Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Robert Carbone, a Connecticut resident, sued two Swiss organizations and several individuals from California, Illinois, and Switzerland for defamation and other tortious conduct. Carbone, a member of the two Swiss organizations, claimed that the defendants used websites to publish defamatory statements about him and facilitate his removal from the organizations. He filed the lawsuit in Ohio, arguing that the defamatory statements passed through servers located in Ohio, which hosted the organizations' websites.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed Carbone's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found that Carbone failed to establish that the defendants had sufficient contacts with Ohio to justify the court's jurisdiction over them. The defendants had not purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of acting in Ohio, as the servers' location in Ohio was chosen by third parties, not the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the defendants did not purposefully avail themselves of the privilege of acting in Ohio, as their only connection to the state was the location of the servers, which was a decision made by third parties. The court also found that Carbone's claims did not arise from the defendants' activities in Ohio, as the allegedly defamatory statements were not directed at Ohio or its residents. Therefore, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants in Ohio would not comply with the Due Process Clause. View "Carbone v. Kaal" on Justia Law

A fifty-nine-year-old General Manager (GM) at a Chili’s restaurant in Nashville, Tennessee, was terminated and replaced by a thirty-three-year-old with no managerial experience. The employer, Brinker International, Inc., claimed the termination was due to the GM creating a toxic "culture" and not "living the Chili’s way," despite the restaurant being one of the top performers in the market. The GM alleged that the termination was due to age discrimination, as he was the oldest manager in the region and believed Brinker was systematically replacing older employees with younger ones.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted summary judgment in favor of Brinker, accepting the company's explanation of "culture" as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination. The court found that the GM could not sufficiently rebut this explanation to show it was pretext for age discrimination. The court also granted in part and denied in part the GM's motion for sanctions due to Brinker’s spoliation of evidence, awarding fees and costs but not excluding the TMR Report, which documented the termination decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the TMR Report could not be authenticated under Federal Rule of Evidence 901 and was therefore inadmissible. The court vacated the district court’s order on sanctions and instructed it to consider whether additional sanctions beyond fees and costs were appropriate. The appellate court also reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Brinker, finding that the GM had provided sufficient evidence to rebut Brinker’s explanation and create a genuine issue of material fact regarding age discrimination. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the GM’s motion for summary judgment. View "Kean v. Brinker Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Brian Lyngaas, a dentist, sued United Concordia Companies, Inc. (UCCI) for sending unsolicited faxed advertisements in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Lyngaas, through his dental practice, was part of UCCI’s Fee for Service Dental Network, which included a “Value Add Program” (VAP) offering discounts from third-party vendors. UCCI sent three faxes promoting these discounts, which Lyngaas claimed were unsolicited advertisements.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of UCCI, ruling that the faxes were not advertisements under the TCPA because UCCI’s profit motive was too remote. Lyngaas appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that UCCI’s faxes were advertisements under the TCPA because they facially promoted third-party products as part of exclusive marketing agreements, and UCCI had a sufficiently direct profit motive. The court emphasized that TCPA liability falls on the sender of the fax, not necessarily the seller of the advertised product. The court also noted that Lyngaas could not proceed with claims regarding a fax he did not receive. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Brian J. Lyngaas, D.D.S., P.L.L.C. v. United Concordia Co." on Justia Law

A high school student, Eszter Pryor, trained and competed with the Ohio State Diving Club at The Ohio State University (OSU). In the summer of 2014, when she was sixteen, her diving coach, William Bohonyi, sexually abused her. Pryor alleged that OSU was aware of the abuse by August 2014, as they fired Bohonyi following an internal investigation. Pryor filed a Title IX lawsuit against OSU in January 2022, claiming the university was deliberately indifferent to a sexually hostile culture and her abuse.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed Pryor's claim, ruling it was time-barred by the statute of limitations. OSU had argued that the applicable statute of limitations was two years, as per Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10(A), and the district court agreed, granting summary judgment in favor of OSU based on the expiration of the limitations period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the correct statute of limitations for Title IX claims in Ohio is the two-year period for personal injury actions under Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10(A). The court rejected Pryor's argument that a twelve-year limitations period for child sex-abuse claims under Ohio Revised Code § 2305.111(C) should apply. The court emphasized the importance of uniformity and predictability in applying the statute of limitations and noted that Pryor's claim accrued when she turned eighteen in July 2015, giving her until July 2017 to file her lawsuit. Since she filed in January 2022, her claim was indeed time-barred. View "Pryor v. The Ohio State University" on Justia Law

