Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

For five days in September 2013, lane closures on the George Washington Bridge caused extraordinary traffic jams in Fort Lee, New Jersey. The closures were allegedly orchestrated as revenge against the Mayor of Fort Lee for his refusal to endorse New Jersey Governor Christie for reelection. In 2015, a grand jury returned a nine-count indictment against Baroni and Kelly based on the “Bridgegate” political payback scheme. With the exception of Count 9, the indictment alleges that Baroni and Kelly committed their offenses with unidentified “others.” The only other individual identified by name in that indictment is Wildstein, who has pled guilty in a separate case. A consortium of media groups took legal steps to force the disclosure of a letter, authored by one of the prosecutors, that purportedly identifies unindicted co-conspirators. The district court ordered the letter to be disclosed. “Doe” intervened and sought to block public access to the letter. The court denied his request. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that the letter in question is a part of the general discovery process and not subject to any First Amendment or common law right of public access. View "N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc v. United States" on Justia Law

More than 200 foreign agricultural workers allege they were exposed to the pesticide DBCP on banana farms throughout Central America, in the 1960s through the 1980s, resulting in health problems. Litigation began in 1993 with a putative class against Dole and related companies in Texas state court. Numerous suits were filed (and consolidated) in 2011 in the Eastern District of Louisiana against Dole and others. That court granted Dole summary judgment based on the statute of limitations; the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Meanwhile, in 2012, several actions were filed in the District of Delaware against the same defendants and alleging the same causes of action. That court dismissed, applying the first-filed rule, reasoning that “one fair bite at the apple is sufficient.” The Third Circuit initially affirmed, but on rehearing, en banc, held that the district court abused its discretion under the first-filed rule by dismissing the claims with prejudice and erred by refusing to transfer claims against Chiquita to another forum. The timeliness dismissals entered by the Louisiana District Court did not create a res judicata bar to the Delaware suits. The court stated that it was “untenable” that 20 years after the litigation began, no court had considered the merits. View "Chavez v. Dole Food Co., Inc" on Justia Law

The Goldmans, proceeding before an arbitration panel operating under the auspices of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), alleged that their financial advisor and Citigroup had violated federal securities law in their management of the Goldmans’ brokerage accounts. The district court dismissed their motion to vacate an adverse award for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, stating the Goldmans’ motion failed to raise a substantial federal question. The Third Circuit affirmed. Nothing about the Goldmans’ case is likely to affect the securities markets broadly. That the allegedly-misbehaving arbitration panel happened to be affiliated with a self-regulatory organization does not meaningfully distinguish this case from any other suit alleging arbitrator partiality in a securities dispute. The court noted “the flood of cases that would enter federal courts if the involvement of a self-regulatory organization were itself sufficient to support jurisdiction.” View "Goldman v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc" on Justia Law

Raab filed a civil complaint (42 U.S.C. 1983) against police officer Ruch and his employer, Ocean. Ruch had stopped his patrol car outside of Raab’s residence to investigate a trailer that had been parked on the street for a month and had no license plate. Ruch requested that it be towed. Shortly thereafter, Raab went outside and told Ruch that the trailer belonged to her brother-in-law and that she would move the trailer into her driveway. Ruch told her not to move the trailer, but she still tried. With the help of a passerby, the trailer was moved into the driveway. The parties dispute what happened next. Raab claims that Ruch grabbed her arm, handcuffed her, and threw her to the ground, then repeatedly pulled and twisted the handcuffs. Ruch claims that Raab fell to the ground while attacking him. Ruch called his supervisor, who arrived, called an ambulance, and told Ruch to remove the handcuffs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ocean City. Raab and Ruch settled all outstanding claims for $150,000, exclusive of attorney’s fees and costs. The court denied both parties attorney’s fees. The Third Circuit reversed in part. A settling plaintiff in a civil rights action can be a “prevailing party” where the district court sua sponte entered a dismissal order incorporating and retaining jurisdiction over the settlement agreement. The court upheld the denial of Ocean City’s motion for attorney’s fees. View "Raab v. City of Ocean City" on Justia Law

In 2005 Constand alleged that William Cosby had drugged and sexually assaulted her at his home. During the​ discovery process, Constand’s counsel took Cosby’s deposition and questioned him regarding whether other women had ingested Quaaludes prior to a sexual encounter with Cosby. The deposition resulted in discovery disputes. The court entered an interim order, requiring the parties to file discovery documents under seal. The Associated Press (AP) moved to intervene and opposed the order. The court denied the motion, stating that the record was not yet sufficient to determine whether a permanent seal was warranted. The sealed documents reveal several damaging admissions during Cosby's deposition, including that he had: engaged in extramarital affairs; acquired Quaaludes and engaged in sexual relations with a woman after she ingested the drug; and given money to one woman and offered money to Constand. Before the court could rule on whether the documents should remain sealed permanently, Cosby and Constand reached a confidential settlement. The case was dismissed. The interim sealing order continued in effect and the documents remained sealed. Though Local Rules require that the Clerk of Court send a notice stating that the documents will be unsealed unless an objection is filed, eight years passed without the Clerk taking action. In 2015, the court unsealed the records, following a request by AP. Finding an appeal moot, the Third Circuit declined to address whether the court properly balanced the public and private interests. View "Constand v. Cosby" on Justia Law

