Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A Canadian company, J.D. Irving (JDI), challenged the U.S. Department of Commerce's assignment of an antidumping duty cash deposit rate of 11.59% on its softwood lumber products from Canada. This rate was determined in the final results of the second administrative review (AR 2) of an antidumping duty order. JDI argued that its cash deposit rate should remain at 1.57%, the rate assigned in the first administrative review (AR 1). JDI filed a complaint with the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), asserting that the CIT had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the court's residual jurisdiction.The CIT dismissed JDI's case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was not appropriate because jurisdiction could have been available under § 1581(c). The CIT noted that JDI's action was essentially a challenge to the final results of AR 2, which is reviewable under § 1581(c). Additionally, the CIT found that JDI had not demonstrated that the remedy provided by administrative review and binational panel review under the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) would be manifestly inadequate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT's dismissal. The court held that the true nature of JDI's suit was a challenge to the AR 2 final results, making § 1581(c) the proper jurisdiction. The court also determined that JDI had not met its burden to show that the alternative remedies of administrative review and binational panel review would be manifestly inadequate. The court emphasized that binational panels have the authority to review and remand final antidumping determinations, and Commerce must take action consistent with the panel's decision. Therefore, the CIT's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was affirmed. View "J.D. IRVING, LTD. v. US " on Justia Law

Provisur Technologies, Inc. owns patents related to food-processing machinery, specifically high-speed mechanical slicers and a fill and packaging apparatus. Provisur sued Weber, Inc. and its affiliates, alleging that Weber's food slicers and SmartLoader products infringed on these patents. The case was tried before a jury, which found that Weber willfully infringed several claims of Provisur's patents and awarded Provisur approximately $10.5 million in damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied Weber's motions for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on noninfringement and willfulness, as well as a motion for a new trial on infringement, willfulness, and damages. Weber appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of JMOL for noninfringement regarding the '812 and '436 patents, as Weber conceded its noninfringement arguments were no longer available due to an intervening decision. However, the court reversed the district court's denial of JMOL for noninfringement of the '936 patent, finding that Provisur failed to provide sufficient evidence that Weber's SmartLoader could be readily configured to infringe the patent.The court also reversed the district court's denial of JMOL on willfulness, ruling that the evidence presented, including testimony about Weber's failure to consult a third party, was insufficient to establish willful infringement. Additionally, the court found that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Provisur to use the entire market value rule for calculating damages without sufficient evidence that the patented features drove customer demand for the entire slicing line. Consequently, the court reversed the denial of a new trial on damages.The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Federal Circuit's decision. View "PROVISUR TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. WEBER, INC. " on Justia Law

The case involves the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) and Apple Inc. WARF accused Apple of infringing U.S. Patent No. 5,781,752 (the '752 patent) with its A7 and A8 processors in a lawsuit filed in 2014 (WARF I). WARF later filed a second lawsuit (WARF II) accusing Apple's A9 and A10 processors of infringing the same patent. In WARF I, the jury found that Apple’s A7 and A8 processors literally infringed the '752 patent. However, Apple appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the jury's verdict, finding that no reasonable jury could find literal infringement under the plain and ordinary meaning of the term "particular" as used in the patent claims.In the district court for WARF I, WARF had abandoned its doctrine-of-equivalents theory in exchange for Apple not presenting certain evidence at trial. After the Federal Circuit's reversal, WARF sought to reassert the doctrine-of-equivalents theory, but the district court denied this request, citing WARF's prior abandonment and the preclusive effect of the Federal Circuit's interpretation of "particular."In WARF II, the district court stayed proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal in WARF I. After the Federal Circuit's decision, WARF attempted to continue WARF II under the doctrine of equivalents. The district court found that WARF I precluded WARF from proceeding in WARF II, citing issue preclusion and the Kessler doctrine, which prevents repeated litigation of the same issue against the same party.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions in both WARF I and WARF II. The court held that WARF had waived its doctrine-of-equivalents theory in WARF I and that issue preclusion and the Kessler doctrine barred WARF II. The court concluded that the A7/A8 and A9/A10 processors were essentially the same for the purposes of preclusion and that literal infringement and the doctrine of equivalents are part of the same overall issue of infringement. View "WISCONSIN ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUNDATION v. APPLE INC. " on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Realtime Adaptive Streaming LLC, sued DISH and related Sling entities for alleged infringement of three patents related to digital data compression. The district court found the asserted claims of one patent ineligible as abstract under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Defendants filed motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court denied, opting to rehear invalidity arguments after claim construction. The district court later stayed the case pending inter partes review (IPR) proceedings, which resulted in some claims being found unpatentable. The stay was lifted after the IPR proceedings concluded, and the district court eventually granted summary judgment of invalidity for the remaining patent claims.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado awarded attorneys’ fees to the defendants, citing six "red flags" that should have warned Realtime that its case was flawed. These included prior court decisions finding similar claims ineligible, Board decisions invalidating related patent claims, non-final office actions rejecting claims in the reexamination of the patent at issue, a notice letter from DISH warning of potential fees, and expert opinions from DISH’s witness. The district court found that the totality of these circumstances rendered the case exceptional.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision and vacated the award of attorneys’ fees. The appellate court found that some of the red flags cited by the district court should not have been given weight, such as the Adaptive Streaming decision and the Board’s decisions on different patents. The court also noted that the district court failed to adequately explain how certain factors, like the notice letter and expert opinions, constituted red flags. The case was remanded for the district court to reconsider the attorneys’ fees award in light of the appellate court’s findings. View "REALTIME ADAPTIVE STREAMING LLC v. SLING TV, L.L.C. " on Justia Law

