Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Davariol Marquavis Taylor, an incarcerated individual, sued several members of the correctional staff at Marquette Branch Prison under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations. Taylor claimed that a nurse administered incorrect medication, resulting in another inmate's overdose and death. He also alleged that a doctor sexually assaulted him and punched him when he resisted. Taylor sought to proceed in forma pauperis, which allows a litigant to avoid paying filing fees upfront due to financial constraints.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Taylor's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, citing the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) “three-strikes” rule, which prevents incarcerated individuals from proceeding in forma pauperis if they have had three or more prior cases dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. The district court identified four previous cases as strikes against Taylor and dismissed his suit when he did not pay the filing fee. Taylor appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that Taylor had only two valid PLRA strikes, not three. The court determined that the district court's original order incorrectly counted two cases, Adler and Stump, as strikes. The court clarified that dismissals based on Eleventh Amendment immunity or improper filing under § 1983 do not count as strikes unless all claims in the complaint are dismissed for being frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Taylor v. Stevens" on Justia Law

Matthew Warman, a former graduate student at Mount St. Joseph University (MSJU), objected to taking the COVID-19 vaccine on religious grounds. When MSJU required all students and employees to be vaccinated, Warman applied for a religious exemption. He was allegedly detained by two MSJU Police Department officers who attempted to convince him to get vaccinated and disparaged his religious beliefs. Warman later sued MSJU, MSJPD, and several individual employees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed Warman’s complaint. The court dismissed his free exercise, equal protection, and disability discrimination claims with prejudice and dismissed MSJPD from all counts with prejudice. Warman appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Warman’s free exercise, equal protection, and disability discrimination claims. However, the court found that Warman plausibly pleaded that the two officers who detained him violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Warman’s wrongful detention claim and reinstated the claim against those defendants. The court also vacated the district court’s declination of supplemental jurisdiction over Warman’s state-law claims and remanded for reconsideration.In summary, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of most of Warman’s claims but reinstated his Fourth Amendment wrongful detention claim against the two officers and remanded the state-law claims for further consideration. View "Warman v. Mount St. Joseph University" on Justia Law

Louisville Metro Police Department officers conducted a search of Jennie and Saul Wright’s home, where they lived with their great-nephews, Jawand Lyle and Brendon Burnett. The Wrights claimed the search violated their constitutional rights and filed a lawsuit against Louisville Metro Government and unknown police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed the claims of both the Wrights and their great-nephews.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky dismissed the Wrights' claims, and the Wrights appealed. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Wrights' counsel withdrew, and the Wrights, proceeding pro se, filed an amended complaint naming the previously unknown officers. The district court dismissed the claims against the individual officers as untimely and dismissed the Monell claim against Louisville Metro Government for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the claims of Jawand and Brendon because they were not included in the notice of appeal. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Jennie and Saul Wright’s claims against the individual officers as untimely, as the amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint under Rule 15(c)(1). The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against Louisville Metro Government, finding that the Wrights failed to provide sufficient factual allegations to support their claims of inadequate training and unconstitutional policies or customs. The court declined to take judicial notice of a 2023 Department of Justice report and denied the request to remand the case for consideration of the report. View "Wright v. Louisville Metro Government" on Justia Law

James King sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and individual government employees under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, alleging physical abuse by U.S. officials. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on both claims. King appealed only the Bivens claim, making the FTCA judgment final. The individual defendants argued that the FTCA's "judgment bar" precluded the Bivens claim. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the defendants, stating that the FTCA judgment barred the Bivens claim.King then filed a Rule 60(b) motion in the district court to reopen the FTCA judgment to withdraw his FTCA claim and avoid the judgment bar. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that attorney error or strategic miscalculation is not a valid basis for reopening under Rule 60. King appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, as attorney error or strategic miscalculation does not justify reopening a final judgment under Rule 60. The court emphasized the public policy favoring the finality of judgments and noted that Rule 60(b)(6) relief is only available in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, which were not present in this case. View "King v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Karim Codrington was subjected to an unlawful traffic stop, search, and arrest by Louisville Metro Police Department officers. During the criminal proceedings, a Kentucky state court suppressed the evidence seized from his vehicle and dismissed the charges. Over three years later, Codrington filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit, alleging that the officers planted drugs on him, provided those drugs to prosecutors, and stole thousands of dollars from him.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims, finding that Codrington’s claims were either barred by the statute of limitations or failed on their merits. Specifically, the court found that the unlawful search and seizure, selective enforcement, and false arrest/imprisonment claims were time-barred. The court also found that Codrington failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his fabrication-of-evidence and malicious-prosecution claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the unlawful search and seizure, selective enforcement, false arrest/imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and state-law conversion claims. However, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the fabrication-of-evidence claim, finding that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the officers fabricated evidence. The court also vacated the district court’s judgment on Codrington’s Monell claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Codrington v. Dolak" on Justia Law

