 2010, real parties in interest applied to the City of Santa Cruz to construct a 40-unit development on a parcel of land located at 1930 Ocean Street Extension. Following an initial mitigated negative declaration and years of litigation surrounding the impact of the nearby crematory at Santa Cruz Memorial Park, in 2016, the real parties in interest renewed their interest in moving forward with their project. As required by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the project applicant and the City of Santa Cruz prepared and circulated the initial study, the draft environmental impact report (EIR), the partially recirculated draft EIR, and the final EIR. Following a public hearing, the city council adopted a resolution to certify the EIR and to adopt Alternative 3, a 32-unit housing project. The Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood Association (OSENA) filed a petition for writ of mandamus, alleging the City of Santa Cruz and its city council violated CEQA and the Santa Cruz Municipal Code in approving the project. The trial court concluded the City had complied with CEQA, but it determined the City violated the municipal code, and it issued a limited writ prohibiting the City from allowing the project to proceed unless and until it followed the municipal code and the court was satisfied with its compliance. Following entry of judgment, OSENA appealed, arguing the court erred by concluding the City complied with CEQA’s requirements. OSENA contended the City violated CEQA by: (1) insufficiently addressing potentially significant biological impacts and mitigation measures in the initial study rather than in the EIR directly; (2) establishing improperly narrow and unreasonable objectives so that alternative options could not be considered meaningfully; and (3) failing to address cumulative impacts adequately. The City cross-appealed, contending the court incorrectly concluded it violated the municipal code by granting a planned development permit without also requiring the project applicant to comply with the slope modifications regulations After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the City, and affirmed that portion of the trial court's order and judgment concluding it complied with CEQA. The Court reversed the portion of the order and judgment concluding the City violated its municipal code. View "Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood etc. v. City of Santa Cruz" on Justia Law

Trackside was a proposed mixed-use building project in the City of Davis, California, between the Downtown Core and Old East Davis, an older neighborhood. After the city council approved Trackside, plaintiff Old East Davis Neighborhood Association (“the Association”) petitioned for a writ of mandate, and the trial court found insufficient evidence supported the City’s finding that Trackside was consistent with applicable planning documents. The court specifically cited the lack of evidence that Trackside served as a “transition” from the Downtown Core to Old East Davis. On appeal, defendants City of Davis and City Council, along with real party in interest Trackside Center, LLC (“the City” and “Trackside”) challenged that ruling, contending the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating consistency with planning documents, and that substantial evidence supported the City’s finding that Trackside was consistent with applicable planning requirements and guidelines. After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded substantial evidence supported the City’s approval, and the Association’s contentions on cross-appeal lacked merit. The Court therefore reversed the judgment granting the petition for writ of mandate. View "Old East Davis Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Davis" on Justia Law

As a vacation destination, the City of Palm Springs (City) has expressly allowed the short-term rental of a single-family dwelling, subject to various conditions designed to protect the interests of neighboring residents (as well as the City’s own interest in collecting transient occupancy taxes, a/k/a hotel taxes). In 2017, the City amended its short term rental ordinances, making specific findings that the amended ordinances were consistent with the City's Zoning Code. Meanwhile, Protect Our Neighborhoods (Protect), a membership organization opposed to short-term rentals, filed this action claiming among other things, that the 2017 version of the short-term rental ordinance (Ordinance) violated the City’s Zoning Code. The trial court disagreed and upheld the Ordinance. Protect appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Protect Our Neighborhoods v. City of Palm Springs" on Justia Law

