Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff alleged that Valeant fraudulently obtained two sets of patents related to a drug and asserted these patents to stifle competition from generic drugmakers. Plaintiff further alleged that Defendants defrauded the federal government by charging an artificially inflated price for the drug while falsely certifying that its price was fair and reasonable. Dismissing Plaintiff’s action under the False Claims Act’s public disclosure bar, the district court concluded that his allegations had already been publicly disclosed, including in inter partes patent review (“IPR”) before the Patent and Trademark Office.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that an IPR proceeding in which the Patent and Trademark Office invalidated Valeant’s “‘688” patent was not a channel (i) disclosure because the government was not a party to that proceeding, and it was not a channel (ii) disclosure because its primary function was not investigative. The panel held that, under United States ex rel. Silbersher v. Allergan, 46 F.4th 991 (9th Cir. 2022), the patent prosecution histories of Valeant’s patents were qualifying public disclosures under channel (ii). The panel assumed without deciding that a Law360 article and two published medical studies were channel (iii) disclosures. The panel held that the “substantially the same” prong of the public disclosure bar applies when the publicly disclosed facts are substantially similar to the relator’s allegations or transactions. None of the qualifying public disclosures made a direct claim that Valeant committed fraud, nor did they disclose a combination of facts sufficient to permit a reasonable inference of fraud. View "ZACHARY SILBERSHER, ET AL V. VALEANT PHARMACEUTICALS INT'L, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ernest Bock, LLC (“Bock”) initially obtained an $11.8 million judgment for breach of contract against Defendants in New Jersey state court. Bock then filed this federal suit in the District of Nevada, alleging that Defendants, assisted by other named Defendants, engaged in an elaborate series of allegedly improper asset transfers to insulate those assets from the New Jersey judgment. While the federal suit was pending, a New Jersey appellate court vacated the underlying judgment and remanded for further proceedings, including discovery, to determine whether Defendants were liable to Bock. The district court then stayed this case pursuant to Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States (Colorado River), 424 U.S. 800 (1976).   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order staying. The panel first concluded that Bock had standing to bring the suit because Bock raised a question of fact as to whether it was injured by the defendants’ asset transfers. Noting that a Colorado River stay is proper only in exceptional circumstances, the panel held that a Colorado River stay cannot issue when, as here, there was substantial doubt as to whether the state proceedings would resolve the federal action. Because Colorado River did not support a stay, neither could the district court’s docket management authority. View "ERNEST BOCK, LLC V. PAUL STEELMAN, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs’ lawyers filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of copyright holders of musical compositions and ended up recovering a little over $50,000 for the class members. The lawyers then asked the court to award them $6 million in legal fees. And the district court authorized $1.7 million in legal fees—more than thirty times the amount that the class received.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs’ counsel in a copyright action and remanded. The panel held that the touchstone for determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees in a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is the benefit to the class. Here, the benefit was minimal. The panel held that the district court erred in failing to calculate the settlement’s actual benefit to the class members who submitted settlement claims, as opposed to a hypothetical $20 million cap agreed on by the parties. The panel held that district courts awarding attorneys’ fees in class actions under the Copyright Act must still generally consider the proportion between the award and the benefit to the class to ensure that the award is reasonable. The panel recognized that a fee award may exceed the monetary benefit provided to the class in certain copyright cases, such as when a copyright infringement litigation leads to substantial nonmonetary relief or provides a meaningful benefit to society, but this was not such a case. The panel instructed that, on remand, the district court should rigorously evaluate the actual benefit provided to the class and award reasonable attorneys’ fees considering that benefit. View "DAVID LOWERY, ET AL V. RHAPSODY INTERNATIONAL, INC." on Justia Law

In an effort to employ an Australian citizen and E-3 visa-holder, Persian Broadcast filed and received approval for a Labor Condition Application (LCA) through the U.S. Department of Labor (“Department”), first in 2011 and again in 2013. An LCA binds an employer to pay the required wages for the period of authorized employment, and only two exemptions can eliminate an employer’s legal obligations: when an employee is nonproductive for personal reasons or there has been a bona fide termination of the employment relationship. In February 2015, the employee filed an administrative complaint with the Department, arguing that Persian Broadcast failed to pay him the full amount of his wages as specified in the two LCAs.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment upholding an Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) order awarding backpay plus pre-and post-judgment interest to the employee. First, the panel held that the employee’s February 2015 complaint was not time-barred. The ARB reasonably relied on the LCAs rather than the employee’s visa to determine the period of authorized employment and Persian Broadcast’s wage obligations. By failing to pay the employee the reported wage under the second LCA period, Persian Broadcast continued to violate the wage requirement until the LCA period ended on September 12, 2015. Second, the panel held that the employee’s circumstances did not meet either of the statutory exemptions to the LCA wage requirement because, by continuing his reporting work, the employee remained in productive status, and there was never a bona fide termination. View "PERSIAN BROADCAST SERVICE GLOB V. MARTIN WALSH, ET AL" on Justia Law

This appeal arises out of a commercial property insurance policy (“Policy”) that Oregon Clinic, P.C. (“Oregon Clinic”) purchased from Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (“Fireman’s Fund”). The Policy provides Oregon Clinic, a medical provider with more than fifty locations in Oregon, with coverage for a reduction of business income only if its insured property suffers “direct physical loss or damage.” In March 2020, after the COVID-19 pandemic began, Oregon Clinic, like hundreds of other insured businesses nationwide, sought coverage under its Policy. It alleged that it suffered “direct physical loss or damage” because of the COVID-19 pandemic and related governmental orders that prevented it from fully making use of its insured property. Fireman’s Fund denied coverage. Oregon Clinic then sued Fireman’s Fund in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. At Oregon Clinic’s request, the Ninth Circuit certified to the Oregon Supreme Court the interpretation of “direct physical loss or damage” under Oregon law and stayed proceedings. The Oregon Supreme Court declined the certification request.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that the Oregon Supreme Court would interpret “direct physical loss or damage” to require physical alteration of property, consistent with the interpretation reached by most courts nationwide. Because Oregon Clinic failed to state a claim under this interpretation and because the amendment would be futile, the panel affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "THE OREGON CLINIC, PC V. FIREMAN'S FUND INS. CO." on Justia Law

