Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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Defendant is serving a lengthy prison sentence for armed robbery. He was arrested with tens of thousands of dollars in cash. However, pertaining to this case, the government's case at trial fell apart based on prosecutorial misconduct. The government never initiated civil forfeiture proceedings.In this case focused on who has a right to the money seized from Defendant upon his arrest, the Ninth Circuit held that neither party can prove they are entitled to it. Defendant is not entitled to the money because there is considerable evidence the money was stolen. The government is not entitled to the money because did not follow the necessary procedures. View "USA V. BRIAN WRIGHT" on Justia Law

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Crime victim Jane Doe filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in this court; she and the defendant in the underlying criminal action also filed a joint stipulation requesting that we “resolve the case on a schedule that parallels a normal appellate process.”   The Ninth Circuit, on a petition for a writ of mandamus in which Jane Doe seeks to vindicate her right under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA) to “full and timely restitution as provided in law,” a motions panel granted a joint motion, filed by Doe and the defendant in the underlying criminal action, stipulating to an extended period for this court to consider Doe’s petition beyond the 72-hour deadline imposed by the CVRA.   Under 18 U.S.C. Section 3771(d)(3), the court of appeals “shall take up and decide a mandamus petition seeking relief under the CVRA within 72 hours after the petition has been filed, unless the litigants, with the approval of the court, have stipulated to a different time period for consideration. . . . In no event shall proceedings be stayed or subject to a continuance of more than five days for purposes of enforcing” rights under the Act. The panel resolved a question of first impression regarding whether the “proceedings” referred to in Section 3771(d)(3) are those of the district court or appellate court. The panel held that the parties can agree to an extension of the 72-hour deadline with the appellate court’s approval, so long as the extension does not involve a stay or continuance of the underlying district court proceedings for more than five days. View "JANE DOE V. USDC-NVL" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Save the Bull Trout, Friends of the Wild Swan, and Alliance for the Wild Rockies challenge the United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s (“Service”) 2015 Bull Trout Recovery Plan under the citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). It is not Plaintiffs’ first time bringing such a challenge. After the Oregon district court dismissed their initial complaint alleging claims concerning the Plan, Plaintiffs elected not to amend to fix the deficiencies identified in the court’s order. Instead, Plaintiffs appealed, and only after losing on appeal did they pursue amending their complaint. The Oregon district court denied their motion to amend, finding no grounds for reopening the judgment.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service based on claim preclusion in an action brought by plaintiff environmental groups, challenging the Service’s 2015 Bull Trout Recovery Plan under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA. The panel held that Friends of the Wild Swan and Alliance for the Wild Rockies had standing to challenge the Plan. Plaintiffs asserted a procedural injury. Their member declarations established ongoing aesthetic, recreational, and conservation interests in bull trout. The procedures outlined in Section 1533(f) of the ESA served to protect these interests by requiring the implementation of a bull trout recovery plan. Because Plaintiffs established a procedural injury, they had standing as long as there was some possibility that the requested relief—revision of the Plan— would redress their alleged harms. The panel held that this benchmark was clearly met. View "SAVE THE BULL TROUT, ET AL V. MARTHA WILLIAMS, ET AL" on Justia Law

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This case involves challenges to five provisions of the Grants Pass Municipal Code (“GPMC”). The provisions can be described as an “anti-sleeping” ordinance, two “anticamping” ordinances, a “park exclusion” ordinance, and a “park exclusion appeals” ordinance.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s summary judgment and its permanent injunction in favor of Plaintiffs; affirmed certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), of a class of “involuntary homeless” persons; and remanded in an action challenging municipal ordinances which, among other things, preclude homeless persons from using a blanket, a pillow, or cardboard box for protection from the elements while sleeping within the City’s limits.   The panel stated that this court’s decision in Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2018), which held that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public property for homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter” served as the backdrop for this entire litigation. The panel held that there was abundant evidence in the record establishing that homeless persons were injured by the City’s enforcement actions in the past and it was undisputed that enforcements have continued. The panel further held that the relief sought by plaintiffs, enjoining enforcement of a few municipal ordinances aimed at involuntary homeless persons, was redressable within the limits of Article III. The panel held that based on the record in this case, the district court did not err by finding plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) such that a class could be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). View "GLORIA JOHNSON, ET AL V. CITY OF GRANTS PASS" on Justia Law

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Polaris sells off-road vehicles that have roll cages, or rollover protective structures (“ROPS”). The labels on the Polaris vehicles stated that the ROPS complied with Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards. Plaintiffs filed a class action against Polaris, claiming that the statements made on these labels were misleading, and that they relied on the statements when purchasing the vehicles.The district court granted summary judgment to Polaris. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff could not bring his equitable UCL claim in federal court because he had an adequate legal remedy in his time-barred CLRA claim. However, the court held that it must still reverse the entry of summary judgment against Plaintiff because no decision was reached on the merits of the claim. Because the district court lacked equitable jurisdiction, which it recognized, it should have denied Polaris’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiff's UCL claim without prejudice for lack of equitable jurisdiction. View "PAUL GUZMAN, ET AL V. POLARIS INDUSTRIES, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

