Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The National Park Service adopted a comprehensive plan for fire management in Yosemite National Park. In 2021 and 2022, the National Park Service approved two projects to thin vegetation in Yosemite in preparation for controlled burns. Those projects comported with the fire management plan except for minor alterations. The Earth Island Institute sued under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), arguing that it was unlawful for the National Park Service to approve the projects without conducting a full review of their expected environmental impacts. The Institute then moved for a preliminary injunction to halt parts of the projects. The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction holding that the National Park Service had sufficiently evaluated the environmental impact of the projects.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, the panel upheld the Agency’s determination that the projects fell under a categorical exclusion called the “minor-change exclusion” that exempted them from the requirement that the Agency prepare an environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement. The projects fell under that categorical exclusion because they were “changes or amendments” to the 2004 Fire Management Plan that would cause “no or only minimal environmental impact.” The panel held that the projects were consistent with the Fire Management Plan, contributing to its goals and using its methods, with only minor modifications. The panel acknowledged that even if a proposed project fits within a categorical exclusion, an agency may not rely on that exclusion if there are “extraordinary circumstances in which a normally excluded action may have a significant effect” on the environment. View "EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. CICELY MULDOON, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, reentered the United States without inspection in 2003. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) ordered him removed to Mexico after reinstating an earlier removal order that had been entered against him in 1994. Petitioner expressed a fear of returning to Mexico. The asylum officer determined that Petitioner did not have a reasonable fear of such harm, and an immigration judge (“IJ”) affirmed that determination. Thirty days after the IJ’s decision—but more than thirty days after the date his removal order was reinstated—Petitioner petitioned for review on several grounds, including that the reasonable fear screening procedures established by federal regulation are inconsistent with the statutory provisions governing withholding of removal. Petitioner agreed that the thirty-day filing deadline is no longer jurisdictional, but still disagrees that his petition was untimely. Petitioner continues to maintain that Ortiz-Alfaro’s holding that petitions for review become ripe upon the conclusion of reasonable fear proceedings remains good law.   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition. The panel held that: (1) the thirty-day deadline for filing a petition for review set forth in 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(b)(1) is a nonjurisdictional rule; (2) Petitioner’s petition for review, which was filed within thirty days of the conclusion of his reasonable fear proceedings, but not within thirty days of the reinstatement of his removal order, was timely; and (3) the reasonable fear screening procedures established by regulation are consistent with the statutory provisions governing withholding of removal. The panel concluded that Petitioner’s petition was timely, however denied the petition on the merits. View "JOSE ALONSO-JUAREZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

United Aeronautical Corporation and Blue Aerospace, LLC (collectively, Aero) filed suit against the United States Air Force and Air National Guard (collectively, USAF) in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Aero alleges that USAF has for some time violated federal procurement regulations and the Trade Secrets Act by improperly using Aero’s intellectual property. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), precludes jurisdiction over Aero’s action by vesting exclusive jurisdiction over federal-contractor disputes in the Court of Federal Claims.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel agreed with the district court that the Contract Disputes Act “impliedly forbids” jurisdiction over Aero’s claims by vesting exclusive jurisdiction over federal-contractor disputes in the Court of Federal Claims. A claim falls within the scope of the CDA’s exclusive grant of jurisdiction if (1) the plaintiff’s action relates to (2) a procurement contract and (3) to which the plaintiff was a party. Here, Aero’s claims that USAF improperly received and used MAFFS data (1) relate to the DRA, (2) the DRA is a procurement contract, and (3) Aero is a contractor for purposes of the DRA. The panel held that the test set forth in Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1982), is limited to determining whether the Tucker Act—which grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims over breach-of-contract actions for money damages—“impliedly forbids” an ADA action because Megapulse addressed implied preclusion only pursuant to the Tucker Act, not pursuant to the CDA. View "UNITED AERONAUTICAL CORP., ET AL V. USAF, ET AL" on Justia Law