Platinum Optics Technology Inc. (PTOT) appealed a final written decision from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) regarding U.S. Patent No. 9,354,369, owned by Viavi Solutions Inc. The patent relates to optical filters with specific properties of hydrogenated silicon. PTOT challenged the patent's claims, arguing they were unpatentable due to obviousness based on prior art references. The PTAB ruled against PTOT, finding that the prior art did not render the claims unpatentable.Previously, Viavi had sued PTOT for patent infringement in two cases in the Northern District of California. The claims related to the '369 patent were dismissed with prejudice in both cases. PTOT then petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of the '369 patent, leading to the PTAB's decision that PTOT failed to prove the claims were unpatentable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. PTOT argued it had standing to appeal based on potential future infringement liability from continuing to supply bandpass filters and developing new models. However, the court found PTOT's arguments speculative and insufficient to establish an injury in fact. The court noted that the previous lawsuits were dismissed with prejudice, and PTOT did not provide concrete plans or specific details about new products that might infringe the '369 patent.The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal, concluding that PTOT failed to demonstrate a substantial risk of future infringement or a likelihood that Viavi would assert a claim of infringement. Therefore, PTOT did not have standing to appeal the PTAB's decision. View "PLATINUM OPTICS TECHNOLOGY INC. v. VIAVI SOLUTIONS INC. " on Justia Law

Koss Corporation (Koss) owns several patents related to wireless earphones. Koss filed a patent infringement lawsuit against Bose Corporation (Bose) in the Western District of Texas, alleging infringement of three patents. Bose challenged the venue and also filed for inter partes review (IPR) of the patents with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). Concurrently, Bose sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement in the District of Massachusetts. The Texas court dismissed Koss's case for improper venue, leading Koss to file counterclaims in Massachusetts. The Massachusetts court stayed the case pending the IPR outcomes.In parallel, Koss's infringement action against Plantronics, Inc. was transferred to the Northern District of California. Plantronics moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the patents were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The California court agreed, invalidating all claims of the patents. Koss amended its complaint but eventually stipulated to dismiss the case with prejudice, without appealing the invalidation order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the PTAB's decisions on the IPRs. However, since the California court had already invalidated all claims of the patents and Koss did not appeal this decision, the Federal Circuit found the appeals moot. The court held that the invalidation order from the California court was final and precluded any further action on the patents, leading to the dismissal of the appeals. View "KOSS CORPORATION v. BOSE CORPORATION " on Justia Law

