Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Hedeen filed suit, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment against OzWest, Inc. and Zing, and against Cummings, the leading shareholder in those companies. Cummings is an Australian citizen who resides in Hong Kong and has never visited Wisconsin. The complaint identified him as a principal of OzWest, an Oregon company, and as OzWest’s signatory on the underlying license agreement. Hedeen served Cummings through office service under Oregon law by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at OzWest’s Oregon office on March 31, 2014, and by mailing copies of those documents to the Oregon office address on June 4. OzWest served a motion to dismiss on July 7, but Cummings did not file any response.The district court declared that it appeared that Cummings was properly served and granted Cummings’ October 22 motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, rejecting Hedeen’s argument that Cummings waived the right to challenge personal jurisdiction because he did not file a motion within 21 days of service (FRCP 12(h); 12(a)(1)). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under a straightforward reading of Rule 12, a challenge to personal jurisdiction may be asserted either in a responsive pleading filed within 21 days, or in a motion with no similar time limit specified. View "Hedeen Int'l, LLC v. Zing Toys, Inc." on Justia Law

Hampton's contracts with Window World, allowed Hampton to use WW trademarks. WW alerted Hampton that their dealings were subject to the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act, and that Hampton had 35 days to elect between rescinding the contracts and signing a franchise agreement. Hampton did neither, but filed suit, alleging violation of the Act and fraud. WW sued under the Lanham Act (Suit 2). Hampton returned a waiver of service, but did not hire a lawyer for Suit 2. Hampton dismissed Suit 1, without prejudice, but did not respond to Suit 2. WW successfully moved for default, then for default judgment. All motions and notices were in the electronic filing system, but Hampton was not using that system and did not respond. The court entered a default judgment for $100,000 in damages and costs, and an injunction. Hampton continued calling his business Window World, but did not make payments or pay the judgment. Hampton closed the business, then filed Suit 3, presenting the same claims as Suit 1, and sought to reopen Suit 2 and set aside the judgment. The judge concluded that Hampton’s failure to follow the electronic filings, plus his professed belief that Suits 1 and 2 had been dismissed together, amounted to excusable neglect, but conditioned reopening of Suit 2 on payment of $33,000. Hampton did not pay. The court reinstated the default judgment. Suit 3 was dismissed; Hampton’s claims in Suit 3 were compulsory counterclaims in Suit 2. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. If the suits are separate, claim preclusion blocks Hampton’s current claims; if they are consolidated, law of the case leads to the same outcome. View "Window World of Chicagoland v. Window World, Inc." on Justia Law

VLM, a Montreal-based supplier, sold frozen potatoes to IT in Illinois. After nine successful transactions, IT encountered financial difficulty and failed to pay for the next nine shipments. Invoices sent after delivery included a provision purporting to make IT liable for collection-related attorney’s fees if it breached the contracts. VLM sued; the deadline for an answer passed. The court entered a default. On defendants' motion, the court vacated the default as to IT’s president only. All three defendants then filed answers, contesting liability for attorney’s fees. The judge applied the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code and found that the fee provision had been incorporated into the contract. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods applied. On remand, the judge applied the Convention and held that the fee provision was not part of the contracts and that IT could benefit from this ruling, despite the prior entry of default. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. IT never expressly assented to the attorney’s fees provision in VLM’s trailing invoices, so under the Convention that term did not become a part of the contracts. VLM waived its right to rely on the default by failing to raise the issue until its reply brief on remand. View "VLM Food Trading Int'l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co." on Justia Law

Nelson was driving home one night when, he claims four Chicago police officers in two squad cars pulled him over, pointed a gun in his face, threatened to kill him, handcuffed him, and searched his car for no apparent reason. The officers have no recollection of the stop; squad car​ computers confirm that they ran Nelson’s name through the law-enforcement database at the time of the stop and turned up nothing that would justify stopping him and searching his car. Nelson sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury found for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit ordered a new trial. The judge should not have admitted evidence of Nelson’s arrest record, nor allowed the defense attorney to cross-examine Nelson about other civil suits he had filed against the city. The judge also improperly allowed one of the officers to offer generalized testimony about when the police might be justified in using firearms and handcuffs during a traffic stop. The errors were not harmless. View "Nelson v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Officer Brooks conducted a traffic stop of Williams for failing to activate his turn signal prior to changing lanes. Williams did not cooperate with instructions from Brooks and Officer Kehl, which led to a physical confrontation. Sergeant Trump arrived at the scene. Officer Brooks arrested Williams for resisting law enforcement. A state court judge dismissed the charge. Williams sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging false arrest, excessive force, and failure to protect in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers, relying on a videotape of the incident from a dashboard camera and rejecting arguments that there were material questions of fact as to the unlawful stop and arrest claims, excessive force claim, and failure to protect claims. The court also upheld the district court’s decision to not consider the state court’s findings and to use and rely on the pretrial diversion agreement View "Williams v. Brooks" on Justia Law