Fire-Dex, a manufacturer of personal protective equipment for firefighters, faced lawsuits from firefighters and their spouses alleging exposure to carcinogens from Fire-Dex's products. These lawsuits were consolidated in multidistrict litigation in South Carolina. Fire-Dex had general commercial liability insurance policies with Admiral Insurance Company and requested Admiral to defend and indemnify it against the lawsuits. Admiral refused, leading to a declaratory judgment action in federal court in Ohio, where the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio initially had diversity jurisdiction over Admiral's declaratory judgment action but chose to abstain from exercising it, a decision affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. Subsequently, Fire-Dex filed a lawsuit in Ohio state court seeking a declaration that Admiral must defend and indemnify it, along with compensatory and punitive damages for breach of contract and bad faith. Admiral removed the case to federal court and filed counterclaims for declaratory judgment. Fire-Dex moved to remand the case to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision to remand the declaratory claims and stay the damages claims. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court erred in abstaining from the declaratory claims under Thibodaux abstention, as the case did not involve unsettled questions of state law intimately involved with state sovereignty. The court also found that abstaining from the declaratory claims was an abuse of discretion because the declaratory and damages claims were closely intertwined, and no traditional abstention doctrine applied to the damages claims. The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fire-Dex, LLC v. Admiral Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this case, Whitney Hodges, representing the estate of her late daughter Honestie Hodges, alleges that on December 6, 2017, Grand Rapids Police Department officers detained Honestie, an eleven-year-old African American girl, at gunpoint, handcuffed her, and placed her in a police car. The officers were searching for a stabbing suspect who did not match Honestie’s description. Honestie was not armed, did not pose a threat, and did not attempt to flee. The complaint asserts that the officers lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to detain Honestie and used excessive force in doing so.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan partially denied the officers' motion to dismiss on qualified-immunity grounds. The district court found that the complaint plausibly alleged violations of Honestie’s Fourth Amendment rights, including unreasonable search and seizure, false imprisonment, and excessive force. The court declined to consider video evidence and police reports provided by the officers, determining that these materials did not blatantly contradict the complaint’s allegations and were subject to reasonable dispute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The court affirmed the district court’s order, agreeing that the complaint plausibly alleged that the officers violated Honestie’s clearly established rights. The Sixth Circuit held that the officers’ actions, as alleged, lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause and involved excessive force. The court dismissed the officers' appeal to the extent it sought to resolve disputed factual issues, emphasizing that such issues should be addressed after discovery. View "Hodges v. City of Grand Rapids, Mich." on Justia Law

Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP and other plaintiffs incurred cleanup costs at a site on the Kalamazoo River in Michigan due to pollution from paper mills. In 1995, Georgia-Pacific and other companies formed the Kalamazoo River Study Group (KRSG) and sought a declaration of shared liability for cleanup costs under CERCLA § 107. In 1998, the district court declared KRSG members, including Georgia-Pacific, liable for the entire cost of response activities at the site. Subsequent judgments in 2000 and 2003 confirmed this liability.In 2010, Georgia-Pacific filed a lawsuit against NCR Corporation, International Paper Company, and Weyerhaeuser Company, asserting claims under both CERCLA § 107(a) and § 113(f) for cleanup costs. The district court found NCR and International Paper liable and apportioned liability among the parties. However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Georgia-Pacific’s § 113(f) claims were time-barred and that Georgia-Pacific could not pursue § 107(a) claims for costs within the scope of the 1998 judgment.On remand, the district court vacated its judgment under § 113(f) but re-entered a declaratory judgment under § 107, declaring Georgia-Pacific, International Paper, and Weyerhaeuser liable for future response costs. International Paper and Weyerhaeuser appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court’s declaratory judgment under § 107. The court held that Georgia-Pacific could not pursue a § 107(a) claim for costs within the scope of the 1998 judgment, as those costs were recoverable only under § 113(f). The court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the scope of the 1998 judgment and allowed Georgia-Pacific to bring § 107(a) claims for costs outside that scope. View "Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP v. NCR Corp." on Justia Law