This case involves rules adopted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to implement the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). Congress enacted PURPA to encourage the development of a new class of independent, non-utility-owned energy producers known as “Qualifying Facilities,” or “QFs.” PURPA tasks FERC with promulgating rules to implement the statute. In 2020, FERC revised its rules to alter which facilities qualify for PURPA’s benefits and how those facilities are compensated. The new rules make it more difficult to qualify for treatment as a QF, and they also make QF status less advantageous.The Ninth Circuit granted in part and denied in part a petition for review brought by the Solar Energy Industries Association and several environmental organizations challenging Orders 872 and 872-A (collectively, “Order 872”). The panel rejected Petitioners’ argument that Order 872 as a whole is inconsistent with PURPA’s directive that FERC “encourage” the development of QFs. Applying the two-step framework of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the panel held that (1) PURPA on its face gives FERC broad discretion to evaluate which rules are necessary to encourage QFs and which are not, and (2) FERC’s interpretation was not unreasonable. Next, the panel rejected Petitioners’ challenges to four specific provisions of Order 872. First, the panel held that the modified Site Rule—which modified the rules for determining when facilities are deemed to be located at the same or separate sites—survives Chevron, is not arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and is not unlawfully retroactive. View "SEIA V. FERC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a practicing attorney, sued a municipal court judge, a prosecutor, and the City of St. Helens, Oregon, in state court. After Defendants removed the case to federal court, Plaintiff moved to remand to state court, claiming that, although his complaint referenced federal law, it was poorly drafted, and he did not intend to bring federal claims. The district court severed and remanded the state-only claims and dismissed the retained claims with prejudice. On appeal, Plaintiff filed an informal pro se brief and argued that he should have been granted leave to amend his complaint to exclude any mention of a federal claim and to seek a remand to state court.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that, although there is a good reason for awarding leeway to pro se parties who presumably are unskilled in the law and more prone to make pleading errors, that logic does not apply to practicing attorneys. The panel determined that his attempt to backtrack seemed aimed at robbing the government of its removal option and ensuring another bite at the apple in state court. The panel held that a sophisticated attorney like Plaintiff should not be allowed to jettison his own complaint when it is beneficial yet avoid the consequences of that renunciation. The panel held that because Plaintiff facially alleged a violation of his federal rights, the district court had federal question jurisdiction. In view of the immunity of the government defendants, the complaint could not be saved by amendment, and therefore the district court’s dismissal without leave to amend was proper. View "JAMES HUFFMAN V. AMY LINDGREN, ET AL" on Justia Law

In early 2020, following the outbreak of COVID-19, Los Angeles County passed the “Resolution of the Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles Further Amending and Restating the Executive Order for an Eviction Moratorium During Existence of a Local Health Emergency Regarding Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19)” (the “Moratorium”). The Moratorium imposed temporary restrictions on certain residential and commercial tenant evictions. It provided tenants with new affirmative defenses to eviction based on nonpayment of rent, prohibited landlords from charging late fees and interest, and imposed civil and criminal penalties to landlords who violate the Moratorium. Id. Section V (July 14, 2021). Plaintiff, a commercial landlord, sued the County, arguing that the Moratorium impaired his lease, in violation of the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court found that Plaintiff had not alleged an injury in fact and dismissed his complaint for lack of standing.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that Plaintiff had standing to bring his Contracts Clause claim. Plaintiff’s injury for Article III purposes did not depend on whether Plaintiff’s tenant provided notice or was otherwise excused from doing so. Those questions went to the merits of the claim rather than Plaintiff’s standing to bring suit. Plaintiff alleged that the moratorium impaired his contract with his tenant because it altered the remedies the parties had agreed to at the time they entered into the lease. The panel held that these allegations were sufficient to plead an injury in fact and to state a claim under the Contracts Clause, and remanded to the district court. View "HOWARD ITEN V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

