Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Boris Bergus and Agustin Florian, both doctors, were colleagues and later co-investors in a company managed by Florian's brother-in-law, Edgardo Jose Antonio Castro Baca. Bergus invested in the company in 2012 and 2014, purchasing stock. Years later, after their relationship deteriorated, Bergus sued Florian, alleging that Florian had omitted material information about the investments, violating the Massachusetts Uniform Securities Act (MUSA). The trial featured testimony from Bergus, Florian, and Baca. The district court precluded Florian from cross-examining Bergus about a 2013 state medical board finding that Bergus had misrepresented his medical credentials. The jury found in favor of Bergus regarding the 2012 investment but not the 2014 investment.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled in favor of Bergus for the 2012 investment, awarding him $125,000 plus interest, totaling $202,506.85, and additional attorney's fees and costs, bringing the total judgment to $751,234.86. The court dismissed Florian's counterclaim for abuse of process, suggesting it be litigated in state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed several issues, including the district court's limitation on Florian's cross-examination of Bergus. The appellate court found that the district court abused its discretion by precluding cross-examination about Bergus's misrepresentations of his medical credentials, which were probative of his character for truthfulness. The court concluded that this error was not harmless, as the case hinged on the credibility of the witnesses.The First Circuit vacated the judgment regarding the 2012 investment and remanded for a new trial on that issue. The jury's verdict on the 2014 investment remained intact. The appellate court did not address Florian's other arguments due to the need for a new trial. View "Bergus v. Florian" on Justia Law

The Government of Puerto Rico sued several pharmaceutical benefit managers (PBMs) and pharmaceutical manufacturers in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Court of First Instance. The Commonwealth alleged that the PBMs, including Express Scripts and Caremark, schemed to unlawfully inflate insulin prices through rebate negotiations and price setting. The PBMs removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), arguing that they acted under federal authority in negotiating rebates and setting drug prices, and that the lawsuit related to their federal service.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico remanded the case back to the Court of First Instance. The district court found that the Commonwealth's disclaimer, which stated that it was not seeking relief related to any federal program or contract, effectively excluded any claims upon which the PBMs could base removal under § 1442(a)(1). The district court concluded that the PBMs could not claim they acted under federal authority for their non-federal PBM services and that dividing the work done for federal and non-federal clients was possible.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the disclaimer did not prevent removal because Caremark's rebate negotiations for federal and non-federal clients were indivisible. The court found that Caremark acted under federal authority when negotiating rebates for FEHBA plans and possessed a colorable federal defense under FEHBA's express preemption provision. The court concluded that the disclaimer did not eliminate the possibility that the Commonwealth would recover for Caremark's official acts, thus justifying removal under § 1442(a)(1). The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to return it to federal court. View "Government of Puerto Rico v. Express Scripts, Inc." on Justia Law

Four noncitizens from India, who have been lawfully residing in the U.S. for over ten years, filed for permanent residency more than four years ago. Their applications have not been adjudicated, prompting them to sue the Director of USCIS and the Secretary of DOS under the APA for unreasonable delay and unlawful withholding of agency action. They argue that USCIS's policy of not adjudicating applications until a visa is "immediately available" violates 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1). The court found that the plaintiffs' interpretation of § 1255(a) was incorrect and that the agencies' policies were within their discretion. The court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for unreasonable delay and unlawful withholding under the APA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The appellate court held that § 1255(a) sets eligibility criteria for applying for adjustment of status but does not mandate the timing of adjudication. The court found that the 1976 amendment to § 1255(a) did not preclude USCIS from considering visa availability at the time of approval. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' structural arguments based on other statutory provisions, finding no conflict with USCIS's policy. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the APA against both USCIS and DOS. View "Patel v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

Salvadoran nationals Julio Alvarado-Reyes, his wife Glenda Garmendia-Ardona, and their minor son J.A.G. fled to the United States after being threatened by the MS-13 gang. Alvarado-Reyes was repeatedly stopped by gang members who demanded he use his truck for their activities, threatening his family when he refused. Garmendia-Ardona also received threatening calls. Fearing for their lives, they did not report to the police and eventually left El Salvador in August 2021. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against them in November 2021.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ found that the harm Alvarado-Reyes experienced did not amount to persecution and that his proposed particular social group (PSG) of "Salvadoran men who resist gang recruitment" was not legally cognizable. The IJ also determined that the harm was not on account of his membership in the "Reyes family" or "Salvadoran men" PSGs. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision without opinion, making the IJ's decision the final agency decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the IJ's findings, agreeing that the proposed PSG of "Salvadoran men who resist gang recruitment" lacked particularity and that there was no sufficient nexus between the harm and Alvarado-Reyes' membership in the "Reyes family" or "Salvadoran men" PSGs. The court also found that the BIA's affirmance without opinion was a valid exercise of discretion. Consequently, the petition for review was denied. View "Alvarado-Reyes v. Garland" on Justia Law

