Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Virl Birch died when the off-road vehicle in which he was riding flipped over and pinned him to the ground. His surviving family members sued Polaris Industries, the vehicle manufacturer, for strict products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. Polaris argued there was no evidence Birch’s vehicle was defective at the time of sale, and moved for summary judgment. Well after the deadlines for amending the pleadings and for discovery had passed, Birch’s survivors filed motions: (1) to add new theories to their complaint; and (2) for additional discovery. A magistrate judge denied both motions as untimely, and the district court affirmed the magistrate’s ruling. Based on the allegations in the unamended complaint, the district court then granted summary judgment to Polaris on all claims. The survivors appealed the district court’s denial of their two motions and the grant of summary judgment. But finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Birch v. Polaris Industries" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were descendants of the victims of the 1864 Sand Creek Massacre and brought suit for an accounting of the amounts they alleged the U.S. government held in trust for payment of reparations to their ancestors. Because the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Flute v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Shawron Lounds appealed a district court's order granting summary judgment to her former employer Lincare, Inc. on her claims of a hostile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981 and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Lounds began working at that office as a customer-service representative in September 2011. She is African-American and, throughout the duration of her employment with Lincare, was the Wichita office’s only African-American employee. The record reflects Lounds recounting specific discussions with her co-workers and direct supervisors that Lounds alleged were racially and culturally insensitive, to the extent that she felt "bombarded" by them. Lounds notified her human resources department. Twenty days after she sent notice of her grievances to HR, she was disciplined for "excessive absenteeism." Lounds believed the discipline was in retaliation for her complaints regarding her co-workers. She would ultimately be fired a little over a year after she was hired. Lincare cited absenteeism as its grounds for termination. After the close of discovery and a full round of briefing, the district court granted summary judgment to Lincare. The court first determined that no reasonable jury could have found the alleged race-based harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive to sustain a hostile work environment claim under section 1981. It then opined, concerning the retaliation claim that “the alleged retaliatory actions against [Ms. Lounds] either were not ‘materially adverse’ or were not caused by [her] protected activity.” The Tenth Circuit reversed in part, finding Lounds carried her burden on summary judgment to create a jury question relating to whether the alleged harassment was sufficiently pervasive or severe. Further, the Court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Lincare on the hostile work environment claim. The Court concluded the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Lincare on the retaliation issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lounds v. Lincare" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Delbert Soseeah, Maxine Soseeah and John Borrego filed this action against defendants Sentry Insurance, Dairyland Insurance Company, Peak Property and Casualty Insurance Company, and Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin (collectively Sentry) claiming, in part, that Sentry failed to timely and properly notify them and other Sentry automobile insurance policyholders of the impact of two New Mexico Supreme Court decisions regarding the availability of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage under their respective policies. The complaint alleged that Delbert Soseeah, after being injured in a motor vehicle accident, made a claim for UM/UIM benefits under two policies of automobile insurance issued by Sentry to Mrs. Soseeah. According to the complaint, Mrs. Soseeah “never executed a valid waiver of UM/UIM coverage under the” two policies and, consequently, Mr. Soseeah “demanded that . . . Sentry reform” the two policies “to provide stacked uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage limits equal to the limits of the liability coverage on each of the vehicles covered by the” policies pursuant to the two New Mexico Supreme Court decisions. Sentry purportedly refused to reform the policies and rejected Mr. Soseeah’s claim for UM/UIM benefits. The complaint alleged that Sentry, by doing so, violated New Mexico’s Unfair Practices Act (UPA), violated a portion of New Mexico’s Insurance Code known as the Trade Practices and Frauds Act (TPFA), breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breached the terms of the two policies. The district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Sentry subsequently sought and was granted permission to appeal the district court’s class certification ruling. Because plaintiffs failed to establish that all members of the general certified class suffered the common injury required by Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2), the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the general class. Because the district court’s certification ruling did not expressly address the Rule 23 factors as they applied to each of the identified subclasses, the Court did not have enough information to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in certifying two subclasses. Consequently, the Court directed the district court on remand to address these issues. View "Soseeah v. Sentry Insurance" on Justia Law

