Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In June 2020, Plaintiff’s father died from COVID-19. He allegedly contracted the disease at his nursing home, NHC HealthCare-Maryland Heights, LLC. Plaintiff brought suit in Missouri state court against the nursing home, three corporate entities that own the facility, and twelve administrators and medical professionals employed by NHC HealthCare-Maryland Heights, LLC. The nursing home and the three corporate entities removed the case to federal court, but the district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remanded the case to state court. The NHC entities appealed and argued that removal was proper.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the remand order of the district court. The court explained that the PREP Act immunizes covered individuals from suit for injuries “caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the use by an individual of a covered countermeasure.” The Act provides no immunity where a covered person’s “willful misconduct” is the proximate cause of a person’s injuries. The statute creates an exclusive federal cause of action for claims based on willful misconduct. The court explained that the NHC entities assert that the nursing home “acted under” the direction of a federal officer because the government designated nursing homes as “critical infrastructure” during the COVID-19 pandemic and subjected these facilities to extensive regulation. However compliance with even pervasive federal regulation is not sufficient to show that a private entity acted under the direction of a federal officer. Thus, the court found that removal is not authorized under 28 U.S.C. Section 1442. View "Zane Cagle v. NHC Healthcare" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 lawsuit against the City of St. Louis and Doc’s Towing, Inc., alleging that Defendants violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they detained her truck pursuant to a “wanted” report. On the first appeal of this case the Eighth Circuit found that the evidence was sufficient for Plaintiff’s claims to survive summary judgment. Plaintiff then settled with Doc’s Towing, and her case against the City proceeded to trial. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the City on Plaintiff’s unreasonable seizure claim, and the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff on her due process claim and awarded her compensatory damages. The district court denied the City’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law but partially granted its motion to reduce the damages award. Both the City and Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that as to Plaintiff’s assertion on cross-appeal that the district court erred by granting the City judgment as a matter of law on her unreasonable seizure claim, the court declined to reverse that ruling. The court explained that her due process claims and unreasonable seizure claim sought compensation for the same injury, and she concedes that she would not be entitled to additional compensatory damages beyond those that were already awarded by the jury. Accordingly, the court declined to remand because Plaintiff failed to articulate what relief she could obtain beyond what she has already achieved by way of the jury verdict. View "Mary Meier v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment on his claims that his former employer, ADESA Missouri, LLC (ADESA), discriminated against and retaliated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court concluded that Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether ADESA’s reasons for terminating him were pretext for disability discrimination and retaliation. The court agreed with Plaintiff’s assertion that a reasonable jury could determine that the company’s VP made the decision to terminate Plaintiff  because of his medical restriction and only retroactively claimed a performance-based concern after HR advised her that terminating an employee due to his disability could be “an issue.” The evidence shows that the VP sent an email to HR about an employee with a “medical restriction” who had been “identified” for termination, asking if this could be “an issue.” Only after she learned that it could be a problem did the VP respond with specific criticisms of his performance. ADESA argues that because Plaintiff does not dispute he was underperforming compared to his peers, there can be no pretext. But neither the sales director nor the VP was able to say when they took these performance assessments into consideration. Thus, the court concluded that Plaintiff has raised genuine doubt as to ADESA’s proffered reasons for his termination. View "Roby Anderson v. KAR Global" on Justia Law

Appellant Attorney Kezhaya represented The Satanic Temple, Inc., in its lawsuits against the City of Belle Plaine, Minnesota. The Temple sued the City, claiming that the City opened a limited public forum for a Christian monument, but closed the forum to exclude a Satanic monument. The City sought $33,886.80 in attorney’s fees incurred by responding to the complaint in the second lawsuit and preparing the motion for sanctions. The court determined that the rates charged by the City’s counsel were reasonable but observed that a portion of the work was duplicative of the first lawsuit and that the issues unique to the second lawsuit were not complex, novel, or difficult. The court thus reduced the requested amount by fifty percent and ordered the Temple’s counsel to pay the City $16,943.40 under Rule 11(c). Kezhaya appealed the sanctions order. He argues that the district court abused its discretion by (i) imposing sanctions, (ii) failing to consider non-monetary sanctions, and (iii) granting an arbitrary amount of sanctions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under the circumstances, it disagreed with Kezhaya’s contention about the righteousness of a second lawsuit. For the claims dismissed “without prejudice” in the first lawsuit, Kezhaya and the Temple made a strategic choice to seek leave to amend the complaint to correct the deficiencies identified in the dismissal order. Further, the court found that even if the City’s insurance carrier ultimately paid the fees, the fees were “incurred” for the motion and could be awarded under Rule 11(c)(2). View "Matthew Kezhaya v. City of Belle Plaine" on Justia Law

The Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections relied on staff to investigate and address sexual assault allegations against a prison guard. At summary judgment, Appellant requested qualified immunity. The district court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that she knew prisoners faced “a substantial risk of sexual assault.”   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the entry of judgment in Appellant’s favor and denied Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the appeal. The court wrote that even if it assumes that Appellant should have done more, neither “controlling authority” nor “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority’” required it. The court explained that Plaintiff’s “broad right” to protection from sexual assault, in other words, “does not answer” the “specific and particularized” question of whether Appellant violated the Eighth Amendment by waiting for her staff to complete their investigation. View "Teri Dean v. Anne Precythe" on Justia Law