Masha was adopted from Russia by Mancuso when she was five years old. During the following five years, Mancuso sexually abused Masha and documented the abuse in photographs and videos, which he distributed online in exchange for media documenting the sexual abuse of other children. Mancuso pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a); the government dropped a charge of possession of material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). Mancuso stipulated that the dismissed count could be considered in imposing sentence and agreed to pay “mandatory restitution” under the Victim-Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663, 3663A and 3664, of $200,000 into a trust for Masha’s benefit. In 2013, 10 years after Mancuso’s conviction, Masha filed suit under 18 U.S.C. 2255 (called Masha’s law) against a purported class of defendants, including Mancuso. The Third Circuit reversed dismissal of the case. A restitution award for a criminal offense does not bar a later-filed civil claim under section 2255 based on that same offense. The interests of Masha and the government were not squarely aligned in the criminal proceeding; she had a limited ability to participate in the determination of her restitution and no right to appeal, so application of collateral estoppel would be inequitable and would offend the “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.” View "Doe v. Hesketh" on Justia Law

Williams captioned his case as a state habeas action against a prison warden. He alleged claims about the conditions of his confinement, specifically Eighth Amendment claims about the lack of medical care. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action, noting that his claims did not challenge to the fact or duration of his imprisonment, which is the essential purpose of the writ of habeas corpus. Williams’s claims would properly be brought in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, not a habeas petition. When the challenge is to a condition of confinement such that a finding in plaintiff's favor would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, a civil rights action is appropriate. The court noted that Williams already has a civil rights action pending relating to the same or similar claims and deliberately filed a different type of action. View "Williams v. Warden, Lackawanna County Prison" on Justia Law

Ordonez, a citizen of Guatemala, entered the U.S. without inspection in 2014 and was detained. She claims that she expressed fear of returning to Guatemala because of abuse she had suffered there. The Department of Homeland Security removed her, but less than two months later, Ordonez reentered with the youngest of her three sons, Gonzalez, then six years old. Border Patrol detained them. DHS initiated proceedings to restore the prior order of removal and served Gonzalez with notice under 8 U.S.C 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). While proceedings were pending, Ordonez sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, based on her alleged fear of abusive conduct by her former boyfriend. Gonzalez applied for derivative relief. An IJ and the BIA denied relief. While a petition was pending in the Third Circuit, the BIA granted a joint motion to reopen and reissued its decisions and orders without change. Ordonez did not file a petition for review in of the reissued decisions and orders. The Third Circuit held that, because the reissued decisions and orders did not alter the challenged decisions and orders it had jurisdiction over the petition, but denied that petition on the merits. View "Ordonez-Tevalan v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Roberts, a former Montgomery County, Pennsylvania employee, brought suit, alleging that he “suffered continual retaliation, discrimination and humiliation” at work. Some claims were dismissed. After Roberts alleged bias on the part of a magistrate judge, the case was reassigned to Judge Savage, who requested supplemental briefing on the effect of recent change in Pennsylvania law. Judge Savage subsequently entertained the parties’ arguments, then granted the defendants summary judgment on two counts. A jury rendered a verdict in favor of defendants on all remaining counts. Because Roberts again raised allegations of bias, the case was reassigned to Judge Quinones, who discovered that four of the six days of the trial transcript had been lost. Judge Quinones granted Roberts’ motion for extraordinary relief and ordered the court reporting company to produce the transcript. Months later, after several unsuccessful attempts to obtain transcripts, Judge Quinones concluded that another such order would be futile, and ordered the parties to recreate the record pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(c) so that she could rule on Roberts’ post-trial motion. Roberts did not comply, arguing that the parties would not be able to agree on a 10(c) statement. Concluding that Roberts’ decision constituted a failure to prosecute, Judge Quiñones dismissed his motion. The Third Circuit affirmed, upholding Judge Savage’s summary judgment decision and the dismissal by Judge Quinones. View "Roberts v. Ferman" on Justia Law

After a foreclosure case, Davis filed various claims against an entity that he calls “Wells Fargo U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for the Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust, 2005-11” as the purported holder of Davis’s mortgage. Davis also sued Assurant, believing it to be the provider of insurance on his home. His claims arise from damage that occurred to his house after Wells Fargo locked him out of it, which went unrepaired and worsened into severe structural problems. The district court dismissed Davis’s claims against Wells Fargo, on the grounds that claim preclusion and a statute of limitations barred recovery, and claims against Assurant for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that Davis lacked standing to bring those claims because he sued the wrong corporate entity, namely Assurant, when he should have sued Assurant’s wholly-owned subsidiary, ASIC. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of Wells Fargo, but vacated as to Assurant. Standing is a jurisdictional predicate, but generally focuses on whether the plaintiff is the right party to bring particular claims, not on whether the plaintiff has sued the right party. View "Davis v. Wells Fargo" on Justia Law