Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
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A fire erupted at a cannabidiol oil extraction factory, leased and operated by JDBC Holdings, Inc, d/b/a The CBD Factories (“JDBC”). JDBC filed a claim for insurance coverage with Kinsale Insurance Company (“Kinsale”)., Kinsale filed a suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia alleging that it was not bound to provide coverage. The district court denied Kinsale’s motion for summary judgment, granted in part JDBC’s motion for partial summary judgment, and declared that Kinsale was bound to provide coverage. The district court certified its Order as a final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) and stayed JDBC’s counterclaims for breach of contract and bad faith pending appeal.The Fourth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the district court’s order was not a final decision. The court reasoned that though the district court resolved the key question of whether Kinsale was liable for providing coverage for the damage at the JDBC facility, “the order does not embody the essential elements of a money judgment because the court has not found all of the facts necessary to compute the amount of damages due.”Further, the court found that even if the district court’s order was a final judgment, the district court abused its discretion in concluding that there was no just reason for the delay to certify the partial summary judgment order for the court’s review. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Kinsale Insurance Company v. JDBC Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

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Nadella Corporation bought a ship, the MV Falcon Carrier, for scrap from Falcon Carrier Shipping Limited. Unbeknownst to Nadella, the ship was encumbered by a $368,000 debt. To recover that debt, the debt holder “arrested” Nadella’s new ship. Nadella then tried to recover that debt from the ship’s seller Falcon Carrier Shipping. Newbrook Shipping—the owner of those two ships arrested by Nadella—sued Nadella in South Africa and was considering another lawsuit in Nevis. Newbrook applied in Maryland federal court for an ex parte order under Sec. 1782 authorizing discovery from Nadella’s purported parent company, Global Marketing Systems. The district court rejected discovery for the speculative “proceeding” in Nevis but then granted the full application.On appeal, Global Marketing argues that the district court substantively erred in granting the entire application and approving service of process. The court stated that Sec. 1782 identifies four mandatory conditions that must be satisfied before an application can be granted. Here, the last condition, that the evidence sought must be “for use” in a foreign proceeding, is not fully satisfied.The court held that Section 1782 gives litigants access to federal courts to obtain discovery for use in international litigation. But that access is not unlimited. The district court erred by granting the full application when it held the speculative proceeding in Nevis did not provide a basis for Sec. 1782 discovery. The court remanded for the district court to consider Global Marketing’s arguments. View "In re: Application of Newbrook" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed 1983 against two nurses alleging that he was provided inadequate medical care during a health crisis he experienced while incarcerated. He was eventually sent a series of hospitals, where doctors told him a flesh-eating organism was damaging his internal organs.The first nurse was successfully served by the Marshals Service within Rule 4(m)’s 90-day period. The second nurse was not served because service was returned as “refused unable to forward.” The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s lawsuit on timeliness grounds after finding that Plaintiff’s amended complaint did not relate back under Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to his initial and timely complaint.At issue is whether the amended complaint adding Defendants is timely because it relates back to the date of the original complaint. The court found that the district court erred and the text of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) makes clear that the required “notice” and knowledge must come “within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service.Next, the court addressed whether Defendants were provided the necessary notice within the Rule 4(m) notice period. The court ruled that Rule 15(c)’s requirements have been satisfied as to the first nurse. In regards to the second nurse, the court remanded to the district court for consideration of Plaintiff’s extension request, reasoning that the district court incorrectly believed that Plaintiff lost his chance to take advantage of Rule 15(c)’s relation-back rule. The court vacated the district court’s order granting the motion to dismiss. View "Patrick McGraw v. Theresa Gore" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs filed suit in South Carolina state court against fourteen defendants (ten individuals and four agencies), alleging five causes of action. The circuit court reviewed five preserved issues: (1) the applicable statutes of limitations for plaintiffs' claims under the Rehabilitation Act ("RA") and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding the witnesses' testimonies; (3) the plaintiffs' assertion that the district court improperly instructed the jury as to the duty owed under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act; (4) whether the district court improperly dismissed plaintiff’s RA claims; and (5) whether the court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s 1983 claims.The circuit court affirmed the district court’s decision to limit the plaintiffs' witness's testimony and further found that the court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the hybrid witness's testimony or by determining whether the defendant’s deposition had any potential to lead to admissible evidence.Further, the court found no error in the district court’s instruction or its' finding that the ADA and RA claims were subject to the South Carolina Human Affairs Law’s one-year statute of limitations. The plaintiffs failed to show reversible error as they neither pleaded nor proved any action or inaction by any individually named defendants that caused them harm. View "Johnny Timpson v. Anderson County Disabilities" on Justia Law

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On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit evaluated eight distinct grounds for removal that twenty-six multinational oil and gas companies ("Defendants") argue provide federal jurisdiction over the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore’s (“Baltimore”) climate-change action.The circuit court looked to two legal doctrines that inform removal inquiries before a federal court: (1) the well-pleaded complaint rule, and (2) complete preemption. Here, the circuit court reasoned that the municipality has decided to exclusively rely upon state-law claims to remedy its own climate-change injuries, which it perceives were caused, at least in part, by the defendants’ fossil-fuel products and strategic misinformation campaign. The circuit court concluded that these claims do not belong in federal court. They declined to take a position on whether Baltimore will ultimately fail or succeed in proving its claims under Maryland law. Ultimately, the circuit court did not discern a proper basis for removal that permits a federal court to entertain Baltimore’s action; thus, the court affirmed the district court’s order granting Baltimore’s Motion to Remand. View "Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C." on Justia Law

