Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
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In this case, Aquila Alpha LLC (Aquila) appealed against a judgment from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, affirming a bankruptcy court’s decision to deny Aquila’s motion to vacate a default judgment. The default judgment was obtained by Howard M. Ehrenberg, as the liquidating trustee of several debtors, and granted the debtors the ownership of a $23.7 million mortgage purchased by Aquila.Aquila argued that the default judgment should be vacated due to lack of personal jurisdiction and misapplication of the relevant Rule 60(b) factors. Aquila posited that it was improperly included in the First Amended Complaint without leave from the bankruptcy court and was not correctly served.However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The appellate court concurred with the district court that the bankruptcy court had personal jurisdiction over the parties and had correctly applied the Rule 60(b) factors to deny Aquila’s motion to vacate default.The appeals court ruled that Aquila was correctly added to the First Amended Complaint as of right pursuant to Rule 15(a). The court also concluded that Aquila was properly served. It was further determined that Aquila’s default was willful, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to set aside the default judgment. View "In re Orion HealthCorp, Inc." on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed a decision made by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff, Do No Harm, a membership organization, filed a suit against Pfizer Inc., alleging that a Pfizer fellowship program unlawfully excluded white and Asian-American applicants on the basis of race. The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction, which was denied by the district court. The district court dismissed the case without prejudice because Do No Harm lacked Article III standing. The court reasoned that the organization failed to identify by name a single injured member.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It upheld that to establish standing under Article III, an association relying on injuries to individual members must name at least one injured member. The court also held that if a plaintiff fails to establish standing in the context of a motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court must dismiss their claims without prejudice rather than allowing the case to proceed if the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to establish standing under the less onerous standard applicable at the pleading stage. View "Do No Harm v. Pfizer Inc." on Justia Law

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The case being summarized involves two subclasses of current and former tipped employees at two New York City restaurants, who filed suit against the restaurants and their owners for violations of the New York Labor Law (NYLL) and the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Prior to the trial, the parties agreed to present only the NYLL claims to the jury. The defendants appealed the partial final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ NYLL claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that because the plaintiffs’ federal claims were never formally dismissed, and the partial final judgment did not contain a disposition as to the federal claims, the matter had to be remanded to the district court. The purpose of the remand was to allow the district court to clarify the record as to the status of the FLSA claims. The court concluded that the lack of clarity concerning the FLSA claims impaired its ability to review the defendants’ challenges, leading to questions about the validity of the district court’s judgment certifying the appeal. The mandate was issued forthwith, with jurisdiction restored to the panel without the need for a new notice of appeal if, within thirty days, either party informed the court by letter that the district court had supplemented the record to clarify the status of the FLSA claims. View "Zivkovic v. Laura Christy LLC" on Justia Law

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This case revolves around the plaintiff, Cindy L. Moll, who made allegations of gender-based discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliatory transfer of her job site, and discriminatory or retaliatory termination of her employment against her former employer, Telesector Resources Group Inc., in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the New York State Human Rights Law. She also claimed she was paid less than her male co-workers for similar work, violating Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York initially granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, dismissing all of the plaintiff's claims. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated parts of the district court's judgment and remanded for trial.Regarding the hostile work environment claim, the Court of Appeals concluded that the district court erred in finding that the plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case. The Court of Appeals noted the district court's failure to take all the circumstances into account and to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.In relation to the retaliatory transfer claim, the Court of Appeals held that the district court failed to view the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. It disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the transfer of the plaintiff's job site to Syracuse was not an adverse employment action and found that the district court ignored evidence that could support a finding of causation.As for the discriminatory or retaliatory termination of employment claim, the Court of Appeals found that the district court did not adhere to the summary judgment principles. It concluded that the record revealed genuine issues as to all of the elements of the plaintiff's claim that the defendant's decision to transfer her job site to Syracuse violated Title VII's prohibition against retaliation.Finally, concerning the Equal Pay Act claim, the Court of Appeals held that there were genuine issues of material fact to be tried. It pointed out that the district court failed to adequately account for the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of some of the plaintiff's other claims but vacated the judgment as to the claims of hostile work environment, retaliatory transfer, discriminatory or retaliatory termination of employment, and the Equal Pay Act claim as to one of the plaintiff's identified comparators. The case was remanded for trial. View "Moll v. Telesector" on Justia Law

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In this case, plaintiff-appellant John Kowalchuck sued his former employer, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries he sustained while clearing snow at an MTA property. The MTA requested a pre-motion conference to discuss its anticipated motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the request, and at the pre-motion conference, it deemed the MTA's motion as having been made and denied it. However, two years later, and only four days before the trial was set to begin, the district court reconsidered its previous denial of the motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the MTA, dismissing the complaint. Kowalchuck was not given an opportunity to submit papers in opposition to the motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the district court erred when it sua sponte reconsidered its denial of summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the MTA, without giving Kowalchuck notice or an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals emphasized the need for procedural safeguards such as notice and an opportunity to be heard before a court can grant summary judgment sua sponte. The court also noted that Kowalchuck was procedurally prejudiced by the district court's use of a truncated or expedited procedure, as he was surprised by the district court's sua sponte grant of summary judgment and that surprise resulted in his failure to present evidence in support of his position. View "Kowalchuck v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