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In Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp. (Sonner I), 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020), the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal without leave to amend of Plaintiff's class action complaint. This court held that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply federal equitable principles to claims for equitable restitution brought under California law and that, under such principles, dismissal was appropriate because Plaintiff could not show that she lacked an adequate remedy at law. After Sonner I was issued, Plaintiff filed a virtually identical complaint in California state court. Premier Nutrition responded by returning to the district court and seeking a permanent injunction against the state court action. The district court denied the injunction.The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the permanent injunction regardless of Sonner I’s preclusive effect. The panel did not determine the preclusive effect of Sonner I.The Ninth Circuit held that there was a strong presumption against enjoining a state court proceeding under the relitigation exception. Premier did not point to any clearly erroneous factual findings in the district court’s order, and the panel detected none. Res judicata principles are of high importance, but they can be addressed by the state court, and do not compel resorting to the heavy artillery of a permanent injunction. View "KATHLEEN SONNER V. PREMIER NUTRITION CORPORATION" on Justia Law

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Petitioner was convicted of the murder of an Oregon Department of Corrections Director. However, since trial, another man has confessed to the killing and nearly all the witnesses who directly implicated Petitioner have recanted their testimony. Petitioner sought federal habeas relief making various claims including constitutional violations based on the trial court’s exclusion of the other man's confession. The constitutional claims are procedurally defaulted because Petitoner failed to raise them in state court as required.The Ninth Circuit held that Petitioner's procedural default is excused under the “actual innocence” exception set forth in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). The panel wrote that other man's detailed and compelling confessions, when considered with the recantations of nearly all the State’s key witnesses, are more than sufficient to satisfy Schlup’s standard, as it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted Petitioner in light of the new evidence.Reaching the merits of Petitioner's claim, the Ninth Circuit found that the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by excluding evidence of the confessor's guilt. View "FRANK GABLE V. MAX WILLIAMS" on Justia Law

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Defendants are GoSmith, Inc., Porch.com, Inc. (which acquired GoSmith), and three individual corporate officers. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) prohibits calls using automatic telephone dialing systems (“ATDS”) to cell phones, see 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b), and telephone solicitations sent to residential telephone subscribers who have registered their phone numbers on the national donot-call registry, see 47 U.S.C. Section 227(c). Both provisions provide private causes of action for damages and injunctive relief. The complaint alleges that Defendants’ use of ATDS to plaintiffs’ cell phones violated (and continues to violate) Section 227(b); and that Defendants’ text messages to Plaintiffs’ cell phones that were (and are) registered on the national do-not-call registry violated (and continue to violate) Section 227(c). The district court assumed that plaintiffs have Article III standing but held they lack statutory standing.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint. The panel held that Plaintiffs have statutory standing under Section 227(b) and (c) of the TCPA. Defendants argued that the TCPA protects only individuals from unwanted calls, and that plaintiffs, as home improvement contractors, fall outside of TCPA’s zone of interest. The panel concluded that all of the Plaintiffs have standing to sue under Section 227(b) of the TCPA. The panel, therefore, concluded that these Plaintiffs have standing to sue under Section 227(c). The panel wrote that after discovery, Defendants may seek to argue that they have rebutted the presumption by showing that Plaintiffs’ cell phones are used to such an extent and in such a manner as to be properly regarded as business rather than “residential” lines. View "NATHAN CHENNETTE, ET AL V. PORCH.COM, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

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Bliss Sequoia Insurance and Risk Advisors held an insurance policy from Allied Property and Casualty Insurance (Allied Property) covering any liability that Bliss Sequoia might incur for “damages because of ‘bodily injury.’” One of Bliss Sequoia’s clients was a water park, and after a park guest was injured, the park sued Bliss Sequoia for professional negligence, alleging that the coverage limits on the park’s liability insurance were too low. This appeal presents the question whether that negligence claim arose “because of” the guest’s “bodily injury” and is therefore covered by Bliss Sequoia’s policy. We agree with the district court that the answer is no.   The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Allied Property. Allied’s policy provided that it covered any sums Bliss Sequoia was “legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage.’” Bliss Sequoia alleged that the bodily injury at issue was a “but-for” cause of Bliss Sequoia’s professional-negligence liability. The panel held that pure but-for causation would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts, and therefore, the law almost never employs that standard without limiting it in some way. The law cuts off remote chains of causation by applying common law principles of proximate causation. Further, the personal-injury lawsuit against the water park arose “because of bodily injury,” but the claims of professional negligence did not. Because Bliss Sequoia’s policy did not cover those claims, Allied had no duty to defend or indemnify Bliss Sequoia against them. View "BLISS SEQUOIA INSURANCE, ET AL V. ALLIED PROPERTY & CASUALTY INS" on Justia Law

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City of Reno’s complaint and declaratory relief under Nevada’s Video Service Law (“VSL”) and the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, respectively. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim of Reno’s complaint alleging that Netflix, Inc. and Hulu, LLC failed to pay franchise fees for the video streaming services they provide.   Specifically, the panel first addressed the VSL. The VSL does not expressly create a private right of action for cities to sue for unpaid franchise fees. The test under Nevada law for whether a statute creates an implied right of action is set forth in Baldonado v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 194 P.3d 96 (Nev. 2008). The panel held that all three Baldonado factors weigh against recognition of an implied right of action here. Concerning the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, the panel held that it does not provide a cause of action when a party, such as Reno, lacks a cause of action under a separate statute and seeks to use the Act to obtain affirmative relief. Here, Reno’s suit was offensive, not defensive, and Reno lacked an independent cause of action, so the Declaratory Judgment Act provided no basis for relief. View "CITY OF RENO V. NETFLIX, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law