Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The petitioner, a taxpayer, received a notice of deficiency from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regarding her 2022 tax return. The IRS determined that she was not entitled to certain tax credits and imposed penalties. The notice, dated May 30, 2023, was sent to her former address, and she did not become aware of it until after the deadline to contest the deficiency had passed. She filed a petition for redetermination with the United States Tax Court on November 1, 2023, well after the ninety-day deadline specified in the Internal Revenue Code. In her petition, she argued that she was entitled to the disputed credits and status, and requested equitable tolling of the filing deadline due to her lack of timely notice.The United States Tax Court dismissed her petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the ninety-day deadline in I.R.C. § 6213(a) was a strict jurisdictional requirement that could not be extended or tolled, regardless of the circumstances. The court relied on prior Sixth Circuit precedent that had characterized the deadline as jurisdictional and rejected the petitioner’s arguments for equitable tolling.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the Tax Court’s dismissal de novo. The Sixth Circuit held that, in light of recent Supreme Court guidance, the ninety-day deadline in § 6213(a) is not a jurisdictional rule but rather a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule. As such, it is presumptively subject to equitable tolling. The court reversed the Tax Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for the Tax Court to consider, in the first instance, whether the petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the filing deadline based on the specific facts of her case. View "Oquendo v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

William Plott suffered severe, lifelong disabilities as a result of a vaccine administered in infancy. His family sought compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, filing a petition in the United States Court of Federal Claims. A special master determined that Plott’s parents were entitled to monetary relief for his care and ordered the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to pay a lump sum and to purchase an annuity from Wilcac Life Insurance Company, with annual payments to be made to Plott’s estate. After Plott’s death, his estate sought a final annuity payment, which Wilcac refused to pay, prompting the estate to sue both HHS and Wilcac.The estate initially filed suit in the Hamilton County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas. Wilcac removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. HHS moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the district court granted this motion, dismissing HHS from the case. Wilcac then argued that HHS was a necessary and indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, and the district court agreed, dismissing the entire case without prejudice because HHS could not be joined without defeating subject matter jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of Rule 19. The appellate court held that the district court erred by applying a bright-line rule that all parties to a contract are necessary and indispensable under Rule 19. Instead, the court emphasized that Rule 19 requires a pragmatic, case-specific analysis. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to conduct a proper Rule 19 analysis based on the specific facts of the case. View "Estate of William Plott v. Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

After the collapse of a federally chartered credit union in Ohio in 2010, the National Credit Union Administration Board (the Board) was appointed as liquidating agent. The Board sued Eddy Zai, his wife Tina Zai, and related entities to recover tens of millions of dollars allegedly owed to the credit union. The parties settled, with the Zais agreeing to transfer a promissory note to the Board, which would collect $22 million and then transfer the note to Tina Zai. Years later, Tina Zai alleged that the Board breached the settlement by failing to timely transfer the note after collecting the agreed sum. She, along with Stretford, Ltd., filed suit against the Board for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, without reaching the merits of Zai’s claims. The district court reasoned that the Federal Credit Union Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provision barred the court from hearing the case, as Zai had not exhausted administrative remedies with the Board.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether the district court had jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit held that the Federal Credit Union Act’s jurisdiction-stripping and administrative-exhaustion provisions apply only to claims that arise before the Board’s claims-processing deadline. Because Zai’s claim for breach of the settlement agreement arose years after the deadline, she was not required to exhaust administrative remedies, and the jurisdictional bar did not apply. The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Zai v. National Credit Union Administration Board" on Justia Law

