Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Ray Sandberg served in the United States Navy during World War II. Afterward, he worked for decades in dockyards and lumberyards. Throughout his work life, he had been exposed to asbestos. He contracted lymphoma, pleural disease and asbestosis relating to asbestos exposure. In 1999, he sued nearly 40 defendants who had some part in exposing him to asbestos. Most defendants settled; of the one that did not, Sandberg obtained a $1.5 million judgment. At age 84, Sandberg died. His daughter Judy Deggs, as personal representative of Sandberg's estate, sued additional companies that had not been named in her father's original lawsuit. The record of this case does not explain why the additional companies were not named in the 199 suit. The defendants here moved to dismiss this suit as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. On appeal, Deggs argued that the wrongful death claim she brought was a distinct statutory claim and that her injuries were not the same injuries her father suffered and sued for in 1999: her injuries were due to the loss of her father, which did not occur until he died. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal, finding that "[a] wrongful death 'action accrues at the time of death' so long as there is 'a subsisting cause of action in the deceased' at the time of death subject to exceptions no present here." The Court found insufficient cause to abandon that well-established precedent in this case. View "Deggs v. Asbestos Corp." on Justia Law

The child (K.M.M.) was in foster care since she was six and a half years old. She was removed from her biological parents' custody in 2009 because their serious substance abuse problems resulted in a neglectful home enviromnent. She was 11 years old at the time of trial in 2013. She had been in two foster care placements and was physically abused in one of those placements. K.M.M.'s biological father completed court-ordered services and remedied the deficiencies identified by the dependency court in prior proceedings. Nevertheless, the trial court terminated his parental rights based on its conclusion that he remained "unable to parent" due to the child's lack of attachment to him. This case required the Washington Supreme Court to determine whether parental rights could be terminated where the father was unable to parent his child due to a lack of attachment and continuing the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the child's emotional development and mental well-being. After review, the Supreme Court concluded there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that all necessary services have been provided to the father and that the provision of any additional services would have been futile. Furthermore, the record supported the trial court's finding of current parental unfitness based on the father's inability to parent the child. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision to uphold the termination order. View "In re Parental Rights to K.M.M." on Justia Law

When petitioner Mike Belenski requested certain records from Jefferson County (County), the County responded that it had "no responsive records." Over two years later, Belenski sued the County, asserting that this response violated the Public Records Act (PRA) because the County did in fact have such records and failed to make the proper disclosures. The Court of Appeals dismissed this claim as time barred under the two-year statute of limitations in RCW 4.16.130. At issue was which statute of limitations applied to Belenski' s PRA claim and whether the applicable statute rendered his claim time barred. The Supreme Court held that the one-year statute of limitations in the PRA applied to Belenski' s claim and that this limitations period usually begins to run on an agency's final, definitive response to a records request. However, the Court remanded this case for the trial court to determine whether equitable tolling should have tolled the statute of limitations. View "Belenski v. Jefferson County" on Justia Law

N.L. met Nicholas Clark at school track practice. She was 14, and he was 18. Both were students in the Bethel School District. Neither N.L. nor any responsible adult on the field knew that Clark was a registered sex offender who had previously sexually assaulted a younger girl who had been about N.L. 'sage at the time. The Pierce County Sheriff's Department had informed Clark's school principal of his sex offender status, but the principal took no action in response. Clark persuaded N.L. to leave campus with him and raped her. N.L. sued the district, alleging negligence. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the School District’s duty to N.L. ended when she left campus and whether its alleged negligence, as a matter of law, was not a proximate cause of her injury. The Court answered both questions “no,” affirming the Court of Appeals’ judgment reversing the trial court’s dismissal of this case on summary judgment. View "N.L. v. Bethel Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Petitioner-plaintiff Jess Nelson sued defendant-respondent Erickson for personal injuries after a car accident. They went to mandatory arbitration, and the arbitrator awarded the plaintiff a total of $44,923. Of that total award, $1,522 was for attorney fees and costs. Defendant decided to seek trial de novo. In an effort to avoid trial, plaintiff offered to settle for "$26,000 plus taxable costs incurred at arbitration." This language from the settlement offer was the center of the legal dispute in this case. Defendant did not respond to the offer, and the parties went to trial. The jury awarded the plaintiff $24,167. Upon plaintiff's motion for additur, the judge added $3,000 for future noneconomic damages. This brought the total award at trial to $27,167. Plaintiff then moved for attorney fees, arguing that defendant had not improved his position at trial. The trial judge agreed and awarded plaintiff $58,908 in attorney fees and $4,488 in costs. Defendant appealed, arguing that the settlement offer was actually for $26,000 plus the known arbitration costs of $1,522. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether defendant improved his position at trial. After review, the Court held that defendant's position prior to trial should have been interpreted as an ordinary person would. Applying that rule, defendant improved his position at trial and was not required to pay the opposing party's attorney fees. View "Nelson v. Erickson" on Justia Law

