Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Raab filed a civil complaint (42 U.S.C. 1983) against police officer Ruch and his employer, Ocean. Ruch had stopped his patrol car outside of Raab’s residence to investigate a trailer that had been parked on the street for a month and had no license plate. Ruch requested that it be towed. Shortly thereafter, Raab went outside and told Ruch that the trailer belonged to her brother-in-law and that she would move the trailer into her driveway. Ruch told her not to move the trailer, but she still tried. With the help of a passerby, the trailer was moved into the driveway. The parties dispute what happened next. Raab claims that Ruch grabbed her arm, handcuffed her, and threw her to the ground, then repeatedly pulled and twisted the handcuffs. Ruch claims that Raab fell to the ground while attacking him. Ruch called his supervisor, who arrived, called an ambulance, and told Ruch to remove the handcuffs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ocean City. Raab and Ruch settled all outstanding claims for $150,000, exclusive of attorney’s fees and costs. The court denied both parties attorney’s fees. The Third Circuit reversed in part. A settling plaintiff in a civil rights action can be a “prevailing party” where the district court sua sponte entered a dismissal order incorporating and retaining jurisdiction over the settlement agreement. The court upheld the denial of Ocean City’s motion for attorney’s fees. View "Raab v. City of Ocean City" on Justia Law

In 2005 Constand alleged that William Cosby had drugged and sexually assaulted her at his home. During the​ discovery process, Constand’s counsel took Cosby’s deposition and questioned him regarding whether other women had ingested Quaaludes prior to a sexual encounter with Cosby. The deposition resulted in discovery disputes. The court entered an interim order, requiring the parties to file discovery documents under seal. The Associated Press (AP) moved to intervene and opposed the order. The court denied the motion, stating that the record was not yet sufficient to determine whether a permanent seal was warranted. The sealed documents reveal several damaging admissions during Cosby's deposition, including that he had: engaged in extramarital affairs; acquired Quaaludes and engaged in sexual relations with a woman after she ingested the drug; and given money to one woman and offered money to Constand. Before the court could rule on whether the documents should remain sealed permanently, Cosby and Constand reached a confidential settlement. The case was dismissed. The interim sealing order continued in effect and the documents remained sealed. Though Local Rules require that the Clerk of Court send a notice stating that the documents will be unsealed unless an objection is filed, eight years passed without the Clerk taking action. In 2015, the court unsealed the records, following a request by AP. Finding an appeal moot, the Third Circuit declined to address whether the court properly balanced the public and private interests. View "Constand v. Cosby" on Justia Law

Masha was adopted from Russia by Mancuso when she was five years old. During the following five years, Mancuso sexually abused Masha and documented the abuse in photographs and videos, which he distributed online in exchange for media documenting the sexual abuse of other children. Mancuso pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a); the government dropped a charge of possession of material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). Mancuso stipulated that the dismissed count could be considered in imposing sentence and agreed to pay “mandatory restitution” under the Victim-Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663, 3663A and 3664, of $200,000 into a trust for Masha’s benefit. In 2013, 10 years after Mancuso’s conviction, Masha filed suit under 18 U.S.C. 2255 (called Masha’s law) against a purported class of defendants, including Mancuso. The Third Circuit reversed dismissal of the case. A restitution award for a criminal offense does not bar a later-filed civil claim under section 2255 based on that same offense. The interests of Masha and the government were not squarely aligned in the criminal proceeding; she had a limited ability to participate in the determination of her restitution and no right to appeal, so application of collateral estoppel would be inequitable and would offend the “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.” View "Doe v. Hesketh" on Justia Law

Williams captioned his case as a state habeas action against a prison warden. He alleged claims about the conditions of his confinement, specifically Eighth Amendment claims about the lack of medical care. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action, noting that his claims did not challenge to the fact or duration of his imprisonment, which is the essential purpose of the writ of habeas corpus. Williams’s claims would properly be brought in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, not a habeas petition. When the challenge is to a condition of confinement such that a finding in plaintiff's favor would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, a civil rights action is appropriate. The court noted that Williams already has a civil rights action pending relating to the same or similar claims and deliberately filed a different type of action. View "Williams v. Warden, Lackawanna County Prison" on Justia Law

