Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The National Advertising Division (“NAD”), a self-regulatory organization, concluded that Defendant Young Living Essential Oils, LC’s (“Young Living”) claims that its oils are “therapeutic-grade” and impart physical and/or mental health benefits are “unsupported,” and recommended that Young Living stop making these claims. Plaintiff had already spent money on Young Living’s products, including lavender oil advertised to “promote [a] feeling of calm and fight occasional nervous tension” and peppermint oil that allegedly “helps to  maintain energy levels.” Feeling misled by claims that the products would have effects like “promoting feelings of relaxation & tranquility,” Plaintiff sued, on behalf of herself and other similarly situated individuals, asserting claims under common law and various state statutes that she believes protect consumers like her against companies like Young Living. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit, finding that Young Living’s claims that its products would do things like “help to maintain energy levels” was run-of-the-mill puffery that companies use when trying to persuade potential customers to part with their dollars.   The Second Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part. The court vacated the district court’s ruling insofar as it dismissed the New York General Business Law claims for being based on statements of non-actionable puffery and the unjust enrichment claim for not satisfying the Rule 9(b) requirement. The court affirmed the ruling as to the dismissal of the breach of warranty claims. The court found that Plaintiff’s stated the circumstances constituting fraud with sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b) and certainly with enough particularity to give fair notice of her claim and enable the preparation of a defense. View "MacNaughton v. Young Living Essential Oils, LC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Virginia-licensed mental health counselor, appealed from a district court judgment dismissing her First Amendment and Due Process challenges to a New York law requiring her to obtain a further license in that state to provide mental health counseling to New York residents. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in (1) dismissing her as-applied challenges for lack of standing, (2) construing her First Amendment facial challenge as alleging overbreadth and concluding therefrom that she failed to state a plausible claim for relief, and (3) overlooking her facial Due Process claim.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Plaintiff need not satisfy the particular requirements for initial licensure to provide mental health counseling to New York residents, she can allege no injury from, and therefore has no standing to challenge, that part of the law. Moreover, as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims, the court explained that New York’s license requirement withstands intermediate scrutiny as a matter of law because there is no question that the law (i) serves an important government interest in promoting and protecting public health, specifically, public mental health; and (ii) is narrowly tailored by statutory definition and exemptions to advance that interest without unduly burdening speech. View "Brokamp v. James" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are 21 U.S. citizens who were harmed, and the estate and family members of a U.S. citizen who was killed in rocket attacks carried out in Israel in 2006 by the terrorist organization Hizbollah. Plaintiffs alleged that the Lebanese Canadian Bank (“LCB”) provided extensive financial assistance to Hizbollah in the years leading up to the attacks. In 2011, Defendant Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL (“SGBL”) acquired all of LCB’s assets and liabilities in a transaction conducted under the laws of Lebanon. Plaintiffs sued for damages under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990 and sought to hold SGBL liable as LCB’s successor. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that SGBL did not inherit LCB’s status for purposes of personal jurisdiction when it acquired LCB’s assets and liabilities.   The Second Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs’ successor-jurisdiction theory raises an important and unresolved issue under New York law. Accordingly, the court certified the following two questions to the New York Court of Appeals:1. Under New York law, does an entity that acquires all of another entity’s liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that entity, inherit the acquired entity’s status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction? 2. In what circumstances will the acquiring entity be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New York? View "Lelchook v. Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs – issuers of collateralized debt obligations secured by certificates in residential-mortgage-backed securities trusts – appealed from three separate judgments dismissing actions brought against The Bank of New York Mellon, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas. In each case, the district courts assumed that Plaintiffs had Article III standing but found that Plaintiffs were precluded from relitigating the issue of prudential standing due to a prior case Plaintiffs had brought against U.S. Bank National Association.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders. The court explained that it joined the Ninth Circuit in concluding that the district courts permissibly bypassed the question of Article III standing to address issue preclusion, which offered a threshold, non-merits basis for dismissal. The court also concluded that the district courts’ application of issue preclusion was correct. The court wrote that it fully agreed with the district courts that Plaintiffs were not entitled to a second bite at the prudential-standing apple after the U.S. Bank Action. The district courts, therefore, did not err in taking this straightforward, if not “textbook,” path to dismissal. View "Phx. Light SF Ltd. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon; Phx. Light SF DAC v. Bank of N." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that he was sexually abused and exploited from approximately 1978 to 1984, when he was between 12 and 17 years old, by Father P.M., a now-deceased Rhode Island priest. Plaintiff sued the Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence (“RCB”), St. Anthony’s Church Corporation North Providence (“St. Anthony’s”), and a retired Bishop (together, “Defendants”) for various torts based on Defendants’ alleged role in enabling the abuse. The district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that New York’s long-arm statute did not permit the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. First, P.M. did not commit the alleged sexual abuse in New York as an agent of Defendants. Second, the alleged conduct is unrelated to Defendants’ business activities in New York. The court explained that Plaintiff argued that the nexus requirement is satisfied because Defendants’ alleged business activity, conducted through P.M., was the “factual cause” of P.M.’s sexual assault of “Plaintiff in New York.” But a chain of causation involving physical presence in New York does not, by itself, create a nexus between an otherwise unrelated tort claim and a business transaction. View "Philip Edwardo v. The Roman Catholic Bishop, et al" on Justia Law