Debtors, husband and wife filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. They listed their home among their assets with a value of $500,000, a mortgage with an outstanding balance of $375,077, and a homestead exemption of $124,923. The bankruptcy court confirmed a Chapter 13 plan, but after roughly twenty months, which included a temporary job loss and deferral of mortgage payments due to the pandemic, the husband contracted Parkinson’s Disease, and the couple could no longer make their required payments. Debtors exercised their right to convert to Chapter 7. In the interim, their home had risen in value by an estimated $200,000. The Chapter 7 trustee (“Trustee”) filed a motion to sell Debtors home to recover the value for creditors.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order, the panel held that post-petition, pre-conversion increases in the equity of an asset belonging to the bankruptcy estate rather than to debtors who, in good faith, convert their Chapter 13 reorganization petition into a Chapter 7 liquidation. The panel held that the plain language of Section 348(f)(1)(A), coupled with the Ninth Circuit’s previous interpretation of 11 U.S.C. Section 541(a), compelled the conclusion that any appreciation in the property value and corresponding increase in equity belonged to the estate upon conversion. The panel looked to the definition of “property of the estate” in Section 541(a), which addresses the contents of the bankruptcy estate upon filing under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, and the court’s prior opinions holding that the broad scope of Section 541(a) means that post-petition appreciation inures to the bankruptcy estate, not the debtor. View "IN RE: JOHN CASTLEMAN, SR., ET AL V. DENNIS BURMAN" on Justia Law

Petitioners moved to quash trial subpoenas issued by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, requiring them to testify via contemporaneous video transmission from their home in the U.S. Virgin Islands. The bankruptcy court denied their motions, and the Petitioners sought mandamus relief from this court. Petitioners argued that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(1) prohibits the bankruptcy court from compelling them to testify, even remotely, where they reside out of state over 100 miles from the location of the trial.   The Ninth Circuit granted the petition. The panel held that the bankruptcy court erred in refusing to quash the trial subpoenas because, under the plain meaning of the text of the Rules, the geographic limitations of Rule 45(c) apply even when a witness is permitted to testify by contemporaneous video transmission. The panel concluded that Rule 45(c) governs the court’s power to require a witness to testify at trial and focuses on the location of the proceeding, while Rule 43(a) governs the mechanics of how trial testimony is presented. Weighing the Bauman factors to determine whether issuance of a writ of mandamus was appropriate, the panel concluded that the third factor, clear error, weighed in favor of granting mandamus relief. The panel concluded that the fifth Bauman factor also weighed in favor because the petition presented an important issue of first impression. The panel held that the third and fifth Bauman factors were sufficient on their own to warrant granting mandamus relief in this case. View "IN RE: JOHN KIRKLAND, ET AL V. USBC, LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants L.A. Central Plaza LLC and Central Liquor & Market, Inc. for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). After Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the merits, the district court instead sua sponte dismissed the case on the ground that Plaintiff’s amended complaint had failed adequately to plead the elements of Article III standing. Plaintiff timely appealed the dismissal.   The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded. The panel held that because Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to prove his case as to standing, the district court had discretion in resolving Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, to also consider sua sponte whether to grant summary judgment against Jones on the issue of standing. The panel held, however, that when presented with the issue of standing in the context of Plaintiff’s fully briefed summary judgment motion, the district court could not ignore the factual evidence of standing presented at summary judgment and instead sua sponte examine the adequacy of the complaint’s allegations of standing. View "GEORGE JONES V. L.A. CENTRAL PLAZA, LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) was dismissed for lack of standing. Thereafter, the district court considered and granted Malibu Road and Bungalow Lighting’s motion for attorneys’ fees under the ADA’s fee provision. Plaintiff did not appeal the dismissal of his ADA claim for lack of standing, but he appeals the award of attorneys’ fees, arguing that his lawsuit was not frivolous. However, the issue before the court was not whether Plaintiff’s claim was frivolous and therefore justified an award of fees, but rather whether there is a basis to award attorneys’ fees under the ADA’s fee provision after the underlying claim has been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.   The Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated. The panel held that because the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for lack of standing, it lacked jurisdiction to award fees under the Americans with Disabilities Act’s fee provision, 42 U.S.C. Section 12205 View "ANTONIO FERNANDEZ V. 23676-23726 MALIBU ROAD, LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this action in May 2018, alleging federal claims under Section 1981 and Section 1983 and state law claims against a building inspector Troy Seguirant, the City and County of Honolulu, and other defendants. Only Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim against Seguirant is at issue in this appeal; the district court dismissed the Section 1983 claims against Seguirant with prejudice.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying qualified immunity on a claim under Section 1981, and remanding, the en banc court held that Section 1981 does not provide an implied cause of action against state actors. Joining other circuits and overruling Federation of African American Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1996), the en banc court held that Section 1981, as amended in 1991, establishes substantive rights that a state actor may violate but does not itself contain a remedy against a state actor for such violations. Thus, a plaintiff seeking to enforce rights secured by Section 1981 against a state actor must bring a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The en banc court remanded with instructions to allow the plaintiff to replead his Section 1981 claim as a Section 1983 claim. View "HITOSHI YOSHIKAWA V. TROY SEGUIRANT, ET AL" on Justia Law