Michael Hermalyn, a former employee of DraftKings, left his position to join a rival company, Fanatics, based in California. DraftKings, headquartered in Massachusetts, claimed that Hermalyn's new role violated a noncompete agreement he had signed, which included a Massachusetts choice-of-law provision and a one-year noncompete clause. DraftKings sued Hermalyn in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts for breach of the noncompete agreement.The district court sided with DraftKings, applying Massachusetts law to determine the enforceability of the noncompete agreement. The court found the noncompete enforceable and issued a preliminary injunction preventing Hermalyn from competing against DraftKings in the United States for one year. Hermalyn appealed, arguing that California law, which generally bans noncompetes, should apply instead of Massachusetts law. Alternatively, he argued that if Massachusetts law applied, the injunction should exclude California.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court examined whether the district judge abused her discretion in granting the preliminary injunction and whether she made any legal errors in applying Massachusetts law. The appellate court found that Massachusetts law was correctly applied, noting that Massachusetts generally respects choice-of-law provisions unless they violate a fundamental policy of another state with a materially greater interest. The court concluded that Hermalyn failed to demonstrate that California's interest in banning noncompetes was materially greater than Massachusetts's interest in enforcing them.The First Circuit also upheld the scope of the preliminary injunction, rejecting Hermalyn's argument to exclude California. The court reasoned that excluding California would undermine the effectiveness of the injunction, as Hermalyn's role involved interacting with clients in states where online sports betting is legal. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court's decision and awarded costs to DraftKings. View "DraftKings Inc. v. Hermalyn" on Justia Law

José Santana De la Rosa and José Algarín Pabón filed a lawsuit against Edwin Santana De la Rosa, alleging abuse of process under Puerto Rico law. They claimed that Edwin, who had sued them in Puerto Rico over financial dealings, had changed his domicile to New York after Hurricane Maria in 2017, thus establishing diversity jurisdiction for their federal case. Edwin moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting he was still domiciled in Puerto Rico. The district court ordered jurisdictional discovery, which revealed Edwin's significant ties to both Puerto Rico and New York.The U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico found that although Edwin spent considerable time in New York after the hurricane, José and Algarín failed to prove that Edwin intended to remain there indefinitely. The court noted Edwin's continued ties to Puerto Rico, including his Puerto Rico address on tax returns, a Puerto Rico driver's license, and voter registration. Consequently, the district court granted Edwin's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not clearly err in its determination that Edwin did not intend to change his domicile to New York. The court emphasized that Edwin's continued ties to Puerto Rico, such as his tax filings, driver's license, and voter registration, supported the district court's conclusion. The appellate court also declined José and Algarín's request for an evidentiary hearing, noting that they had not timely requested it during the lower court proceedings. View "Santana de la Rosa v. Santana de la Rosa" on Justia Law

The appellants, Meredith O'Neil, Jessica Svedine, Deanna Corby, and Roberto Silva, sued various officials from the Canton Police Department and the Town of Canton, Massachusetts, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement of Massachusetts witness intimidation statutes, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268 §§ 13A and 13B. They claimed that these statutes violated their First Amendment rights, fearing prosecution for their actions during a November 5, 2023 protest and alleging that their speech would be chilled for a planned protest on November 12, 2023. The appellants moved for emergency relief to enjoin the enforcement of these statutes.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the emergency motion on November 10, 2023. The court assumed the plaintiffs had standing but found they did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court held that the statutes served compelling interests in protecting the administration of justice and were narrowly tailored. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not shown they faced a risk of irreparable harm, noting that the plaintiffs had other public forums to express their views. The balance of harms and public interest considerations also weighed against granting the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the appeal as moot. The court noted that the state court had dismissed the charges against the appellants for lack of probable cause, and no ongoing conduct remained for the court to enjoin. The court also found that the appellants' general allegations of future protests did not show a credible threat of prosecution, failing to establish standing for their pre-enforcement challenges. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings as appropriate. View "O'Neil v. Canton Police Department" on Justia Law

