Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Conway filed a putative class action suit against PRA under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and survived a motion to dismiss. PRA offered Conway judgment in his favor. Conway declined. PRA again moved to dismiss, arguing that, as PRA had offered Conway all the relief he sought, there was no longer a live controversy. Heeding then-governing Sixth Circuit precedent, the district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and found the issue of class certification moot. The Sixth Circuit vacated, citing the intervening Supreme Court holding in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez (2016) that an unaccepted offer of judgment generally does not moot a case, even if the offer would fully satisfy the plaintiff’s demands. The court rejected PRA’s attempt to distinguish Campbell-Ewald because the court simultaneously entered a final judgment against Conway granting him all the relief he wanted. The district court erred in entering that judgment. Campbell-Ewald revived the Article III controversy between Conway and PRA that Sixth Circuit precedent wrongly extinguished. That a judgment that should never have been entered does not extinguish a plaintiff’s stake in the litigation; an appeal remains alive if the effects of a court’s order can be undone. The court declined to address class certification. View "Conway v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

APU holds 5.2 million shares of Amtrak common stock pursuant to the Rail Passenger Service Act, 84 Stat. 1327. The 1997 Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act, 49 U.S.C. 24304 mandated that “Amtrak shall, before October 1, 2002, redeem all common stock previously issued, for the fair market value.” In 2000, Amtrak proposed to redeem APU’s common stock for three cents per share. APU rejected Amtrak’s offer in November 2000. The statutory deadline passed without Amtrak making any further offer to redeem the shares. APU and Amtrak negotiated until January 2008, when Amtrak declared that the shares were worthless and that further negotiations would be futile. The parties never reached a settlement. In May 2008, APU sued Amtrak. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit remanded one claim. On remand, the district court dismissed that claim as barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that there is no disputed question of fact regarding the dates of the three key events: Amtrak valued APU’s shares at three cents each in 2000; the deadline for redeeming the shares lapsed in 2002; and Amtrak terminated negotiations in 2008. The court rejected an argument that the limitations period began to run in 2008. View "Am. Premier Underwriters v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp." on Justia Law

On May 6, 2016, the NLRB (Board) found that the Union had violated the National Labor Relations Act by seeking to undermine prior NLRB judgments. The Union petitioned for review on June 13. The Board cross-petitioned on July 6. On July 13, five of the six charging parties, all winners in the Board proceedings, moved to intervene in both the Union’s petition and the Board’s cross-petition after the court clerk’s office directed them to do so. On August 2, more than 30 days after the Union filed its initial petition for review, the charging parties’ counsel filed another amended motion to intervene, clarifying that they had inadvertently omitted a sixth charging party, Hunt Construction, from their first two motions. No one objected to Hunt’s motion. The Sixth Circuit granted the motion. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(d), which sets forth the conditions for intervening and includes a 30-day filing deadline, does not implement any general jurisdictional statute and is claim-processing-rule that permits forfeiture and equitable exceptions to the deadline. View "Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

An anonymous caller to the district court clerk’s office complained that an accident might make it difficult for voters to reach the polls before they closed on Ohio’s March 15 primary election. That office relayed the call to a judge, who orally directed the clerk to enter an order: This matter is before the court upon an oral complaint requesting that the polling locations within the counties of Butler, Clermont, Hamilton and Warren be extended for one hour due to Interstate I-275 being closed for hours due to a fatal accident. The request is hereby GRANTED and the Secretary of State is hereby ordered to keep the polling locations within the counties of Butler, Clermont, Hamilton and Warren open until 8:30 p.m. The call from the clerk’s office went to the cell phone voicemail of Assistant Secretary of State Damschroder. Damschroder got the message, but the polls had closed minutes earlier and had to try to reopen; “some polls were open and others were not.” No complaint preceded the order; none materialized after. Seeking to avoid similar last-minute election orders, the Ohio Secretary of State and boards of elections appealed. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing Article III limitations. View "In re: 2016 Primary Election" on Justia Law

In 2002, Deere became the exclusive North American wholesale supplier of Hitachi products. In 2014, Deere notified Rudd, a long-time authorized dealer of Hitachi equipment, of its intent to terminate its dealer agreements and initiated arbitration proceedings, as required by the agreement. Although Rudd agreed that arbitration was the proper forum, it sought injunctive relief to maintain the status quo during arbitration and moved to seal the case, stating that “the very fact of this lawsuit” could cause loss of customers, layoffs (or preemptive departure) of employees, and diminution of the value of Rudd’s financial investment. Two weeks later, the district court entered Rudd's proposed order, before Deere submitted a response. During an on-the-record telephonic status conference, the court asked the parties whether the case should remain under seal; Rudd’s counsel replied that it should, while Deere’s counsel was silent. The matter proceeded to an Agreed Order. The arbitration panel requested a copy of that Order, believing that it would obviate the need for an expedited hearing. Deere’s counsel forwarded the Order without consulting Rudd. Rudd moved for contempt . Deere moved to vacate the sealing order. The Sixth Circuit affirmed an order unsealing the case. Rudd cannot show any countervailing privacy interest sufficient to outweigh the strong presumption in favor of public access to federal court records View "Rudd Equip. Co., Inc. v. John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co." on Justia Law