Parents and guardians of students with disabilities brought an enforcement action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, alleging that the New York City Department of Education must immediately fund their children’s educational placements during the pendency of ongoing state administrative proceedings. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, which the district court denied. Plaintiffs appealed from that denial.   The Second Circuit affirmed. As a threshold jurisdictional matter, the court held that although the Plaintiffs are not yet entitled to tuition payments for the portion of the school year that has yet to occur, their claims are nevertheless ripe because they also seek payments for past transportation costs. On the merits, the court held that the IDEA’s stay-put provision does not entitle parties to automatic injunctive relief when the injunctive relief concerns only educational funding, not placement. Applying the traditional preliminary injunction standard, the court concluded that Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek because they have not shown a likelihood of irreparable injury. View "Mendez v. Banks" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court’s judgment dismissing all claims against Defendants-Newburgh Enlarged City School District, Superintendent, and Assistant Superintendent. Plaintiff, an African American woman of West Indian descent who served as principal of South Middle School, asserts claims of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Title VII claim to the extent the claim is based on alleged adverse employment actions in May 2019 and vacated the district court’s judgment to the extent it dismissed the Section 1983 claim and the remainder of the Title VII claim. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, including a determination as to whether Plaintiff should be provided with an extension of time to effectuate proper service as to the Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent. The court explained that taking the allegations in the FAC as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the FAC meets that pleading standard with respect to the denial of the position for RISE administrator, the denial of her application to administer the summer-school program, and the termination of her position as SMS principal. Accordingly, the court explained that Plaintiff has stated plausible discrimination claims under Title VII and Section 1983, and the district court erred in dismissing them. Therefore, Plaintiff may proceed with her Section 1983 claim as to all three alleged adverse employment actions and with her Title VII claim against the School District. View "Buon v. Spindler, et al." on Justia Law

Argonaut Insurance Company (“Argonaut”) appealed from an order of the district court remanding this breach-of-bond action, brought by LeChase Construction Services, LLC (“LeChase”), to New York state court after Argonaut removed it on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The district court purported to issue its remand order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(e), which authorizes remand if, after removal, a plaintiff joins defendants whose inclusion would destroy diversity jurisdiction. The district court expressly acknowledged that section 1447(e) is facially inapplicable here, as LeChase was not seeking to join a non-diverse defendant or otherwise contesting the existence of diversity jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the district court reasoned that, since remand would facilitate this case’s consolidation with two related actions then pending in New York state court, thus conserving judicial resources and avoiding the risk of inconsistent outcomes, it was appropriate under the “rubric” of section 1447(e). At issue was: (1) whether the Second Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s remand order notwithstanding Section 1447(d; and (2) if the court does, whether the district court issued such order in excess of its statutory authority under section 1447(e).   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded. The court concluded, as a matter of first impression, that “[section] 1447(d) permits appellate review of a district-court remand order that dresses in [section 1447(e)’s] jurisdictional clothing a patently non-jurisdictional ground,” such as the prudential considerations invoked by the district court here. The court concluded – for essentially the reasons acknowledged by the district court itself – that its remand order here was unauthorized under section 1447(e). View "LeChase Constr. Servs. LLC v. Argonaut Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant the Law Offices of Crystal Moroney (“Moroney”) is a law firm that principally provides legal advice and services to clients seeking to collect debt. As the agency charged with regulating this industry, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) served on Moroney a civil investigative demand (“CID”) for documents, which it subsequently petitioned to enforce in the district court. While that petition was pending, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020), holding that the provision that protected the Director of the CFPB from removal other than for cause was an unconstitutional limitation on the President’s removal power. The CFPB filed a notice to ratify the CID and the enforcement action against Moroney. The district court granted the CFPB’s petition to enforce the CID. On appeal, Moroney argues that the CID cannot be enforced.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the CID was not void ab initio because the CFPB Director was validly appointed, that the CFPB’s funding structure is not constitutionally infirm under either the Appropriations Clause or the nondelegation doctrine and that the CID served on Moroney is not an unduly burdensome administrative subpoena. The court explained that under the nondelegation doctrine’s lenient standard, Congress has plainly provided an intelligible principle to guide the CFPB in setting and spending its budget. Therefore, the court concluded that the CFPB’s funding structure is proper under the nondelegation doctrine. View "CFPB v. Law Offs. of Crystal Moroney" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision dismissing her claims against New York University (NYU) and declining to allow her to amend her complaint to add another plaintiff. Plaintiff s a parent of an adult student who attended New York University (NYU) (Defendant-Appellee) during the Spring 2020 semester—a semester during which NYU suspended its in-person operations and transitioned to remote instruction. Alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and other claims, Plaintiff brought a putative class action suit against NYU to partially recover the tuition and fees she paid for her daughter’s Spring 2020 semester. The district court granted NYU’s motion to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff lacked standing and denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint to add a current NYU student as an additional plaintiff because it concluded that amendment would be futile.   The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring her breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims because she has not alleged an injury-in-fact to herself, rather than to her daughter. The court held that Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a claim for conversion. The court wrote that for these reasons, the district court properly dismissed her claims. However, the court concluded that amending the complaint to add a current student as plaintiff would not be futile. The student plaintiff plausibly alleged claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and money had and received that would survive a motion to dismiss. View "Christina Rynasko v. New York University" on Justia Law