A school bus owned by First Student, Inc., and insured by National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA, collided with two underinsured vehicles in Rhode Island, injuring Tiffany Briere and her minor daughter. Briere submitted a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to National Union, which was denied on the grounds that First Student had rejected such coverage. Briere then sued National Union, arguing that Rhode Island law required the policy to offer underinsured motorist coverage.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island granted summary judgment to National Union and First Student. The court found that the Rhode Island statute requiring underinsured motorist coverage did not apply because the insurance policy was not "delivered or issued for delivery" in Rhode Island. The policy had been issued by a New York-based broker and delivered to FirstGroup's headquarters in Ohio. Consequently, the court ruled that the policy was exempt from the statutory requirement.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court's summary judgment. The appellate court held that National Union had waived its defense based on the delivery requirement because it had not mentioned this ground in its initial denial letter to Briere. The court emphasized that insurers must notify their insureds of all grounds for denying coverage in their denial letters. Since National Union failed to do so, it could not later rely on the delivery requirement defense. The case was remanded for further proceedings to address other potential defenses and issues not considered by the district court. View "Briere v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA" on Justia Law

In 2006, Lisa Wilson's late husband, Mason, purchased a home in Coventry, Rhode Island, financing it with a $150,000 mortgage. Both Mason and Lisa signed the mortgage agreement, but only Mason signed the promissory note. The mortgage agreement included covenants requiring the "Borrowers" to defend the title, pay property taxes, and discharge any superior liens. In 2007, Deutsche Bank acquired the mortgage and note. Mason defaulted on the mortgage payments, and the Wilsons failed to pay property taxes, leading to a tax sale in 2014. Birdsong Associates bought the property and later obtained a court decree extinguishing Deutsche Bank's mortgage lien. Birdsong then sold the property to Coventry IV-14, RIGP, which eventually sold it to Dunkin Engineering Solutions, LLC, a company formed by Mason's parents. After Mason's parents' deaths, Lisa became the sole owner of Dunkin.Deutsche Bank sued Lisa, Mason, and Dunkin in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, alleging breach of the mortgage covenants and seeking equitable relief. The district court granted summary judgment to Lisa and Dunkin, finding that the mortgage agreement had been extinguished by the 2016 court decree and that Deutsche Bank had no remaining contractual rights. The court also rejected Deutsche Bank's equitable claims, concluding that there was no evidence of a scheme to benefit Lisa and Mason and that no benefit had accrued to Dunkin or Lisa from Deutsche Bank's payments.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the mortgage agreement did not unambiguously bind Lisa to the covenants, and thus, Deutsche Bank could not enforce those covenants against her. The court also found that Deutsche Bank failed to establish a fiduciary or confidential relationship necessary for its equitable claims and that Deutsche Bank's payments did not unjustly enrich Dunkin or Lisa. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Wilson" on Justia Law

A physician in Puerto Rico, Dr. Jaime Salas Rushford, had his board certification suspended by the American Board of Internal Medicine (ABIM) after ABIM concluded that he had improperly shared board exam questions with his test prep instructor. ABIM sued Salas Rushford for copyright infringement in New Jersey. Salas Rushford counterclaimed against ABIM and several ABIM-affiliated individuals, alleging that the process leading to his suspension was a "sham."The counterclaims were transferred to the District of Puerto Rico, where the district court granted ABIM's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied Salas Rushford leave to amend his pleading. The court found that Salas Rushford failed to state a claim for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and tort claims against the ABIM Individuals. The court also dismissed his Lanham Act claim for commercial disparagement.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Salas Rushford's claims. It held that ABIM had broad discretion under its policies to revoke certification if a diplomate failed to maintain satisfactory ethical and professional behavior. The court found that Salas Rushford did not plausibly allege that ABIM acted with bad motive or ill intention, which is necessary to state a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under New Jersey law.The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Lanham Act claim, noting that Salas Rushford failed to allege actual consumer deception or intentional deception, which is required to state a claim for false advertising. Finally, the court upheld the district court's denial of leave to amend the complaint, citing undue delay and lack of a concrete argument for why justice required an amendment. View "American Board of Internal Medicine v. Salas-Rushford" on Justia Law