Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This case arises from the September 2017 fatal police shooting of Ruben Galindo Chavez (who used the surname “Galindo”) during an encounter with officers of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department. The action was initiated by plaintiff Azucena Zamorano Aleman — Galindo’s girlfriend and the mother of his child — both as the administrator of Galindo’s estate and in her individual capacity. Plaintiff asserted five causes of actions, including a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court awarded summary judgment to the defendants on each of the plaintiff’s claims. The court therein determined that — because it was objectively reasonable for Officer Guerra to shoot Galindo, in that Galindo posed an immediate threat to Guerra and others — Guerra is entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim. For the same reason, the court awarded summary judgment to Guerra and the City on the assault and battery, wrongful death, and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. Citing a lack of sufficient evidence, the court also awarded summary judgment to the City on the negligent training claim.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment award to the City on the negligent training claim. The court vacated the award of qualified immunity to Officer Guerra on the Fourth Amendment claim, as well as the related summary judgment awards to Guerra and the City on the balance of the state law claims. Rather than directing the entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff on any of those claims, the court remanded for further proceedings as to all of them View "Azucena Zamorano Aleman v. City of Charlotte" on Justia Law

The Montgomery County Board of Education adopted Guidelines for Gender Identity for 2020–2021 that permit schools to develop gender support plans for students. The Guidelines allow implementation of these plans without the knowledge or consent of the students’ parents. They even authorize the schools to withhold information about the plans from parents if the school deems the parents to be unsupportive. In response, three parents with children attending Montgomery County public schools challenged the portion of the Guidelines that permit school officials to develop gender support plans and then withhold information about a child’s gender support plan from their parents. Terming it the “Parental Preclusion Policy,” the parents alleged the policy unconstitutionally usurps the parents’ fundamental right to raise their children under the Fourteenth Amendment.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for the case to be dismissed. The court explained that the parents have not alleged that their children have gender support plans, are transgender or are even struggling with issues of gender identity. As a result, they have not alleged facts that the Montgomery County public schools have any information about their children that is currently being withheld or that there is a substantial risk information will be withheld in the future. Thus, under the Constitution, they have not alleged the type of injury required to show standing. Absent an injury that creates standing, federal courts lack the power to address the parents’ objections to the Guidelines. Thus, the court remanded to the district court to dismiss the case for lack of standing. View "John and Jane Parents 1 v. Montgomery County Board of Education" on Justia Law

After receiving a long suspension, Jacob Doe sued Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (“Virginia Tech”) and several university officials, alleging that Virginia Tech’s Title IX investigation, hearing, and appeal process denied him due process of law. The district court dismissed Doe’s complaint, holding that he hadn’t alleged a cognizable liberty or property interest in his continuing education.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed for a different reason. The court held that even assuming Doe has such an interest, he hasn’t alleged that he was deprived of it without sufficient process. The court wrote that Doe complains that his witnesses couldn’t appear in person at the hearing because it was held during the summer. But he doesn’t allege that the witnesses weren’t able to provide testimony by phone, video, or in writing. Nor does Doe claim he sought to continue the hearing until his witnesses were available. And Doe admits that the investigator interviewed his witnesses during her investigation into Roe, and the allegations against Roe were adjudicated at the same hearing. So these allegations too, don’t rise to the level of a due-process violation.   Moreover, the court explained that to find that Doe alleged a due-process violation on this sparse record, the court would have to hold that university students have a right—in effectively every disciplinary hearing—to advance notice of the evidence to be presented against them. The ask is even more striking here because Doe doesn’t allege that he sought a continuance or that Virginia Tech relied on the surprise testimony. Therefore, the court rejected Doe’s claim of error. View "Jacob Doe v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universit" on Justia Law

Fisheries Reform Group alleges that shrimp trawlers operating in North Carolina’s Pamlico Sound are violating the Clean Water Act by engaging in two types of unpermitted activity: throwing bycatch overboard and disturbing sediment with their trawl nets.   The Fourth circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Fisheries’ complaint. The court explained that though the Clean Water Act’s includes the term “biological materials” in its definition of “pollutant,” that is not clear authorization for the EPA to regulate bycatch under the Act. So Fisheries Reform Group’s first claim— that shrimpers are violating the Clean Water Act by discarding bycatch overboard without a Section 1342 permit—was properly dismissed. The court further explained that Fisheries’ second claim—that shrimpers are violating the Act by using trawl nets without a permit—fares no better. The shrimpers are not “dredging” the Pamlico Sound with their nets, so they cannot be discharging “dredged spoil.” And the dirt and sand that their nets kick up is not “added”—and thus not “discharged”—into the Sound. View "North Carolina Coastal Fisheries Reform Group v. Capt. Gaston LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for Tug Hill Operating, LLC, for approximately a year and a half at rig sites in West Virginia. He commenced an action against Tug Hill under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), alleging that while Tug Hill formally classified him as an independent contractor, he actually qualified as an employee for purposes of the FLSA based on the degree of control that Tug Hill exercised over his work. He, therefore, claimed that Tug Hill was required to pay him overtime for those weeks in which he worked more than 40 hours. Tug Hill filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s action on the ground that Plaintiff was contractually required to arbitrate his claim against it. In addition, RigUp itself filed a motion to intervene in order to seek the action’s dismissal in favor of arbitration. The district court granted both motions.   The Fourth Circuit reversed both rulings and remanded. The court explained that the numerous provisions in the Agreement preclude any conclusion that the Agreement was entered into solely or directly for the benefit of Tug Hill, such that Tug Hill could enforce it as a third-party beneficiary. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting Tug Hill’s motion to dismiss and compelling Plaintiff, under the arbitration agreement between him and RigUp, to proceed to arbitration with respect to his FLSA claim against Tug Hill. Moreover, the court explained that because RigUp’s agreement with Plaintiff expressly disclaimed any interest in any litigation, Plaintiff might have with a company in Tug Hill’s position RigUp cannot now opportunistically claim that intervention is necessary. View "Lastephen Rogers v. Tug Hill Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