Phillip Armstrong appealed a judgment dismissing his amended complaint. The district court granted dismissal of the amended complaint after finding Armstrong had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. In 1996, Armstrong filed a surety bond with the North Dakota Industrial Commission when he became the operator of several oil wells on private land. In 2001, Armstrong also began operating wells on federal lands. Armstrong was engaged with federal authorities in formulating a reclamation plan for the federal lands. The wells were not producing oil, and Armstrong requested a release of his surety bond filed with the Commission. The Commission conditioned the release of the bond on Armstrong performing a geoprobe assessment of the wells, which Armstrong refused. Armstrong thereafter filed a complaint in the district court seeking release of his bond. The court ultimately concluded Armstrong's claims were barred by his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, rejected Armstrong’s argument state law did not apply because of federal preemption, and entered a judgment dismissing the action. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded federal regulations did not preempt the application of N.D.C.C. ch. 38-08, Armstrong failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and the court properly dismissed the action. View "Armstrong v. Helms" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review involved the proposed redevelopment of a 90-year-old abandoned two-story industrial building, consisting of approximately 14,000 square feet, formerly used as a garage/warehouse facility. In 2013, Appellant Metal Green Inc. purchased the property at a sheriff’s sale for approximately $90,000. In August 2016, Mt. Airy USA, a local nonprofit, commenced a legal action against Metal Green pursuant to the 2008 Abandoned and Blighted Property Conservatorship Act (“Act 135”). A court declared the property to be blighted and abandoned and ordered Metal Green to remediate the hazards that the property posed to the community. While the court possessed the authority to order the demolition of the building, it held such action in abeyance, allowing Metal Green to not only make necessary repairs, but to pursue redevelopment of the property. The Department of Licenses and Inspections denied Metal Green’s application for a building permit to convert the warehouse to apartments. The Supreme Court considered the proper legal standard to be applied when considering an application for a “use variance” under the Philadelphia Zoning Code, as well as the appropriate standard of review for such determinations. The Court held that the minimum variance requirement, as set forth in the Philadelphia Zoning Code, applied to use variances. Additionally, in determining the entitlement to a use variance, the Court concluded considerations of property blight and abandonment were more properly evaluated under the Code’s unnecessary hardship requirement, rather than under the minimum variance requirement. Finally, the Court reaffirmed its traditional abuse of discretion or error of law standard of review with respect to a court’s review of a variance determination; however, as a component thereof, the Court allowed for review for a capricious disregard of the evidence under certain circumstances. View "Metal Green Inc. v. City of Phila, et al." on Justia Law

The City of San Diego (City) certified an environmental impact report (EIR) for the “Serra Mesa Community Plan [SMCP] Amendment Roadway Connection Project” (Project) and approved an amendment to the SMCP and the City’s General Plan to reflect the proposed roadway. Save Civita Because Sudberry Won’t (“Save Civita”) filed a combined petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief (Petition/Complaint) against the City, challenging the City’s certification of the EIR and approval of the Project. Save Civita contended that the City violated the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), the Planning and Zoning Law, and the public’s due-process and fair-hearing rights. The trial court denied the Petition/Complaint in its entirety and entered a judgment in favor of the City. On appeal, Save Civita raised four claims related to the City’s certification of the EIR for the Project: (1) the City violated CEQA Guidelines section 15088.5, subdivision (g) in failing to summarize revisions made in the Project’s recirculated draft EIR (RE-DEIR); (2) the Project’s final EIR (FEIR) was deficient because it failed to adequately analyze, as an alternative to the Project, a proposal to amend the MVCP to remove the planned road from that community plan; (3) the FEIR is deficient because it failed to adequately analyze the Project’s traffic impacts; and (4) the FEIR failed to adequately discuss the Project’s inconsistency with the General Plan’s goal of creating pedestrian-friendly communities. In addition to its EIR / CEQA claims, Save Civita maintains that the Project will have a deleterious effect on the pedestrian-friendly Civita community and that the City therefore violated the Planning and Zoning law in concluding that the Project is consistent with the City’s General Plan. Finally, Save Civita maintains that the City acted in a quasi-adjudicatory capacity in certifying the FEIR and approving the Project and that a City Council member violated the public’s procedural due process rights by improperly advocating for the Project prior to its approval. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the City in its entirety. View "Save Civita Because Sudberry Won't v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Dennis and Sherrilyn Munden (the Mundens) and their limited liability company, Coyote Creek Ranch, LLC, purchased property in Bannock County, Idaho in 2012 (the Upper Property), and acquired adjoining property (the Lower Property) in 2014. The Mundens’ ranch was accessible by a gravel road (the Road) which left a paved public road before crossing the Lower Property. It then traversed a neighbor’s parcel to the Upper Property, before exiting to the north. The Mundens began ranching on the Lower Property in 2013 and started construction of a barn and living quarters on the Upper Property in 2015 after obtaining a three-year building permit. In 2017, the Mundens were informed by the Bannock County Commissioners that, pursuant to a 2006 county ordinance, the Road had been designated by the Commissioners for “snowmobile use only” between December 15 and April 15. All other vehicular use was prohibited during this timeframe. In January 2019, Bannock County passed an ordinance which gave discretion to the Bannock County Public Works Director (the Director) to determine when snowmobile trails would be closed to all but snowmobile use. Subsequently, the Director decided to close the Road for the 2018–19 winter season. The Mundens filed a complaint in district court against Bannock County, bringing several claims involving the Road, and obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) to prohibit enforcement of the 2019 ordinance. The County moved to dissolve the TRO, which the district court granted. The district court then awarded attorney fees to the County. The Mundens amended their complaint to add their ranching operation, Coyote Creek Ranch, LLC, as a plaintiff, to which the County responded with an answer and counterclaim, alleging that the Road was a public right-of-way with no winter maintenance that had been designated as a snowmobile trail by the 2006 ordinance. The County then moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court granted this motion, concluding that because the claims turned on a legal determination of the Road’s status, the Mundens were required by Idaho Code section 40-208(7) to first petition for validation or abandonment proceedings with the Board of County Commissioners before they could bring a lawsuit. The district court accordingly entered a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ amended complaint in its entirety. Ultimately, the district court entered a judgment certified under IRCP 54(b)(1) authorizing an immediate appeal, and the Mundens timely appealed. The only error the Idaho Supreme Court found in review of this case was that the district court erred in issuing a writ of execution before there was a final appealable judgment. Judgement was affirmed in all other respects. View "Munden v. Bannock County" on Justia Law

