Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In her case, consolidated for pretrial proceedings as part of multidistrict litigation, Dzik alleged that she suffered a venous thromboembolism because she used a prescription birth control pill, Yasmin. Dzik’s medical records disclosed that she last filled a Yasmin prescription 10 months before her injury. Dzik’s counsel “suggested” that her doctor had provided samples of Yasmin before Dzik suffered the VTE. In March 2014, defendants requested additional medical records or an affidavit from Dzik’s doctor substantiating her use of the drug near the time of her injury. Dzik’s counsel ignored the request for 15 months. Bayer settled other cases, prompting the court to enter a case‐management order in August 2015 that provided for automatic dismissal should any plaintiff fail to comply. Defendants notified Dzik’s counsel of their obligations under the order, but got no response. In December 2015, Bayer moved to dismiss several cases, including Dzik’s. Dzik failed to respond. In January 2016, the court dismissed her suit with prejudice. Her attorney, having taken no action for nearly two years, immediately moved (unsuccessfully) to set aside the dismissal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that affidavits submitted by Dzik’s attorneys contradicted the sworn account of defense counsel and concluding that those affidavits were “a red flag,” based on vagueness and a concession of “neglect” by the firm. The order was “crystal clear,” Dzik’s attorneys had ample time to respond to discovery, and their neglect was not excusable. View "Dzik v. Bayer Corp." on Justia Law

King, an Illinois prisoner, suffers from a severe case of temporomandibular joint dysfunction. Since 2004 he has been confined at different correctional facilities. He receives some medical care from healthcare personnel employed directly by the state; the rest is overseen by employees of Wexford, a private correctional healthcare company under contract with Illinois. After years of failed treatment for his condition, a complex surgery, and an unsuccessful postsurgical recovery, King sued Wexford and medical professionals alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Following partial summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings, claims against two doctors remained. More than 30 days after the order granting judgment on the pleadings and more than a year after the partial summary judgment, King obtained a Rule 54(b) judgment on the claims for which summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings were granted, concluding that those claims were ripe for appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed that appeal. An untimely Rule 54(b) motion may be granted only if there is a showing of extreme hardship; there was no showing of hardship, let alone extreme hardship. View "King v. Newbold" on Justia Law

Allin and Baskett lived together in Allin’s residence. Allin, in poor health, signed over the titles to several vehicles, including a 2001 FLSTS Harley Davidson motorcycle, to “make it easier for his survivors.” The Illinois Secretary of State issued a certificate of title in Baskett’s name. Months later, Baskett moved in with her sister, McClure. Allin refused Baskett’s request for financial help. He discovered that the Harley title was missing. He filed a theft report. McClure contacted her co-worker (Sergeant Barr’s wife) about Baskett’s fears about retrieving her belongings. Springfield officers, including Barr, were present when she went to collect her property. Allin and Baskett presented conflicting stories about the motorcycle. A title search showed that the motorcycle had been in Baskett’s name for six months. A computer search did not indicate that it was reported stolen. Barr stated that he would not prevent Baskett from taking the motorcycle. Hours later, with no officers present, Baskett removed the motorcycle. Later, police officers and Baskett met at a motorcycle dealership to have the security system modified so that the motorcycle was operational. Barr bought the motorcycle from Baskett for $7,000, Allin sued the city, Barr, and Baskett, raising 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law claims. The Seventh Circuit held that Barr was entitled to qualified immunity on unreasonable seizure of property and civil conspiracy claims. Barr did not act plainly incompetently nor knowingly violate the law. The parties presented their dispute; Baskett produced a certificate of title, which “provide[s] the public with a readily available means of identifying the owners.” View "Allin v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

Parker and her sister, Schiavon, checked into adjoining rooms at the Four Seasons. In each, a sliding glass door separated the shower area from the vanity area. As Parker exited the shower area by opening that door, it exploded, raining shards of glass onto her naked body and causing her injuries. Schiavon summoned help. Gartin, a hotel engineer, arrived, immediately looked at the overhead track and said: “Looks like the stopper moved again!” He explained that a “bunch” of newly installed glass doors had exploded because the track stoppers were not working properly, allowing the door-handles to crash into walls and cause the glass to explode. Gartin said the room was on a “do not sell” list; “You might want to check yours.” Schiavon checked and determined that the door in her room had the same defect. Parker uncovered evidence suggesting that the door in her room had previously shattered and had been replaced. An email between third party contractors revealed that several rooms had similar issues. The hotel conceded negligence. The court blocked Parker from raising the issue of punitive damages before the jury, finding her evidence insufficient as a matter of law. Parker recovered $20,000 in compensatory damages, reduced to $12,000 after set-off. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Four Seasons may have thought it repaired the problem. Parker’s room could have been pulled from service for another reason. These are issues for a fact-finder. Parker has the right to present her punitive damages claim to the jury. View "Parker v. Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd." on Justia Law

