Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Union erected a giant inflatable rat and an inflatable fat cat during a labor dispute in Grand Chute, Wisconsin. Both are staked to the ground in the highway median, to prevent the wind from blowing them away. Grand Chute forbids private signs on the public way and defines signs to mean “[a]ny structure, part thereof, or device attached thereto” that conveys a message. The Union removed them at the town's request and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the First Amendment. The district court denied a preliminary injunction and, a year later, granted the town summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that the case may be moot because the construction that led to the use of demonstrative inflatables was complete; the Union was no longer picketing. The court also noted that the town amended its code and changed the definition of a sign. If the Union persists in seeking damages, the district court must weigh the probability of a fresh dispute between this union and Grand Chute and the risk that it would be over too quickly to allow judicial review to apply the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine and must address the validity of current ordinances, rather than one that was changed before the final judgment. View "Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Local Union v. Town of Grand Chute" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs each purportedly owed a debt; each creditor filed suit in Cook County seeking to collect on that debt. After each plaintiff failed to appear, a Cook County Circuit Court entered a default judgment. B&G, a debt collector, filed an affidavit for a wage deduction in the First Municipal District in downtown Chicago and obtained a summons against Plaintiffs’ respective employers. Plaintiffs allege it was this final act that violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) venue provision, 15 U.S.C. 1692i(a)(2), because B&G should have filed the affidavits in the Sixth Municipal District in Markham, Illinois (the municipal district closest to Plaintiffs) and not in the First Municipal District. The Cook County Circuit Court’s Municipal Department has been sub‐divided into six smaller units called municipal districts. B&G moved to dismiss on the basis that B&G’s filing of an affidavit for a wage deduction did not constitute a “legal action” against a “consumer” within the meaning of the FDCPA. The district courts agreed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that such actions are not against the consumer. View "Etro v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C." on Justia Law

In several cases, including this one, plaintiffs have asserted that medical care at the Cook County Jail falls below constitutional standards as a matter of official policy, custom, or practice. The 2008 findings from a U.S. Department of Justice investigation of health care at the Jail found systemic flaws in the Jail’s scheduling, record‐keeping, and grievance procedures that produced health care below the minimal requirements of the U.S. Constitution. In this case, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s refusal to allow admission of the report as evidence toward meeting a plaintiff’s burden of proving an unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice under the Supreme Court’s holding in Monell v. Department of Social Services. The district court held that the report was hearsay and was not admissible to prove the truth of its findings. The Seventh Circuit concluded that it should be admitted under the hearsay exception for civil cases in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(A)(iii) for factual findings from legally authorized investigations. View "Daniel v. Cook County" on Justia Law

Rizvi and his company, Prime Builders, performed repair work for Alikhan, whose house was damaged in a fire. When the work was completed in 2009, Alikhan paid Rizvi only part of what he owed. Rizvi sued for breach of contract in federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332. (Rizvi and Prime are Illinois citizens. Alikhan is a citizen of Texas.) When Alikhan failed to appear, plaintiffs obtained a default judgment, then served a citation to discover assets on Allstate under an Illinois statute that governs supplementary proceedings to assist in collecting on a judgment. Allstate responded that Alikhan had no accounts of any sort with Allstate, had no claims pending with Allstate, and was not owed any insurance payments by Allstate. Plaintiffs then asked the court to order Allstate to remit “outstanding insurance proceeds of $110,926.58” and to impose sanctions, arguing that Allstate had participated in negotiating the repair contract and had made a partial payment to Alikhan in 2008. The court ultimately dismissed the supplemental action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Allstate is a citizen of Illinois, the supplemental proceeding against Allstate was sufficiently independent of the underlying case as to require its own basis for subject matter jurisdiction. View "Rizvi v. Allstate Corp." on Justia Law

Deb contracted with an Indian moving company, Allied Lemuir, to move his belongings from Calcutta, India to St. John’s, Canada, but the company demanded more money and his belongings never left India. After filing suit in Canada, Deb sued two U.S. companies, SIRVA and Allied Van Lines, in Indiana, asserting a “joint venture” theory. The district court dismissed, concluding that U.S. federal courts were not the proper venue for his claim. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court did not hold the defendants to their burden of demonstrating that India was an available and adequate forum for the litigation, The parties never addressed Canada as a forum for resolution of the dispute. View "Deb v. Sirva Inc." on Justia Law