After years of unsuccessful negotiation and several years of contentious litigation, this case came before the Colorado Supreme Court to resolve a dispute over the placement of an irrigation ditch and maintenance obligations related to that ditch. Instead of proceeding as a straightforward determination of these issues under the standards established in Roaring Fork Club v. St. Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229 (Colo. 2001), the case was made complex by plaintiffs’ repeated assertions of unsubstantiated factual allegations and multiple legal claims lacking substantial justification. In the end, after ruling against plaintiffs on the merits, the water court took the rare step of awarding attorney fees to defendants because of the “frivolous, vexatious, and litigious” nature of many of the plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the water court lacked jurisdiction over the case, notwithstanding their vigorous assertion the court did have jurisdiction throughout proceedings at the trial level. Further, plaintiffs argued the water court made numerous errors on the merits of the case. Reviewing these arguments, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the water court did have jurisdiction to hear this case; (2) the court’s conclusions on the merits of the various claims were correct; and (3) the court’s decision to award attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the water court. View "Glover v. Resource Land Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

This case arose from Rockdale County, Georgia's denial of an application for a permit to build a QuikTrip on property owned by William Corey and U.S. Enterprises, Inc. (the “Owners”), on the ground that the proposed facility was a “truck stop,” which was a prohibited use under the County’s Unified Development Ordinance (“UDO”). After the County’s Board of Adjustment affirmed the denial of the permit, the Owners filed a petition to the Rockdale County Superior Court seeking, among other things, certiorari under OCGA 5-4-1 et seq. The superior court sustained the petition for certiorari, rejecting the County’s argument that the Owners’ lawsuit was barred by res judicata and reversing the Board’s decision on the ground that the UDO’s applicable definition of a “truck stop” was unconstitutionally vague and therefore violated due process under the Georgia Constitution. The Georgia Supreme Court granted County’s application for a discretionary appeal, and the Owners then cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s rejection of the County’s res judicata argument, reversed the part of the superior court’s judgment ruling that the “truck stop” definition was unconstitutionally vague, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court's holding made it unnecessary to address the Owners’ cross-appeal, which was accordingly dismissed as moot. View "Rockdale County et al.. v. U. S. Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law