In 2011, Bogina sued under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, seeking compensation for exposing fraud allegedly perpetrated against the federal government and several state governments. Defendants included a major supplier of medical equipment to institutions reimbursed by Medicare and other federal programs and its customer, a chain of nursing homes. The district judge dismissed the federal claims as being too similar to those in a prior suit and relinquished jurisdiction over the state claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding differences between this suit and an earlier suit “unimpressive” and stating that it did not matter that the alleged fraud continued. View "Bogina v. Medline Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Brown began working as a United flight attendant in 1991. He suffered from depression and bipolar disorder and was disciplined for absenteeism and unprofessionalism. In 2000, he required psychiatric hospitalization. The Flight Attendants Board of Adjustment directed that he be permitted to return to work if his treating physician and a United doctor found him medically fit. Brown never complied. In 2005, the Board affirmed his termination. Meanwhile, United filed for bankruptcy. Brown filed a claim seeking back pay ($80,000). In 2004, Brown sued United in California state court, seeking more than $500,000. United sought transfer to the Illinois bankruptcy court, which did not lift the automatic stay. For 18 months, Brown did not pursue the case. In 2006, a California bankruptcy court granted transfer of Brown’s lawsuit, calling it an adversary proceeding, to Illinois. Brown had never filed a new or amended proof of claim and had not objected to United’s reorganization plan, which was confirmed in 2006, days after Brown’s lawsuit was transferred. The plan discharged claims “filed by Union-represented employees pertaining to rights collectively bargained for.” The clerk’s office mistakenly returned Brown’s file to California. None of the courts took any further action; neither did Brown. The bankruptcy closed in 2009. In 2013, Brown moved to reopen so that his California claims could be litigated. The bankruptcy court, district court, and Seventh Circuit rejected Brown’s arguments. Brown’s years of inaction amounted to abandonment of those claims. View "Brown v. UAL Corp." on Justia Law

FirstMerit Bank sued CFE Group in federal court to enforce a promissory note and guaranties. The district court dismissed without prejudice, with leave to amend. Rather than amend, FirstMerit filed a notice of voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). FirstMerit then filed a new complaint in an Illinois state court asserting the same claims. CFE moved to dismiss the new suit, arguing that the earlier federal dismissal meant that FirstMerit’s claims were barred by claim preclusion (res judicata). The state trial court denied the motion. CFE filed a new federal action, seeking to enjoin the state court under the relitigation exception to the federal Anti‐Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283. The district court refused, ruling that the dismissal of the first federal case was not a judgment on the merits and, therefore, did not preclude the state action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that CFE’s request for an injunction was also barred by the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738, and finding the appeal frivolous, so that sanctions on CFE are appropriate. View "CFE Group, LLC v. FirstMerit Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Inmates, acting pro se, alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment by overcrowding and provision of inadequate mental-health services. The district court denied their “Motion for Class Certification and Appointment of Counsel” seeking to certify three classes: (1) “all prisoners who are now or in the future will be confined in the [Wisconsin Department of Corrections],” (2) all prisoners who are now or in the future will be confined at [Waupun Correctional Institution],” and (3) all prisoners with a serious mental illness or disability “who are now or in the future will be confined at” Waupun. The courts then rejected their claim that they “should be appointed counsel to represent the certified classes … pursuant to Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” The court stated that the pro se plaintiffs could not adequately represent a class and that Rule 23(g), “is only implicated when a class is first certified under Rule 23(a)(4).” The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for leave to appeal. View "Howard v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Tate filed suit pro se, claiming that his former employer, which provides non‐emergency medical transportation, discriminated against him and then having retaliated against him for complaining about the discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; 42 U.S.C. 12101 (Americans with Disabilities Act). The court dismissed, without allowing amendment, citing 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which requires dismissal of a complaint seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis if it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” The judge stated that Tate’s complaint contained “little more than conclusory legal jargon.’” The Seventh Circuit reversed. The plaintiff was not required to plead more elaborately, except with regard to his claim of disability discrimination. Tate used a complaint form supplied by the district court. The form does not require, nor permit, extensive factual detail; it provides six lines for listing facts. Plaintiff’s only seriously deficient allegation concerns the disability, which is not named or otherwise identified. The court dismissed the suit before expiration of the 21‐day period during which a plaintiff may file an amended complaint without the court’s approval. The judge should not only have complied with the rule; he should have told the plaintiff what is required to allege disability discrimination. View "Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., Inc" on Justia Law