Backertop Licensing LLC and Lori LaPray appealed the U.S. District Court of Delaware’s orders requiring LaPray to appear in-person for testimony regarding potential fraud and imposing monetary sanctions for her failure to appear. The District Court identified potential misconduct in numerous related patent cases involving IP Edge and Mavexar, which allegedly created shell LLCs, assigned patents for little consideration, and directed litigation without disclosing their ongoing rights. The court was concerned that this arrangement concealed the real parties in interest and potentially perpetrated fraud on the court.The District Court ordered LaPray, the sole owner of Backertop, to produce documents and appear in-person to address these concerns. LaPray moved to set aside the order, citing travel difficulties and requesting to appear telephonically, which the court denied. The court rescheduled the hearing to accommodate her schedule but maintained the requirement for in-person testimony to assess her credibility. LaPray did not attend the rescheduled hearing, leading the court to hold her in civil contempt and impose a daily fine until she appeared.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the District Court’s orders were within its inherent authority and not an abuse of discretion. The court found that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, which limits the geographic range of subpoenas, did not apply to the court’s sua sponte orders. The court affirmed the District Court’s orders, emphasizing the necessity of in-person testimony to investigate potential misconduct and assess credibility. The monetary sanctions for LaPray’s failure to appear were also upheld. View "BACKERTOP LICENSING LLC v. CANARY CONNECT, INC. " on Justia Law

The Chemehuevi Indian Tribe filed a complaint against the United States, alleging mismanagement of funds and breach of trust. The Tribe sought an accounting and damages for the alleged mismanagement of the Parker Dam compensation funds, the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) Judgment funds, and the suspense accounts. The Tribe also claimed that the U.S. government's failure to approve a proposed lease of its water rights constituted a Fifth Amendment taking and a breach of trust.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed the Tribe's complaint, ruling that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court found that the Tribe was essentially seeking an accounting to discover potential claims against the government, rather than asserting a right to be paid a certain sum. The court also dismissed the Tribe's claims related to the proposed water rights lease, stating that the claim was outside the six-year statute of limitations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the Tribe's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The appellate court agreed that the Tribe was seeking an accounting to discover potential claims, rather than asserting a right to be paid a certain sum. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Tribe's claim related to the proposed water rights lease, agreeing that it was outside the statute of limitations. However, the appellate court vacated the lower court's dismissal of the Tribe's claim for failure to state a takings claim, stating that the Tribe's decision to lease the water off-reservation could fulfill the purpose of the reservation. View "CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE v. US " on Justia Law

The Portland Mint delivered truckloads of coins to a foundry designated by the United States Mint for redemption under a regulation that provided for the redemption of mutilated coins. The coins were melted down and used to make new coins. However, the U.S. Mint refused to pay for the shipment, claiming that a high percentage of the coins were counterfeit. Portland Mint, asserting that the coins were genuine, brought five claims against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims. The Claims Court dismissed all five claims, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction for the first two claims and that all five claims failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the Claims Court erred in dismissing the second claim for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court held that the regulation under which the coins were submitted created an implied-in-fact contract between Portland Mint and the U.S. Mint, and that the Claims Court had jurisdiction over this claim. The court also held that Portland Mint had sufficiently stated a claim for breach of this implied contract. The court affirmed the dismissal of the remaining three merits claims and did not reach the fifth claim concerning attorneys’ fees. The case was affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part for further proceedings. View "The Portland Mint v. United States" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jay Anthony Dobyns, a former agent with the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), who sued the United States for failing to adequately protect him and his family from threats related to his undercover work. The government counterclaimed, alleging that Dobyns violated his employment contract and several federal regulations by publishing a book based on his experience as an agent and by contracting his story to create a motion picture. The Court of Federal Claims found that the government had not breached the settlement agreement but had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, awarding Dobyns emotional distress damages. The court also found that the government was not entitled to relief on its counterclaim.The government appealed the Claims Court’s judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reversed the finding that the government breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Dobyns, having prevailed on the government’s counterclaim, sought attorneys’ fees and costs. However, the Claims Court denied his application for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) as untimely. Dobyns appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the Claims Court had abused its discretion and applied the incorrect legal standard. The Appeals Court held that the filing deadline for fee applications under EAJA is subject to equitable tolling. It found that Dobyns had justifiably relied on the government's representations about the procedure for Claims Court judgments, and thus his motion for attorneys’ fees under EAJA should be accepted as timely. The court reversed the Claims Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Dobyns v. United States" on Justia Law