Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff a deaf man, sought an interpreter to communicate with Novant Health Huntersville Medical Center during his wife’s childbirth there. After Novant Health failed to provide him with a live interpreter or a functioning Video Remote Interpreting device, Plaintiff filed this disability discrimination lawsuit. The district court dismissed his claim.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment finding that the district court applied an incorrect standard of law. The court held that under the proper standard, Plaintiff has plausibly pled enough under the Rehabilitation Act to survive a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal motion. The court explained that Patients often arrive at hospitals in pain, unconscious, or feeling intense stress. In these situations, which can be not only confusing but overwhelming, a patient’s companion, often a spouse or a family member, may be the only advocate available. Plaintiff, a hearing-impaired individual, was unable to communicate his wife’s complicated medical history to her doctors during childbirth, despite repeated requests for some effective means of doing so. The situation was a highrisk one for the couple, and the medical event one of the highest urgency and meaning. To have that single advocate barred from communication with a hospital and its staff is to leave the patient stranded. View "Neil Basta v. Novant Health Incorporated" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of seventeen environmental organizations, sued the Council on Environmental Quality in July 2020 related to the Trump Administration’s promulgation of a final rule that affected how federal agencies would conduct reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act. On appeal the issue is whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider this particular challenge, as Plaintiffs have chosen to frame it, at this stage.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that it did not have jurisdiction. The court explained that Plaintiffs argue that forcing them to litigate their claims one project at a time will be time- and resource-intensive, for them and for the courts. Certainly, it would be more efficient for the parties and the courts if the court could adjudicate the 2020 Rule in one preemptive fell swoop. But such efficiency concerns cannot generate jurisdiction. They just will need to bring such a challenge under circumstances where they can present evidence sufficient to support federal-court jurisdiction. View "Wild Virginia v. Council on Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

The North Carolina Insurance Guaranty Association (“Appellant”) to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) sought an advisory opinion about whether Appellant is required to reimburse Medicare for certain medical bills that Medicare pays on behalf of insured individuals. CMS declined to issue the requested opinion. Dissatisfied with this response, Appellant filed this action against Alex M. Azar, II, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), HHS, and CMS (collectively, “Appellees”).   In this appeal, Appellant challenges the district court’s determination that Appellant lacked standing to bring this action because it failed to plausibly allege that it suffered an injury-in-fact. Additionally, Appellant challenges the district court’s conclusion that it did not possess jurisdiction over the action because Appellant failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s complaint. The court concluded that the district court properly determined that it did not have jurisdiction over this case because 42 U.S.C. Section 405(h) precludes federal question jurisdiction for claims against the United States or its agents if such claims arise under the Medicare Act. The court further wrote that the existence of the administrative appeal is fatal to Appellant’s claim that it is completely precluded from seeking review of its argument that it is not a primary plan through the administrative process. Additionally, the court agreed with the district court that the ordinary exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are inapplicable here, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s guidance in Illinois Council. View "North Carolina Insurance Guaranty Association v. Xavier Becerra" on Justia Law

K.I., a minor who lives in Durham, North Carolina, was diagnosed with a variety of learning and psycho-social disorders. Dissatisfied with her school’s response to her request for special education services, K.I. and her mother J.I. asked for and received a hearing under North Carolina’s administrative procedures. Because they disagreed with the hearing decision, K.I. and J.I. tried to appeal it administratively. But their appeal was not considered because K.I. and J.I. did not follow North Carolina’s rules for filing appeals. K.I. and J.I. sued in federal court under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the “IDEA”). The district court found that K.I. and J.I.’s failure to properly appeal under North Carolina’s administrative rules meant that they had not exhausted their administrative remedies. So, it dismissed the federal action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. K.I. and J.I.’s appeal of that decision.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that it agreed with the district court because K.I. and J.I. did not challenge the court’s ruling on the ADA and Section 504 claims; the issue is waived. Second, the court found that the district court correctly analyzed these claims. Both the ADA and Section 504 claims sought relief due to the alleged failure of Durham Public Schools and the State Board to provide a FAPE to K.I. Thus, under Fry, the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement applied to those claims. The court also affirmed the district court in dismissing the ADA and Section 504 claims. View "K.I. v. Durham Public Schools Board" on Justia Law

