Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Alyne Fortgang filed a request for documents concerning the elephants at the Woodland Park Zoo (Zoo). She filed a request under the Public Records Act (PRA), which required every government "agency" to make records "available for [public] inspection and copying." Petitioner filed her request with the Woodland Park Zoo Society (WPZS), the private nonprofit that runs the Zoo. WPZS argued that the PRA did not apply to it as a private entity. The Court of Appeals interpreted the statutory word "agency" to include private entities when they act as the functional equivalent of government agencies. Under the Telford analysis, the appellate court concluded WPZS was not the functional equivalent of a government agency, and did not have to produce the records. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Fortgang v. Woodland Park Zoo" on Justia Law

Clark County Councilor Thomas Mielke filed recall charges essentially alleging that three fellow council members improperly held a vote in executive session, improperly designated The Columbian as the newspaper of record, and did not prevent the county executive from dissolving a county department. The superior court judge dismissed the charges as legally and factually insufficient, which Mielke appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "In re Recall of Boldt" on Justia Law

Multiple cases were consolidated cases in this opinion, all stemming from a 2007 flood of the Chehalis River in Lewis County. In its first review, the Washington Supreme Court considered the trial court's orders dismissing the cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; a majority of the Court held that "RCW 4.12.010 relates to venue, not jurisdiction" and therefore "reverse[d] and remand[ed] for further proceedings." the respondents promptly moved to transfer venue to Lewis County in each case. Over the petitioners' objections, the trial court granted the respondents' motions. Those transfer orders were at issue here. The Supreme Court held that respondents did not waive their objections to proper venue for these actions, but that as a matter of statutory interpretation, RCW 4.12.010(1) did not provide for exclusive proper venue in Lewis County. King County was another possible proper venue in accordance with RCW 4.12.020(3) and 4.12.025(3). The Court therefore reversed the trial court's orders transferring venue to Lewis County to the extent those orders were based solely on exclusive proper venue. It was unclear from the record if the trial court considered whether venue should be transferred to Lewis County for the convenience to the witnesses, so the Court remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion on that issue in a manner consistent with its decision here. View "Ralph v. Weyerhaeuser Co." on Justia Law

The City of Bremerton, Kitsap County, and other defendants filed a motion to dismiss a civil suit filed by pro se litigant John Worthington. He responded by filing a special motion to strike under the Washington Act Limiting Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP statute). The trial court denied the motion and imposed financial sanctions on Worthington on grounds that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous. The Supreme Court found only that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court on the issue of the monetary sanction: the statute under which authority the trial court used in applying the sanctions was made invalid at the time of Worthington's anti-SLAPP motion. View "Worthington v. City of Bremerton" on Justia Law

Jamie Fast sought medical care because of difficulty conceiving and menstrual bleeding, which had been heavier and more prolonged than normal. Upon first consulting with Dr. Adam Smith, she noted on her medical history forms that her grandmother had diabetes and her parents had high cholesterol. In late March 2008, Dr. Smith confirmed Jamie was pregnant. Jamie bled for the first few months of pregnancy-visiting the emergency room at least once for bleeding. Jamie phoned Dr. Smith's office multiple times to inquire about her bleeding. Each time, Jamie went to Dr. Smith for an examination or she had an ultrasound at the hospital. After each checkup or ultrasound, Dr. Smith assured Jamie that everything was fine or normal. Neither Dr. Smith nor his nursing staff ever raised concerns about blood sugar, diabetes, high blood pressure, or weight loss during Jamie's pregnancy. At an August 2008 appointment, Dr. Gregory Schroff covered for Dr. Smith. Dr. Schroff discovered Jamie's blood glucose concentration was over six times the upper limit of normal. A second test confirmed the high result was not a fluke. Dr. Schroff admitted Jamie to the hospital for management of diabetes and pregnancy that same day. At the hospital, Dr. Schroff ordered intermittent fetal monitoring. The monitor detected fetal distress several times, indicating decelerations of the fetal heart rate. The nursing staff's response was to turn off the monitor, rather than to substitute a different monitor or to expedite delivery of the unborn child. Dr. Schroff failed to review fetal monitor strips. Nurses were unable to detect a fetal heartbeat; Jamie delivered a stillborn baby. She was diagnosed as an insulin-dependent type 2 diabetic since the stillbirth. The medical negligence statute of limitations (MNSOL) required filing a claim for medical negligence within three years of the allegedly negligent act or omission or within one year of when the negligence was or should have been discovered, whichever is later. The MNSOL may be tolled for one year upon the making of a good-faith request for mediation. The general torts catchall statute of limitations was also three years, but with no associated tolling provision. statute of limitations. Dr. Smith, joined by the other defendants, moved for summary judgment, because the Fasts’ wrongful death claim was barred by the general torts catchall statute of limitations and violation of a tort claim statute. The trial court granted summary judgment on both grounds. The Fasts appealed. After review, the Supreme Court held that in cases of wrongful death resulting from negligent health care, the MNSOL (RCW 4.16.350(3)) applied. View "Fast v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist." on Justia Law

