Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded a decision by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, which had ruled against Andrew Warren, a Florida State Attorney for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit. Warren had filed a lawsuit against Governor Ron DeSantis, claiming that DeSantis had suspended him in retaliation for his First Amendment activity. The circuit court agreed with the district court that Warren had satisfied his initial burden of showing that he had engaged in protected activity, suffered an adverse action, and that DeSantis's actions were motivated by Warren's protected activity. However, the circuit court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the First Amendment did not protect certain activities that motivated DeSantis's decision, and found that the district court erred in concluding that DeSantis would have suspended Warren based solely on unprotected activities. The case was remanded for the district court to reconsider whether DeSantis would have made the same decision based solely on the unprotected activities. View "Warren v. DeSantis" on Justia Law

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This case revolves around Kenneth Bailey's lawsuit against Deputy Shawn Swindell, claiming that Swindell violated his civil rights when he tackled Bailey through the door of Bailey's parents' home and arrested him without a warrant or exigent circumstances. Bailey's suit was filed under Section 1983. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida initially granted summary judgment in favor of Swindell based on qualified immunity. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed this decision, concluding that Swindell violated clearly established law when he entered Bailey's parents' home to arrest him without a warrant or exigent circumstances, and was therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.On remand, the case went to trial and the jury returned a verdict for Bailey, awarding him $625,000 for his injuries. However, the district court later granted Swindell's motion for judgment as a matter of law, setting aside the jury's verdict. Bailey appealed this decision.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law. The appellate court found that the jury's factual findings, including that the arrest was initiated outside the home but no exigent circumstances existed allowing for a warrantless entry into the home, should have been used by the district court in making its legal conclusions about qualified immunity. The court emphasized that it was clearly established that an officer violates the Constitution by initiating an arrest outside of a home and then entering the home without a warrant to complete the arrest in the absence of exigent circumstances. Therefore, Swindell was not entitled to qualified immunity, and the jury's verdict in favor of Bailey should be reinstated. View "Bailey v. Swindell" on Justia Law

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In this case, Eliezer and Valeria Taveras (the appellants) appealed the decision of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida when it abstained from exercising federal jurisdiction over their case, pending the conclusion of a related state case under the Colorado River abstention doctrine. The Taveras' case centered around a dispute concerning the validity of a mortgage and an allegedly fraudulent promissory note secured by a parcel of real property they had purchased in 2006. The appellants contended that the district court improperly abstained from exercising jurisdiction and erroneously denied their motion to amend the complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in abstaining under the Colorado River doctrine as the federal and state proceedings involved substantially similar issues and parties. It also found that the district court properly denied the Taveras' motion to amend the complaint because the proposed amendments would not have changed the outcome of the abstention analysis. View "Taveras v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

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Doris Lapham, a former employee of Walgreen Co., filed a lawsuit against the company claiming violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and Florida’s Private Sector Whistleblower Act (FWA). Lapham asserted that Walgreens interfered with her attempts to obtain leave under the FMLA to care for her disabled son, and retaliated against her for those attempts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Walgreens on all claims.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Appeals Court held that the proper causation standard for both FMLA and FWA retaliation claims is but-for causation, meaning that the plaintiff must prove that the adverse action would not have occurred but for the purported cause. Here, Lapham failed to show that Walgreens’ stated reasons for her termination (insubordination and dishonesty) were merely pretext for retaliation and that, but for her attempts to exercise her FMLA rights, she would not have been fired. Furthermore, Lapham failed to produce evidence showing she suffered any remediable prejudice due to Walgreens' alleged interference with her FMLA rights. View "Lapham v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia regarding a dispute over the enforceability of a restrictive covenant in Georgia. The plaintiff, Charles Baldwin, had worked for various franchisees of Express Oil Change, LLC, and was asked to sign a restrictive covenant as a condition of receiving a payment after the franchisees' stores were sold to Express. The covenant restricted Baldwin from engaging in certain competitive business activities for a specified duration and within a specified geographic area. After leaving Express, Baldwin sued, seeking a declaration that the covenant was unenforceable under the Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act (GRCA). The district court preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of the covenant, finding it unreasonable in terms of its geographic scope and duration. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court correctly concluded that the covenant's geographic scope was unreasonable under the GRCA, but that it applied the wrong presumption in concluding that the covenant's duration was unreasonable. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, dismissed the appeal in part, and remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of its preliminary injunction under the proper presumptions. View "Baldwin v. Express Oil Change, LLC" on Justia Law

