Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A mudslide destroyed a commercial building in Boulder, Colorado, owned by Paros Properties LLC and insured under a policy issued by Colorado Casualty Insurance Company. Paros filed an insurance claim but the Insurer denied payment because damage from mudslides was excluded from policy coverage. Paros then filed a state-court suit seeking payment under the Policy and damages for bad-faith breach of the insurance contract. It argued that the mudslide caused the building to explode, bringing the incident within the scope of an explosion exception to the Policy’s mudslide exclusion. The Insurer removed the action to federal court, which granted summary judgment to the Insurer. On appeal Paros argued: (1) that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the Insurer’s removal from state court was untimely; and (2) that the district court erred on the merits in holding that there was no coverage. After its review, the Tenth Circuit held that the notice of removal was too late. But because the district court correctly ruled on the merits and the jurisdictional requirements were satisfied at that time, the Court affirmed the judgment below rather than burden the state court and the parties by requiring relitigation. View "Paros Properties v. Colorado Casualty Ins Co" on Justia Law

Hugo Gutierrez-Brizuela applied for adjustment of status in reliance on the Tenth Circuit's decision in "Padilla-Caldera I" in the period it was valid law. Gutierrez-Brizuela applied for relief during the period after the BIA’s announcement of its contrary interpretation in "Briones" yet before "Padilla-Caldera II" declared "Briones" controlling and "Padilla-Caldera I" effectively overruled. The BIA suggested this factual distinction made all the legal difference. "But we fail to see how. Indeed, the government’s position in this appeal seems to us clearly inconsistent with both the rule and reasoning of De Niz Robles." In 2009 the law expressly gave Gutierrez-Brizuela two options: he could seek an adjustment of status pursuant to "Padilla-Caldera I" or accept a ten-year waiting period outside the country. "Relying on binding circuit precedent, he chose the former path. Yet the BIA now seeks to apply a new law to block that path at a time when it’s too late for Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela to alter his conduct. Meaning that, if we allowed the BIA to apply Briones here, Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela would lose the seven years he could’ve spent complying with the BIA’s ten year waiting period and instead have to start that waiting period now. The due process concerns are obvious: when Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela made his choice, he had no notice of the law the BIA now seeks to apply. And the equal protection problems are obvious too: if the agency were free to change the law retroactively based on shifting political winds, it could use that power to punish politically disfavored groups or individuals for conduct they can no longer alter." This case was remanded back to the BIA for reconsideration of Gutierrez-Brizuela's application based on the law in effect at the time of his application. View "Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Richard George, Steven Leavitt, Sandra Leavitt, and Darrell Dalton appealed the district court’s dismissal of their putative class action against Urban Settlement Services, d/b/a Urban Lending Solutions (Urban) and Bank of America, N.A. (BOA). Plaintiffs asserted a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against BOA and Urban. Plaintiffs also brought a promissory estoppel claim against BOA. Both claims arose from the defendants’ allegedly fraudulent administration of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). The district court granted the defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss both claims, denied the plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend their first amended complaint, and dismissed the case. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs’ first amended complaint stated a facially plausible RICO claim against BOA and Urban and a facially plausible promissory estoppel claim against BOA. As such, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. This reversal mooted plaintiffs’ challenge to the district court’s denial of their request to further amend the complaint. View "George v. Urban Settlement Services" on Justia Law