Two police officers were dispatched to a gym after a man reportedly threatened gym patrons and assaulted a security guard. The suspect then violently attacked the officers and refused to stop after they repeatedly deployed their tasers. One officer eventually resorted to lethal force to end the aggression. Plaintiff, the man’s mother, filed this lawsuit against Defendant and the City of Los Angeles. She claimed a violation of Section 1983 based on the officer’s allegedly unreasonable use of deadly force. She also sought to hold the City liable under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services. Plaintiff further brought wrongful death actions against the officer and the City under California law. The court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claims for similar reasons. Defendant appealed.   The Ninth Circuit reversed. The panel held that because Defendant did not challenge the district court’s determination that a reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant violated the man’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, this appeal turned solely on the second step of the qualified immunity analysis. The panel held that Defendant’s use of deadly force, including his failure to give a warning that he would be using such force, did not violate clearly established law given the specific circumstances he encountered. The court wrote that there was no basis to conclude that Defendant’s use of force here was obviously constitutionally excessive. View "PAULETTE SMITH V. EDWARD AGDEPPA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Lead Plaintiff E. Öhman J:or Fonder AB and others (“Plaintiffs”) brought this putative class action on behalf of all persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired common stock of NVIDIA Corporation (“NVIDIA”) during the proposed Class Period. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ first complaint with leave to amend, holding that it failed to plead sufficiently that defendants’ statements were materially false or misleading, and that the statements were made knowingly or recklessly.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that Section 20(a) assigns joint and several liability for any person who controls any person liable under Section 10(b). Because the panel held that the amended complaint did not sufficiently plead a cause of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 against defendants Kress and Fisher, the only alleged primary violation was that committed by NVIDIA through defendant Huang. The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ Section 20(a) claims against Kress and Fisher, vacated the dismissal of the Section 20(a) claims as to Huang, and remanded for further proceedings as to those claims. View "E. OHMAN J:OR FONDER AB, ET AL V. NVIDIA CORPORATION, ET AL" on Justia Law

When Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee and a patient at Patton State Hospital in California, he was twice attacked by a fellow patient. He sued Defendant, the psychiatrist in charge of his unit, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for injuries from the second attack, alleging that Defendant violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. The district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel determined that both tests ask whether Defendant’s conduct was reasonable, and both require Alexander to show that Defendant’s conduct was worse than negligent. The panel held that under either test, Plaintiff offered no evidence that Defendant failed to act reasonably, let alone that he was “more than negligent” in not transferring Plaintiff or the other patient after the first attack. Although Plaintiff was attacked a second time, the evidence showed that Defendant’s responses to both incidents were thorough and careful. Accordingly, the panel found no violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. View "SURIE ALEXANDER V. DAU NGUYEN" on Justia Law

Appellants, the Law Offices of Ben C. Martin and the law firm Martin Baughman, PLLC (collectively, BCM), argued that the district court in this multidistrict litigation (MDL), In re Bard IVC Filters Products Liability Litigation, lacked authority to order common benefit fund assessments against the recoveries of claimants who were not involved in cases that were part of the MDL—that is, those with claims that were not filed in any court, or were filed in state court, or were filed in federal court after the MDL closed (collectively, non-MDL cases). After settling their clients’ claims against C.R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. (collectively, Bard), BCM moved to exempt the recoveries of their clients in non-MDL cases from common benefit fund assessments. The district court denied the motion.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The panel held that the district court’s order requiring common benefit fund assessments in the non-MDL cases was within the scope of the district court’s authority. A district court properly exercises its authority to order common benefit fund holdback assessments from claimants’ recoveries in non-MDL cases when (1) counsel for claimants voluntarily consents to the district court’s authority by signing, or otherwise entering into, a participation agreement requiring contributions in exchange for access to common benefit work product, (2) that participation agreement is incorporated into a court order, and (3) as a result of entering the participation agreement, counsel receives access to common benefit work product. The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying claimants’ motion to exempt non-MDL cases from common benefit fund assessments. View "IN RE: LAW OFFICES OF BEN C. MARTIN V. BABBITT & JOHNSON PA, ET AL" on Justia Law