Robert Cox, acting as the personal representative and special administrator of the estate of Greta Cox, sued Total Quality Logistics, Inc. and Total Quality Logistics, LLC (collectively, TQL) for negligence under Ohio law. Cox alleged that TQL, in its role as a freight broker, negligently hired an unsafe motor carrier, Golden Transit, Inc., which resulted in a motor vehicle crash that killed his wife, Greta Cox. The crash occurred when the driver of the motor carrier, Amarjit Singh Khaira, failed to slow down in a construction zone and collided with Greta Cox's vehicle.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed the case, ruling that Cox’s claims were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA), specifically 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c). The district court found that the FAAAA preempted the state law claims because they related to the services of a broker with respect to the transportation of property and did not fall within the Act’s safety exception.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred in its interpretation of the FAAAA’s safety exception. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the safety exception, which preserves the safety regulatory authority of a state with respect to motor vehicles, includes common law claims like Cox’s negligent hiring claim. The court reasoned that such claims are genuinely responsive to safety concerns and directly involve motor vehicles and motor vehicle safety. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

Tammy Livingston, individually and as a beneficiary and co-trustee of the Livingston Music Interest Trust, sued her mother, Travilyn Livingston, over the termination of copyright assignments and associated royalties for songs authored by Jay Livingston. Jay had assigned his copyright interests in several songs to a music publishing company owned by Travilyn. Travilyn later invoked her statutory right to terminate these copyright grants and filed termination notices with the U.S. Copyright Office. Tammy challenged these terminations, claiming her rights as a beneficiary were affected.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed Tammy's complaint, holding that it failed to state a claim. Tammy appealed the decision, arguing that the termination notices were ineffective, defective, or invalid, and that she retained a state law right to receive royalties from the songs covered by the terminated agreements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the 2003 California probate court order, which declared that the Family Trust held no ownership interests in Jay's copyrights, precluded Tammy's claims. The court also found that Jay had validly executed the copyright grants as an individual, not as a trustee, and that Travilyn owned Jay Livingston Music at the time of the assignments. Additionally, the court rejected Tammy's arguments regarding the termination notices' compliance with federal requirements, noting that she failed to plead specific factual allegations for most of the notices. Finally, the court held that Tammy did not identify a state law basis for her claim to royalties, thus failing to meet the pleading standards under Civil Rule 12(b)(6). View "Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc." on Justia Law

Lester Warren Martin, a renowned pediatric surgeon and successful investor, passed away in 2020, leaving behind a substantial estate. He had created a revocable trust in 1990, which was to be distributed equally among his five children. After one of his daughters, Sarah Stewart, passed away, her share was to be divided between her two children, Daniel Stewart and Rachel Kosoff. In 2018, Lester gave his son, David Martin, power of attorney and made him the trustee of the revocable trust. David distributed $13,930,000 from the trust, mostly to Lester’s four living children, with a smaller portion to Daniel and Rachel.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that David breached his fiduciary duties by making distributions without specific written authorization from Lester, as required by the trust. The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on liability and dismissed their remaining claims. A jury trial determined that David owed Daniel and Rachel $2,086,000 in damages. David later filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs did not have a legal right to sue under Ohio law. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that Daniel and Rachel had Article III standing, as they alleged a concrete monetary injury traceable to David’s actions and redressable by the court. The appellate court vacated the district court’s order granting relief from judgment and remanded the case for the district court to rule on David’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding the necessity of expert testimony to prove damages. The appellate court affirmed the denial of David’s motion in limine to exclude the plaintiffs’ damages testimony. View "Stewart v. Martin" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a Belgian company, agreed to ship car parts made in Mexico to a Mexican plant operated by the defendants, a Delaware LLC and a Delaware corporation. The initial contract documents included a forum-selection clause pointing to a Mexican venue. However, the plaintiff later sued in Michigan, alleging that the parties had switched to a Michigan forum-selection clause during their transactions. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and the forum non conveniens doctrine, arguing that the Mexican forum-selection clause applied.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion, dismissing the suit without conducting a forum non conveniens analysis. The court found that the forum-selection clause in the initial contract documents, which pointed to a Mexican venue, was controlling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the complaint plausibly alleged that the parties had switched to a Michigan forum-selection clause. The court noted that a factual dispute existed over which forum-selection clause applied to the plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claims. The court held that this venue issue could not be resolved on the pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6) or under the forum non conveniens doctrine without factual findings. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve the factual disputes regarding the applicable forum-selection clause. View "VCST Int'l B.V. v. BorgWarner Noblesville, LLC" on Justia Law

In late July 2022, an unprecedented flood destroyed numerous homes and properties in Eastern Kentucky. Plaintiffs, who suffered losses, filed a lawsuit against Pine Branch Mining, LLC, alleging that the company violated Kentucky mining regulations in maintaining a surface mine property near their lands, resulting in negligence per se. They claimed that Pine Branch's infractions substantially contributed to the flooding.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky excluded the opinion of Plaintiffs' sole causation expert, Scott Simonton, under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B). The court found that Simonton's report was not based on sufficient facts or data specific to the mining sites in question, lacked reliable principles and methods, and failed to consider alternative causes of the damage. Consequently, the district court granted summary judgment to Pine Branch, concluding that Plaintiffs could not establish a prima facie case of negligence per se without competent expert proof.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Simonton's testimony, as it was deficient in reliability and completeness. Without Simonton's expert opinion, Plaintiffs lacked sufficient evidence to prove causation, an essential element of their negligence per se claim. The court held that the remaining evidence was insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact, and thus, summary judgment in favor of Pine Branch was appropriate. View "Baker v. Blackhawk Mining, LLC" on Justia Law