Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 1986, after Moreland waived trial by jury, a three-judge panel found Moreland guilty of the aggravated murders of his girlfriend Glenna, her adult daughter and three grandchildren, and of the attempted aggravated murders of three other grandchildren. The panel sentenced Moreland to prison and death. He exhausted direct appeal and state-post-conviction remedies. In 2005, Moreland filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which was denied. In 2012, while Moreland’s appeal of that denial was pending, Moreland filed a motion for relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b) and a motion to amend the already-denied 2005 petition under FRCP 15, seeking to raise claims about his waiver of his right to a jury trial, and trial counsel’s failure to use certain police reports and to obtain an expert to challenge the state’s blood evidence. The Sixth Circuit held that Moreland’s motions were second or successive habeas petitions that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider. Rather than denying Moreland’s motions, that court should have transferred them as requests for permission to file. Considered as requests for such permission, Moreland’s requests do not meet the gatekeeping requirements for presenting claims in a second or successive habeas petition. Moreland has not established a basis for relief. View "Moreland v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Trumbull County has provided sewer service to General Motors’ Lordstown Assembly Plant since 1964. In the mid-2000s, the County borrowed $3.4 million from the U.S. Department of Agriculture to maintain and improve its sewer lines. That loan obligation triggered the protections of 7 U.S.C. 1926(b), under which sewer providers that owe money to the Department are protected from competition with other sewer providers. The County claims that the Village of Lordstown violated section 1926(b) when the Village built sewer lines that could one day serve GM’s Plant. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding on the merits that the Village’s mere construction of sewer lines did not curtail or limit the County’s service. The Sixth Circuit vacated, reaching the same result on grounds of lack of standing. While the County still owes a balance, section 1926(b) affords it a legally protected interest in freedom from competition, but it has shown not any actual or imminent invasion of that interest. Sewer lines can last for decades, so the mere fact of their construction does not show that the Village intends to compete with the County anytime soon. View "Trumbull Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Village of Lordstown" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Burniacs executed a mortgage on their home in Plymouth, Michigan to secure a loan from WaMu. Wells Fargo acted as servicer of the mortgage and sent Burniac monthly mortgage statements. WaMu assigned ownership of Burniac’s mortgage to Wells Fargo in 2007. Burniac continued to receive statements from Wells Fargo. WaMu filed for bankruptcy in 2008. Burniac sent his mortgage payments to Wells Fargo for several years, but eventually stopped making payments. Wells Fargo initiated foreclosure proceedings;a foreclosure sale was scheduled for May 23, 2013. Burniac filed suit to prevent the sale, arguing that the assignment was invalid. The state court purportedly entered a default judgment against the bank and preliminarily enjoined the foreclosure sale. Wells Fargo then removed the action to a federal district court, which refused to remand and later entered summary judgment for the bank. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the purported state court default prevented the federal court from entering summary judgment and required a remand. Burniac failed to demonstrate that the alleged assignment irregularities will subject him to double liability, placed him in a worse position to keep his property, or prejudiced him in any other way. View "Burniac v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In 2011, Asakevich pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography and attempting to entice a minor via the internet, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The district court sentenced Asakevich to life in prison. The Sixth Circuit dismissed his appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Asakevich’s petition for a writ of certiorari on October 7, 2013, so that Asakevich’s conviction became final. He had one year to file a motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(1). Asakevich has not filed a section 2255 motion. On October 6, 2014, Asakevich filed a pro se “Motion for Extension of Time to File 28 U.S.C. 2255 Motion,” seeking pre-approval for a 90-day extension. The district court denied Asakevich’s motion, reasoning that there was no published authority for enlarging the time for filing a section 2255 motion before the statute of limitations expires. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Federal courts do not lightly grant relief in non-existent cases or offer advisory opinions about what they might do if an action were filed. Asakevich requested an advisory opinion about whether he could obtain an extension for an action not yet in existence and one that may never come into existence. View "United States v. Asakevich" on Justia Law