Former FBI agent Robert Lustyik wanted to help his friend and business partner, Michael Taylor, in return for payment. Taylor owned American International Security Corporation (AISC), a company that offered security and defense contracting services. The Department of Defense awarded AISC a contract in 2007 to provide training and related services to Afghan Special Forces. In mid-2010, the United States began investigating AISC regarding fraud and money laundering in connection with the 2007 contract. In September 2011, the United States filed a civil forfeiture action against assets owned by Taylor and AISC, which resulted in the seizure of more than $5 million dollars from AISC’s bank account. Lustyik used his status as an FBI agent to impair the government’s investigation of Taylor, including attempting to establish Taylor as a confidential source. Lustyik was indicted on charges related to the obstruction of justice. Prior to trial, Lustyik pleaded guilty to all charges in the indictment without a plea agreement. After his plea, his lead counsel withdrew and Lustyik obtained new counsel. On the eve of sentencing, counsel sought an order allowing him to obtain security clearance to review classified material he believed might be relevant for sentencing. The district court, having previously reviewed the documents, deemed them irrelevant to the sentencing issues, denied the motion, and subsequently sentenced Lustyik to 120 months’ imprisonment. Lustyik argued on appeal that the district court’s order denying his counsel access to the classified materials violated his Sixth Amendment rights at sentencing. Finding that the district court’s decision was not presumptively prejudicial to Lustyik’s advocacy at sentencing, nor did the district court abuse its discretion in concluding the documents were not relevant for sentencing, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Lustyik" on Justia Law

In 2011, city officials of West Valley City terminated Plaintiff Karen Bird from her position as manager of the city’s Animal Shelter. During the latter half of Plaintiff’s employment, the environment of the Animal Shelter was toxic. Plaintiff was one of the biggest contributors to this tumultuous environment. During the high point of what staffers at the shelter dubbed "the little war," the Salt Lake Tribune published an article about a cat that had survived two euthanization attempts in the Animal Shelter’s gas chamber. A reporter called a West Valley City official and informed the official that he (the reporter) had received an anonymous telephone call alleging that the shelter had ordered a mass execution of animals due to overpopulation. Other shelter managers were under the impression that Plaintiff, who was notoriously against using the gas chamber to euthanize animals and who was one of the few individuals privy to the meeting discussing the shelter’s overpopulation, was the source of these leaks. Around the same time as the anonymous phone call to the press, Plaintiff finally decided she "had enough" and filed the formal complaint that belied this lawsuit before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Tenth Circuit could not find that Plaintiff had been fired because of her gender, any hostile work environment she experienced, and West Valley City did not form any contract with her that mandated it would protect her from workplace violence or prevent her from being retaliated against. The Court did find, however, that the district court did not determine whether Plaintiff raised a genuine issue of material fact that this belief substantially motivated West Valley City officials’ decision to terminate Plaintiff. Nor did it determine whether the leaks to the press qualified as “constitutionally protected activity.” The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bird v. West Valley City" on Justia Law

Eugene Foster appeals from a district-court order granting summary judgment in favor of Mountain Coal Company, LLC (Mountain Coal) on his retaliation claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Foster injured his neck while working for Mountain Coal. Mountain Coal terminated Foster several months after the injury, citing that Foster “gave false information as to a credible Return To Work Slip.” After Mountain Coal terminated his employment, Foster filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Colorado Civil Rights Division. Ultimately, the EEOC issued Foster a right-to-sue notice; armed with the notice, Foster filed a complaint against Mountain Coal, seeking relief under the ADA and Colorado law. On the briefs, the district court entered summary judgment for Mountain Coal on Foster’s ADA and state-law discrimination claims and on Foster’s ADA retaliation claims. Foster appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court erred in granting Mountain Coal’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Foster’s ADA retaliation claims. "We conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Foster established a prima facie case of retaliation with respect to both his April 3 and April 11 purported requests for accommodation." The Court further concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Mountain Coal’s asserted basis for terminating Foster’s employment was pretext. Therefore the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Mountain Coal’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Foster’s ADA retaliation claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Foster v. Mountain Coal Company" on Justia Law

