Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This case was heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and involved the Estate of Arturo Giron Alvarez and 773 other plaintiffs, who brought claims against The Rockefeller Foundation (TRF), alleging the foundation's involvement in nonconsensual human medical experiments in Guatemala from 1946 to 1948. The experiments involved exposing people to sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) to study the diseases and potential treatments. The defendants had previously filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the district court. The plaintiffs appealed this decision, specifically challenging the decision relating to TRF.The appeal hinged on the question of whether Dr. Soper, an Associate Director of TRF who was assigned to the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau (PASB) in Guatemala during the time of the experiments, was acting as an agent of TRF, thus making TRF liable for his actions. The court found that despite TRF paying Dr. Soper's salary during his time at the PASB, there was no indication that TRF was directing or controlling Dr. Soper’s work. Furthermore, the evidence showed that Dr. Soper considered himself no longer with TRF, and the PASB's constitution prohibited him from taking outside direction.The court concluded that TRF's connection to the experiments was too tenuous to be held liable for them. It affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of TRF, stating that Dr. Soper was not an agent of TRF during the time of the experiments. View "In re Estate of Alvarez v. Rockefeller Foundation" on Justia Law

This case was before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit where the City of Huntington and Cabell County Commission (plaintiffs) brought a suit against AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation, Cardinal Health, Inc., and McKesson Corporation (defendants), three distributors of opioids. The plaintiffs alleged that these companies perpetuated the opioid epidemic by repeatedly shipping excessive quantities of opioids to pharmacies, thus creating a public nuisance under West Virginia common law. The district court ruled in favor of the distributors, holding that West Virginia’s common law of public nuisance did not cover the plaintiffs’ claims.After a bench trial in 2021, the district court held that the common law of public nuisance in West Virginia did not extend to the sale, distribution, and manufacture of opioids. The court found that the application of public nuisance law to the sale, marketing, and distribution of products would invite litigation against any product with a known risk of harm, regardless of the benefits conferred on the public from proper use of the product. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ proposed remedy, a 15-year “Abatement Plan” developed by an expert in opioid abatement intervention. The court held that this relief did not qualify as an abatement as it did not restrict the defendants' conduct or their distribution of opioids but generally proposed programs and services to address the harms caused by opioid abuse and addiction.The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia: Under West Virginia’s common law, can conditions caused by the distribution of a controlled substance constitute a public nuisance and, if so, what are the elements of such a public nuisance claim? View "City of Huntington v. Amerisourcebergen Drug Corporation" on Justia Law

The case originated from a lending relationship between Jeffrey Frye and his companies, The Wall Guy, Inc., and JR Contractors, and First State Bank. After the relationship soured, both parties sued each other, leading to nearly a decade of litigation involving two state-court lawsuits, a jury trial, post-trial motions, removal to federal district court, and motions practice in that court. However, the appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit were dismissed due to a lack of jurisdiction.The court determined that the plaintiffs had not properly invoked the court's appellate jurisdiction. The plaintiffs had filed a notice of appeal before the district court had announced a decision on a future or pending motion, which under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(B)(ii), was insufficient to give the appellate court jurisdiction over a later order related to that motion.The court also determined that the plaintiffs had not established a timely notice of appeal regarding other orders. The court emphasized that while the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should be liberally construed, they cannot be ignored, especially when they implicate the court's appellate jurisdiction. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not met their burden to establish appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals. View "The Wall Guy, Inc. v. FDIC" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging negligence, wrongful death, and survival claims arising from the death of Eleusipa Van Emburgh who was treated at a Navy medical center. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that regulations enacted under 28 U.S.C. § 2672 do not impose additional jurisdictional requirements beyond those listed in 28 U.S.C § 2675. As such, the court reversed the district court's decision for six of the plaintiffs and remanded the case for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of one plaintiff, Imelda Crovetto, who failed to satisfy one of the jurisdictional requirements listed in § 2675.The Court of Appeals held that the jurisdictional requirements laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 2675 were the sole source of jurisdictional requirements for the FTCA’s administrative exhaustion requirement. The court found that the implementing regulations did not impose additional jurisdictional requirements. The plaintiffs satisfied these jurisdictional requirements when they submitted their claims to the agency, included a specific valuation of their claims, and waited until after their claims were denied before filing suit. View "Estate of Eleusipa Van Emburgh v. US" on Justia Law

Edgardo Vasquez Castaneda, a citizen of El Salvador, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his ongoing civil detention during his ongoing withholding-only proceedings was unlawful. He had been ordered removed to El Salvador but had instigated withholding-only proceedings claiming a fear of torture if returned to El Salvador. The length of his detention, pending the resolution of those proceedings, had exceeded the six-month period deemed presumptively reasonable under Zadvydas v. Davis. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition.Vasquez Castaneda failed to show that his removal from the U.S. was not significantly likely to happen in the foreseeable future. The court reasoned that ongoing withholding-only proceedings, even lengthy ones, do not present the same risk of "indefinite and potentially permanent" detention at issue in Zadvydas. Furthermore, the court rejected Vasquez Castaneda's assertion that due process requires another bond hearing before an immigration judge given his circumstances. The court emphasized that Vasquez Castaneda's ongoing detention was directly tied to the proceedings he voluntarily initiated and that these proceedings would eventually conclude. The court also noted that Vasquez Castaneda had received ample process since his detention began, including a bond hearing, numerous custody reviews by ICE, and the very habeas proceedings in question. View "Castaneda v. Perry" on Justia Law

