Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Schaefer’s employer, Brand Energy, was erecting scaffolding at a Dynegy power plant. Brand had complete control over the scaffold construction. Brand acquired the scaffold components from Universal, but Dynegy paid for the scaffolding and owned it. Brand workers had difficulties with the Universal components because faulty components would not readily lock. A bar popped loose and struck Schaefer on the head. Schaefer suffered serious injuries. In addition to bringing a workers’ compensation claim against Brand, Schaefer sued Universal. Because the piece of scaffolding that hit him was lost, he added claims for negligent spoliation of evidence against Brand and Dynegy. Schaefer also alleged construction negligence and failure to warn against Dynegy. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding that without the missing piece, Schaefer could not prove his product liability claims; that Dynegy was not liable for any defects or negligence; and that Schaefer could not prove the spoliation claims because, without proof that the missing piece was defective, it was not possible to prove that its loss caused any damage. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, but reversed as to spoliation. Illinois law does not require a plaintiff to prove that he would have won his case but for the spoliation, it requires only that the plaintiff show a “reasonable probability” of success. Schaefer adduced evidence from which a jury could make this finding: the batch of scaffolding had a large number of defective pieces. View "Schaefer v. Universal Scaffolding & Equip., LLC" on Justia Law

Carlson, along with scholarly, journalistic, and historic organizations, sought access to grand-jury materials sealed decades ago. The materials concern an investigation into the Chicago Tribune in 1942 for a story it published revealing that the U.S. military had cracked Japanese codes. The government conceded that there are no interests favoring continued secrecy, but declined to turn over the materials, on the ground that Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure entirely eliminates the district court’s common-law supervisory authority over the grand jury and that no one has the power to release these documents except for the reasons enumerated in Rule 6(e)(3)(E). Carlson’s request is outside the scope of Rule 6(e). The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling in favor of Carlson. The text and history of the Rules indicate that Rule 6(e)(3)(E) is permissive, not exclusive, and does not eliminate the district court’s long-standing inherent supervisory authority to make decisions as needed to ensure the proper functioning of a grand jury. While this inherent supervisory authority is limited to “preserv[ing] or enhanc[ing] the traditional functioning” of the grand jury, that includes the power to unseal grand jury materials in circumstances not addressed by Rule 6(e)(3)(E). View "Carlson v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2010, Trentadue’s ex‐wife sought to modify placement and child support, related to one of their six children. A three-year legal dispute over custody, placement, health insurance, and child support followed, involving substantial motion practice, requests for contempt findings, engagement of experts, and evidentiary hearings. The Wisconsin state court overseeing the litigation determined that Trentadue’s conduct resulted in excessive trial time to resolve the case and awarded Trentadue’s ex‐wife $25,000 in attorney’s fees for “overtrial,” to be paid to attorney Gay. Trentadue never paid Gay. Instead, he filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. Gay countered by filing a $25,000 claim for the unpaid overtrial award and classified it as a nondischargeable, domestic support obligation entitled to priority. Trentadue objected that the obligation was imposed as a punishment, not a domestic support obligation. The bankruptcy court overruled his objection. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the restorative nature of the award. which “furthers two objectives, providing compensation to the overtrial victim for fees unnecessarily incurred and deterring unnecessary use of judicial resources.” The court also noted that Trentadue’s finances are “not so bleak,” including monthly income of six to seven thousand dollars. View "Trentadue v. Gay" on Justia Law

After losing an Illinois guardianship battle concerning her mother, Gloria filed a federal lawsuit, alleging that officials and the state were violating the Americans with Disabilities Act by refusing reasonable accommodations to allow her mother of the right to be present at court proceedings with family members. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal,citing the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine and long‐established precedent that federal courts may not intervene in state probate proceedings . Gloria returned to state court, pursuing a “Motion for Reasonable Accommodations” for herself and her mother in the probate proceeding. Gloria went to the motion hearing with her service dog, Shaggy, for assistance with her post‐traumatic stress disorder. She entered the building without a problem and went to Judge MacCarthy’s courtroom. Gloria alleges that Judge MacCarthy called the case, and then “immediately, angrily, and indifferently” interrogated Gloria about her need for Shaggy and “expelled Gloria and her dog from the courtroom—banned forever.” The record reflects only an order striking Gloria’s motion without prejudice and prohibiting Gloria from returning with Shaggy without leave of the court. Gloria returned to federal court, alleging that banning Shaggy from the courtroom violated the ADA. The district court again dismissed, finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit agreed, reasoning that the source of any injury is a state court judgment. View "Sykes v. Cook Cnty. Circuit Court Prob. Div." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a purported class action against Moscov, his law firm Weinstein, Pinson & Riley, and a debt collection agency NCO Financial, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, arising out of attempts to collect on student loan debts allegedly owed by the plaintiffs. The complaint asserted that the defendants included a misleading and deceptive statement in a paragraph of the debt-collection complaint they filed against the plaintiffs in state court: Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 1692g(a), Defendants are informed that the undersigned law firm is acting on behalf of Plaintiff to collect the debt and that the debt referenced in this suit will be assumed to be valid and correct if not disputed in whole or in part within thirty (30) days from the date hereof. Plaintiffs claimed that the statement was misleading and deceptive as to the manner and timing of their response to the state lawsuit. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the statements fall within the category: communications which are plainly deceptive and misleading to an unsophisticated consumer as a matter of law. View "Marquez v. Weinstein, Pinson & Riley, P.S" on Justia Law

