Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Believing Texas intends to enforce its abortion laws to penalize their out-of-state actions, Plaintiffs sued Texas Attorney General (Petitioner). Petitioner moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs then issued subpoenas to obtain Petitioner’s testimony. Petitioner moved to quash the subpoenas, which the district court initially granted. On reconsideration, however, the district court changed course, denied the motion, and ordered Petitioner to testify either at a deposition or evidentiary hearing. Petitioner petitioned for a writ of mandamus to shield him from the district court’s order.   The Fifth Circuit granted the writ, concluding that the district court clearly erred by not first ensuring its own jurisdiction and also by declining to quash the subpoenas. The court explained that the district court committed a “clear abuse of discretion” by finding that exceptional circumstances justified ordering Petitioner to testify. Petitioner has therefore shown a clear and indisputable right to relief. The court further found that the errors are ones that cannot be rectified as the case progresses. Petitioners compelled testimony cannot be undone or corrected by the district court or a reviewing court once it occurs. Accordingly, the court was satisfied that, under the circumstances, it should exercise its discretion to issue the writ. View "In Re: Ken Paxton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was dismissed from her role as a Cadre On-Call Response Employee (CORE) for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 2017. Plaintiff claimed that her dismissal resulted from race-based discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Following administrative proceedings in which an administrative law judge rejected her complaint, Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s order granting FEMA summary judgment and denying her motion for additional time to conduct discovery, arguing that the court abused its discretion by declining to grant a continuance under Rule 56(d) as required by Chandler v. Roudebush.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that because Plaintiff failed to diligently pursue her limited discovery needs during the two-month continuance, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her Rule 56(d) motion. Further, Chandler cannot be construed as demanding further discovery where, as here, the government acquiesces, but the employee fails to diligently pursue it. Plaintiff received a de novo trial and treatment equal to that afforded to a private-sector employee. The district court did not contravene Chandler by denying further discovery and granting the summary judgment motion. View "Dominick v. DHS" on Justia Law

This mandamus petition concerns a qui tam action brought against Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., and five Texas-based affiliates. Relator filed the initial complaint on February 5, 2021, alleging that Petitioners presented millions of dollars of false or fraudulent claims for payment under the Medicaid system.Petitioners moved to dismiss both complaints, and the district court denied those motions in large part in April of 2022. Petitioners then sought reconsideration of that order, which the district court denied in July of 2022. Discovery proceeded meanwhile; tens of thousands of documents were exchanged and several motions to compel were raised by both parties and ruled on.Seven months after the case was unsealed, Petitioners moved to transfer to the Austin Division of the Western District of Texas, arguing that it is a more convenient forum than the Amarillo Division of the Northern District of Texas, where the case was originally filed and remains pending. The district court denied the motion. Petitioners then sought mandamus relief.The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Petitioners failed to show that the district court clearly abused its discretion in denying their motion to transfer. As a result, they failed to demonstrate that they are entitled to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus. View "In re Planned Parenthood Federation of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are two voter registration organizations who challenged Texas’s recently revised requirements for voter residency. The district court concluded Plaintiffs had organizational standing because the new laws caused them to divert resources from other projects and also chilled their ability to advise and register voters. On the merits, the district court ruled that the challenged laws, in large part, impermissibly burdened the right to vote. Texas appealed.   The Fifth Circuit agreed with Texas that Plaintiffs lack organizational standing. So, without reaching the merits, the court reversed the district court’s judgment and rendered judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs argue that it is “a crime under Texas law to help someone to register to vote in violation of [S.B. 1111’s] confusing new requirements.” But Texas law does not criminalize giving good faith but mistaken advice to prospective voters. Rather, the statute on which Plaintiffs rely applies only “if the person knowingly or intentionally” “requests, commands, coerces, or attempts to induce another person to make a false statement on a [voter] registration application.” Plaintiffs do not assert that they plan to “knowingly or intentionally” encourage people to register who are ineligible under S.B. 1111. Plaintiffs’ argument turns on the “confusion and uncertainty” S.B. 1111 supposedly injects into their voter outreach efforts. Uncertainty is not the same as intent, however. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not shown a serious intention to engage in protected activity arguably proscribed by the challenged law. In sum, the district court erred in concluding Plaintiffs had organizational standing based on a chilled-speech theory View "Texas State LULAC v. Paxton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to remand this removed action to state court for want of federal-court jurisdiction. This matter arises from a traffic collision. Plaintiff is a citizen of Louisiana, as is the driver of the other vehicle, Defendant. At the time of removal by diverse Defendant Zurich American Insurance Company (“Zurich”), neither Defendant nor defendant Dynamic Energy Services International, LLC, had been served. Plaintiff initiated an action in Louisiana state court against the three defendants. According to Zurich, it could remove to federal court because the driver—a citizen of the forum state—had not yet been served.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for writ of mandate. The court explained that because the only basis for removal, in this case, was diversity jurisdiction, and complete diversity is lacking, The court explained that the district court must dismiss want of jurisdiction. the critical distinction is whether diversity is complete. In that regard, Plaintiff, in his mandamus petition, correctly posits that “Texas Brine is consistent with Deshotel,” based on the fact that “[i]n Texas Brine, unlike [Plaintiff], diversity was complete. Had the Texas plaintiff wanted, it could have filed its case originally in federal court. Plaintiff by contrast, could not have done so.” View "In Re: Calvin Levy" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)  brought an enforcement action against BP, alleging the company capitalized on the hurricane-induced chaos in commodities markets by devising a scheme to manipulate the market for natural gas. BP sought judicial review of FERC’s order finding that BP engaged in market manipulation and imposing a $20 million civil penalty.   The Fifth Circuit explained that because FERC predicated its penalty assessment on its erroneous position that it had jurisdiction over all (and not just some) of BP’s transactions, the court must remand for a reassessment of the penalty in the light of the court’s jurisdictional holding. Thus, the court granted in part and denied in part BP’s petition for review and remanded to the agency for reassessment of the penalty.   The court explained that it has rejected FERC’s expansive assertion that it has jurisdiction over any manipulative trade affecting the price of an NGA transaction. The court, however, reaffirmed the Commission’s authority over transactions directly involving natural gas in interstate commerce under the NGA. The court further determined that there was substantial evidence to support FERC’s finding that BP manipulated the market for natural gas. The court found that FERC’s reasoning in imposing a penalty was not arbitrary and capricious, though the court concluded that FERC’s reliance on an erroneous understanding of its own jurisdiction necessitates remand for recalculation of the penalty. Finally, the court held that neither separation of functions nor statute of limitations issues justify overturning the Commission’s order. View "BP America v. FERC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants, forty-eight owners of property located near the former Dresser Industrial Valve Operations Facility (“Dresser Facility”) in Rapides Parish, Louisiana, appeal the district court’s order dismissing the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (“LDEQ”) as improperly joined and denying their motion for remand. They further challenge the injunction issued by the district court against Plaintiff M.G. from pursuing a proceeding in state court.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s ruling. The court concluded that Defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing that LDEQ was improperly joined. Although the district court carefully reviewed certain Louisiana constitutional provisions and statutes in determining that Plaintiffs had not stated a cognizable claim against LDEQ, the court noted that at least one Louisiana appellate court has recognized that LDEQ may be sued in tort for its negligence under circumstances similar to those alleged by Plaintiffs. Additionally, it is unclear whether LDEQ would have discretionary immunity under La. R.S. Section 9:2798.1 in this case under the court’s standard for determining improper joinder, any ambiguity or uncertainty in the controlling state law must be resolved in Plaintiffs’ favor. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of LDEQ and its denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for remand. View "D & J Invst of Cenla v. Baker Hughes" on Justia Law