Ordonez, a citizen of Guatemala, entered the U.S. without inspection in 2014 and was detained. She claims that she expressed fear of returning to Guatemala because of abuse she had suffered there. The Department of Homeland Security removed her, but less than two months later, Ordonez reentered with the youngest of her three sons, Gonzalez, then six years old. Border Patrol detained them. DHS initiated proceedings to restore the prior order of removal and served Gonzalez with notice under 8 U.S.C 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). While proceedings were pending, Ordonez sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, based on her alleged fear of abusive conduct by her former boyfriend. Gonzalez applied for derivative relief. An IJ and the BIA denied relief. While a petition was pending in the Third Circuit, the BIA granted a joint motion to reopen and reissued its decisions and orders without change. Ordonez did not file a petition for review in of the reissued decisions and orders. The Third Circuit held that, because the reissued decisions and orders did not alter the challenged decisions and orders it had jurisdiction over the petition, but denied that petition on the merits. View "Ordonez-Tevalan v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Roberts, a former Montgomery County, Pennsylvania employee, brought suit, alleging that he “suffered continual retaliation, discrimination and humiliation” at work. Some claims were dismissed. After Roberts alleged bias on the part of a magistrate judge, the case was reassigned to Judge Savage, who requested supplemental briefing on the effect of recent change in Pennsylvania law. Judge Savage subsequently entertained the parties’ arguments, then granted the defendants summary judgment on two counts. A jury rendered a verdict in favor of defendants on all remaining counts. Because Roberts again raised allegations of bias, the case was reassigned to Judge Quinones, who discovered that four of the six days of the trial transcript had been lost. Judge Quinones granted Roberts’ motion for extraordinary relief and ordered the court reporting company to produce the transcript. Months later, after several unsuccessful attempts to obtain transcripts, Judge Quinones concluded that another such order would be futile, and ordered the parties to recreate the record pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(c) so that she could rule on Roberts’ post-trial motion. Roberts did not comply, arguing that the parties would not be able to agree on a 10(c) statement. Concluding that Roberts’ decision constituted a failure to prosecute, Judge Quiñones dismissed his motion. The Third Circuit affirmed, upholding Judge Savage’s summary judgment decision and the dismissal by Judge Quinones. View "Roberts v. Ferman" on Justia Law

After a foreclosure case, Davis filed various claims against an entity that he calls “Wells Fargo U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for the Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust, 2005-11” as the purported holder of Davis’s mortgage. Davis also sued Assurant, believing it to be the provider of insurance on his home. His claims arise from damage that occurred to his house after Wells Fargo locked him out of it, which went unrepaired and worsened into severe structural problems. The district court dismissed Davis’s claims against Wells Fargo, on the grounds that claim preclusion and a statute of limitations barred recovery, and claims against Assurant for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that Davis lacked standing to bring those claims because he sued the wrong corporate entity, namely Assurant, when he should have sued Assurant’s wholly-owned subsidiary, ASIC. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of Wells Fargo, but vacated as to Assurant. Standing is a jurisdictional predicate, but generally focuses on whether the plaintiff is the right party to bring particular claims, not on whether the plaintiff has sued the right party. View "Davis v. Wells Fargo" on Justia Law

Weitzner, a Brooklyn, New York doctor, filed a putative class action against Sanofi and Vaxserve, alleging that they transmitted more than 10,000 facsimiles to members of the class without the prior express invitation or permission, violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227. Before a motion for class certification was filed, defendants made offers of judgment under FRCP 682 to both Weitzner and his professional corporation: $1,500 for each facsimile advertisement sent to Plaintiff “understood to be eleven (11) facsimile transmissions.” Defendants also offered to pay costs and to stop sending any facsimile advertisements in violation of the TCPA. Plaintiffs did not respond to the offers. More than 14 days after defendants made their offers, defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, contending their unaccepted offers mooted the case. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss, stating that plaintiffs had not engaged in “undue delay” in failing to file their motion for class certification and a successful class certification motion would “‘relate . . . back to the filing of the class complaint.’” The Supreme Court’s 2016 decision, Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez, held that an unaccepted offer does not make such a case moot. View "Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc" on Justia Law

S.B., a minor, was allegedly injured at a daycare center when another child tore a hair braid from her scalp. Her mother, Muwwakkil, filed a negligence complaint against KinderCare in Pennsylvania state court. After removal to federal court, Muwwakkil retained new counsel, who moved for voluntary dismissal without prejudice under FRCP 41, stating the lawsuit was prematurely filed because S.B., a four-year-old, was too young to articulate details about the incident and how it affected her. KinderCare opposed the motion. The court dismissed the case without prejudice, imposing conditions on the right to refile the case: payment of KinderCare's reasonable attorneys’ fees, as determined by the court upon receiving an affidavit of costs and refiling by June 24, 2019, with the possibility of extending that deadline by a showing of good cause. Instead of submitting an objection to KinderCare’s affidavit of costs, and before the district court entered a final order, S.B. and Muwwakkil filed an appeal challenging the imposition of these conditions on their right to refile. The Third Circuit dismissed, stating itsvjurisdiction is limited generally to reviewing the “final decisions” of district courts. 28 U.S.C. 1291. View "S. B. v. Kindercare Learning Ctrs., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs obtained residential mortgage loans from M&T to finance the purchase of their homes and, because the loans exceeded 80% of the value of the residences, agreed to pay for private mortgage insurance. As is customary, M&T selected the insurers who, in turn, reinsured the insurance policy with M&T Reinsurance, M&T’s captive reinsurer. Beginning in 2011, counsel sent letters to Plaintiffs advising that they were investigating claims concerning M&T’s captive mortgage reinsurance. Plaintiffs agreed to be part of a lawsuit against M&T and filed a putative class action complaint alleging violations of the anti-kickback and anti-fee-splitting provisions of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2607, and unjust enrichment. After discovery, the court granted M&T summary judgment, finding the claims time-barred and that Plaintiffs could not equitably toll the limitations period because none of them had exercised reasonable diligence in investigating any potential claims under RESPA. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the one-year statute of limitations runs “from the date of the occurrence of the violation,” View "Cunningham v. M&T Bank Corp." on Justia Law