Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Asakevich pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography and attempting to entice a minor via the internet, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The district court sentenced Asakevich to life in prison. The Sixth Circuit dismissed his appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Asakevich’s petition for a writ of certiorari on October 7, 2013, so that Asakevich’s conviction became final. He had one year to file a motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(1). Asakevich has not filed a section 2255 motion. On October 6, 2014, Asakevich filed a pro se “Motion for Extension of Time to File 28 U.S.C. 2255 Motion,” seeking pre-approval for a 90-day extension. The district court denied Asakevich’s motion, reasoning that there was no published authority for enlarging the time for filing a section 2255 motion before the statute of limitations expires. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Federal courts do not lightly grant relief in non-existent cases or offer advisory opinions about what they might do if an action were filed. Asakevich requested an advisory opinion about whether he could obtain an extension for an action not yet in existence and one that may never come into existence. View "United States v. Asakevich" on Justia Law

Askins filed a citizen suit alleging that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Ohio EPA, and the Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) violated the Clean Water Act’s permitting procedures with respect to controlling water pollution caused by certain animal feeding operations, 33 U.S.C. 1251. They alleged that the Ohio EPA failed to inform the EPA that it transferred authority over part of the state’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination (NPDES) permit program to ODA until five years after it had done so; that ODA administered part of the state-NPDES Program without approval from the EPA; that the EPA permitted Ohio EPA to transfer part of the state-NPDES program without its approval; and that the EPA allowed ODA to administer part of the state-NPDES program without its approval. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Clean Water Act does not permit suits against regulators for regulatory functions. View "Askins v. Ohio Dep't of Agric." on Justia Law

In 2004, the Baumans purchased Ohio property with a loan from Taylor, secured by a mortgage that listed Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems as nominee on behalf of Taylor. In previous litigation involving the parties, the court found the loan was sold to Hudson in 2004. BAC became the loan servicer in 2008. In 2010, BAC brought a foreclosure action in state court. Under Ohio law, a party who seeks to foreclose on a mortgage must prove that “it is the current holder of the note and mortgage.” At the time, Hudson was the note holder, but BAC falsely represented that it had standing. BAC later voluntarily dismissed the case. The Baumans sued BAC’s successor, Bank of America, and Hudson alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e. The district court rejected the suit, finding that the defendants were not a “debt collector” under FDCPA because they acquired their interests in the debt prior to the Baumans's default. The Baumans filed a new complaint requesting a declaration barring a future foreclosure action and to quiet title. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, holding that defendants were not required to bring a foreclosure action as a compulsory counterclaim to the FDCPA action. View "Bauman v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

Hawver claims that the Jackson, Michigan, Center for Family Health a federally qualified health center, caused her mother’s death by providing negligent medical care. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides the exclusive remedy for claims against federally qualified health centers such as Family Health, 42 U.S.C. 233. By the time Hawver filed suit, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to claims under the Act had run. The district court dismissed, holding that failure to satisfy the Act’s statute of limitations requirements doubles as a failure to satisfy the subject matter jurisdiction requirements of the federal courts and precludes equitable tolling. After the district court’s decision, the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, held that the Act’s statute of limitations requirements do not implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts and that equitable tolling may save a late claim in some circumstances. The Sixth Circuit remanded to the district court to determine whether equitable tolling saves Hawver’s claim. View "Hawver v. United States" on Justia Law

The Libertarian Party claimed unequal treatment under Ohio’s election laws. The court entered partial summary judgment, finding that the statutes did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments and that sovereign immunity barred state constitutional claims, effectively denying a preliminary injunction. Such denials are immediately appealable (28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1)), but the Party filed a Rule 54(b) motion, asking that portions of the decision be made final (appealable). The court has not ruled on the motion. The Party filed notice of appeal 35 days after the court issued its order. The Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Rule 54(b), rulings that do not dispose of an entire case do not end the action; but if the court “expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay,” it may “direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties.” A Rule 54(b) motion cannot request that a judgment be altered; granting the motion serves only to make a nonappealable order an appealable judgment. Unlike a Rule 59(e) request, the motion did not seek a modification of the order’s substance, but asked only that it be made appealable. Since the relevant portions of the order were immediately appealable under 1292, those portions were already a “judgment” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a). View "Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted" on Justia Law

AVIC filed an interlocutory appeal of the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss asserting immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602 et seq. The court held that the district court erred by treating AVIC's challenge to federal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) as a facial challenge and thus taking plaintiff’s factual allegations as true because AVIC's challenge is a factual challenge rather than a facial one. Although the parties agree on a number of important facts, there remain material factual disputes that the district court must decide in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Global Technology, Inc. v. Yubei (XinXiang) Power" on Justia Law

The district court dismissed plaintiff's suit alleging that police officers violated his constitutional rights during a 2009 arrest. Plaintiff now brings a new suit stemming from the 2009 arrest raising similar constitutional challenges. The court concluded that similar allegations arising from the same underlying dispute lead to a similar result. The court affirmed the trial court's rejection of the second action on claim-preclusion grounds. View "Wheeler v. Dayton Police Dep't" on Justia Law

In 2007, Durand filed an Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461 (ERISA) class action against her former employer and the pension plan it sponsors, challenging the projection rate used by the Plan to calculate the lump-sum payment Durand elected to receive after ending her employment at the Company in 2003. The Plan then used a 401(k)-style investment menu to determine the interest earned by members’ hypothetical accounts. Durand alleged that it impermissibly used the 30-year Treasury bond rate instead of the projected rate of return on her investment selections in the “whipsaw” calculation required under pre-2006 law. The Sixth CIrcuit reversed dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Defendants then answered the complaint and raised defenses, including that the claims of putative class members “who received lump-sum distributions after December 31, 2003” were barred due to an amendment to the Plan that took effect after that date. Plaintiffs argued that the 2004 Amendment was an illegal reduction or “cutback” in benefits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the “cutback” claims were time-barred and did not relate back to the “whipsaw” claim asserted in the original class complaint. View "Durand v. Hanover Ins. Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Alexander filed a suit, claiming that nine individuals—all of whom had some connection to child support proceedings related to Alexander’s son—conspired against him and violated his civil rights by imposing child support obligations that he did not owe; providing false information about those obligations to the IRS; and extorting money from him through “bribery” and “terror tactics.” Among other relief requested, Alexander asked that his child support payments “be abated.” The district court dismissed claims against the federal and the state court judges on grounds of absolute judicial immunity and remaining federal claims after finding that they fell within the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on grounds of failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted, noting that the Supreme Court has indicated that the domestic relations exception is narrow and finding that this case did not fall within the exception. View "Alexander v. Rosen" on Justia Law

Mokdad, a naturalized U.S. citizen, alleges that he has been denied boarding on commercial airline flights between the U.S. and his native country, Lebanon because he was on the No Fly List. Mokdad applied for redress under the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP). Mokdad received a letter that did not confirm or deny whether he was on the List but informed him that “we have conducted a review of any applicable records in consultation with other federal agencies ... no changes or corrections are warranted at this time.” The letter notified him of his right to file administrative appeal with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within 30 days, that the TRIP determination would become final if he did not, and that final determinations are reviewable by the Court of Appeals under 49 U.S.C. 46110. Mokdad did not file a TSA administrative appeal or a petition with the Court of Appeals but filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Michigan against the Attorney General, the FBI, and the Director of the Terrorist Screening Center. Mokdad did not name TSA or any TSA officer. The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal, finding that the district court had jurisdiction, but declined to address the challenge to the adequacy of procedures to contest inclusion on the No Fly List, for failure to join a necessary party. View "Mokdad v. Lynch" on Justia Law