Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2007-2011, the Department of Justice and the FBI issued press releases disclosing Appellant’s role in the mortgage fraud crimes with which he and his co-conspirators were charged. The press releases included Appellant’s name, age, and the charges against him, and some limited employment history. The notices remain publicly available on the DOJ and FBI websitesThe Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s action alleging that the continued online public availability of the government’s press releases relating to Appellant’s guilty plea and sentencing violated his statutory and constitutional rights. Appellant’s Privacy Act claim was barred by the Act’s two-year statute of limitations, which begins to run when a cause of action arises; while information may be repeatedly accessed after publication, the “single publication rule” provides that the limitations period runs only from the date of original dissemination. The court declined to apply equitable tolling. While individuals may have a constitutional privacy interest in certain, highly sensitive information, Appellant did not have such an interest in the information at issue. Rejecting an Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual punishment" claim, the court held that the district court applied the correct test in determining whether the press releases were punitive in purpose or effect. View "Doe v. Garland" on Justia Law

WhatsApp sued under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and California state law, alleging that NSO, a privately owned and operated Israeli corporation, sent malware through WhatsApp’s server system to approximately 1,400 mobile devices. NSO argued that foreign sovereign immunity protected it from suit and, therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because NSO was acting as an agent of a foreign state, entitling it to “conduct-based immunity”—a common-law doctrine that protects foreign officials acting in their official capacity.The district court and Ninth Circuit rejected that argument. The Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. 1602, occupies the field of foreign sovereign immunity and categorically forecloses extending immunity to any entity that falls outside the Act’s broad definition of “foreign state.” There has been no indication that the Supreme Court intended to extend foreign official immunity to entities. Moreover, the FSIA’s text, purpose, and history demonstrate that Congress displaced common-law sovereign immunity as it relates to entities. View "WhatsApp Inc.v. NSO Group Technologies Ltd." on Justia Law

Blue Lake, a federally-recognized Tribal Nation, sued Acres and his company in Tribal Court over a business dispute involving a casino gaming system. Acres prevailed in tribal court. Acres then brought suit in federal court against the tribal judge, tribal officials, employees, and casino executives and lawyers who assisted the tribal court, and Blue Lake’s outside lawyers, alleging malicious prosecution, with allegations under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961. According to the complaint, “Blue Lake and its confederates sought ruinous judgments, within a court they controlled, before a judge they suborned, on conjured claims of fraud and breach of contract.” The district court concluded that tribal sovereign immunity shielded all of the defendants.The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that tribal sovereign immunity did not apply because Acres sought damages from the defendants in their individual capacities; the Tribe was not the real party in interest. Some of the defendants were entitled to absolute personal immunity; the district court properly dismissed Acres’s claims against them on that basis. The Blue Lake judge, law clerks, and the tribal court clerk were entitled to absolute judicial or quasi-judicial immunity. The court remanded for further proceedings as to the remaining defendants not entitled to absolute personal immunity. View "Acres Bonusing, Inc. v. Marston" on Justia Law

Tan operates businesses that import agricultural merchandise. The director of a U.S. Customs and Border Protection section that specializes in agricultural imports served Tan with an administrative summons to compel him to provide testimony. Tan refused to appear. The government filed an enforcement petition in the district court, 19 U.S.C. 1510. Tan argued that the statute's requirement that the government must provide “reasonable notice” when issuing an administrative summons for testimony required the government to provide a notice that described with “reasonable probability” the subjects about which it intended to question the summoned person.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the enforcement order. The statute's requirement that records be described “with reasonable specificity” only applies when the summons required the production of records. The court distinguished Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), which allows a party to notice the deposition of a corporation and to list proposed areas of inquiry with “reasonable particularity.” Customs supported its position with a sworn declaration, on personal knowledge, from the director of the Customs section that covers agricultural imports and complied with all statutory criteria, including personal service, and details concerning the date, time, and location of the interview. The court rejected Tan’s argument that the declaration contained too little detail to permit the district court to assess compliance. View "United States v. Tan" on Justia Law

A putative nationwide class of current and former members sued MEF, a membership-based spa-services company, alleging that MEF increased fees in violation of the membership agreement. The parties settled. In exchange for the release of all claims against MEF, class members could submit claims for “vouchers” for MEF products and services. The district court approved the settlement as “fair, reasonable, and adequate” under FRCP 23(e).The Ninth Circuit vacated. If a class action settlement is considered a “coupon” under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) additional restrictions apply to the settlement approval process. The court did not defer to the district court’s determination that the MEF vouchers were not coupons but applied a three-factor test, examining whether settlement benefits require class members “to hand over more of their own money before they can take advantage of” those benefits, whether the credit was valid only for “select products or services,” and how much flexibility the credit provided. The district court also failed to adequately investigate some of the potentially problematic aspects of the relationship between attorneys’ fees and the benefits to the class, which impacted the fairness of the entire settlement, not just attorneys’ fees. The district court did not apply the appropriate enhanced scrutiny; it failed to adequately address the three warning signs of implicit collusion. View "McKinney-Drobnis v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC" on Justia Law

