Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Inmate Troche alleges that in 2001 he was severely beaten by Officer Crabtree and that after he received treatment for his injuries, he was placed in isolation and deprived of food. Troche alleges he submitted an Informal Complaint Resolution, initiating a three-step grievance procedure. Troche never received a response and submitted a notification of grievance form to the inspector of institutional services. Receiving no response, he sent, via internal prison mail, correspondence to prison personnel to inquire about the status of his grievance. After receiving no response, he filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. Crabtree submitted declarations that Troche had filed complaints days after the incident, but did not submit an informal complaint to Crabtree’s direct supervisor or the staff member most directly responsible for the incident, as required, and that an investigation had determined that his complaints were without merit. The court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Administrative Code authorizes an inmate to proceed to step two of Ohio’s grievance procedure if he does not receive a response to his informal complaint within a “reasonable time.” Such authorization is not granted to inmates who fail to receive a response to a notification of grievance form at step two of the process. Troche was not required to proceed to a step-three appeal. View "Troche v. Crabtree" on Justia Law

Columbia stores natural gas in Medina Field, a naturally-occurring system of porous underground rock, pumping gas into the Field during summer, during low demand, and withdrawing it during winter. Medina is among 14 Ohio gas storage fields used by Columbia. Columbia received a federal Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, 15 U.S.C. 717f, and was required to compensate those who own part of the Field by contractual agreement or eminent domain. The owners allege that Columbia stored gas for an indeterminate time without offering compensation and then offered $250 per lot. Each Medina owner rejected this offer. Columbia did not bring eminent domain proceedings. Other Ohio landowners accused Columbia of similar behavior and filed the Wilson class action in the Southern District of Ohio, including the Medina owners within the putative class. The Medina owners filed suit in the Northern District. Both actions claim trespass and unjust enrichment under Ohio law, and inverse condemnation under the Natural Gas Act. The Wilson suit also seeks damages for “native” natural gas Columbia takes when it withdraws its own gas. Columbia filed a counterclaim in Wilson, seeking to exercise eminent domain over every member of the putative class and join the Medina owners. The Northern District applied the first-to-file rule and dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The rule does apply, but dismissal was an abuse of discretion given jurisdictional and procedural hurdles to having the Medina claims heard in Wilson. View "Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC" on Justia Law

Officers signaled for Brown to pull over. They claim that Brown was driving without headlights on, though eyewitnesses dispute this. Before Brown retrieved his license and registration, they ordered him out of the car. Brown complied. During a pat-down, Officer Chapman hit Brown in the neck and pushed Brown onto the vehicle. Brown wrestled free. The officers claim that Brown was resisting arrest, but eyewitnesses say that Brown was trying to protect himself. Chapman tasered Brown’s chest. Brown ran. The officers caught and wrestled him down, tasering him. The officers handcuffed Brown at 8:52 P.M., seven minutes after pulling Brown over. Brown repeatedly stated he was having trouble breathing and went limp before reaching the squad car. Officers request EMS at 8:55 P.M., stating that Brown was conscious and breathing. EMS was notified at 9:00 P.M., arrived at 9:07 P.M., found Brown “propped up,” with no pulse, and was unable to resuscitate him. Brown’s mother filed suit. The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment to the officers on plaintiff’s claim that the officers stopped Brown’s vehicle without probable cause, holding that the city is not liable on that claim; reversed summary judgment to Chapman on plaintiff’s claim that use of a taser constituted excessive force, stating that the city is liable on that claim; and reversed summary judgment to an officer on plaintiff’s deliberate-indifference claim. View "Brown v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Officers signaled for Brown to pull over. They claim that Brown was driving without headlights on, though eyewitnesses dispute this, They walked to Brown’s vehicle and asked for his license and registration. Before Brown could retrieve the documents, they ordered him out of the car, unsettled by his slow speech. Brown complied. While the officers were patting him down, one hit Brown in the back of his neck and pushed Brown onto the vehicle. Brown wrestled free. The officers claim that Brown was resisting arrest, but eyewitnesses say that Brown was trying to protect himself. An officer tasered Brown’s chest. Brown ran. The officers caught Brown and wrestled him to the ground, tasering him. The officers notified dispatch that they handcuffed Brown at 8:52 P.M., seven minutes after pulling Brown over. Brown repeatedly stated he was having trouble breathing and went limp before he reached the squad car. Officers request EMS at 8:55 P.M., stating that Brown was conscious and breathing. EMS was notified at 9:00 P.M. EMS arrived at 9:07 P.M., and found Brown “propped up,” with no pulse. EMS was unable to resuscitate him. Brown’s mother filed suit. The Sixth Circuit upheld allowing plaintiff to amend her complaint and application of the deliberate-indifference standard, and dismissed the remainder of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction over appeals from denial of summary judgment. View "Brown v. Chapman" on Justia Law

