Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims based on lack of Article III standing. Plaintiffs filed suit against online retailer Zappos.com, alleging that they were harmed by hacking of their accounts. The panel held that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged standing based on the risk of identity theft under Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs also alleged an injury in fact under Krottner, based on a substantial risk that the Zappos hackers will commit identity fraud or identity theft. The panel explained that it assessed standing at the time the complaints were filed, not as of the present. Finally, the panel held that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the risk of future harm was fairly traceable to the conduct being challenged and that their identity theft injury was redressable. The panel addressed an issue raised by sealed briefing in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. View "Stevens v. Zappos.com, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied without prejudice a petition for a writ of mandamus where federal defendants sought an order directing the district court to dismiss a case seeking various environmental remedies. Plaintiffs, twenty-one young individuals, filed suit alleging defendants have contributed to climate change in violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Defendants argued that allowing the case to proceed would result in burdensome discovery obligations on the federal government that would threaten the separation of powers. The panel held that defendants did not not satisfy the Bauman factors at this stage of the litigation, and the issues that defendants raised on mandamus were better addressed through the ordinary course of litigation. In this case, the district court had not issued a single discovery order, plaintiffs have not filed a single motion seeking to compel discovery, any merits errors were correctable through the ordinary course of litigation, and there was no controlling Ninth Circuit authority on any of the theories asserted by plaintiff. Therefore, the panel declined to exercise its discretion in granting mandamus relief. View "United States v. USDC-ORE" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for EpiCept in an action brought by doctors, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud. The doctors' claims relate to two patents for a non-FDA approved drug (NP-2) and EpiCept's failure to develop those patents into FDA-approved drugs. The doctors' arguments mainly center on the jury's determination that the doctors materially breached their contract with EpiCept by failing to disclose that Dr. Flores treated burn patients with NP-2. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in formulating the jury instructions, or in determining that the jury's verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence; neither the jury instructions given in this case nor the evidence presented at trial warrant the do-over the doctors demanded; the district court's response to the jury's question also did not merit a new trial because the jury's question was essentially factual and the district court's answer appropriately directed the jury to consider its original instructions and the evidence presented at trial; and because the panel affirmed the jury's finding that the doctors materially breached the contract, the district court's exclusion of the doctor's damages expert was necessarily harmless. View "Crowley v. EpiCept Corp." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction of an action alleging a claim of legal malpractice. The panel held that what little business Lincoln One conducted was done in Missouri—its state of incorporation—making both Lincoln One and its wholly-owned subsidiary, plaintiff, putative citizens of that state alone. Therefore, there was complete diversity between the parties because defendant was a California citizen. The panel conditionally reversed the district court's jurisdictional dismissal and remanded so that it may consider in the first instance whether Lincoln One and plaintiff were alter egos or there was jurisdictional manipulation that would warrant treating plaintiff as a California citizen. In regard to the issue of classifying the citizenship of a holding company such as Lincoln One that has engaged in no activity other than incorporation, the panel held that a recently-formed holding company's principal place of business is the place where it has its board meetings, regardless of whether such meetings have already occurred, unless evidence shows that the corporation is directed from elsewhere. View "3123 SMB LLC V. Horn" on Justia Law

The value of the property or amount of indebtedness are not the amounts in controversy when a complaint seeks only a temporary stay of foreclosure pending review of a loan modification application pursuant to the California Homeowners Bill of Rights (HBOR). In this case, the Ninth Circuit held that because SPS did not establish that removal was proper, the district court should have granted Corral's motion to remand and was without subject matter jurisdiction to consider SPS's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court's denial of the motion to remand, vacated the order granting SPS's motion to dismiss, and remanded to state court. View "Corral v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging that VSI's practices violated state law and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The Ninth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the district court's denial of VSI's motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute, because under the terms of the state statute, such a denial in a case deemed to be filed in the public interest was not immediately appealable. The panel held that it did have jurisdiction over VSI's appeal of the district court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration and affirmed the denial because this was not a private contract subject to the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Breazeale v. Victim Services" on Justia Law

EZ-FLO manufactures supply lines that connect water pipes to plumbing fixtures. The supply lines consist of flexible tubing on the inside, a protective covering of braided wire on the outside, and plastic nuts on both ends that connect the supply lines to adjacent plumbing. Plaintiffs, insurance companies, alleged that the plastic nuts are defective and allow water to leak out of the supply lines and that they made payments to their insured homeowners for damages caused by the alleged defect. They filed suit as subrogees of those insureds, seeking over $5,000,000 in damages. EZ-FLO filed a notice of removal pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction because the amended complaint “does not include more than 100 named plaintiffs.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed. A CAFA “mass action” is defined as “any civil action . . . in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact.” A lawsuit filed by 26 insurance companies in their capacity as subrogees of 145 insured homeowners does not qualify as a mass action. View "Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. EZ-FLO International, Inc." on Justia Law

Under New Jersey's traditional res judicata doctrine, a claim asserting breach of a contractual guarantee of a third party's debt does not preclude later alter ego and successor liability claims to collect the debt directly from entities related to the debtor. Further, although New Jersey's procedural joinder rules may require such claims to be joined in a single action, New Jersey law declines to impose these rules on other courts. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of most of Daewoo's claims as barred by a prior judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. In this case, the district court failed to apply New Jersey law correctly and erred in ruling that the claims in the present action were precluded under New Jersey law. View "Daewoo Electronics America v. Opta Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a naturalized U.S. citizen, filed suit against defendants under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), after agents erroneously lodged an immigration detainer against him while he was detained in county jail. After the notice of appeal on the Bivens ruling was filed, however, the district court sanctioned plaintiff for egregious misconduct during that discovery and ultimately dismissed his FTCA claims. Defendants then filed a motion in the Ninth Circuit to consider applying the sanction to plaintiff's remaining claims under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.1(b). The panel held that a limited remand was permissible without first moving in the district court under FRCP 62.1 for a targeted "indicative ruling" and, in this case, a limited remand was appropriate in order for the government to move for dismissal of the remaining claims. View "Mendia v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Following Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014), the panel held that while a theory of individualized targeting may remain relevant to the minimum contacts inquiry, it will not, on its own, support the exercise of specific jurisdiction, absent compliance with what Walden requires. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a copyright infringement action based on lack of personal jurisdiction over defendant, a United Kingdom limited company. In this case, the panel applied the "effects" test and held that defendant committed an intentional act, but did not expressly aim its intentional act at the forum state. The panel held that the district court properly declined to exercise jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). View "Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law