John Doe, a convicted sex offender, challenged the enforcement of Tennessee's sex-offender statutes against him, arguing that the requirements imposed by these statutes constituted retroactive punishment in violation of the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause. Tennessee's sex-offender statutes require offenders to register with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, update their personal information quarterly, limit where they can live and work, and allow the state to publish information about registrants. Doe committed his offenses before the passage of the 2004 statutes and sought to prevent Tennessee officials from enforcing these laws against him.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee issued a preliminary injunction barring Tennessee officials from enforcing any of the state’s sex-offender statutes against Doe. This decision was influenced by a related case, Does #1–9 v. Lee, where the district court had issued a similar injunction for nine other convicted sex offenders. After the Sixth Circuit reviewed Does #1–9, it held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the governor and directed the trial court to modify its injunction against the director, stating that the district court had misinterpreted precedent and that only specific provisions of the sex-offender statutes could be enjoined.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's refusal to dissolve or modify the preliminary injunction following the Does #1–9 decision. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by not dissolving or modifying the injunction, as the Does #1–9 decision clarified that the injunction was overly broad. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order administratively closing the case and remanded for proceedings consistent with the Does #1–9 opinion, instructing the district court to determine which specific provisions of Tennessee’s sex-offender statutes could be enjoined. View "Doe v. Lee" on Justia Law

The case involves the Public Interest Legal Foundation (PILF) filing a two-count complaint against Jocelyn Benson, the Michigan Secretary of State, alleging non-compliance with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). PILF claimed that Michigan failed to conduct proper maintenance of voter registration lists by not removing deceased registrants and did not allow inspection of public records related to voter rolls. PILF's requests for records and subsequent correspondence with the Secretary of State's office did not yield the desired information, leading to the lawsuit.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of Secretary Benson. The court found that Michigan's efforts to maintain voter registration lists, including using state and federal death records and collaborating with the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC), constituted a reasonable effort under the NVRA. The court also found that PILF's claim regarding the failure to allow inspection of records was moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment, agreeing that Michigan's program for removing deceased registrants was reasonable under the NVRA. The court noted that the NVRA requires a reasonable effort, not a perfect one, and that Michigan's multi-layered approach met this standard. The court also found that PILF lacked standing to assert its claim regarding the inspection of records, as it failed to demonstrate concrete downstream consequences from the alleged NVRA violation.In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Michigan's efforts to maintain accurate voter registration lists were reasonable and that PILF did not have standing to pursue its claim regarding the inspection of records. View "Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Benson" on Justia Law

In November 2021, a school shooting occurred at Oxford High School in Michigan, resulting in the deaths of four students and injuries to several others. This event had a profound impact on the local community, leading some families to transfer their children to other schools. Plaintiff C.S., a third-grade student at Robert Kerr Elementary School in Durand, Michigan, wore a hat depicting an AR-15-style rifle and the phrase "COME AND TAKE IT" to school during a "Hat Day" event. School officials, concerned about the potential for disruption given the recent shooting and the presence of transfer students from Oxford, asked C.S. to remove the hat.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the school officials, concluding that their actions were justified under the circumstances. The court found that the school officials reasonably forecasted a substantial disruption due to the hat's imagery and message, particularly considering the recent trauma experienced by some students.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the school officials did not violate C.S.'s First Amendment rights by asking her to remove the hat. The court emphasized the unique context of the recent school shooting and the young age of the students, which justified the school officials' concerns about potential disruption. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the defendants' untimely motion for summary judgment. View "C.S. v. McCrumb" on Justia Law