Two former students of Tulane University, on behalf of a putative class of current and former students, sued the University for failing to provide a partial refund of tuition and fees after Tulane switched from in-person instruction with access to on-campus services to online, off-campus instruction during the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court agreed with Tulane that the student's complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court concluded that the claim is not barred as a claim of educational malpractice because the Students do not challenge the quality of the education received but the product received. Second, the court rejected Tulane’s argument that the breach-of-contract claim is foreclosed by an express agreement between the parties because the agreement at issue plausibly does not govern refunds in this circumstance. And third, the court concluded that Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Tulane breached an express contract promising in-person instruction and on-campus facilities because Plaintiffs fail to point to any explicit language evidencing that promise. But the court held that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged implied-in-fact promises for in-person instruction and on-campus facilities. Moreover, the court found that the Students’ alternative claim for unjust enrichment may proceed at this early stage. Finally, genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Plaintiffs saw and agreed to the A&DS preclude reliance on the agreement at this stage. Thus, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a claim of conversion. View "Jones v. Admin of the Tulane Educ" on Justia Law

Appellant Advanced Indicator and Manufacturing, Inc. claims its building was damaged by Hurricane Harvey’s winds. Advanced’s insurer, Acadia Insurance Company, determined that the damage to the building was caused by poor maintenance and routine wear and tear. When Acadia denied Advanced’s claim, Advanced sued. Advanced filed a motion to remand the case to state court   The district court granted Acadia’s motion and granted summary judgment on Advanced’s extra-contractual claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to remand, reversed the grant of summary judgment on Advanced’s claims, and remanded the matter to the district court.   The court explained that Advanced’s argument is unavailing because it fails to consider Flagg’s command that “the district court must examine the plaintiff’s possibility of recovery against that defendant at the time of removal.” At the time of removal, then, it would have been proper for the district court to find that “there is no possibility of recovery by [Advanced] against an in-state defendant.” Accordingly, the differences between Sections 542A.006(b) and 542.006(c) are not material as long as the insurer elects to accept liability for the agent before removal. The court held that summary judgment was not warranted on Advanced’s breach of contract claim given the evidence Advanced has put forth. This conclusion requires the reversal of the district court’s dismissal of Advanced’s other claims. View "Adv Indicator v. Acadia Ins" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, including the American Civil Liberties Union, sought an injunction compelling the Texas Attorney General to release the names of certain individuals who were suspected of being non-citizens but were registered to vote. The case arose when the Texas Attorney General began matching Department of Public Safety data against voter registration rolls on a weekly basis and intended to notify county election officials of voters identified as potential non-citizens. Through their claim under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Plaintiffs obtained an injunction from the district court requiring the State of Texas to provide the names and voter identification numbers of persons suspected of being noncitizens though registered to vote.The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a case under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, finding that they did not suffer injury in fact because "an injury in law is not an injury in fact." View "Campaign Legal Center v. Scott" on Justia Law