Several chambers of commerce, including regional and national organizations, brought a lawsuit on behalf of their pharmaceutical-manufacturer members challenging the constitutionality of the Drug Price Negotiation Program established by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. This federal program authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to negotiate prices for certain high-expenditure drugs sold to Medicare and Medicaid. Among the plaintiffs’ members were AbbVie Inc. and its subsidiary Pharmacyclics LLC, manufacturers of a drug selected for the first round of negotiations. Notably, Pharmacyclics joined the Dayton and Ohio Chambers only after the litigation began, while AbbVie had longstanding membership in several chambers.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio reviewed the case after the government moved to dismiss, arguing that the Dayton Chamber lacked associational standing and that venue was therefore improper. The district court allowed limited discovery and permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. Ultimately, the district court dismissed the case, holding that the regional chambers’ purposes were not sufficiently related to the interests at stake in the lawsuit, and thus they lacked associational standing. The court also found that, without standing for the Dayton and Ohio Chambers, venue in the Southern District of Ohio was improper and declined to transfer the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that the interests asserted in the lawsuit were not germane to the purposes of the Dayton, Ohio, or Michigan Chambers, as their regional missions were too remote from the national pharmaceutical issues at stake. The court further concluded that, with no plaintiff residing in the district, venue was improper. The judgment of dismissal for improper venue was therefore affirmed. View "Dayton Area Chamber of Commerce v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the management of an ERISA fund, specifically the Southern Ohio Painters Health and Welfare Plan and Trust. Plaintiffs, including union-appointed trustees and the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades District Council No. 6, allege that two union-appointed trustees, Smith and Clark, have engaged in actions that violate their fiduciary duties. These actions include procedural changes that benefit themselves and undermine the union's authority, such as amendments to the Trust Agreement that make it difficult to remove trustees and provide benefits to retired trustees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against the employer-appointed trustees and denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs sought to remove Smith and Clark as trustees, terminate their employment with the Fund, and prevent the Fund from paying their legal expenses, among other relief. The district court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, a necessary requirement for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the plaintiffs did not show they would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. The court noted that the plaintiffs' concerns about self-dealing and the inability to exercise fiduciary duties were speculative and could be addressed through monetary damages. The court also declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the district court's dismissal of the claims against the employer-appointed trustees, as the issues were not inextricably intertwined with the appeal of the preliminary injunction denial. View "Int'l Union of Painters & Allied Trades v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, including Mike Yoder and his company Drone Deer Recovery, LLC (DDR), along with hunter Jeremy Funke, challenged a Michigan law that bans the use of drones to hunt or collect downed game. DDR uses drones equipped with infrared cameras to locate downed game and provide hunters with GPS coordinates. Plaintiffs argued that the law prevents DDR from operating in Michigan, violating their First Amendment rights to create, disseminate, and receive information.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed the complaint, holding that Plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to state a claim. The court found that the law did not prohibit the dissemination of location information but only the use of drones to locate game, which it deemed non-speech conduct. The court also concluded that the alleged injury was not redressable because the law would still prohibit drone use even if the requested injunction was granted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that Plaintiffs had standing but failed to state a claim. The court determined that Plaintiffs' intended conduct of using drones to create and share location information was arguably affected with a constitutional interest and that there was a credible threat of enforcement under the Michigan law. However, the court applied intermediate scrutiny, finding the law content-neutral and justified by substantial governmental interests in conservation and fair-chase hunting principles. The court concluded that the law was narrowly tailored to achieve these interests and did not violate the First Amendment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. View "Yoder v. Bowen" on Justia Law

In the 1950s, Goodrich Corporation built a vinyl-manufacturing complex in Calvert City, Kentucky, and used unlined ponds for hazardous waste disposal. In 1988, the EPA declared the site a Superfund site. Goodrich sold the complex to Westlake Vinyls, Inc. in the 1990s, agreeing to cover future cleanup costs. In 2000, PolyOne Corporation (now Avient Corporation) assumed Goodrich’s responsibilities. Disputes arose over cleanup costs, leading to a 2007 settlement agreement that included arbitration provisions for future cost allocations.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky previously reviewed the case. Avient had twice sought arbitration under the agreement, first in 2010 and again in 2017. In 2018, Avient challenged the arbitration provisions' validity, but the district court held that Avient had waived this argument by initiating arbitration. The court enforced the arbitration award, and Avient did not challenge this decision. In 2022, Westlake demanded arbitration, and Avient again claimed the arbitration provisions were invalid. The district court granted summary judgment to Westlake, holding that Avient’s challenge was waived and barred by res judicata and judicial estoppel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment but on different grounds. The court held that the settlement agreement’s provision for de novo judicial review of arbitration awards was invalid under the Federal Arbitration Act, as established in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. However, the court found that this invalid provision could be severed from the agreement without affecting the economic and legal substance of the transactions contemplated by the parties. Therefore, the arbitration provisions remained valid and enforceable. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Avient Corp. v. Westlake Vinyls, Inc." on Justia Law