In this case, a South Carolina court-appointed receiver brought an action against Travelers Casualty and Surety Company and other insurers, alleging breaches of insurance policies issued to a defunct company within a state receivership. Travelers removed the action to federal court, asserting diversity jurisdiction. However, the district court granted the receiver’s motion to remand the case back to state court. The court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the case involved property of a state receivership exclusively under the jurisdiction of the state court (based on the doctrine articulated in Barton v. Barbour), and the removal lacked unanimous consent of all defendants due to a forum selection clause in some of the insurance policies issued to the defunct company.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that the district court's conclusions in support of remand were at least colorably supported. The court found that the district court's reliance on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and procedural defect as grounds for remand were colorably supported, and thus, not reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). The court also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's remand order and dismissed the appeal. View "Protopapas v. Travelers Casualty and Surety Co." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to remand two lawsuits back to Maryland state court. The lawsuits were brought by the City of Annapolis and Anne Arundel County against more than 20 energy companies, including BP P.L.C. The local governments accused the companies of misrepresenting and concealing information about the environmental impact of their fossil fuel products in violation of Maryland's Consumer Protection Act and various state tort laws. The companies tried to remove the cases to federal court, arguing that because they had acted under federal authority in their operations, the court had federal question jurisdiction. However, the appeals court found that the company's activities related to fossil fuel production were not relevant to the claims brought by the local governments, which were based on alleged concealment or misrepresentation of information about fossil fuel products. The court also rejected the companies' argument that the First Amendment question related to their right to free speech provided a basis for federal jurisdiction, as this question was a defense rather than a necessary element of the plaintiffs' state-law claims. View "Anne Arundel County v. BP P.L.C." on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Bikachi Amisi, a contract nurse, sued Officer Lakeyta Brooks and Officer Roy Townsend for violating her Fourth Amendment rights when she was mistakenly strip searched on her first day of work at Riverside Regional Jail. Amisi also brought several tort claims under Virginia state law. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing they were entitled to qualified immunity and good-faith immunity under Virginia law. They also argued that the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision barred Amisi's claims. The district court denied their motions and the defendants appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It held that both officers were not entitled to qualified immunity, a legal protection that shields officers who commit constitutional violations but who could reasonably believe their actions were lawful, because their actions were not reasonable and Amisi’s right to be free from unreasonable strip searches was clearly established. The court also held that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act did not bar Amisi's state-law claims because her injuries did not arise out of her employment. The Court further held that Officer Townsend was not entitled to immunity under Virginia law as his belief that his conduct was lawful was not objectively reasonable. View "Amisi v. Brooks" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiff, identified as Jane Doe, filed an appeal against two orders from the district court. The first order denied her request to compel the defendant, Cenk Sidar, to provide a DNA sample for a sexual assault case. The second order demanded that Doe disclose her real name in the proceedings following a default judgment against Sidar.The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal regarding the DNA sample for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that orders denying requests for physical or mental examinations are not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.However, the court did rule on the anonymity issue. The court found that the district court committed legal error in its order demanding Doe to disclose her real name. The district court had understated Doe's interest in anonymity, announced a general rule that fairness considerations invariably cut against allowing a plaintiff to be anonymous at trial unless the defendant is also anonymous, and failed to recognize the significance of its default judgment on liability. The Court of Appeals thus vacated the non-anonymity order and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to reconsider its order in light of the appeals court's opinion. The court emphasized the importance of Doe's privacy interests, particularly given that the case involved allegations of sexual assault. View "Doe v. Sidar" on Justia Law

In this case, Sony Music Entertainment and numerous other record companies and music publishers sued Cox Communications, alleging that Cox's customers used its internet service to infringe their copyrights. The plaintiffs argued that Cox should be held accountable for its customers' copyright infringement. A jury found Cox liable for both willful contributory and vicarious infringement of over 10,000 copyrighted works owned by the plaintiffs and awarded $1 billion in statutory damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Cox was not vicariously liable for its customers' copyright infringement because Cox did not profit from its subscribers’ acts of infringement, a legal prerequisite for vicarious liability. However, the court affirmed the jury’s finding of willful contributory infringement because Cox knew of the infringing activity and materially contributed to it.The court vacated the $1 billion damages award and remanded the case for a new trial on damages, holding that the jury’s finding of vicarious liability could have influenced its assessment of statutory damages. The court did not vacate the contributory infringement verdict. View "Sony Music Entertainment v. Cox Communications, Incorporated" on Justia Law