Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a petition asserting that Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools (CMS) failed to provide her daughter, A.C., with a free appropriate public education in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled for Plaintiff on two of the seven issues she had raised but against her on all others. Plaintiff sought review contending that the ALJ had improperly delegated the remedy for the two issues and erred in deciding the rest. Plaintiff further argued that the ALJ’s adverse findings were not entitled to deference. The district court granted summary judgment to CMS.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that based on the extensive process Plaintiff received in the handling of her case, as well as the detail provided in the ALJ’s written decision, the court concluded that the ALJ’s findings were regularly made. The court further held that the district court was correct to accord those findings deference and to determine that Plaintiff failed to prevail by a preponderance of the evidence on the five issues she disputes. While the deference in these cases is owed the ALJ, it is not remiss to point out that the district court likewise proceeded with its own thorough review in a lengthy opinion. Plaintiff does not persuasively challenge the court’s decision on appeal. Further, the court wrote, it discerns no abuse of remedial discretion on the part of the district court in allowing the respondent to fashion “benchmark(s) and criteria” in A.C.’s IEP indicating when she may move on from Metro School. View "Hind Bouabid v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools Board of Education" on Justia Law

Lincare, Inc. terminated Plaintiff, concluding that she had violated Lincare’s “Corporate Health Care Law Compliance Program” and “Code of Conduct.” While Plaintiff does not dispute her conduct, she contends that Lincare discriminated against her on the basis of sex because it gave a fellow male employee, who had engaged in similar conduct, only a “final written warning.” Plaintiff filed suit alleging violations of the West Virginia Human Rights Act. The district court found Lincare liable to Plaintiff and awarded her damages. On appeal, Lincare contends that there was no evidence of discrimination on the basis of sex and that, therefore the district court’s finding that it violated the Human Rights Act was clearly erroneous. Plaintiff cross-appealed, contending that the district court erred in determining her compensatory damages award.   The Fourth Circuit reversed. The court explained that while the district court’s findings are entitled to substantial deference, the core evidence showed that Plaintiff was fired by a woman and replaced by a woman and that, during the entire process, there was no indication that gender was even remotely a factor in Lincare’s decision. The only explanation Plaintiff offered to substantiate the claim that Lincare had discriminated against her on the basis of sex was her “belief” that she and her comparator “were doing the same thing” and the fact that “he’s a man; [she’s] a woman.” The court wrote that Plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient for a factfinder to conclude that it was the product of discrimination based on sex. View "Chandra Balderson v. Lincare Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, an employee of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement division of the Department of Homeland Security (“ICE” or “Agency”), petitions for review of the final judgment of the Merit Systems Protection Board (the “Board”), which rejected Petitioner’s claim that the Agency suspended him for two days in retaliation for his disclosures of misconduct.   The Fourth Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that after conducting a hearing and considering the evidence, the administrative judge denied the corrective action sought by Petitioner, concluding that Petitioner’s protected disclosures were not contributing factors to the discipline imposed and, alternatively, that the Agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the action even in the absence of the disclosures. The court denied the petition explaining that the administrative judge committed no legal error and his factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. View "Yuriy Mikhaylov v. Dept. of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

On March 20, Plaintiff, an inmate, experienced abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting. He was transported to an outside hospital for evaluation and testing. The results were deemed “unremarkable,” and Plaintiff was returned to his home institution. Ultimately, Plaintiff was diagnosed with an abdominal infection due to a small bowel obstruction and alleged permanent injury.Plaintiff brought a claim of deliberate indifference against various prison officials ("Defendants"). The district court dismisses Plaintiff's claim under 12(b)(6). Defendants argued that Plaintiff's “generalized, conclusory, and collective allegations” fail to plausibly allege deliberate indifference on the part of each Defendant.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's complaint made collective allegations against all “Defendants,” without identifying how each individual Defendant personally interacted with Langford or was responsible for the denial of his Eighth Amendment rights. View "Chad Langford v. Hector Joyner" on Justia Law

The Employees’ Retirement System of the City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge represents the class of persons and entities who acquired shares of common stock in MacroGenics, Inc. (“MacroGenics”) between February 6, 2019, and June 4, 2019 (the “Class Period”). Plaintiffs initiated an action against MacroGenics, its president and CEO, and its senior vice president and CFO (collectively “Defendants”) for alleged violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Rule 10b–5, and sections 11, 12(a), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933. In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that after purchasing MacroGenics’ stock, they experienced economic harm proximately caused by Defendants’ material misrepresentations, misleading statements, or omissions concerning MacroGenics’ clinical trial drug, Margetuximab. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss after concluding that Plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently allege any actionable misrepresentations or omissions that would give rise to Defendants’ duty to disclose and that most of Defendants’ statements were also immunized from suit.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any materially false, misleading representations or omissions in Defendants’ statements. Because Plaintiffs’ Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) claims are inextricably intertwined with the alleged misstatements and omissions raised under their Exchange Act claims, their Securities Act claims cannot prevail. Further, because Plaintiffs have failed to plead a primary violation of the Securities Act, they have consequently failed to plead a Section 15 violation View "Employees' Retirement System of the City of Baton v. Macrogenics, Inc." on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission sued Defendant for trading Corporate Executive Board, Inc. (“CEB”) stock using inside information. The Commission alleged that Defendant aggressively traded CEB stock after he received inside information about a potential merger from co-Defendant, Defendant’s brother-in-law and CEB’s Corporate Controller. At trial, Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a)1 at the conclusion of the Commission’s case. He argued the Commission failed to present evidence that co-Defendant possessed inside information about the merger at the time Defendant began the relevant trading. And if co-Defendant had no such information at that time, Defendant contended, co-Defendant could not have passed it on to Defendant The district court agreed and granted judgment for Defendant.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained the right to a trial by jury is enshrined by the Seventh Amendment. And the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that juries, not judges, decide cases so long as there is evidence from which a reasonable decision can be made. Here, evidence existed from which a reasonable jury could infer that Defendant engaged in prohibited insider trading beginning on December 9, 2016. View "SEC v. Christopher Clark" on Justia Law