Davariol Marquavis Taylor, an incarcerated individual, sued several members of the correctional staff at Marquette Branch Prison under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations. Taylor claimed that a nurse administered incorrect medication, resulting in another inmate's overdose and death. He also alleged that a doctor sexually assaulted him and punched him when he resisted. Taylor sought to proceed in forma pauperis, which allows a litigant to avoid paying filing fees upfront due to financial constraints.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Taylor's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, citing the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) “three-strikes” rule, which prevents incarcerated individuals from proceeding in forma pauperis if they have had three or more prior cases dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. The district court identified four previous cases as strikes against Taylor and dismissed his suit when he did not pay the filing fee. Taylor appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that Taylor had only two valid PLRA strikes, not three. The court determined that the district court's original order incorrectly counted two cases, Adler and Stump, as strikes. The court clarified that dismissals based on Eleventh Amendment immunity or improper filing under § 1983 do not count as strikes unless all claims in the complaint are dismissed for being frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Taylor v. Stevens" on Justia Law

Matthew Warman, a former graduate student at Mount St. Joseph University (MSJU), objected to taking the COVID-19 vaccine on religious grounds. When MSJU required all students and employees to be vaccinated, Warman applied for a religious exemption. He was allegedly detained by two MSJU Police Department officers who attempted to convince him to get vaccinated and disparaged his religious beliefs. Warman later sued MSJU, MSJPD, and several individual employees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed Warman’s complaint. The court dismissed his free exercise, equal protection, and disability discrimination claims with prejudice and dismissed MSJPD from all counts with prejudice. Warman appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Warman’s free exercise, equal protection, and disability discrimination claims. However, the court found that Warman plausibly pleaded that the two officers who detained him violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Warman’s wrongful detention claim and reinstated the claim against those defendants. The court also vacated the district court’s declination of supplemental jurisdiction over Warman’s state-law claims and remanded for reconsideration.In summary, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of most of Warman’s claims but reinstated his Fourth Amendment wrongful detention claim against the two officers and remanded the state-law claims for further consideration. View "Warman v. Mount St. Joseph University" on Justia Law

Louisville Metro Police Department officers conducted a search of Jennie and Saul Wright’s home, where they lived with their great-nephews, Jawand Lyle and Brendon Burnett. The Wrights claimed the search violated their constitutional rights and filed a lawsuit against Louisville Metro Government and unknown police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed the claims of both the Wrights and their great-nephews.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky dismissed the Wrights' claims, and the Wrights appealed. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Wrights' counsel withdrew, and the Wrights, proceeding pro se, filed an amended complaint naming the previously unknown officers. The district court dismissed the claims against the individual officers as untimely and dismissed the Monell claim against Louisville Metro Government for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the claims of Jawand and Brendon because they were not included in the notice of appeal. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Jennie and Saul Wright’s claims against the individual officers as untimely, as the amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint under Rule 15(c)(1). The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against Louisville Metro Government, finding that the Wrights failed to provide sufficient factual allegations to support their claims of inadequate training and unconstitutional policies or customs. The court declined to take judicial notice of a 2023 Department of Justice report and denied the request to remand the case for consideration of the report. View "Wright v. Louisville Metro Government" on Justia Law