An employee of a nonprofit serving disabled adult clients used her position to embezzle more than half a million dollars held by the nonprofit for its clients. After the embezzlement was discovered, Travelers Casualty & Surety Company, the nonprofit's insurance company, made the nonprofit whole. Travelers then sought contribution from the bank in federal court. By submitting certified questions of Washington law, that court has asked the Washington Supreme Court to decide, among other things, whether a nonpayee's signature on the back of a check was an indorsement. Furthermore, the Court was also asked whether claims based on unauthorized indorsements that are not discovered and reported to a bank within one year of being made available to the customer are time barred. The Supreme Court answered yes to both questions. View "Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Wash. Trust Bank" on Justia Law

A police dog bit a police officer during a nighttime search for a burglary suspect in an abandoned building. Dog owners are usually strictly liable for dog bite damages. However, there is a statutory exception to strict liability for dog bites caused by the "lawful application of a police dog." At issue in this case was whether the County was strictly liable for an on-duty police dog biting an on-duty police officer. The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances of this case, the County was not subject to strict liability. View "Finch v. Thurston County" on Justia Law

Ray Sandberg served in the United States Navy during World War II. Afterward, he worked for decades in dockyards and lumberyards. Throughout his work life, he had been exposed to asbestos. He contracted lymphoma, pleural disease and asbestosis relating to asbestos exposure. In 1999, he sued nearly 40 defendants who had some part in exposing him to asbestos. Most defendants settled; of the one that did not, Sandberg obtained a $1.5 million judgment. At age 84, Sandberg died. His daughter Judy Deggs, as personal representative of Sandberg's estate, sued additional companies that had not been named in her father's original lawsuit. The record of this case does not explain why the additional companies were not named in the 199 suit. The defendants here moved to dismiss this suit as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. On appeal, Deggs argued that the wrongful death claim she brought was a distinct statutory claim and that her injuries were not the same injuries her father suffered and sued for in 1999: her injuries were due to the loss of her father, which did not occur until he died. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal, finding that "[a] wrongful death 'action accrues at the time of death' so long as there is 'a subsisting cause of action in the deceased' at the time of death subject to exceptions no present here." The Court found insufficient cause to abandon that well-established precedent in this case. View "Deggs v. Asbestos Corp." on Justia Law

The child (K.M.M.) was in foster care since she was six and a half years old. She was removed from her biological parents' custody in 2009 because their serious substance abuse problems resulted in a neglectful home enviromnent. She was 11 years old at the time of trial in 2013. She had been in two foster care placements and was physically abused in one of those placements. K.M.M.'s biological father completed court-ordered services and remedied the deficiencies identified by the dependency court in prior proceedings. Nevertheless, the trial court terminated his parental rights based on its conclusion that he remained "unable to parent" due to the child's lack of attachment to him. This case required the Washington Supreme Court to determine whether parental rights could be terminated where the father was unable to parent his child due to a lack of attachment and continuing the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the child's emotional development and mental well-being. After review, the Supreme Court concluded there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that all necessary services have been provided to the father and that the provision of any additional services would have been futile. Furthermore, the record supported the trial court's finding of current parental unfitness based on the father's inability to parent the child. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision to uphold the termination order. View "In re Parental Rights to K.M.M." on Justia Law

When petitioner Mike Belenski requested certain records from Jefferson County (County), the County responded that it had "no responsive records." Over two years later, Belenski sued the County, asserting that this response violated the Public Records Act (PRA) because the County did in fact have such records and failed to make the proper disclosures. The Court of Appeals dismissed this claim as time barred under the two-year statute of limitations in RCW 4.16.130. At issue was which statute of limitations applied to Belenski' s PRA claim and whether the applicable statute rendered his claim time barred. The Supreme Court held that the one-year statute of limitations in the PRA applied to Belenski' s claim and that this limitations period usually begins to run on an agency's final, definitive response to a records request. However, the Court remanded this case for the trial court to determine whether equitable tolling should have tolled the statute of limitations. View "Belenski v. Jefferson County" on Justia Law