South Carolina law makes it a crime for elementary and secondary school students to act “disorderly” or in a “boisterous manner,”; use “obscene or profane language”; or “interfere with,” “loiter about,” or “act in an obnoxious manner” in (or sometimes near) a school. Four students who had been referred or charged under the disorderly conduct or disturbing schools laws, and a nonprofit organization that advocates for at-risk youth filed a putative class action challenging both laws as unconstitutionally vague. After denying a motion to dismiss, the district court certified one main class and two subclasses under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). The court held that both laws were unconstitutionally vague as applied to elementary and secondary school students, and it permanently enjoined future enforcement of the disorderly conduct law against those students. South Carolina’s Attorney General—appealed, lodging multiple challenges to the district court’s rulings.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that the district court committed no abuse of discretion here—not just because the challenged laws are facially invalid as applied to elementary and secondary school students but also because the subclasses demonstrated ongoing injury by the retention of existing records. A delinquency adjudication under South Carolina law may impair a minor’s future practice of law, application for military service, use of a driver’s license, and educational opportunities. Having concluded the laws may not be constitutionally enforced against South Carolina’s elementary and secondary students, the court saw no reason for allowing such continuing injuries to stand. View "Carolina Youth Action Project v. Alan Wilson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued numerous media organizations and individual journalists, alleging defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy. Plaintiff’s claims arise from misstatements of his criminal record: he was convicted and served one year in prison for a federal conspiracy offense, but Defendants made statements describing him as a “felon.” The sixteen Defendants moved for summary judgment in their respective cases. The district court granted summary judgment to all sixteen Defendants after concluding they did not make the statements with actual malice. At issue are two appeals: a consolidated appeal from the district court’s decisions granting summary judgment to fifteen Defendants and a separate appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Boston Globe.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the cumulative record simply does not permit a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that any Defendant “in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth” of the statements it published. Some of the statements may have been the product of carelessness and substandard journalistic methods. But at the end of the day, the record does not contain evidence that the commentators and journalists responsible for the statements were anything more than confused about how to describe a person who served a year in prison for a federal offense. Further, the court wrote that Plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence of actual malice to support his defamation or false light claims against Fox News, he cannot establish an underlying tort, and his conspiracy claims fail as a matter of law. View "Don Blankenship v. NBCUniversal, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claim against TrustedID, Inc. under South Carolina’s Financial Identity Fraud and Identity Theft Protection Act (the “Act”), S.C. Code Ann. Section 37-20-180. The district court held that Plaintiff alleged an Article III injury in fact but failed to state a claim under the Act. Plaintiff agrees with the district court’s decision on standing but appeals its Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.   The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to remand this case to state court where it originated. The court conceded that it is odd that TrustedID failed to comply with the five-digit SSN cutoff, which doesn’t appear to be unique to South Carolina’s Act. But federal courts can’t entertain a case without a concrete injury in fact. The court offered no opinion about whether the alleged facts state a claim under the Act. Absent Article III jurisdiction, that’s a question for Plaintiff to take up in state court. View "Brady O'Leary v. TrustedID, Inc." on Justia Law

Colorado Bankers is a life, accident, and health insurance company. Colorado Bankers made several interrelated agreements with Academy Financial Assets (Academy). After Academy failed to pay the still outstanding balance in full by the June 30 maturity date, Colorado Bankers filed an amended complaint adding a second breach of contract claim. At issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Colorado Bankers Life Insurance Company in its suit against Academy Financial Assets for violating a loan agreement? Second, did the district court err in concluding a North Carolina statute requires Academy to pay 15% of the outstanding loan balance as attorneys’ fees?   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court acknowledged various federal district and bankruptcy courts have adopted this view, we decline to do so. The court wrote that while perhaps appealing as a policy matter, Academy’s argument has scant basis in the statutory text, and Academy has identified no compelling reason for concluding the Supreme Court of North Carolina would interpret the statute in such an atextual manner. The court thus held the district court did not err in following the plain language of the statute and imposing a 15% fee award without requiring evidence of “the attorney’s actual billings or usual rates.” View "Colorado Bankers Life Insurance Company v. Academy Financial Assets, LLC" on Justia Law