In 2012, appellant Charles D. Leone II resigned his position as a principal of Madison Street Partners, LLC (“MSP”). Pursuant to the terms of MSP’s Operating Agreement, fellow principals Steven Owsley and Drew Hayworth elected to buy Leone’s interest in MSP. The agreement required the purchase price to be set at fair market value, as determined in good faith by MSP’s managers, Owsley and Hayworth. After receiving valuations from two independent valuation firms, the Managers proposed a purchase price of $135,850, which Leone rejected. Leone then sued the Managers in federal district court, contending the proposed purchase price was far below market value and asserted claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Managers moved for summary judgment on both claims, arguing Leone’s claims were barred by their good faith reliance upon the value set by the independent valuation firms. The district court granted the motion. On appeal, Leone argued: (1) the district court misapplied the law regarding express and implied good faith obligations; (2) the district court incorrectly held that bad faith requires a tortious state of mind; and (3) he presented sufficient evidence of bad faith to survive summary judgment. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded Leone indeed presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment: “three different types of ‘good faith’ were at play in this case: the express contractual provision, an implied covenant of good faith, and the statutory safe harbor for good faith reliance on experts’ opinions. Regardless of which one applies, the Managers bore the burden as movants for summary judgment to establish there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to their defense of good faith reliance on outside valuations. Although the Managers are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of good faith in relying on the outside valuations, Mr. Leone has raised genuine issues of material fact to rebut that presumption. Without the presumption and given the existence of fact issues regarding the Managers’ good faith, we conclude the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Managers on their affirmative defense.” View "Leone v. Owsley" on Justia Law

Western Union Company and its subsidiary, Western Union Financial Services, Inc. (collectively, Western Union), appealed the district court’s award of $40 million in attorney fees to class counsel after the settlement of a putative class action against Western Union. Plaintiffs filed this putative class action to challenge Western Union’s practice of failing to timely notify customers of failed money transfers and of holding customer money for years while accruing interest and charging administrative fees. While litigation over procedural hurdles to class certification was ongoing, the parties agreed to a settlement of the class claims against Western Union. “Generally, a settling defendant in a class action has no interest in the amount of attorney fees awarded when those fees are to be paid from the class recovery rather than the defendant’s coffers.” Western Union argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that it had standing to challenge the attorney-fee award in this case because it claimed it would be injured by a diminution of the Class Settlement Fund (CSF) if Class Counsel was awarded an excessive attorney-fee award. Western Union argued its interest in the CSF (and the potential effect of the attorney-fee award on the size of that fund) established its standing to challenge the fee award. The Tenth Circuit concluded any potential injury to Western Union was too attenuated from the award of attorney fees to Class Counsel to support Western Union’s standing. Because Western Union lacked standing to challenge the attorney-fee award, the Tenth Circuit lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. View "Tennille v. Western Union" on Justia Law

Celeste Grynberg, individually and as trustee on behalf of the Rachel Susan Trust, Stephen Mark Trust, and Miriam Zela Trust, and Jack J. Grynberg, petitioned the federal district court to vacate an arbitration award that had been entered against them and in favor of Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P. (“KMEP”) and Kinder Morgan CO2 Company, L.P. (“KMCO2”). The Grynbergs invoked the court’s diversity jurisdiction. When they filed the action, the Grynbergs were citizens of Colorado, KMEP was a Delaware master limited partnership, and KMCO2 was a Texas limited partnership with one partner, KMEP. The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. It concluded that under "Carden v. Arkoma Associates," (494 U.S. 185, 195 (1990)), KMEP’s citizenship was the citizenship of all its unitholders, and because KMEP had at least one Colorado unitholder, its citizenship was not completely diverse from the Grynbergs’. The Grynbergs appealed, arguing the district court improperly applied "Carden." Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Grynberg v. Kinder Morgan Energy" on Justia Law