Robert Half International, Inc. (“RHI”) provides legal staffing solutions for its clients. Plaintiff worked for RHI as a contract attorney performing document review. Plaintiff was employed on various projects on an as-needed basis. Defendants Marcia Miller and Theresa Hodnett were Plaintiff’s coworkers and had no supervisory duties related to Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that Miller, Hodnett, and other coworkers engaged in a pattern of discrimination and harassment toward her. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s dismissal of her claims against Marcia Miller and Theresa Hodnett.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The court explained the relevant conduct at issue here is RHI’s continuous employment of Miller following the doorway incident. The court explained that no reasonable jury could find this conduct rises to the requisite level necessary to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff asserts that Miller committed a battery against her during the doorway incident. In Minnesota, the battery is an intentional and offensive contact with another person.   Further, the court wrote that it reviewed the video footage of the alleged trip and find there is sufficient evidence in the video to create a factual dispute as to whether Miller intended to lift her leg, make contact with Plaintiff, and cause Plaintiff to trip. Because of the factual dispute, summary judgment on this claim is improper the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s battery claim and remand. View "May Yang v. Robert Half Int., Inc." on Justia Law

After being passed over for a superintendent role, Plaintiff sued her employer, Pulaski County Special School District (“PCSSD”), and its board members for discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. A jury found in her favor on her Title VII and Section 1981 retaliation claims and awarded damages, including punitive damages. Defendants appealed the district court’s denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law and the punitive damages award. Plaintiff cross-appeals the district court’s denial of her request for front pay, additional back pay, and equitable relief.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment. The court explained that, as a whole, the evidence demonstrates that she believed she reported the disparity in the facilities as part of her duty to oversee compliance with Plan 2000, which sought to rectify discrimination against students in public education. The court explained that it does not rule out that the disparity in the facilities could affect employees too, there is simply no evidence here that Plaintiff believed she was complaining about a discriminatory employment practice. Thus, a jury could not conclude that Plaintiff had a good faith belief that she was reporting a discriminatory employment practice. View "Janice Warren v. Mike Kemp" on Justia Law

The Trustee for the bankrupt debtor, Simply Essentials, LLC, filed a Motion to Compromise under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019(b) and a Motion to Sell Property Free and Clear of Liens under 11 U.S.C. Section 363(f). Pitman Farms, the owner of Simply Essentials, who is also a creditor in this action, objected. Pitman Farms argued that the sale included Chapter 5 avoidance actions and that such actions are not part of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. Section 541(a). The bankruptcy court granted the motion, finding Chapter 5 avoidance actions are part of the bankruptcy estate. Pitman Farms filed a motion to appeal the decision. The Bankruptcy Court certified Pitman Farms’ motion to appeal, and the Eighth Circuit granted permission to appeal.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that Chapter 5 avoidance actions are the property of the estate and affirmed the order approving the Trustee’s motion to sell the property of the estate. The court explained that to the extent that Pitman Farms argues the property is created in a third period of time, a time that is equivalent to the moment the bankruptcy proceeding commences, we disagree. Finding such a period of time existed “would frustrate the bankruptcy policy of a broad inclusion of property in the estate[.]” View "Pitman Farms v. ARKK Food Company, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a diversity action in the District of Nebraska against Defendant, seeking damages for losses allegedly caused by an auto accident in 2015. Defendant’s Answer admitted that her negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. After protracted discovery disputes over expert witness disclosures, the district court excluded all of Plaintiff’s numerous treating physician witnesses for failure to comply with Rule 26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the summary judgment record supports the district court’s conclusion that the treating physician’s letter “demonstrates that his causation opinion was not formed during his treatment of Plaintiff.” Therefore, the district court did not abuse its wide discretion in determining that the physician was a prospective expert witness subject to the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and excluding his testimony for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with that Rule. View "J.T. Johnson, Jr. v. Jenna Friesen" on Justia Law

Officers shot and killed Brian Quinones-Rosario as he approached officers with the knife drawn. His widow as trustee, sued the officers and their employing municipalities. She alleged an excessive use of force that resulted in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court concluded that the officers did not commit a constitutional violation, and granted judgment for the officers and the municipalities. Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the use of force “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”. Applying those principles, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Quinones, the court concluded that the officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable. The court explained that Quinones-Rosario posed an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to the officers. He aggressively wielded a knife that he refused to drop despite repeated commands to do so. He then charged at the officers with the knife. One officer deployed a non-lethal taser against him, but it had no effect. The officers reasonably believed that Quinones-Rosario posed a serious threat to their safety. The officers fired more rounds when Quinones-Rosario survived the first round of shots and continued to approach the officers with the knife. The court concluded that their actions were a reasonable defensive response under the circumstances. View "Ashley Quinones v. City of Edina, MN" on Justia Law