The Secretary of Labor filed an action against Valley Wide, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. During discovery, Valley Wide sought the identities of all informant employees who provided information to the Secretary. The Secretary sought a protective order, invoking the government’s informant privilege and requesting the district court to prohibit Valley Wide from soliciting information tending to reveal any informant identities. The district court granted the motion but also ordered the Secretary to reveal the identities of informants testifying at trial by April 2, 2021. The Secretary sought a writ of mandamus, seeking an order directing the district court not to order the Secretary to identify the informant witnesses any earlier than 75 days before trial.The Ninth Circuit denied relief. The district court’s order requiring the Secretary to disclose the identities of informant witnesses and their unredacted witness statements by April 2, 2021, was not clearly erroneous as a matter of law. The record showed that the district court identified a need for Valley Wide to know the identities of informant witnesses by April 2, 2021, before summary judgment motions were due, and carefully balanced the government’s interest in nondisclosure before making its decision. The district court did not pick that date arbitrarily and addressed and considered the informant privilege issue on four separate occasions. View "Walsh v. United States District Court for the District of Arizona" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order remanding a removed action to state court, vacated the district court's award of attorneys' fees to plaintiff under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c); and remanded for further proceedings. This appeal stemmed from plaintiff's suit against Boeing and others in state court, alleging causes of action based on her exposure to asbestos that her family members brought home from work.The panel held that it had jurisdiction over the remand order under 28 U.S.C. 1447(d), explaining that even though the district court remanded pursuant to section 1446(b), under BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532 (2021), the panel had jurisdiction to review the remand order because the case was removed under section 1442.The panel explained that 28 U.S.C. 1446(b) lays out two pathways for removal. Because plaintiff's initial complaint does not set forth a ground for removal, the first pathway does not apply. Applying the "unequivocally clear and certain" standard, the panel concluded that an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper must make a ground for removal unequivocally clear and certain before the removal clock begins under the second pathway of section 1446(b)(3). In this case, Boeing's removal was timely because no ground for removal was unequivocally clear and certain until service of plaintiff's amended discovery requests. View "Dietrich v. The Boeing Company" on Justia Law

The Defendants, Ohana Military Communities, LLC and Forest City Residential Management, began a major housing construction project on Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH) in 2006. MCBH was widely contaminated with pesticides potentially impacting human health. Defendants developed and implemented a Pesticide Soil Management Plan but allegedly never informed residential tenants of the Plan, the decade-long remediation efforts, or known pesticide contamination. Plaintiffs, military servicemember families, filed suit in Hawaii state court alleging 11 different claims under state law. Defendants removed the case to federal court.The Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of the Plaintiffs’ motion to remand. Federal jurisdiction did not exist because, under the Hawaii Admission Act, 73 Stat. 4 (1959), Hawaii had concurrent legislative or political jurisdiction over MCBH, so state law had not been assimilated into federal law. The court rejected an argument that, regardless of any concurrent state jurisdiction, federal jurisdiction exists where federally owned or controlled land is involved, and a substantial federal interest exists. There was no federal officer or agency jurisdiction because there was no causal nexus between the Navy and Ohana under 28 U.S.C. 1442, and Ohana was not a federal agency for purposes of federal jurisdiction. Under the Gunn test, no federal issue was “necessarily raised.” View "Lake v. Ohana Military Communities, LLC" on Justia Law

Alliance alleged that County and City policies and inaction have created a dangerous environment in the Skid Row area, claiming that the County violated its mandatory duty to provide medically necessary care and that the municipalities have facilitated public nuisance violations by failing to clear encampments, violated disability access laws by failing to clear sidewalks of encampments, and violated constitutional rights by providing disparate services to those within the Skid Row area and by enacting policies resulting in a state-created danger to area residents and businesses. The district court issued a preliminary injunction, ordering the escrow of $1 billion to address homelessness, offers of shelter to all unhoused individuals in Skid Row within 180 days, and numerous reports. The court found that structural racism was behind Los Angeles’s homelessness crisis and its disproportionate impact on the Black community.The Ninth Circuit vacated. The plaintiffs lacked standing on all but their ADA claim; no claims were based on racial discrimination. The district court impermissibly resorted to independent research and extra-record evidence. There was no allegation that any individual plaintiff was Black nor that there was a special relationship between the City and unhoused residents nor that any individual plaintiff was deprived of medically necessary care or general assistance. Two plaintiffs who use wheelchairs and cannot traverse Skid Row sidewalks because of homeless encampments had standing to bring ADA claims but had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. View "LA Alliance for Human Rights v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's orders holding the Company and the Law Firm in contempt for failure to comply with grand jury subpoenas related to a criminal investigation, in a case in which the district court ruled that certain dual-purpose communications were not privileged because the "primary purpose" of the documents was to obtain tax advice, not legal advice. The panel concluded that the primary-purpose test governs in assessing attorney-client privilege for dual-purpose communications.The panel stated that district courts in its circuit have applied both the "primary purpose" and "because of" tests for attorney-client privilege claims for dual-purpose communications; the primary-purpose test applies to dual-purpose communications in the attorney-client privilege context; and the panel left open whether "a primary purpose test" should apply rather than "the primary purpose" test. The panel addressed remaining issues in a concurrently filed, sealed memorandum disposition. View "In re Grand Jury" on Justia Law