The creditors of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtor filed an adversary complaint, arguing that assets held by the debtor’s wife and business (defendants) rightfully belonged to the estate under 11 U.S.C. 542(a). The bankruptcy court recommended, and the district court granted, judgment on the pleadings, saying that the defendants were alter egos of the debtor and the corporate veils should be pierced and the assets “brought into the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate.” Three weeks later, the defendants, having failed to timely appeal the bankruptcy court’s turnover order, appealed the district court’s order remanding the case to the bankruptcy court to implement the district court’s ruling requiring that the defendants’ assets be turned over to the debtor’s estate. The defendants cited 28 U.S.C. 157(c)(1), arguing that the turnover claim was not a “core proceeding,” so only the district court could enter a final order resolving the claim. The Seventh Circuit dismissed their appeal. Core proceedings involve bankruptcy law; non‐core proceedings are proceedings that relate to a bankruptcy but arise under some other body of law. The turnover of the defendants’ assets to the debtor’s estate and their liquidation for the benefit of the defendants is a core proceeding; the limitations on the bankruptcy court’s authority are irrelevant. View "Gemini Int'l, Inc. v. BCL-Burr Ridge, LLC" on Justia Law

Five months after Chicago police arrested Janusz, a court found that the officers’ stated reasons for approaching and arresting Janusz at a gas station were implausible. Janusz had lost his job because of the charges. Janusz sued in Illinois state court, alleging breach of employment contract, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and separately sued the city and officers in federal court, alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. The state court jury awarded Janusz $3,177,500. While appeals were pending, the parties executed a settlement. Janusz executed a release in exchange for $3 million; the parties stipulated that the defendants “ha[d] paid [Janusz] all monies due and owing him as the result of the Judgment previously entered.". In the federal suit, the city defendants sought summary judgment as to damages, arguing that Illinois’s single‐recovery rule prevented Janusz from recovering any damages relating to lost wages and emotional injuries for which the state settlement had compensated him. The district court granted the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Both lawsuits involve a single, indivisible set of injuries for which Janusz has already received compensation. Janusz is judicially estopped from arguing that the judgment in the state action was not fully satisfied. View "Janusz v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Chicago Police officers pulled over a car driven by Rosado for failing to use a turn signal. After stopping the car, the officers “claimed to have seen” a badge, handcuffs, and a handgun in plain view “between the brake lever and center console.” They arrested Rosado for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and for violating the armed habitual criminal statute. Another officer approved the report as establishing probable cause. Rosado spent about 18 months in jail before receiving a copy of the dash cam video recorded when he was arrested, which, contrary to the officers’ accounts, showed that Rosado had used an operable turn signal. The state court dismissed the charges. Rosado filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed Rosado’s false‐arrest claim as barred by the two‐year statute of limitations. Because his claims of conspiracy and failure to intervene arose from the false‐arrest claim, those were also dismissed. The court dismissed Rosado’s due‐process and respondeat‐superior claims on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rosado did not promptly file. He knew the officers had fabricated probable cause by February 2014, when he received the video, and still had seven months to timely file suit. Rosado’s unexplained failure to timely file precluded equitable tolling. View "Rosado v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit held, in 2012, that the plaintiffs, injured by a 2007 flood in Bagley, Wisconsin, had forfeited an argument concerning Wis. Stat. 88.87, which concerns liability for negligent design and maintenance of a railroad grade that causes an obstruction to a waterway. Plaintiffs’ counsel identified new plaintiffs and refiled the same litigation in Arkansas state court to pursue that argument. The new suit was removed to the Western District of Wisconsin, which dismissed. The defendant asked the court to sanction plaintiffs’ counsel under FRCP 11 or 28 U.S.C. 1927 for pursuing frivolous claims and engaging in abusive litigation tactics. The court denied that request, reasoning that although the claims were all but foreclosed by the 2012 decision, they were not frivolous. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but reversed the denial of sanctions. The record indicated that counsel unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings by filing suit in Arkansas, which had no connection to the case. On rehearing, the Seventh Circuit noted its inherent authority to sanction willful abuse of the judicial process. Stombaugh long had notice of the conduct on which BNSF sought sanctions, and had multiple opportunities make his case against the award of sanctions. View "Boyer v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Teledyne terminated Shekar’s employment; 10 days later Teledyne sought injunctive relief, alleging that Shekar had accessed or attempted to access Teledyne’s servers, containing confidential information. There was a large data transfer between a Teledyne server and Shekar’s laptop computer on the day he was terminated. Before his termination, Shekar emailed Teledyne’s confidential information to his personal email addresses and saved it on his computers. Shekar refused to return electronic equipment provided by Teledyne for Shekar’s use at home. Teledyne asserted violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, and the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The district court issued a temporary restraining order requiring Shekar to return Teledyne’s electronic information and equipment and later granted Teledyne’a preliminary injunction, noting Shekar’s failure to comply with the TRO. The injunction required Shekar to provide “unrestricted access” to all of his devices that were capable of storing electronic information. The court later found Shekar in contempt for not producing several devices, not accounting for Teledyne’s electronic information, and not providing complete and truthful answers to interrogatories. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over Shekar’s appeal of his motion to vacate the preliminary injunction, which the court characterized as a “belated appeal” of the preliminary injunction. Since Shekar cannot appeal the preliminary injunction, he cannot appeal the contempt order while the underlying litigation remains pending. View "Teledyne Techs. Inc. v. Shekar" on Justia Law