In 2012, the government charged Scotts Miracle-Gro in the Southern District of Ohio with one misdemeanor count of pesticide misuse (7 U.S.C. 136j(a)(2)(G)), alleging that Scotts sold approximately 73 million units of wild bird food treated with pesticides unapproved for application to bird food. Scotts pled guilty and admitted the facts in the information. Plaintiffs, five putative class members in a California lawsuit seeking to represent consumers that purchased the wild bird food treated with unapproved pesticides, asked the district court to release two sets of objections, attached to the presentence report (PSR), from the criminal case. The district court denied Plaintiffs access to the objections, holding that neither the First Amendment nor the common law entitled Plaintiffs to the documents. The district court treated the objections the same as the PSR, which carries a presumption of confidentiality. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s application of the same standard of confidentiality as the PSR and concluding that Plaintiffs failed to show a special need to overcome that standard. View "Cyphert v. Scotts Miracle-Gro Co." on Justia Law

Rembisz, an IRS investigator, did not obtain sought-after promotions. He filed an administrative charge of discrimination, claiming ongoing discrimination against his sex (male) and race (Caucasian) or color (white). The Treasury Department investigated and rejected the claim. Federal employees must file a civil action for discrimination “[w]ithin 90 days of receipt of final action,” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c). He filed suit on June 21, 2013, alleging that he received notice of the final agency decision on March 25, within the 90-day window. The Sixth Circuit rejected a motion to dismiss in 2014, stating that Rembisz would have to “come forward with evidence” to support his allegation concerning notice. On remand, he never did so. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government. It is presumed that notice is given, “and hence the ninety-day limitations term begins running, on the fifth day following the [] mailing of [a right-to-sue] notification to the claimant[].” The agency served its notification by first class and certified mail on March 15, making March 20 the presumptive date that the limitations period began. Rembisz offered no evidence to the contrary. The government submitted a certified-mail receipt, showing that Rembisz received the notice on March 22, so that his complaint was one day late. View "Rembisz v. Lew" on Justia Law

The American husband and German wife have lived together in Germany since 2002. They sought damages for complications that arose when a surgical stapler manufactured in Mexico by an American corporation, Ethicon, allegedly malfunctioned during a 2012 surgery that husband underwent in Germany. An Ohio district court dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens in favor of litigating in Germany. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Where a district court has considered all relevant public- and private-interest factors, and has reasonably balanced those factors, its decision deserves substantial deference. Private-interest factors include the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process and the cost of obtaining witnesses; possibility of view of premises, id appropriate; and all other practical problems. Public-interest factors include administrative difficulties from court congestion; the local interest in the controversy’; the interest in having the trial in a forum that is at home with the law that governs the action; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty. The court here correctly concluded that Ethicon met its burden of showing that if the case remained in Ohio, the vexation it would endure and trouble to the court would be disproportionate to the plaintiffs’ minimal convenience. View "Hefferan v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011 UJC private jet charter services hired Plaintiff as a co-pilot. After altercations between Plaintiff, a woman, and male pilots, which Plaintiff perceived to constitute sexual harassment, Plaintiff wrote an email to UJC management. About three weeks later, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. Plaintiff sued, alleging retaliation. Defendants’ answer stated that UJC had converted from a corporation to an LLC. Plaintiff did not amend her complaint. Defendants’ subsequent motions failed did not raise the issue of UJC’s identity. UJC’s CEO testified that he had received reports that Plaintiff had used her cell phone below 10,000 feet; that once Plaintiff became intoxicated and danced inappropriately at a bar while in Atlantic City for work; that Plaintiff had once dangerously performed a turning maneuver; and that Plaintiff had a habit of unnecessarily executing “max performance” climbs. There was testimony that UJC’s male pilots often engaged the same behavior. The jury awarded her $70,250.00 in compensatory and $100,000.00 in punitive damages. When Plaintiff attempted to collect on her judgment, she was told that the corporation was out of business without assets, but was offered a settlement of $125,000.00. The court entered a new judgment listing the LLC as the defendant, noting that UJC’s filings and witnesses substantially added to confusion regarding UJC’s corporate form and that the LLC defended the lawsuit as though it were the real party in interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating it was unlikely that UJC would have offered a generous settlement had it genuinely believed itself to be a victim of circumstance, or that it would be deprived of due process by an amendment to the judgment; the response indicated a litigation strategy based on “roll[ing] the dice at trial and then hid[ing] behind a change in corporate structure when it comes time to collect.” View "Braun v. Ultimate Jetcharters, LLC" on Justia Law

Giles was convicted of second-degree manslaughter in 2007. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed his conviction in an opinion dated October 21, 2010. Under Kentucky Rule 76.30(2)(a), the opinion was considered final 21 days later (November 12, 2010), as reflected by a docket notation labeled “finality.” Giles did not seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, but filed a state post-conviction petition on February 23, 2011, 34 days into the one-year limitations period for his federal habeas petition. That limitations period was tolled while Giles’s state petition was pending, leaving 331 days. The state Supreme Court denied discretionary review on May 15, 2013. On May 16, the limitations period began to run, Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a); Giles had until Monday, April 14, 2014, to file. On May 1, 2014, Giles filed his federal habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found Giles’s petition untimely and that equitable tolling was not appropriate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the limitations period begins to run from the latest of four dates—in this case “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review,” 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). Delayed finality under Kentucky’s procedure did not entitle Giles to an additional 21 days. View "Giles v. Beckstrom" on Justia Law