H.O. appealed the termination of her parental rights to her child, B.P. H.O., suffered from drug addiction, depression and other mental health issues, and the effects of long term childhood trauma. B.P., suffered too: she was born addicted to methamphetamine, endured withdrawal, was abandoned by H.O. during infancy, and experienced multiple disruptions when forming attachments with H.O. and various foster parents. On the other hand, after several tries, H.O. achieved sobriety; benefited from treatment in a structured environment; and became an attentive and caring mother to another child, A., in that structured environment. She also engaged in partially supervised, therapeutic visitation with B.P., and the two began to form what witnesses at the termination hearing called a social relationship with an emerging emotional attachment. Despite all that, the Department of Social and Health Services recommended termination of H.O.'s parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that where a child has special needs (here, special attachment needs); and where, as here, those special needs were exacerbated by the State's failure to timely provide necessary services to the biological parent; then the State has failed to prove this legislatively mandated prerequisite to termination (absent futility, which was not shown here). View "In re Welfare of B.P." on Justia Law

The State of Washington sued more than 20 foreign electronics manufacturing companies (including petitioners) for price fixing. The State claimed the foreign companies conspired to fix prices by selling CRTs (cathode ray tubes) into international streams of commerce intending they be incorporated into products sold at inflated prices in large numbers in Washington State. The trial court dismissed on the pleadings, finding it did not have jurisdiction over the foreign companies. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the State alleged sufficient minimum contacts with Washington to satisfy both the long arm statute and the due process clause. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. LG Elecs., Inc." on Justia Law

Historically, sovereigns were not subject to statutes of limitations without their explicit consent. Washington State consented to some statutes of limitations but not to others. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review in this case was whether Washington consented to a statute of limitations that would bar this antitrust suit filed by the Washington State attorney general on behalf of the State against more than 20 foreign electronics manufacturing companies. The State alleged that between at least March 1, 1995, through at least November 25, 2007, the defendants violated RCW 19.86.030, which prohibited any "contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce," by agreeing to raise prices and agreeing on production levels in the market for CRTs (cathode ray tubes) used in televisions and computer monitors before the advent of LCD (liquid crystal display) panels and plasma display technologies. Due to this unlawful conspiracy, the State alleges, Washington consumers and the State of Washington itself paid supracompetitive prices for CRT products. Ten of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the claims were time barred because Washington's Consumer Protection Act (CPA) must be brought within four years. The State responded that RCW 19.86.120's statute of limitations did not apply to its claims under RCW 19.86.080. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the State's action for injunctive relief and restitution was exempt from the statute of limitations in RCW 19.86.120 and from the general statutes of limitations in chapter 4.16 RCW. View "Washington v. LG Elecs., Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether a city of Seattle (City) employee who recovered wages from a Seattle Civil Service Commission (Commission) hearing was entitled to attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030 when the city code provided she could be represented in those proceedings only at her own expense. Georgiana Arnold recovered wages from the civil service proceeding, after which she initiated an action in superior court to request attorney fees. The trial court denied attorney fees, but the Court of Appeals reversed and granted her attorney fees. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed and held that the commission proceedings at issue here constituted an "action" for which RCW 49.48.030 provided attorney fees when requested in a separate court action. View "Arnold v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the alleged tortious conduct of an Idaho state trooper against an Idaho citizen during a traffic stop in which pursuit began in Idaho, but ended in Washington. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether, under these facts, a trial court could exercise subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction under the Washington long-arm statute, RCW 4.28.185. Based on the facts of this case, the Court held that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, but that personal jurisdiction was in either Idaho or Washington. The Court remanded this case back to the trial court to consider whether to dismiss this case on comity grounds. View "Pruczinski v. Ashby" on Justia Law