Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A preliminary injunction required the Highland School District Board to treat an 11-year old transgender special-needs student as a female and permit her to use the girls’ restroom. Highland moved to stay the injunction pending appeal and to file an appendix under seal. The Sixth Circuit granted the motion to file under seal only with respect to four exhibits that were filed under seal in the trial court. In denying a stay, the court noted the girl’s personal circumstances—her young age, mental health history, and unique vulnerabilities—and that her use of the girls’ restroom for over six weeks has greatly alleviated her distress. Maintaining the status quo in this case will protect the girl from the harm that would befall her if the injunction is stayed. Public interest weights strongly against a stay of the injunction; the protection of constitutional and civil rights is always in the public interest. View "Board of Education of Highland School v. Doe" on Justia Law

In 2010, plaintiffs, former employees of establishments that operate in “Fourth Street Live,” a Louisville entertainment district, sued, alleging violations of the Kentucky Wage and Hour Act, KRS 337.385, based on policies regarding off-the-clock work and mandatory tip-pooling. In 2012, the district court granted class certification under Rules 23(a) and 23(b). In 2013, the defendants unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, citing the Supreme Court’s 2013 "Comcast" decision. In 2014, the parties reached a financial settlement. It took almost another year to reach an agreement regarding non-monetary terms. In March 2015, the parties filed a joint status report declaring that they had reached a settlement agreement and anticipated filing formal settlement documents in April. The defendants then became aware of a February 2015 Kentucky Court of Appeals holding that KRS 337.385 could not support class-action claims. Defendants unsuccessfully moved to stay approval of the settlement. The court granted preliminary approval of the settlement. The Sixth Circuit denied an appeal as untimely because the defendants had not challenged an appealable class-certification order under Rule 23(f). Defendants filed another unsuccessful decertification motion with the district court. The court granted final approval of the settlement as “a binding contract under Kentucky law.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A post-settlement change in the law does not alter the binding nature of the parties’ agreement. View "Whitlock v. FSL Management, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1991, Hill crept into Teresa's Cincinnati apartment and removed their six-month-old daughter, Domika. Days later, police found Domika’s body in a vacant lot behind Hill’s house. A neighbor had heard Teresa telling Hill that she was going to court for child support. Hill responded that he would not pay. Two neighbors saw Hill enter the yard of Teresa’s apartment building on the night Domika was taken. Hill did not participate in the search for the child and was “snickering” as Teresa talked to police. Domika was wrapped in a shirt that “looked like” a shirt Hill owned. The baby formula box, in which Domika was found, was like one that Hill’s aunt had placed next to Hill’s garage. Batch numbers on a can from the aunt’s pantry matched batch numbers on the box. A forensic expert testified that the trash bag wrapped around Domika had been directly attached to a trash bag from Hill’s kitchen. On the day Domika’s body was found, a bus driver overheard a young man, crying, telling another, “he could not believe what he had done to a little baby,” and that “he might get the chair.” The driver contacted police and picked Hill out of a photo array. State courts affirmed Hill’s convictions and rejected his petitions for post-conviction relief. Hill filed a federal habeas petition in 1998. In a second amended petition in 2005, Hill asserted aBrady claim in a “sweeping assertion” without identifying any evidence. In 2007, Hill discovered a suppressed police report. In 2012, Hill moved the court to expand the record to include a transcript of Teresa’s grand jury testimony. The district court granted habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Hill's Brady claim, filed beyond the one-year limitations period, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), is procedurally barred and lacks merit. View "Hill v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

In 2013, Flint, Michigan, decided to switch its primary drinking water provider from the Detroit Water Department to the new Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA). KWA was not yet operational, so Flint needed an interim water source and chose the Flint River, which it had previously used for back-up service. According to several reports, the river was highly sensitive and required anti-corrosive treatment to prevent heavy metals from leaching into the water. The city contracted with Lockwood, a Texas-based corporation, for design engineering services in rehabilitating Flint’s Water Treatment Plant. The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality approved Lockwood’s plans, which did not include necessary upgrades for anti-corrosive treatment. Flint began supplying residents with Flint River drinking water. Within days, residents complained of foul smelling and tasting water. Within weeks, some residents’ hair began to fall out; their skin developed rashes. Within a year, there were positive tests for E. coli, a spike in deaths from Legionnaires’ disease, and reports of dangerously high blood lead levels in children. Residents sued, alleging professional negligence. Lockwood removed the action to federal court, citing diversity jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2)). Plaintiffs argued that the mandatory “local controversy” exception to jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(4)(A) applied. The district court remanded, noting that more than two-thirds of the putative class members were likely Michigan citizens. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that injuries were limited to the area of the water system and the significant involvement of Lockwood’s Michigan-based affiliate. View "Mason v. Lockwood, Andrews & Newnam, P.C." on Justia Law

Conway filed a putative class action suit against PRA under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and survived a motion to dismiss. PRA offered Conway judgment in his favor. Conway declined. PRA again moved to dismiss, arguing that, as PRA had offered Conway all the relief he sought, there was no longer a live controversy. Heeding then-governing Sixth Circuit precedent, the district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and found the issue of class certification moot. The Sixth Circuit vacated, citing the intervening Supreme Court holding in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez (2016) that an unaccepted offer of judgment generally does not moot a case, even if the offer would fully satisfy the plaintiff’s demands. The court rejected PRA’s attempt to distinguish Campbell-Ewald because the court simultaneously entered a final judgment against Conway granting him all the relief he wanted. The district court erred in entering that judgment. Campbell-Ewald revived the Article III controversy between Conway and PRA that Sixth Circuit precedent wrongly extinguished. That a judgment that should never have been entered does not extinguish a plaintiff’s stake in the litigation; an appeal remains alive if the effects of a court’s order can be undone. The court declined to address class certification. View "Conway v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