Following the liquidation of Pine Top Insurance, some of its receivables were assigned to PTRIL, a Delaware LLC with its principal place of business in New York. One of those receivables was owed by Nissan, a Japanese insurance company that transacted business in the U.S. Transfercom, a United Kingdom insurance company had assumed that obligation. PTRIL filed suit in state court alleging breach of contract against Transfercom and seeking recovery under reinsurance treaties entered into by Transfercom’s predecessor and Pine Top in 1981 and 1982. Transfercom removed the litigation to federal court. PTRIL moved to remand, contending that Transfercom had waived its right to remove the case in the reinsurance treaties. Those treaties contain service of suit clauses, stating: In the event of the failure of the Reinsurer hereon to pay any amount claimed to be due hereunder, the Reinsurer hereon, at the request of the Company, will submit to the jurisdiction of any Court of competent jurisdiction within the United States. The district court found that under the plain language, PTRIL reserved the exclusive authority to select jurisdiction and venue; Transfercom waived its right to remove the case to federal court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed: to allow removal would be to ignore the contract’s plain and ordinary meanin View "Pine Top Receivables of Ill. v. Transfercom, Ltd." on Justia Law

Hamer, a former Intake Specialist for Housing Services of Chicago and Fannie Mae, filed suit against her former employers, citing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The deadline for Hamer to file her Notice of Appeal was October 14, 2015. On October 8, Hamer’s counsel filed a “Motion to Withdraw and to Extend Deadline.” The district court extended the deadline to December 14. Hamer filed her Notice of Appeal on December 11, as permitted by the order, but exceeding the extension allowable under Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5)(C). Hamer argued that the court extended the time to file under 28 U.S.C. 2107(c), that Rule 4(a)(5)(C) did not apply, and that the defendants waived their challenge by not initially raising it. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The statutory requirement for filing a timely notice of appeal is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Rule 4(a)(5)(C) is the vehicle by which section 2107(c) is employed and limits a district court’s authority to extend the notice of appeal filing deadline to no more than an additional 30 days. The district court erred in granting Hamer an extension that exceeded the Rule 4(a)(5)(C) time period by almost 30 days. View "Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous/ Servs. of Chicago" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit denied petitions for initial hearing en banc in appeals concerning Wisconsin’s law requiring voters to have qualifying photo identification. The court noted that Wisconsin will start printing absentee ballots this month and that it is unlikely that qualified electors will be unable to vote under Wisconsin’s current procedures. The state had assured the court that temporary credentials will be available to all qualified persons who seek them. Wisconsin has enacted a rule that requires the Division of Motor Vehicles to mail automatically a free photo ID to anyone who comes to DMV one time and initiates the free ID process. No one must present documents, that, for some, have proved challenging to acquire; no one must show a birth certificate, or proof of citizenship, so the urgency needed to justify an initial en banc hearing has not been shown. The state adequately informed the general public of the plan and the district court​ has the authority to monitor compliance. View "One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen" on Justia Law

A 49-count indictment charged 51 Outlaws Motorcycle Club members with racketeering, mail and wire fraud, money laundering, drug trafficking, extortion, running an illegal gambling business, witness tampering, and firearms offenses; 19 were charged under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute. The indictment included a forfeiture notice. The FBI executed search warrants on Indiana clubhouses and residences and seized items bearing the Outlaws insignia. The FBI sought forfeiture of patches, shirts, hats, belt buckles, signs, mirrors, flags, calendars, and pictures, which were use to deter other groups from infringing on Outlaw territory. In plea agreements, 18 Outlaws agreed to forfeiture. The court received Carlson’s letter, which it interpreted as a motion to intervene under 18 U.S.C. 1963(l)(2). Carlson asserted that he was entitled to direct notice, having been elected by the collective membership to manage Outlaws' indicia and memorabilia, which were owned by the collective membership, not by individuals. The government had provided notice to each defendant and had posted notice on the of government forfeiture website. The district court denied Carlson’s motions, finding that Carlson had not shown that the government was aware of Carlson or his alleged interest, nor demonstrated a property interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing Indiana law: “[o]wnership cannot be conferred by a wave of a magic semantic wand.” The asserted collective ownership mechanism was “designed solely ‘to insulate from forfeiture.” View "United States v. Bowser" on Justia Law

Armstrong filed suit under 42 U.S.C.1983, claiming that Belleville police needlessly used a Taser against him. Armstrong did not reply to defendants’ summary judgment motion. The court entered judgment. Armstrong did not appeal within 30 days or request an extension. In September 2014 he requested a docket sheet, which showed the case as closed in May. In January 2015, Armstrong moved to reopen, claiming that he had not received defendants’ motion or the order. The motion cited FRCP 59(e), but the judge deemed it to be under Rule 60(b), because it had not been filed within 28 days, then denied the motion. Armstrong had notified the clerk of his address change, but did not include the caption or docket number of either of two suits he had pending. The clerk found one case, but apparently was unaware of the other. In March, Armstrong filed another unsuccessful motion; 38 days later, a notice of appeal appeared in the electronic filing system, from a state prison library. Armstrong stated that he gave the notice to staff, who delayed filing. The Seventh Circuit deemed the appeal timely under the mailbox rule, FRAP 4(c)(1), but nonetheless affirmed the dismissal. Armstrong did not appeal until after denial of multiple post-judgment motions. Successive post-judgment motions do not extend the time to appeal the denial of the initial motion, nor from the original judgment. Armstrong learned of the judgment within 180 days, but waited to seek relief. Armstrong missed deadlines that a court cannot extend, so the characterization of his papers is irrelevant. View "Armstrong v. City of Belleville" on Justia Law