Tri-State sued the Bauers in small claims court for the cost of a water treatment system it had installed following a free, in-home assessment of their water. The Bauers answered and filed a counterclaim, asserting a multi-state class action for fraud. Their subsequent, amended class-action counterclaim added Home Depot and Aquion as counterclaim-defendants and asserts that the counterclaim-defendants conducted in-home water tests that did nothing but identify mineral content, rather than contaminants, and thereby misled consumers into buying their water treatment systems. Home Depot filed notice of removal, 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(1), 1453(b), arguing that although it was not an original “defendant” in the underlying case, its status as an additional counterclaim-defendant in an action meeting criteria of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1453(b), entitled it to do so. The Bauers argued that the general removal statute, as modified by CAFA, does not permit any kind of counterclaim-defendant to remove. The district court held that CAFA did not disturb the longstanding rule that only original defendants can remove cases to federal court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the remand to state court. The court has previously held that a counterclaim-defendant is not entitled to remove a case to federal court under CAFA; the statute does not support treating an original counterclaim-defendant differently from a new one. View "Bauer v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Williams filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, based on an injury he suffered in Cook County jail. For his in forma pauperis (IFP) applications, McWilliams used a form provided by the Northern District of Illinois clerk’s office. McWilliams checked a box, indicating that his application was for “both” leave to proceed IFP and appointment of counsel. The form, which says nothing about the need for a separate motion if assistance of counsel is desired, asks for an inmate identification number, the name of the applicant’s institution, and records from the inmate’s trust account. He omitted his identification number and the name of the prison (both appeared on his complaint, submitted contemporaneously, and in the attached trust officer’s certification). The court denied IFP, for failure “to provide sufficient or accurate information” and denied McWilliams’s “motion for attorney assistance,” although no such motion had been filed. McWilliams submitted a second IFP application, with a motion for appointment of counsel, providing his inmate identification number and the name of the prison. Instead of checking “no” in response to every question about sources of funds, he said that he was not employed and wrote “N/A” across the questions. The prison trust officer certified that McWilliams had $106.85 in his account. In seeking appointment of counsel, McWilliams explained that he “has limited formal education of a fourth grader.” The court denied the IFP application because McWilliams had written “N/A” instead of answering “no,” struck McWilliams’s motion for appointment of counsel as moot, and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit authorized McWilliams to file an appeal IFP and reversed. That McWilliams was indigent and qualified to proceed IFP is apparent from the applications he submitted. View "McWilliams v. Cook County" on Justia Law

Ramirez, born in Mexico, alleges that his former employer, T&H, subjected him to discriminatory working conditions and a hostile work environment based on his national original and fired him in retaliation for reporting the harassment, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. Nearly three years into discovery, Ramirez had not located any witnesses to corroborate his allegations. His attorney was seeking leave to withdraw. Ramirez then located three former T&H co-workers, willing to testify on his behalf. The witnesses, Hernandez, Velasquez, and Villagrana were serially deposed; all three testified that they had witnessed a supervisor refer to Ramirez as a burro. Three months later, Villagrana sent a text to Ramirez’s counsel asking for a letter “saying what percent I will receive when the case is settled.” Ramirez’s counsel reported the text to defense counsel. Villagrana also contacted a T&H employee, stating that he and the others were no longer supporting Ramirez and that he was willing to testify for T&H if he could get his job back. After hearing testimony, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice, finding “clear and convincing evidence of witness tampering.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the finding was supported by sufficient evidence and that the sanction was reasonable. View "Ramirez v. T&H Lemont, Inc." on Justia Law

Pension funds regulated by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, part of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), sued to collect shortfalls in contributions for 2003-2008 from System Parking, under four collective bargaining agreements with the union. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a judgment of $2,000,000, after concluding that it had authority to change the name on the judgment. The funds’ complaint and the judgment named, as defendant, the “L&R Group of Companies,” which is not a recognized business entity, organization, partnership, or trust; Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) states that suits must be conducted in the name of the real parties in interest. Rule 17(b) says that only persons or entities with the capacity to sue or be sued may be litigants. A “description” is not a juridical entity. System Parking’s assets were acquired by an entity not named in the complaint or served with process, so a motion to dismiss would have been granted, had the parties or the court been “paying attention.” With respect to the merits, the court upheld a finding that the employer’s audit was unreliable, having been prepared in-house, by a person without relevant experience, rather than by an independent accounting firm and being based on “murky” assumptions. View "Teamsters Local Union No. 727 v. L&R Group of Companies" on Justia Law

On the night of January 27, 2014, DND’s driver, Velasquez, crashed his semi-truck into two emergency vehicles and another semi which were stopped on an unlit highway. An Illinois Toll Authority employee was killed and a police officer was seriously injured. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) immediately revoked Velasquez’s commercial-driving privileges and opened a company-wide investigation. After a very thorough, two-month investigation, FMCSA issued an imminent-hazard out-of-service order (IHOOSO) without warning, directing DND to immediately halt its trucking operations nationwide and freeze trucks in place within eight hours. During the investigation DND had been permitted to continue normal operations and there were two or three minor problems. An administrative law judge opened a hearing nine days after the order issued and rendered his decision after another six days, finding that the IHOOSO should not have been issued and was an effective “death penalty” to the small company. Apparently, the sudden halt to the company’s operations put the company out of business. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, for lack of Article III standing, a petition for review seeking to correct a decision of an assistant administrator that upheld the ALJ grant of relief to DND. The case is moot. View "DND International, Inc. v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration" on Justia Law

A barge exploded in 2005, while under way between Joliet and Chicago with a cargo of slurry oil. Deckhand Oliva did not survive. Claiming that Egan, master of the tug that had been pushing the barge, told Oliva to warm a pump using a propane torch, the United States filed a civil suit. Open flames on oil carriers are forbidden by Coast Guard regulations. The judge determined that the government did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Oliva was using a propane torch at the time of the incident. There was no appeal. Two years later, the government charged Egan under 18 U.S.C.1115, which penalizes maritime negligence that results in death, plus other statutes that penalize the negligent discharge of oil into navigable waters. The judge found that the prosecution had established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Egan gave the order to Oliva, that the torch caused the explosion, and that Oliva died and that the barge released oil as results. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court has said that the outcome of a civil case has preclusive force in a criminal prosecution. If the government could not prove a claim on the preponderance standard, it cannot show the same thing beyond a reasonable doubt. View "United States v. Egan" on Justia Law