Askins filed a citizen suit alleging that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Ohio EPA, and the Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) violated the Clean Water Act’s permitting procedures with respect to controlling water pollution caused by certain animal feeding operations, 33 U.S.C. 1251. They alleged that the Ohio EPA failed to inform the EPA that it transferred authority over part of the state’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination (NPDES) permit program to ODA until five years after it had done so; that ODA administered part of the state-NPDES Program without approval from the EPA; that the EPA permitted Ohio EPA to transfer part of the state-NPDES program without its approval; and that the EPA allowed ODA to administer part of the state-NPDES program without its approval. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Clean Water Act does not permit suits against regulators for regulatory functions. View "Askins v. Ohio Dep't of Agric." on Justia Law

In 2004, the Baumans purchased Ohio property with a loan from Taylor, secured by a mortgage that listed Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems as nominee on behalf of Taylor. In previous litigation involving the parties, the court found the loan was sold to Hudson in 2004. BAC became the loan servicer in 2008. In 2010, BAC brought a foreclosure action in state court. Under Ohio law, a party who seeks to foreclose on a mortgage must prove that “it is the current holder of the note and mortgage.” At the time, Hudson was the note holder, but BAC falsely represented that it had standing. BAC later voluntarily dismissed the case. The Baumans sued BAC’s successor, Bank of America, and Hudson alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e. The district court rejected the suit, finding that the defendants were not a “debt collector” under FDCPA because they acquired their interests in the debt prior to the Baumans's default. The Baumans filed a new complaint requesting a declaration barring a future foreclosure action and to quiet title. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, holding that defendants were not required to bring a foreclosure action as a compulsory counterclaim to the FDCPA action. View "Bauman v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

Hawver claims that the Jackson, Michigan, Center for Family Health a federally qualified health center, caused her mother’s death by providing negligent medical care. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides the exclusive remedy for claims against federally qualified health centers such as Family Health, 42 U.S.C. 233. By the time Hawver filed suit, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to claims under the Act had run. The district court dismissed, holding that failure to satisfy the Act’s statute of limitations requirements doubles as a failure to satisfy the subject matter jurisdiction requirements of the federal courts and precludes equitable tolling. After the district court’s decision, the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, held that the Act’s statute of limitations requirements do not implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts and that equitable tolling may save a late claim in some circumstances. The Sixth Circuit remanded to the district court to determine whether equitable tolling saves Hawver’s claim. View "Hawver v. United States" on Justia Law

The Libertarian Party claimed unequal treatment under Ohio’s election laws. The court entered partial summary judgment, finding that the statutes did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments and that sovereign immunity barred state constitutional claims, effectively denying a preliminary injunction. Such denials are immediately appealable (28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1)), but the Party filed a Rule 54(b) motion, asking that portions of the decision be made final (appealable). The court has not ruled on the motion. The Party filed notice of appeal 35 days after the court issued its order. The Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Rule 54(b), rulings that do not dispose of an entire case do not end the action; but if the court “expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay,” it may “direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties.” A Rule 54(b) motion cannot request that a judgment be altered; granting the motion serves only to make a nonappealable order an appealable judgment. Unlike a Rule 59(e) request, the motion did not seek a modification of the order’s substance, but asked only that it be made appealable. Since the relevant portions of the order were immediately appealable under 1292, those portions were already a “judgment” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a). View "Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted" on Justia Law

AVIC filed an interlocutory appeal of the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss asserting immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602 et seq. The court held that the district court erred by treating AVIC's challenge to federal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) as a facial challenge and thus taking plaintiff’s factual allegations as true because AVIC's challenge is a factual challenge rather than a facial one. Although the parties agree on a number of important facts, there remain material factual disputes that the district court must decide in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Global Technology, Inc. v. Yubei (XinXiang) Power" on Justia Law

The district court dismissed plaintiff's suit alleging that police officers violated his constitutional rights during a 2009 arrest. Plaintiff now brings a new suit stemming from the 2009 arrest raising similar constitutional challenges. The court concluded that similar allegations arising from the same underlying dispute lead to a similar result. The court affirmed the trial court's rejection of the second action on claim-preclusion grounds. View "Wheeler v. Dayton Police Dep't" on Justia Law