Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Rembisz, an IRS investigator, did not obtain sought-after promotions. He filed an administrative charge of discrimination, claiming ongoing discrimination against his sex (male) and race (Caucasian) or color (white). The Treasury Department investigated and rejected the claim. Federal employees must file a civil action for discrimination “[w]ithin 90 days of receipt of final action,” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c). He filed suit on June 21, 2013, alleging that he received notice of the final agency decision on March 25, within the 90-day window. The Sixth Circuit rejected a motion to dismiss in 2014, stating that Rembisz would have to “come forward with evidence” to support his allegation concerning notice. On remand, he never did so. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government. It is presumed that notice is given, “and hence the ninety-day limitations term begins running, on the fifth day following the [] mailing of [a right-to-sue] notification to the claimant[].” The agency served its notification by first class and certified mail on March 15, making March 20 the presumptive date that the limitations period began. Rembisz offered no evidence to the contrary. The government submitted a certified-mail receipt, showing that Rembisz received the notice on March 22, so that his complaint was one day late. View "Rembisz v. Lew" on Justia Law

The American husband and German wife have lived together in Germany since 2002. They sought damages for complications that arose when a surgical stapler manufactured in Mexico by an American corporation, Ethicon, allegedly malfunctioned during a 2012 surgery that husband underwent in Germany. An Ohio district court dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens in favor of litigating in Germany. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Where a district court has considered all relevant public- and private-interest factors, and has reasonably balanced those factors, its decision deserves substantial deference. Private-interest factors include the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process and the cost of obtaining witnesses; possibility of view of premises, id appropriate; and all other practical problems. Public-interest factors include administrative difficulties from court congestion; the local interest in the controversy’; the interest in having the trial in a forum that is at home with the law that governs the action; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty. The court here correctly concluded that Ethicon met its burden of showing that if the case remained in Ohio, the vexation it would endure and trouble to the court would be disproportionate to the plaintiffs’ minimal convenience. View "Hefferan v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011 UJC private jet charter services hired Plaintiff as a co-pilot. After altercations between Plaintiff, a woman, and male pilots, which Plaintiff perceived to constitute sexual harassment, Plaintiff wrote an email to UJC management. About three weeks later, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. Plaintiff sued, alleging retaliation. Defendants’ answer stated that UJC had converted from a corporation to an LLC. Plaintiff did not amend her complaint. Defendants’ subsequent motions failed did not raise the issue of UJC’s identity. UJC’s CEO testified that he had received reports that Plaintiff had used her cell phone below 10,000 feet; that once Plaintiff became intoxicated and danced inappropriately at a bar while in Atlantic City for work; that Plaintiff had once dangerously performed a turning maneuver; and that Plaintiff had a habit of unnecessarily executing “max performance” climbs. There was testimony that UJC’s male pilots often engaged the same behavior. The jury awarded her $70,250.00 in compensatory and $100,000.00 in punitive damages. When Plaintiff attempted to collect on her judgment, she was told that the corporation was out of business without assets, but was offered a settlement of $125,000.00. The court entered a new judgment listing the LLC as the defendant, noting that UJC’s filings and witnesses substantially added to confusion regarding UJC’s corporate form and that the LLC defended the lawsuit as though it were the real party in interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating it was unlikely that UJC would have offered a generous settlement had it genuinely believed itself to be a victim of circumstance, or that it would be deprived of due process by an amendment to the judgment; the response indicated a litigation strategy based on “roll[ing] the dice at trial and then hid[ing] behind a change in corporate structure when it comes time to collect.” View "Braun v. Ultimate Jetcharters, LLC" on Justia Law

Giles was convicted of second-degree manslaughter in 2007. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed his conviction in an opinion dated October 21, 2010. Under Kentucky Rule 76.30(2)(a), the opinion was considered final 21 days later (November 12, 2010), as reflected by a docket notation labeled “finality.” Giles did not seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, but filed a state post-conviction petition on February 23, 2011, 34 days into the one-year limitations period for his federal habeas petition. That limitations period was tolled while Giles’s state petition was pending, leaving 331 days. The state Supreme Court denied discretionary review on May 15, 2013. On May 16, the limitations period began to run, Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a); Giles had until Monday, April 14, 2014, to file. On May 1, 2014, Giles filed his federal habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found Giles’s petition untimely and that equitable tolling was not appropriate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the limitations period begins to run from the latest of four dates—in this case “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review,” 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). Delayed finality under Kentucky’s procedure did not entitle Giles to an additional 21 days. View "Giles v. Beckstrom" on Justia Law

In 2006, the district court adopted a consent order to resolve Dispatch's suit for an accounting of the gold from the S.S. Central America shipwreck. The order required defendants to produce financial documents regarding the period starting January 1, 2000. The court later issued a contempt order, citing defendants’ failure to produce an inventory of the gold recovered and sold. Defendants then produce an inventory of gold that they sold to California Gold Group from February 15 to September 1, 2000. They did not produce any prior inventories, which would have provided a complete accounting of treasure recovered from the ship. At a 2007 contempt hearing, the parties argued about whether the defendants possessed any earlier inventories. The court issued another contempt order in 2009. Defendants continued to assert that they had no such inventories. In 2013, Dispatch obtained the appointment of a receiver that it had first sought in 2008 to take control of and wind down the defendants. The receiver recovered found numerous inventories created before the California Gold sale, in a duplex owned by defendants' attorney and leased to defendants. The court concluded that defendants’ attorney engaged in bad-faith conduct, rejected Dispatch’s request for $1,717,388 (its total litigation expenses) and limited sanctions to the cost of pursuing the motion for sanctions, plus the expenses to uncover the fraud and locate the inventories. Dispatch submitted bills for $249,359.85. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a reduced award of $224,580. View "Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