In 1986, after Moreland waived trial by jury, a three-judge panel found Moreland guilty of the aggravated murders of his girlfriend Glenna, her adult daughter and three grandchildren, and of the attempted aggravated murders of three other grandchildren. The panel sentenced Moreland to prison and death. He exhausted direct appeal and state-post-conviction remedies. In 2005, Moreland filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which was denied. In 2012, while Moreland’s appeal of that denial was pending, Moreland filed a motion for relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b) and a motion to amend the already-denied 2005 petition under FRCP 15, seeking to raise claims about his waiver of his right to a jury trial, and trial counsel’s failure to use certain police reports and to obtain an expert to challenge the state’s blood evidence. The Sixth Circuit held that Moreland’s motions were second or successive habeas petitions that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider. Rather than denying Moreland’s motions, that court should have transferred them as requests for permission to file. Considered as requests for such permission, Moreland’s requests do not meet the gatekeeping requirements for presenting claims in a second or successive habeas petition. Moreland has not established a basis for relief. View "Moreland v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Trumbull County has provided sewer service to General Motors’ Lordstown Assembly Plant since 1964. In the mid-2000s, the County borrowed $3.4 million from the U.S. Department of Agriculture to maintain and improve its sewer lines. That loan obligation triggered the protections of 7 U.S.C. 1926(b), under which sewer providers that owe money to the Department are protected from competition with other sewer providers. The County claims that the Village of Lordstown violated section 1926(b) when the Village built sewer lines that could one day serve GM’s Plant. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding on the merits that the Village’s mere construction of sewer lines did not curtail or limit the County’s service. The Sixth Circuit vacated, reaching the same result on grounds of lack of standing. While the County still owes a balance, section 1926(b) affords it a legally protected interest in freedom from competition, but it has shown not any actual or imminent invasion of that interest. Sewer lines can last for decades, so the mere fact of their construction does not show that the Village intends to compete with the County anytime soon. View "Trumbull Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Village of Lordstown" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Burniacs executed a mortgage on their home in Plymouth, Michigan to secure a loan from WaMu. Wells Fargo acted as servicer of the mortgage and sent Burniac monthly mortgage statements. WaMu assigned ownership of Burniac’s mortgage to Wells Fargo in 2007. Burniac continued to receive statements from Wells Fargo. WaMu filed for bankruptcy in 2008. Burniac sent his mortgage payments to Wells Fargo for several years, but eventually stopped making payments. Wells Fargo initiated foreclosure proceedings;a foreclosure sale was scheduled for May 23, 2013. Burniac filed suit to prevent the sale, arguing that the assignment was invalid. The state court purportedly entered a default judgment against the bank and preliminarily enjoined the foreclosure sale. Wells Fargo then removed the action to a federal district court, which refused to remand and later entered summary judgment for the bank. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the purported state court default prevented the federal court from entering summary judgment and required a remand. Burniac failed to demonstrate that the alleged assignment irregularities will subject him to double liability, placed him in a worse position to keep his property, or prejudiced him in any other way. View "Burniac v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In 2011, Asakevich pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography and attempting to entice a minor via the internet, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The district court sentenced Asakevich to life in prison. The Sixth Circuit dismissed his appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Asakevich’s petition for a writ of certiorari on October 7, 2013, so that Asakevich’s conviction became final. He had one year to file a motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(1). Asakevich has not filed a section 2255 motion. On October 6, 2014, Asakevich filed a pro se “Motion for Extension of Time to File 28 U.S.C. 2255 Motion,” seeking pre-approval for a 90-day extension. The district court denied Asakevich’s motion, reasoning that there was no published authority for enlarging the time for filing a section 2255 motion before the statute of limitations expires. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Federal courts do not lightly grant relief in non-existent cases or offer advisory opinions about what they might do if an action were filed. Asakevich requested an advisory opinion about whether he could obtain an extension for an action not yet in existence and one that may never come into existence. View "United States v. Asakevich" on Justia Law

Askins filed a citizen suit alleging that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Ohio EPA, and the Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) violated the Clean Water Act’s permitting procedures with respect to controlling water pollution caused by certain animal feeding operations, 33 U.S.C. 1251. They alleged that the Ohio EPA failed to inform the EPA that it transferred authority over part of the state’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination (NPDES) permit program to ODA until five years after it had done so; that ODA administered part of the state-NPDES Program without approval from the EPA; that the EPA permitted Ohio EPA to transfer part of the state-NPDES program without its approval; and that the EPA allowed ODA to administer part of the state-NPDES program without its approval. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Clean Water Act does not permit suits against regulators for regulatory functions. View "Askins v. Ohio Dep't of Agric." on Justia Law

In 2004, the Baumans purchased Ohio property with a loan from Taylor, secured by a mortgage that listed Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems as nominee on behalf of Taylor. In previous litigation involving the parties, the court found the loan was sold to Hudson in 2004. BAC became the loan servicer in 2008. In 2010, BAC brought a foreclosure action in state court. Under Ohio law, a party who seeks to foreclose on a mortgage must prove that “it is the current holder of the note and mortgage.” At the time, Hudson was the note holder, but BAC falsely represented that it had standing. BAC later voluntarily dismissed the case. The Baumans sued BAC’s successor, Bank of America, and Hudson alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e. The district court rejected the suit, finding that the defendants were not a “debt collector” under FDCPA because they acquired their interests in the debt prior to the Baumans's default. The Baumans filed a new complaint requesting a declaration barring a future foreclosure action and to quiet title. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, holding that defendants were not required to bring a foreclosure action as a compulsory counterclaim to the FDCPA action. View "Bauman v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law