Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Before registering a pesticide, EPA must consult with the statutorily specified agencies that have expertise on risks to species’ survival. But for decades, the EPA skipped that step when it registered pesticides, including those at issue in this case. After the EPA went ahead and approved the five registrations, the Conservation Groups petitioned the D.C. Circuit court to invalidate them. The parties then jointly requested that the court hold the petitions in abeyance to allow for settlement negotiations.The parties arrived at the terms of a settlement allowing the registrations to stand if EPA fulfills core ESA obligations by agreed deadlines. As a condition of their settlement agreement’s binding effect, the parties then jointly moved for an Order returning the cases to abeyance until the specified deadlines to afford EPA time to comply with the parties’ settlement terms.The D.C. Circuit agreed with the Order of Consent and held in the case in abeyance. However, the court dismisses as moot the challenge to the registration of cuprous iodide based on the parties’ report that EPA has complied to their satisfaction with the proposed settlement regarding that pesticide ingredient. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA" on Justia Law

Appellants are foreign companies that allegedly launder money for Kassim Tajideen, a prominent Hezbollah financier and specially designated global terrorist (SDGT). The United States seized three sums totaling $612,168.23 belonging to Appellants and filed the instant forfeiture action in order to keep the funds permanently. When no one claimed the funds for more than a year after the government gave notice of the forfeiture action, the government moved for a default judgment. Apparently realizing their mistake, Appellants belatedly attempted to file claims to the seized funds to prevent the district court from ordering forfeiture. The court struck Appellants’ filings as untimely and entered default judgment in favor of the government. After the court denied Appellants’ late reconsideration motion, they filed the instant appeal.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court in part and dismiss the appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that Appellants’ Rule 59(e) motion was untimely and, as a result, so was its notice of appeal, at least with respect to the district court’s June 3 order striking Appellants’ putative claims and entering default judgment. Further, although the notice of appeal was timely with respect to the district court’s order denying Appellants’ Rule 59(e) motion, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. The motion was not only untimely but also presented arguments that either were or could have been raised before judgment was entered. View "USA v. Three Sums Totaling $612,168.23 in Seized United States Currency" on Justia Law

Petitioner a Guantanamo prisoner awaiting trial as a terrorist, petitioned the DC Circuit for a writ of mandamus, forbidding the government from using statements obtained by torture in prosecution against him and the Military Commission from receiving such evidence.   The DC Circuit dismissed the petition holding that the court has no jurisdiction to hear this petition. The court explained that there is simply no remaining case or controversy with respect to the identified statements obtained by Petitioner’s torture. Second, Petitioner’s other request—to vacate all ex parte orders using statements obtained by torture—is similarly unripe for adjudication. Petitioner has not identified any non-withdrawn submissions that rely upon torture statements, preventing this issue from becoming “crystallized” into a “concrete legal dispute.Further, at this point in time, Petitioner has alleged no injury that has been caused him by the possible (albeit remote) use of the torture-obtained statements. The court wrote, obviously, if he has not alleged injury, he has not alleged redressability. Under no theory of law does he have standing to bring this action at this time. View "Abd Al-Rahim Hussein Al-Nashiri" on Justia Law

In 1997, EPA adopted stricter NAAQS for ozone. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone. The agency later adopted an implementation rule that, among other things, construed the Act’s anti-backsliding provision to apply not only when EPA relaxes a NAAQS but also when it strengthens one. The EPA reasoned that if Congress desired to maintain existing controls when a NAAQS is relaxed, Congress also must have intended to maintain such controls when a NAAQS is strengthened. The D.C. Circuit previously sustained the EPA’s interpretation.The Sierra Club challenged the EPA’s decisions to lift antibacksliding requirements in Houston and Dallas. The EPA responded that the proper and exclusive venue for the Sierra Club’s challenge is the Fifth Circuit. Thus, the D.C. Circuit transferred the case to the Fifth Circuit. View "Sierra Club v. EPA" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Department of Housing and Urban Development promulgated a rule prohibiting the use of lit tobacco products in HUD-subsidized public housing units and their immediate surroundings. Appellants, led by New York City Citizens Lobbying Against Smoker Harassment (C.L.A.S.H.), brought an action raising a number of statutory and constitutional challenges to the Rule. The district court rejected all of C.L.A.S.H.’s claims.The D.C. Circuit affirmed, finding that the Department did not exceed its authority in passing the rule and was not arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. The Court similarly rejected C.L.A.S.H.’s constitutional claims under the Spending Clause and the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Amendments. View "NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. Marcia L. Fudge" on Justia Law