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In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the plaintiffs were U.S. investors who purchased Mexican government bonds. They alleged that the defendants, Mexican branches of several multinational banks, conspired to fix the prices of the bonds. The defendants sold the bonds to the plaintiffs through non-party broker-dealers. The defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the District Court granted the motion, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction as the alleged misconduct, price-fixing of bonds, occurred solely in Mexico.Upon appeal, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the case. The court found that the defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with New York as they had solicited and executed bond sales through their agents, the broker-dealers. The plaintiffs' claims arose from or were related to these contacts. The court rejected the defendants' argument that the alleged wrongdoing must occur in the jurisdiction for personal jurisdiction to exist, stating that the defendants' alleged active sales of price-fixed bonds through their agents in New York sufficed to establish personal jurisdiction. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re: Mexican Government Bonds Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has ruled in a complex environmental case involving an entity known as the Revitalizing Auto Communities Environmental Response Trust (RACER), which was created to manage the environmental cleanup of former General Motors (GM) properties. RACER sought recovery of costs related to environmental cleanup under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) from multiple defendants who had also contributed to the pollution. The district court had dismissed RACER's claims, concluding that a 2011 consent decree had resolved RACER's liability for the area in question. On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the decision, ruling that the 2011 consent decree did not resolve RACER's liability for the entire area. The court held that the extent of RACER's liability under the 2011 consent decree is a factual question that could not be resolved at the pleading stage. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Revitalizing Auto Communities Environmental Response Trust v. National" on Justia Law

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The case involves an appeal by a plaintiff against the dismissal of his lawsuit against the City of Buffalo and some of its police officers. The plaintiff was arrested and charged with violating a city noise ordinance after he shouted at a police officer, who was driving without headlights, to turn his lights on. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit, asserting that his arrest violated his First Amendment right to free speech and amounted to false arrest and malicious prosecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the district court erred in ruling that the plaintiff's shout was not protected by the First Amendment, given that it was a warning about a public safety issue. The court further concluded that there were genuine issues of fact concerning whether there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, which should have been resolved by a jury rather than at summary judgment.The court vacated the part of the district court's judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, and First Amendment retaliation, as well as his claims related to failure to intervene and respondeat superior. The court affirmed the part of the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim that the noise ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to him. The case was remanded for trial on the reinstated claims. View "Rupp v. City of Buffalo" on Justia Law

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In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Minhye Park’s case against David Dennis Kim by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The District Court dismissed the case due to Park’s persistent and knowing violation of court orders, specifically regarding discovery. The Court of Appeals found that Park’s noncompliance amounted to "sustained and willful intransigence" despite repeated warnings that continued refusal to comply would result in dismissal.Additionally, the Court of Appeals addressed the conduct of Park's attorney, Jae S. Lee. Lee cited a non-existent court decision in her reply brief to the court, which she admitted she generated using an artificial intelligence tool, ChatGPT. The court deemed this action as falling below the basic obligations of counsel and referred Lee to the court’s Grievance Panel. The court also ordered Lee to provide a copy of the decision to her client. The court emphasized that attorneys must ensure that their submissions to the court are accurate and that they have conducted a reasonable inquiry to confirm the existence and validity of the legal authorities on which they rely. View "Park v. Kim" on Justia Law

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John Wilson, the plaintiff-appellant, made several requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the defendant-appellee, to release records concerning him. Dissatisfied with the FBI's response, Wilson filed a suit in the Southern District of New York, alleging that the FBI failed to conduct an adequate search. The District Court ruled in favor of Wilson, partially granting his motion for summary judgment by ordering the FBI to conduct a search of an additional database. However, the search did not yield any new disclosures to Wilson. Subsequently, Wilson filed a motion seeking attorneys’ fees and costs under FOIA's fee-shifting provision, arguing that he was a substantially prevailing party. The District Court denied his motion, applying the criteria set by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a previous case, Pietrangelo v. United States Army. Wilson appealed this decision.On appeal, the Second Circuit Court affirmed the decision of the District Court, concluding that the District Court correctly applied the Pietrangelo factors and did not abuse its discretion in ruling that those factors weighed against an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. The Second Circuit Court found that the public benefit derived from Wilson's case was minimal, Wilson's interest in the records was personal rather than public, and the FBI had a reasonable basis for withholding the requested information. As such, it concluded that the District Court did not err in denying Wilson's motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. View "Wilson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation" on Justia Law