When the five investment funds at issue lost nearly 90 percent of their value in 2007-2008, investors lost large sums. Various plaintiffs (investors) initially filed claims with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, participated in arbitration, or filed state suits. In 2013, they filed suit under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77k, 77l, and 77o, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and 78t(a), and SEC Rule 10b-5. They alleged that the funds were overvalued and concentrated in risky securities and that investors relied on misrepresentations in purchasing the funds. The district court initially granted class certification, but dismissed the claims as barred by the statutes of limitations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the suits were barred by the applicable statutes of repose. The court declined to “toll” those statutes View "Stein v. Regions Morgan Keegan Select High Income Fund, Inc." on Justia Law

Consumer class actions against Global, on behalf of individuals who purchased gym memberships, alleged improper fees, unfair sales practices, lack of disclosures, improper bank account deductions, and improper handling of contract cancellations. The cases claimed breach of contract, unjust enrichment, fraud, and violation of state consumer protection laws. Objectors challenged a settlement, claiming it was unfair under FRCP 23(e); that class counsel’s fees were disproportionate to claims paid; that the settlement unnecessarily required a claims process; and that the settlement contained a “clear-sailing” agreement from Global not to oppose any application for $2.39 million for costs and fees or less and a “kicker” clause, providing that if the court awarded less than $2.39 million, that amount would constitute full satisfaction of Global’s obligation for costs and fees. Some further argued that the settlement failed to provide adequate compensation for Kentucky state-law claims and for plaintiffs who had signed an early, more favorable version of the contract. The district court approved the settlement based on a magistrate judge’s 80-page Report and Recommendation, which addressed each objection. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Though some courts disfavor clear sailing agreements and kicker clauses, their inclusion alone does not show that the court abused its discretion in approving the settlement. View "Gascho v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The IRS conducted a criminal investigation into businesses owned by Rogers and his associates and subsequently seized millions of dollars. Forfeiture actions settled by an agreement executed in August, 2012. Rogers released his right to bring future claims “related to and/or in connection with or arising out of” the forfeiture actions. In November 2012, Rogers requested records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 5 U.S.C. 552. The IRS denied the request. In 2013, Rogers filed suit. In November 2014, the IRS moved for summary judgment, arguing that the release affirmatively waived Rogers’ right to bring his FOIA action. Rogers argued that the IRS forfeited its right to rely on the release by not pleading it as an affirmative defense; the IRS should be estopped from asserting the affirmative defense; and the release did not apply because the FOIA claim was not related to the forfeiture actions. The court granted the IRS summary judgment, finding the release’s language broad enough to encompass Rogers’ FOIA action. The Sixth Circuit affirmed While the IRS could have been more diligent in raising its defense, the court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the IRS to raise it in a summary judgment motion. View "Rogers v. Internal Revenue Serv." on Justia Law

When the main Youngstown-area crushed-stone supplier discontinued production, RGI, a Sandusky quarry, approached Hardrives, Sabatine's asphalt paving company, to discuss jointly establishing a large RGI distribution center and Hardrives production plant. In 1998, RGI’s representatives and Sabatine produced a draft agreement, with contingencies, such as the minimum amount of stone Hardrives was to buy, low-cost railroad transportation, and government incentives; it stated that it was subject to RGI senior management approval. Sabatine was unable to convince Norfolk Railroad to establish access and enlisted Congressman Traficant’s help.Unbeknownst to RGI, Sabatine paid Traficant a $2,400 bribe and was later indicted. Ultimately, the parties arrived at an acceptable rail rate and selected a Youngstown site. Hardrives began bidding on larger projects and purchasing new equipment. All the agreed contingencies were fulfilled, except RGI had arguably not given explicit senior management approval. Sabatine called RGI about ordering a $1.5 million asphalt plant for the site. According to Sabatine, RGI gave him the go ahead. Sabatine purchased the plant. Two months later RGI told Hardrives that it would no longer participate in the joint venture. Hardrives began losing money, and by 2001, became Cranmark and sold to McCourt. In 2004, Cranpark sued, alleging breach of contract and promissory estoppel. In 2010, the court granted RGI summary judgment, based on the limitations period, and holding RGI’s representations were not unambiguous promises. On remand, RGI argued that Cranpark was not the “proper party” because it had sold everything, including the right to bring the cause of action, to McCourt. The court denied the motion. A jury awarded $15.6 million, but the court then held that Cranmark lacked standing. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that the court failed to timely call the proof-of-standing issue to counsel’s attention, once RGI finally squarely presented the issue. View "Cranpark, Inc. v. Rogers Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Graiser, an Ohio citizen, saw a “Buy One, Get One Free” eyeglasses advertisement at the Beachwood, location of Visionworks, a Texas eye-care corporation operating in more than 30 states. According to Graiser, a Visionworks salesperson quoted Graiser “a price of $409.93 for eyeglasses, with a second eyeglasses ‘free.’” Alternatively, the salesperson told Graiser that he could purchase a single pair of eyeglasses for $245.95. Graiser filed a purported class action in state court, alleging violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. Visionworks removed the case under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), claiming that the amount in controversy recently surpassed CAFA’s jurisdictional threshold of $5,000,000. Graiser successfully moved to remand, arguing that removal was untimely under the 30-day period in 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(3). The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that section 1446(b)’s 30-day window for removal under CAFA is triggered when the defendant receives a document from the plaintiff from which it can first be ascertained that the case is removable under CAFA. The presence of CAFA jurisdiction provides defendants with a new window for removability, even if the case was originally removable under a different theory of federal jurisdiction. View "Graiser v. Visionworks of America, Inc." on Justia Law