At the heart of this case was a 2004 oil and gas lease with a five-year term between Trans-Western Petroleum, Inc. and United States Gypsum Co. (“USG”). Trans-Western contacted USG to lease its land at the conclusion of an existing lease between USG and Wolverine Oil & Gas. USG and Trans-Western agreed to terms, and Trans-Western recorded its lease. Wolverine protested the recording of the new lease, claiming that its lease with USG remained valid under pooling and unitization provisions contained in its lease. In response to the protest, USG, in writing and by phone, rescinded the Trans-Western lease. Trans-Western sued for a declaration that the Wolverine lease expired. The district court determined that the Wolverine lease had expired. As part of their agreement, USG and Trans-Western executed a ratification and lease extension. Armed with the determination that the Wolverine lease was no longer in effect, in 2010, Trans-Western also filed a second amended complaint, seeking a declaratory judgment that its lease with USG was valid and damages for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, among other claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Trans-Western, determining that USG had breached the lease but denied attorney’s fees due to disputed material facts on damages. During a bench trial on damages, Trans-Western contended that it was entitled to expectation damages for both breach of contract and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment because USG deprived it of the opportunity to assign the lease during its five-year term. USG contended, inter alia, that damages for the breach of an oil and gas lease, like any real property, were measured at the date of breach and not pegged to a hypothetical sale at the market’s peak. The district court rejected Trans-Western’s damages theories, finding that Trans-Western was entitled only to nominal damages based on the value of the contract on the date of breach, which had not increased since the date of execution. The Tenth Circuit certified a question of how expectation damages for the breach of an oil and gas lease should have been measured to the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court held that general (or direct) and consequential (or special) damages were available for the breach of an oil and gas lease and should be measured in “much the same way as expectation damages for the breach of any other contract.” In light of the Utah Supreme Court’s holding, the Tenth Circuit remanded this case to the district court for consideration of damages. View "Trans-Western Petroleum v. United States Gypsum Co." on Justia Law

Darrell Jent suffered serious injuries while working on an oil rig. The rig’s owner, Precision Drilling Company, L.P., paid him a settlement, then made a claim on its insurance. The insurance company, Lexington Insurance Company, denied the claim. Precision sued, contending that Lexington should have reimbursed the money it paid Jent. Lexington issued two insurance policies covering Precision for accidents exactly like Jent's. However, Lexington argued that under Wyoming state law, the policies were a nullity, so any coverage here was more illusory than real and that Precision was solely responsible. "There can be no doubt that Wyoming law usually prohibits those engaged in the oil and gas industry from contractually shifting to others liability for their own negligence." The district court agreed with Lexington and granted its motion for summary judgment. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court misinterpreted the statute that was grounds for Lexington's motion. The case was then remanded for further proceedings. View "Lexington Insurance v. Precision Drilling" on Justia Law

CEEG (Shanghai) Solar Science & Technology Co., Ltd. (“CEEG”), a Chinese company, agreed to sell solar energy products to LUMOS, LLC, a U.S. company. After receiving certain shipments, LUMOS filed a warranty claim alleging workmanship defects, and refused to remit the balance due. After two years of "fitful" negotiations, CEEG filed an arbitration proceeding pursuant to the parties’ agreements. Although the parties had communicated exclusively in English to that point, CEEG served LUMOS with a Chinese-language notice of the proceedings, and LUMOS did not immediately realize what the notice was. After the arbitration panel ruled in its favor, CEEG moved for the district court to confirm the award. LUMOS filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Chinese-language notice caused it to miss the deadline to participate in appointing the arbitration panel. The district court granted the motion, finding that the notice was not reasonably calculated to apprise LUMOS of the arbitration proceedings. The Tenth Circuit agreed and affirmed. View "CEEG (Shanghai) Solar Science v. Lumos" on Justia Law

In December 2007, a driver rear-ended Donald Etherton’s vehicle. He injured his back in the accident. Etherton filed a claim with his insurer, Owners Insurance Company (“Owners”), seeking uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage up to his policy limit. After months of back and forth, Owners offered to pay an amount significantly lower than the policy limit. Etherton sued, alleging claims for (1) breach of contract and (2) unreasonable delay or denial of a claim for benefits. A jury found in Etherton’s favor on both claims. The district court entered judgment for Etherton, awarding $2,250,000 in damages. Owners appealed, arguing the trial court erred: (1) by denying Owners' motion for a new trial based on the allegedly erroneous admission of expert testimony; (2) by denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law based on Owners' purported reasonableness; and (3) in granting Etherton's motion to amend the judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in all respects. View "Etherton v. Owners Insurance Company" on Justia Law