Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Ward received twice medical treatment at Stonecrest. Stonecrest hired NPAS, Inc. to collect Ward’s outstanding balances. NPAS first sent Ward a billing statement on October 3 related to his July hospital visit. The statement provided NPAS's full name and address at the top of the first page; the reverse side explained who it was. NPAS called Ward on October 24 and left a voice message: We are calling from NPAS on behalf of Stonecrest … Please return our call. On November 17, NPAS, sent a second billing statement. On December 27, NPAS left a second, identical, voice message. NPAS then returned his account to Stonecrest. Ward’s second account regarding his October hospital visit followed a similar process. On December 28, after retaining counsel, Ward sent a cease-and-desist letter to “NPAS Solutions, LLC,” an entity unrelated to NPAS, Inc. Ward stated at his deposition that NPAS, Inc.’s voice messages caused him to become confused as to which entity had called him.Ward filed suit under the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692e(11) alleging NPAS failed, in its voice messages, to identify itself as a debt collector and failed to identify the “true name” of its business. The Sixth Circuit held that the case should be dismissed because Ward lacks Article III standing. Ward does not automatically have standing simply because Congress authorizes a plaintiff to sue for failing to comply with the Act. The procedural injuries Ward asserts do not bear a close relationship to traditional harms. View "Ward v. National Patient Account Services Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are three Ohioans who tried to get initiatives to decriminalize marijuana on local ballots. Soon after they filed their proposed initiatives for November 2020 ballots, Ohio declared a state of emergency because of COVID-19 and ordered Ohioans to stay at home. Ohio’s ballot-access laws require the submission of a petition with a minimum number of ink signatures witnessed by the petition’s circulator. Plaintiffs say the laws, as applied during the COVID-19 pandemic, made it too difficult for them to get any of their initiatives on 2020 ballots. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief but tied their requests for relief exclusively to the November 2020 election. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. The election has come and gone and, with it, the prospect that plaintiffs can get any of the relief they asked for. The case is moot. View "Thompson v. DeWine" on Justia Law

Rowland brought claims arising from injuries she sustained while incarcerated. The district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Rowland’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 and punitive damages claims. After that judgment, by agreement of the parties, the court entered an order dismissing Rowland’s remaining state-law negligence claims without prejudice, so that Rowland could pursue an appeal on her federal claims. Civil Rule 54(b) permits a district court to enter final judgment “as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties” when it determines, using a multi-factor analysis, that “there is no just reason for delay.”The Seventh Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the voluntary dismissal of Rowland’s remaining state-law claims did not create an appealable final order under 28 U.S.C. 1291, A litigant cannot circumvent the requirements of Rule 54(b) by the expedient of voluntarily dismissing her surviving claims in order to seek immediate appellate review of an adverse judgment on her resolved claims, with the intention of reinstating the dismissed claims should she obtain a favorable outcome on appeal. Such a dismissal does not create a final order under 28 U.S.C. 1291. View "Rowland v. Southern Health Partners, Inc" on Justia Law

Kensu, a resident of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), was sentenced to life imprisonment for first-degree murder. He has filed several actions under 42 U.S.C. 1983 during his sentence; he won $325,002 after the jury found that five defendants had been “deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need[s].” Since then, Kensu has filed several more suits against MDOC and Corizon, a correctional health care contractor, including putative class actions, some of which remain pending.The complaint, in this case, had 808 numbered allegations plus additional sub-allegations, spanning 180 pages. Although his counsel failed to identify this case as related to any of his earlier actions (in violation of a local rule) the district court determined that it was a companion to Kensu v. Borgerding, and reassigned it. Finding his complaint too long and unclear, the district court dismissed, allowing Kensu to try again. His second effort was still too long and unclear. The district court explained the problems with Kensu’s complaint in more detail and gave him one last chance to amend it. Kensu made his complaint longer instead of reducing it to a plain statement of his grievance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his complaint with prejudice. View "Kensu v. Corizon, Inc." on Justia Law

RLR owns land on the Little Pigeon River. Tract 1 had a private resort and parking spaces. Tract 2 had a duplex building. The city decided to build a pedestrian walkway along the River, going through both tracts, and filed a petition for condemnation of a permanent easement. The easement would make some of the parking spaces on Tract 1 unusable. The petition also sought temporary construction easements, including one on which the city would construct Tract 2 parking spaces to replace those lost on Tract 1. RLR argued that the compensation for the loss of the spaces was too low and that the plan of building parking spaces on Tract 2 was a private, rather than public, purpose. The court ruled in favor of the city, which took possession of the land and built the walkway, but never built the parking spots. Before valuation proceedings, RLR filed suit in federal court, alleging an unlawful taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the source of RLR’s injury was the state court’s order. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Supreme Court’s 2005 Exxon decision abrogated Sixth Circuit precedent applying Rooker-Feldman to interlocutory orders. The state-court order of possession counts as a judgment under Rooker-Feldman. View "RLR Investments, LLC v. City of Pigeon Forge" on Justia Law