APU holds 5.2 million shares of Amtrak common stock pursuant to the Rail Passenger Service Act, 84 Stat. 1327. The 1997 Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act, 49 U.S.C. 24304 mandated that “Amtrak shall, before October 1, 2002, redeem all common stock previously issued, for the fair market value.” In 2000, Amtrak proposed to redeem APU’s common stock for three cents per share. APU rejected Amtrak’s offer in November 2000. The statutory deadline passed without Amtrak making any further offer to redeem the shares. APU and Amtrak negotiated until January 2008, when Amtrak declared that the shares were worthless and that further negotiations would be futile. The parties never reached a settlement. In May 2008, APU sued Amtrak. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit remanded one claim. On remand, the district court dismissed that claim as barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that there is no disputed question of fact regarding the dates of the three key events: Amtrak valued APU’s shares at three cents each in 2000; the deadline for redeeming the shares lapsed in 2002; and Amtrak terminated negotiations in 2008. The court rejected an argument that the limitations period began to run in 2008. View "Am. Premier Underwriters v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp." on Justia Law

On May 6, 2016, the NLRB (Board) found that the Union had violated the National Labor Relations Act by seeking to undermine prior NLRB judgments. The Union petitioned for review on June 13. The Board cross-petitioned on July 6. On July 13, five of the six charging parties, all winners in the Board proceedings, moved to intervene in both the Union’s petition and the Board’s cross-petition after the court clerk’s office directed them to do so. On August 2, more than 30 days after the Union filed its initial petition for review, the charging parties’ counsel filed another amended motion to intervene, clarifying that they had inadvertently omitted a sixth charging party, Hunt Construction, from their first two motions. No one objected to Hunt’s motion. The Sixth Circuit granted the motion. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(d), which sets forth the conditions for intervening and includes a 30-day filing deadline, does not implement any general jurisdictional statute and is claim-processing-rule that permits forfeiture and equitable exceptions to the deadline. View "Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

An anonymous caller to the district court clerk’s office complained that an accident might make it difficult for voters to reach the polls before they closed on Ohio’s March 15 primary election. That office relayed the call to a judge, who orally directed the clerk to enter an order: This matter is before the court upon an oral complaint requesting that the polling locations within the counties of Butler, Clermont, Hamilton and Warren be extended for one hour due to Interstate I-275 being closed for hours due to a fatal accident. The request is hereby GRANTED and the Secretary of State is hereby ordered to keep the polling locations within the counties of Butler, Clermont, Hamilton and Warren open until 8:30 p.m. The call from the clerk’s office went to the cell phone voicemail of Assistant Secretary of State Damschroder. Damschroder got the message, but the polls had closed minutes earlier and had to try to reopen; “some polls were open and others were not.” No complaint preceded the order; none materialized after. Seeking to avoid similar last-minute election orders, the Ohio Secretary of State and boards of elections appealed. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing Article III limitations. View "In re: 2016 Primary Election" on Justia Law

In 2002, Deere became the exclusive North American wholesale supplier of Hitachi products. In 2014, Deere notified Rudd, a long-time authorized dealer of Hitachi equipment, of its intent to terminate its dealer agreements and initiated arbitration proceedings, as required by the agreement. Although Rudd agreed that arbitration was the proper forum, it sought injunctive relief to maintain the status quo during arbitration and moved to seal the case, stating that “the very fact of this lawsuit” could cause loss of customers, layoffs (or preemptive departure) of employees, and diminution of the value of Rudd’s financial investment. Two weeks later, the district court entered Rudd's proposed order, before Deere submitted a response. During an on-the-record telephonic status conference, the court asked the parties whether the case should remain under seal; Rudd’s counsel replied that it should, while Deere’s counsel was silent. The matter proceeded to an Agreed Order. The arbitration panel requested a copy of that Order, believing that it would obviate the need for an expedited hearing. Deere’s counsel forwarded the Order without consulting Rudd. Rudd moved for contempt . Deere moved to vacate the sealing order. The Sixth Circuit affirmed an order unsealing the case. Rudd cannot show any countervailing privacy interest sufficient to outweigh the strong presumption in favor of public access to federal court records View "Rudd Equip. Co., Inc. v. John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co." on Justia Law

In 2012, the government charged Scotts Miracle-Gro in the Southern District of Ohio with one misdemeanor count of pesticide misuse (7 U.S.C. 136j(a)(2)(G)), alleging that Scotts sold approximately 73 million units of wild bird food treated with pesticides unapproved for application to bird food. Scotts pled guilty and admitted the facts in the information. Plaintiffs, five putative class members in a California lawsuit seeking to represent consumers that purchased the wild bird food treated with unapproved pesticides, asked the district court to release two sets of objections, attached to the presentence report (PSR), from the criminal case. The district court denied Plaintiffs access to the objections, holding that neither the First Amendment nor the common law entitled Plaintiffs to the documents. The district court treated the objections the same as the PSR, which carries a presumption of confidentiality. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s application of the same standard of confidentiality as the PSR and concluding that Plaintiffs failed to show a special need to overcome that standard. View "Cyphert v. Scotts Miracle-Gro Co." on Justia Law