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. intends to decommission two oil platforms located off the coast of California. The activity of those platforms is generally subject to the Clean Air Act. Chevron asked the Environmental Protection Agency for guidance on whether, as the process of decommissioning the two oil platforms moves forward, the platforms will cease to qualify as regulated sources under the Clean Air Act. EPA responded in a letter to Chevron. Unsatisfied with the views set out in EPA’s letter, Chevron now seeks judicial review of EPA’s response.The DC Circuit dismissed Chevron’s petition for review. The court wrote that it does not reach the merits of Chevron’s petition for review. In the circumstances of this case, the Clean Air Act’s venue provision allows for judicial review in this court only if EPA’s challenged action is “nationally applicable,” as opposed to “locally or regionally applicable.” 42 U.S.C. Section 7607(b)(1). The court concluded that EPA’s response letter is locally or regionally applicable, and that venue over Chevron’s challenge lies exclusively in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. View "Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF” or the “Bureau”) promulgated a rule classifying “bump stocks” as machine guns. The Bureau’s new rule instructed individuals with bump stocks to either destroy them, abandon them at the nearest ATF facility, or face criminal penalties. Plaintiffs initially moved for a preliminary injunction to stop the rule from taking effect, which the District Court denied, and a panel of this Court affirmed. At the merits stage, the District Court again rejected Plaintiffs’ challenges to the rule under the Chevron framework. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).The central question on appeal was whether the Bureau had the statutory authority to interpret “machine gun” to include bump stocks and the DC Circuit affirmed. In employing the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, the court found that the disputed rule is consistent with the best interpretation of “machine gun” under the governing statutes. The court explained that it joins other circuits in concluding that these devices, which enable such prodigious rapid-fire capability upon a pull of the trigger, fall within the definition of “machine gun” in the National Firearms Act and Gun Control Act. View "Damien Guedes v. ATF" on Justia Law

Plaintiff believes that officials in the Department of Justice (and elsewhere) have persecuted him for supporting the Irish republican cause. So he sued the United States Attorney General and the Department of Justice Inspector General. On February 24, 2021, the district court dismissed his suit. At least seventy-five days later, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal in the district court. This Court noted that Plaintiff had filed his notice of appeal after the sixty-day deadline imposed by Congress in 28 U.S.C. Section 2107(b).On appeal, the DC Circuit was tasked with deciding whether Plaintiff’s response to the court’s show-cause order can be combined with his notice of appeal in the district court to serve as a substitute for a motion to extend or reopen the time to file a notice of appeal. The DC Circuit affirmed the dismissal holding that his appeal was untimely. The court explained that Plaintiff’s response to the court’s show-cause order was nothing more than a request to the court for an equitable exemption from the jurisdictional deadline. Accordingly, the court wrote it has no power to grant that equitable relief. View "Joseph Ladeairous v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Two nursing homes bring interlocutory appeals to this court from orders in two separate cases in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Plaintiffs' estate in each case claims that a defendant nursing home failed to provide adequate care and should therefore be held liable for the resident’s death from COVID-19. The district courts denied Defendant's motions to dismiss based on PREP Act immunity. Defendants invoked a provision of the PREP Act that they claim gives us jurisdiction over these appeals.The DC Circuit dismissed the appeals, holding that the PREP Act subsection 247d6d(e)(10) does not authorize interlocutory appeals to this court from orders of district courts elsewhere allowing other types of claims to proceed despite assertions of PREP Act immunity. View "Anne Cannon v. Watermark Retirement Communities, Inc." on Justia Law

Two nursing homes bring interlocutory appeals to this court from orders in two separate cases in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff estate in each case claims that a defendant nursing home failed to provide adequate care and should therefore be held liable for the resident’s death from COVID-19. The district courts denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss based on PREP Act immunity. Defendants invoke a provision of the PREP Act that they claim gives us jurisdiction over these appeals.These cases raise the common threshold question of whether 42 U.S.C. Section 247d-6d(e)(10) empowers us to hear interlocutory appeals from decisions of out-of-circuit district courts rejecting assertions of PREP Act immunity.The DC Circuit concluded that the PREP Act confers interlocutory appellate jurisdiction on the court only from orders of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (D.D.C.) denying motions to dismiss or for summary judgment in willful misconduct cases—a distinct, limited cause of action that subsection 247d-6d(d) of the PREP Act excepts from its broad grant of immunity and channels to the federal district court here. Because PREP Act subsection 247d6d(e)(10) does not authorize interlocutory appeals to this court from orders of district courts elsewhere allowing other types of claims to proceed despite assertions of PREP Act immunity, the court dismissed the appeals. View "Christopher Beaty, Jr. v. Fair Acres Geriatric Center" on Justia Law