Three independent contractors of Eastman Chemical Company were severely injured, one of them fatally, when a pump exploded during maintenance. Eastman moved to dismiss their state-law personal injury suits, contending that the contractors qualified as Eastman’s “statutory employees” under the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Law – which would mean that workers’ compensation was their exclusive remedy and that the courts lacked jurisdiction to hear their claims.   The district court agreed that Plaintiffs were Eastman’s “statutory employees” under the workers’ compensation law and dismissed their actions. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held their cases in abeyance pending the decision of South Carolina’s Supreme Court in Keene v. CNA Holdings, LLC, 870 S.E.2d 156 (2021).   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s ruling. The court explained that in Keene, when an employer makes a “legitimate business decision” to outsource a portion of its work, the contractors it hires to perform that work are not “statutory employees” for workers’ compensation purposes. 870 S.E.2d at 163. No party here contests that Eastman’s outsourcing of its maintenance and repair work was a “legitimate business decision.” It follows that the plaintiffs, independent contractors performing maintenance at the time of the 2016 pump explosion, were not statutory employees and may bring personal injury actions. View "Sallie Zeigler v. Eastman Chemical Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff a commercial-real-estate broker specializing in tenant representation sued Newmark Southern Region, LLC (Newmark)—an international real-estate brokerage and advisory firm. Plaintiff alleged eight state law claims, including breach of contract. Newmark counterclaimed, alleging only breach of contract. The district court dismissed each of Plaintiff’s claims at the pleading stage, with the exception of his claim for breach of contract. Following the district court’s judgment against him, Plaintiff appealed. In addition to seeking reversal of the judgment, Plaintiff also sought reversal of the district court’s dismissal of his various claims at the pleading stage.   The Fourth Circuit concluded that this situation warrants vacatur and remand for dismissal without prejudice. The court reasoned that first Plaintiff and Newmark agree that complete diversity did not exist between them at the time of filing, given the North Carolina citizenship of at least one limited partner of Newmark Holdings, L.P.—a great-grandparent entity to Newmark. Consequently, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against Newmark pre-consolidation, so it lacked the power to consolidate the lawsuits in the first place.   Further, neither side of this dispute lacked the means to ascertain Newmark’s citizenship at any point. Whether mutual contentment with the federal forum or genuine obliviousness brought the parties to this unfortunate juncture, the court explained that it will not condone the exercise of jurisdiction where it did not truly exist. View "Timothy Capps v. Newmark Southern Region, LLC" on Justia Law

Blenheim Capital Holdings Ltd. and Blenheim Capital Partners Ltd., Guernsey-based companies (collectively, “Blenheim”), commenced this action against Lockheed Martin Corporation, Airbus Defence and Space SAS, and the Republic of Korea and its Defense Acquisition Program Administration (the last two, collectively, “South Korea”), alleging that Defendants conspired to “cut it out” as the broker for a large, complex international military procurement transaction.   Blenheim alleged that the defendants (1) tortiously interfered with its brokerage arrangement and its prospective business expectations; (2) conspired to do so; (3) were unjustly enriched; and (4) conspired to violate federal and state antitrust laws. The district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). With respect to the tort claims, it concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction by reason of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act because South Korea was presumptively immune from jurisdiction under the Act and had not been engaged in “commercial activity,”   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the offset transaction was not commercial activity as excepted from the immunity from jurisdiction conferred in the FSIA, accordingly the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over Blenheim’s tort claims. Further, because Blenheim felt adverse impacts immediately upon Lockheed’s October 2016 termination of the brokerage agreement, the date of the satellite launch is not relevant to the date when the cause of action accrued. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling that Blenheim’s antitrust claims are barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations. View "Blenheim Capital Holdings Ltd. v. Lockheed Martin Corporation" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her minor daughter, natives and citizens of Guatemala, petition for review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing their appeal from the immigration judge’s order denying Petitioner’s application for asylum and withholding of removal. Petitioners filed their petition for review with this Court one day after the deadline set by 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(b)(1). They contend that the Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(c) extends the filing period by three additional days because the Board served the order by mail.   The Fourth Circuit dismissed the petition concluding that Rule 26(c) does not apply to petitions for review governed by Section 1252(b)(1). The court explained that because Section 1252(b)(1) calculates the time to file a petition for review from “the date of the final order of removal,” and not from service of that order, Rule 26(c) does not apply. View "Ana Santos-De Jimenez v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255, challenging his conviction for using a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence. The district court denied his motion and Defendant appealed.The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the federal arson statute which served as the predicate for Defendant's Sec. 924(c) conviction is not categorically a crime of violence. Because the statute Defendant was convicted under criminalized the arson of property fully owned by the defendant, and not just that of the property “of another” as required by Sec. 924(c). View "US v. Cecil Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) claims against the U.S. Attorney General because she failed an allegedly discriminatory physical-fitness test that was a condition of her federal employment and was told to either retake the test, resign, or be fired. She resigned. The district court dismissed her complaint for lack of Article III standing, finding that her resignation did not constitute an “adverse employment action” that could serve as the basis of either claim.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remand for further proceedings. The court held that the district court inappropriately intertwined its standing analysis with the merits. Plaintiff alleged that she suffered financial and job-related injuries in fact that are fairly traceable to the government’s action and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling. View "Jane DiCocco v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law