In 1998, Old Ben Coal Company conveyed its rights to the methane gas in various coal reserves to Illinois Methane. A “Delay Rental Obligation” required the owner of the coal estate to pay Methane rent while it mined coal in areas that Methane had not yet exploited. A deed, including the Delay Rental Obligation was recorded. A few years later, Old Ben filed for bankruptcy and purported to sell its coal interests “free and clear of any and all Encumbrances” to Alliance. Old Ben did not notify Methane before the bankruptcy sale but merely circulated notice by publication in several newspapers. Alliance later sought a permit to mine coal. Methane eventually sought to collect rent in Illinois state court. Alliance argued that Old Ben’s “free and clear” sale had extinguished Methane’s interest.The bankruptcy court held that Alliance was not entitled to an injunction. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed. The deed indicates that the Delay Rental Obligation runs with the land and binds successors; it “is not simply a personal financial obligation between” Old Ben and Methane. The covenant directly affects the value of the coal and methane estates. Methane was a known party with a known, present, and vested interest in real property, entitled to more than publication notice. View "Alliance WOR Properties, LLC v. Illinois Methane, LLC" on Justia Law

Objectors to a class action settlement in the Flint Water Cases sought to compel the district court to cease holding off-the-record substantive ex parte meetings that exclude objectors’ counsel; to order the participants at certain conferences to recount for the record their recollection of what transpired at those conferences; to order settling parties to identify any other substantive unrecorded conferences since February 26, 2021; and to refrain from continuing to prescribe or dictate the litigation strategy of the parties in advocating for the settlement.The Sixth Circuit denied the petition. Despite the seriousness of their allegations, petitioners must show that mandamus is the appropriate remedy. The district court has not approved the settlement; their objections remain pending. If the court overrules their objections, and if the petitioners believe this decision was because of some impropriety, they can bring a direct appeal. Petitioners have not shown a clear and indisputable right to the relief they seek. Requiring district courts to invite unnamed class members and individual attorneys to every proceeding risks the efficiency interests that class actions are meant to promote. District courts appoint interim lead and liaison counsel to represent the class’s interests in pre-judgment proceedings. The court’s order indicates that it is aware of its ethical obligations and plans to hear from objectors during the fairness hearing. View "In re: Hall" on Justia Law

Paul was driving his daughter Kelly’s vehicle when it was struck by a United States Postal Service (USPS) vehicle. Kelly was a passenger. Days later, Kelly filed her SF 95, for a claim under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671–80. Use of the form is not required to present an FTCA claim. Kelly listed herself as the claimant, noted Paul’s involvement, and indicated that the extent of their injuries was unknown. Kelly alone signed the form and provided only her contact information. The form requests a total amount of damages and states: “[f]ailure to specify may cause forfeiture of your rights.” Kelly wrote: “I do not have ... a total on medical.” Kelly sent USPS the final car repair bill, which USPS paid. Later, USPS received a representation letter from counsel for Kelly that did not mention Paul. USPS responded, stating: “A claim must be for a specific dollar amount.” USPS states that it did not receive any further information concerning the amount of personal injury damages.Paul and Kelly filed suit, seeking $25,000 in personal injury damages. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit remanded. While the sum certain requirement in the FTCA is not jurisdictional, Kelly never provided a sum certain so, her personal injury claim is not cognizable. The agency had adequate notice of Paul’s claim but he also failed to satisfy the statutory “sum certain” requirement. View "Copen v. United States" on Justia Law

Rite Aid’s “Rx Savings Program” provides generic prescription drugs at reduced prices. The program is free and widely available but excludes customers whose prescriptions are paid by publicly funded healthcare programs like Medicare or Medicaid. Federal regulations require pharmacies to dispense prescriptions for beneficiaries of those programs at their “usual and customary charge to the general public” (U&C rate). Rahimi alleged that Rite Aid overbilled the government programs because the amounts it charged did not take into account the lower Rx Savings Program prices. Rahimi claimed Rite Aid's submission of bills for those covered by publicly funded health insurance, representing the price to be the U&C rate, violated the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a).The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Rahimi’s claim. The Act’s public disclosure bar precludes qui tam actions that merely feed off prior public disclosures of fraud. From the beginning, communications about the Rx Savings Program have stated that publicly funded health care programs were ineligible for the discounted prices. Before Rahimi’s disclosures, Connecticut investigated membership discount prices; the Department of Health and Human Services announced that it would review Medicaid claims for generic drugs to determine the extent to which large chain pharmacies are billing Medicaid the usual and customary charges for drugs provided under their retail discount generic programs; and a qui tam action was unsealed in California, describing an identical scheme. View "Rahimi v. Rite Aid Corp." on Justia Law

When Perez (now 23) was nine, he emigrated from Mexico and started school in the Sturgis. Perez is deaf; the school assigned him a classroom aide who was not trained to work with deaf students and did not know sign language. Perez nonetheless appeared to progress academically. He was on the Honor Roll every semester. Months before graduation, the school informed the family that Perez did not qualify for a diploma—he was eligible for only a “certificate of completion.” Perez filed a complaint with the Michigan Department of Education, citing the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1412, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and Michigan disabilities laws. The ALJ dismissed the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims for lack of jurisdiction. Before a hearing on the IDEA claim, the parties settled. The school agreed to pay for Perez to attend the Michigan School for the Deaf, for any “post-secondary compensatory education,” for sign language instruction, and for the family’s attorney’s fees.Months later, Perez sued Sturgis Public Schools, with one ADA claim and one claim under Michigan law, alleging that the school discriminated against him by not providing the resources necessary for him to fully participate in class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. Under the IDEA, the decision to settle means that Perez is barred from bringing a similar case against the school in court—even under a different federal law. View "Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools" on Justia Law