A Virginia statute required the automatic suspension of residents’ driver’s licenses if they failed to pay certain court fines and fees. in 2016, a group of indigent Virginians who lost their licenses when they were unable to pay court debts initiated a putative class action against the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (“Commissioner”), alleging that the Commonwealth’s license-suspension scheme was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs raised several claims under the Fourteenth Amendment: that the statute’s requirement of automatic suspension without notice or a hearing violated their procedural due process rights; and that the statute’s enforcement against those who were unable, not unwilling, to pay violated both their substantive due process rights and their equal protection rights. As relief, the plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing the statute’s enforcement and requiring license reinstatement to the “hundreds of thousands of Virginians” with suspended licenses. Plaintiffs then petitioned for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988(b), which provides that the district court, “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party” in Section 1983 actions “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees and remanded. The court held that Plaintiffs here prevailed” in every sense needed to make them eligible for a fee award. The court explained that the named plaintiffs sought not only reinstatement of their own licenses but also class certification, a declaratory judgment that Section 46.2-395 was unconstitutional, and hence permanent license reinstatement for hundreds of thousands of Virginians. Those are precisely the kinds of considerations that bear on the “extent of a plaintiff’s success” – a critical factor in assessing a reasonable fee award in any fee litigation under Section 1988. View "Damian Stinnie v. Richard Holcomb" on Justia Law

Brothers pleaded guilty to conspiring to participate in a racketeering enterprise, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act. The district court ordered the forfeiture of various real properties and financial accounts linked to the RICO conspiracy. Several third parties came forward to claim an interest in one or more of the forfeited assets, including the brothers’ sister, Ilana Bangiyeva (“Bangiyeva”), and one brother’s wife, Irina Alishayeva (“Alishayeva”). The court rejected most of Bangiyeva’s claimed ownership interests. As to Alishayeva the court granted a life estate in and the exclusive use of one of the properties after finding that she owned a one-third interest in that property as a tenant in common with the Government, which owned the remaining two-thirds interest. Bangiyeva appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the final order of forfeiture in that respect. Additionally, the Government cross-appealed, asserting that the district court erred as a matter of law in granting Alishayeva a life estate in the relevant property at the expense of the Government’s majority ownership interest. The court agreed with the Government and vacated that part of the final order of forfeiture and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that in granting Alishayeva full and exclusive use of the 110-37 69th Ave. property for the remainder of her life and marriage, the district court accorded the Government less than the full bundle of property rights that it would otherwise be entitled to as a tenant in common under New York state law. The district court was without legal authority to do so. View "US v. Ilana Bangiyeva" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Virginia state court asserting federal claims against his former employer, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (“Virginia Tech”). Plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit of that action, as was his right under Virginia law, and refiled the action in federal district court about ten days later. The district court granted Virginia Tech’s motion to dismiss the case on statute of limitation grounds. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that under Virginia law, a voluntary nonsuit tolls the limitations period as long as the action is refiled within six months after the nonsuit was granted.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remand for further proceedings on Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that the Virginia court where Plaintiff originally filed his complaint had statutorily granted subject-matter jurisdiction over the class of claims asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint. The order granting Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary nonsuit was therefore valid under Morrison and triggered the tolling provisions of Va. Code Section 8.01-229(E)(3). Because Plaintiff refiled his case in federal court within six months of the date of the nonsuit order, this action was timely filed under Section 8.01- 229(E)(3), and the district court therefore erred by dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. View "John Massey, Jr. v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Virginia state court asserting federal claims against his former employer, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (“Virginia Tech”). Massey took a voluntary nonsuit of that action, as was his right under Virginia law, and refiled the action in federal district court about ten days later. The district court granted Virginia Tech’s motion to dismiss the case on statute of limitation grounds. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that under Virginia law, a voluntary nonsuit tolls the limitations period as long as the action is refiled within six months after the nonsuit was granted.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with Plaintiff and vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings on Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that the Virginia court where Plaintiff originally filed his complaint had statutorily granted subject-matter jurisdiction over the class of claims asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint. The order granting Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary nonsuit was therefore valid under Morrison and triggered the tolling provisions of Va. Code Section 8.01-229(E)(3). Because Plaintiff refiled his case in federal court within six months of the date of the nonsuit order, this action was timely filed under Section 8.01- 229(E)(3), and the district court therefore erred by dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. View "John Massey, Jr. v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute" on Justia Law

A collective-bargaining agreement between the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) and the United States Maritime Alliance (USMX), an association of carriers and other employers, earmarks all container loading and unloading work on the East and Gulf Coasts for the union’s members. So when USMX-affiliated ships docked at a new South Carolina terminal that used non-union lift operators, the union sued USMX and its carrier members for damages. Soon enough, USMX’s carrier members stopped calling at that terminal. At issue is whether the ILA’s lawsuit—and a separate provision of its contract with USMX—violate the National Labor Relations Act. The National Labor Relations Board held that they don’t, and the South Carolina State Ports Authority petitioned for review.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Board and denied the petition. The court agreed that USMX and the ILA haven’t made an agreement that violates Section 8(e). Moreover, the court explained that the Board rationally held that the ILA’s lawsuit against USMX sought to preserve its coastwide jurisdiction over loading and unloading work, so it didn’t violate the Act. And the Board and ALJ correctly concluded that Section 7(b) of the Master Contract didn’t constitute an illegal hot-cargo provision, whether by its text or by tacit agreement. View "South Carolina State Ports Authority v. NLRB" on Justia Law