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In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dealt with the question of when an order finding contempt becomes a final, appealable order. The case arose from a dispute between Robert A. Sweetapple and Asset Enhancement, Inc., in which Sweetapple was found in contempt by a bankruptcy court for violating an automatic stay. The bankruptcy court awarded Asset Enhancement attorney's fees and costs for filing and prosecuting its motion for contempt, but did not specify the amount. The amount was later determined in a subsequent order. Sweetapple appealed the contempt order to the district court, but the district court dismissed his appeal as untimely, reasoning that the contempt order was a final, appealable order when it was issued, not when the amount of the attorney's fees was later determined. Sweetapple then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.The Eleventh Circuit held that the contempt order did not become a final, appealable order until the bankruptcy court issued the later order setting the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded. The court reasoned that this rule avoided the risk of disrupting ongoing proceedings and was consistent with its precedent. Accordingly, since Sweetapple filed his appeal within fourteen days of the bankruptcy court's issuance of the later order, his appeal of the contempt order was timely and the district court had jurisdiction over the appeal. The court vacated the district court's dismissal of Sweetapple's appeal and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Sweetapple v. Asset Enhancement, Inc." on Justia Law

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Appellant as next of kin and on behalf of a minor, J.T.A., and all similarly situated minors (“Appellants”), filed a class action lawsuit against the School Board of Volusia County, Florida for allegedly violating the minors’ rights to free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The Appellants appealed the district court’s order dismissing their amended complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the holding in Perez. The court explained that here, Appellants seek compensatory and punitive damages. The IDEA provides neither. Thus, applying Perez to this case, Appellants can proceed without attempting to exhaust administrative remedies that do not exist under the IDEA. Appellants unambiguously sought compensatory monetary damages under the ADA and not compensatory education under the IDEA. Consequently, in light of Perez, the Appellants should have been allowed to proceed with their claims regardless of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements. View "Kimberly Powell, et al. v. School Board of Volusia County, Florida" on Justia Law

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The Eleventh Circuit certified the following two questions to the Florida Supreme Court:(1) does Fla. Stat. § 559.921(1) grant an insurance company a cause of action when a repair shop does not provide any written repair estimate?(2) Do the violations here under the repair act void a repair invoice for completed windshield repairs and preclude a repair shop from being paid any of its invoiced amounts by an insurance company? View "Government Employees Insurance Company, et al v. Glassco, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs s filed a class action complaint and sought to represent a class of individuals whose Healthcare Revenue tradelines had been wrongly “re-aged” by Experian. They alleged that Experian “willfully” violated its obligation under the Fair Credit Reporting Act to “follow reasonable procedures” to ensure consumer credit reports were prepared with “maximum possible accuracy” when it allowed credit reports to reflect allegedly inaccurate status dates. The district court denied Experian’s summary judgment motion. After the close of discovery, Plaintiffs moved to certify a class of all consumers “whose Experian credit reports had an account or accounts reported by [Healthcare Revenue] with an inaccurately displayed Date of Status and were viewed by one or more third parties.” The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and denied class certification. Plaintiffs petitioned for permission to appeal the district court’s class certification order under Rule 23(f).   The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the denial of Plaintiffs' motion for class certification was an abuse of discretion because the district court’s analysis of Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement was based on its contrary interpretation of the second option in section 1681n(a)(1)(A). The court wrote that a consumer alleging a willful violation of the Act doesn’t need to prove actual damages to recover “damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000.” While the parties raise other issues that may ultimately affect whether the class should be certified, the district court’s order denying class certification only relied on its interpretation of section 1681n(a)(1)(A) and didn’t address these other arguments. View "Omar Santos, et al v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

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Defendant, petitioned for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and listed PRN Real Estate & Investments, Ltd. (“PRN”) as his primary creditor. PRN sought to exempt debts that Defendant owes PRN from being discharged. The bankruptcy court granted judgment for Defendant on all of PRN’s claims and fully discharged Defendant’s debt. The district court affirmed.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed the bankruptcy court’s rulings and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that it agrees with each of the bankruptcy court’s rulings except one: that PRN pleaded a viable discharge exception in Count 3. The court explained that Congress gave PRN the right to request an exception of COLP’s contribution debt, if PRN can prove that Defendant fraudulently obtained COLP’s money and, as a result, became responsible for COLP’s contribution debt. PRN has pleaded facts that, if proven, meet these requirements. The Trustee’s action to avoid the same fraudulent transfer does not preempt PRN’s right to seek a discharge exception. Because the bankruptcy court dismissed PRN’s claim based on non-viability and lack of standing, the bankruptcy court did not rule on the merits of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Thus, the court remanded the case for the bankruptcy court to determine in the first instance whether any facts material to Count 3 are genuinely disputed and, if not, whether Defendant is entitled to judgment on Count 3. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). View "PRN Real Estate & Investments, Ltd. v. William W. Cole, Jr." on Justia Law