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While shopping at a Wal-Mart Supercenter retail store in Weatherford, Texas, the plaintiff slipped and fell in the store’s deli section. Her amended complaint referred to the cause of her fall as “grease or a similar slick substance.” She alleged that Wal-Mart had either actual or constructive knowledge of the spilled grease yet failed to clean it up or warn her of the hazardous condition.Wal-Mart argued that the plaintiff’s testimony showed that she had no evidence that it had actual or constructive knowledge of the spill Plaintiff submitted an affidavit, and Wal-Mart objected that it “lack[ed] credibility” and was a “self-serving sham.” The Fifth Circuit explained that the sham-affidavit doctrine is not applicable when discrepancies between an affidavit and other testimony can be reconciled such that the statements are not inherently inconsistent.The court found that affidavit testimony did not inherently contradict her deposition testimony, and the district court abused its discretion in applying the sham-affidavit rule. Further, because the evidence shows a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Wal-Mart had constructive notice of the spilled grease, the district court erred in granting summary judgment. View "Svetlana Lokhova v. Stefan Halper" on Justia Law

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A hung jury on one claim is a non-finding that cannot be used to conduct a consistency analysis with another finding by the jury. In this case, the jury was given a general verdict form, found defendant liable on one count and awarded plaintiff $25,000 in damages. However, the district court invalidated that verdict based on a jury deadlock for a different count, reasoning that the deadlock on excessive force was irreconcilable with a verdict on retaliation.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting a new trial and reinstated the jury verdict finding defendant liable for $25,000 based on plaintiff's retaliation claim and vacated the district court's final judgment based on the second trial. The court also vacated the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and vacated the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion for partial voluntary dismissal because its decision on those matters was based on the district court's ruling on the motion for a new trial. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Jordan v. Large" on Justia Law

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This appeal involves a motion to enforce the final judgment and final order in a class action settlement made in the district court by the defendant in the class action, EQT, and class members, the Huey Plaintiffs. The Huey Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit in the Circuit Court of Wetzel County, West Virginia (the Wetzel County litigation) against EQT three years after the entry of the final judgment and final order, alleging that EQT trespassed on their mineral estate in violation of West Virginia statutory and common law. After the district court denied the final judgment and final order and declined to enjoin the Wetzel County litigation, EQT appealed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of EQT's motion to enforce the final judgment order and final order, concluding that the district court did not err in declining to enjoin the Wetzel County litigation. The court found no error in the district court's assumption that the Huey Plaintiffs were class members bound by the Settlement Agreement. The court agreed with the district court's holding that the trespass claim in the Wetzel County litigation is not a royalty claim and not released by the Agreement. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not issuing an injunction and by finding that two exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act, the "in aid of jurisdiction" and the relitigation exceptions, did not apply in this case. View "Huey v. Equitable Production Co." on Justia Law

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Ali sought to pursue 42 U.S.C. 1983 proceedings challenging as unconstitutional an executive order of Maryland’s Governor that prohibits boycotts of Israel by business entities that bid on the state’s procurement contracts. According to the Initial Complaint, “Ali is a computer software engineer who wishes to submit bids for government software project contracts but is barred from doing so due to the presence of mandatory ‘No Boycott of Israel’ clauses.”The district court dismissed with prejudice Ali’s lawsuit for want of Article III standing to sue. The Fourth Circuit affirmed but modified the judgment to provide that the dismissal is without prejudice. The court first disagreed with Ali’s interpretation of the Order. The Order indicates that if a business entity has engaged in anti-Israel national origin discrimination in the process of preparing a bid for a state procurement contract, the entity is barred from being awarded the contract; if the entity has engaged in a boycott of Israel entirely unrelated to the bid formation process, the Order is of no relevance. The court rejected Ali’s argument that the certification requirement constitutes an unconstitutionally vague loyalty oath. The Order does not require the entity to pledge any loyalty to Israel or profess any other beliefs. View "Ali v. Hogan" on Justia Law

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Employees of a Navy services contractor, SA-TECH, sued the contractor in California state court for violations of the state’s labor laws. Before and during that suit, SA-TECH sought guidance from the Navy as to whether California’s labor laws applied to it and its subcontractors, given the federal nature of its service contract. Those requests went unanswered. SA-TECH’s claim with its contracting officer under the Contract Disputes Act was denied. SA-TECH then sought declaratory relief on the questions: whether the modified understanding of California labor laws would control SA-TECH’s operations on Navy and Navy-chartered ships; whether SA-TECH would be permitted or required by the Navy, under its contracts, to pay any sleep-time over-time; and whether costs incurred by SA-TECH in settling the state-court litigation would be allowable costs under its current contract.The district court dismissed the complaint, citing lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act’s exhaustion requirements, 41 U.S.C. 7103(a)(1)–(3). The Fourth Circuit affirmed. SA-TECH did not specifically assert any legal or contractual grounds entitling it to the Navy’s opinion on its agency status. Its other issues are monetary claims for which SA-TECH did not present a requested sum certain, as required to exhaust its remedies. View "Systems Application & Technologies, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law